Denman Application for Reconsideration of Release Decision

| | [Home ]
[Databases ]
[World Law ]
[Multidatabase Search ]
[Help ]
[Feedback ]
[DONATE ] | |
| # The Parole Board for England and Wales | | |
| You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Parole Board for England and Wales >>

  Denman, Application for Reconsideration [2026] PBRA 63 (19 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/PBRA/2026/63.html
Cite as:
[2026] PBRA 63 | | |
[New search ]

[Printable PDF version ]

[Help ]

[2026] PBRA 63

Application for Reconsideration by Denman

---

---

Application

---

1. This is an application by Denman (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision dated 8 January 2026 not to direct his release. The decision was made by a single member panel on the papers.

2. Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis (a) that the decision contains an error of law, (b) that it is irrational and/or (c) that it is procedurally unfair.

3. I have considered the application on the papers. These are the decision, the dossier (now consisting of 437 numbered pages), and the application for reconsideration.

Background

1. On 8 February 2008, the Applicant was sentenced after conviction for a number of offences: threats to kill, possession of an offensive weapon in a public place x 2, possession of knife blade/sharp pointed article in a public place, threatening or disorderly behaviour to cause harassment, alarm or distress, and three road traffic offences.

2. He received a sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) for threats to kill, together with a number of short determinate sentences. The minimum term was set at 12 months less time spent on remand and expired in October 2008.

3. The Applicant was 27 years old at the time of sentencing and is now 45 years old.

4. The Applicant has been released and recalled six times on this sentence. He was most recently released in June 2023 but recalled in November 2023 after having been arrested for assaults on his mother and stepfather. He pleaded guilty and was convicted of two counts of battery in November 2023. He received a further sentence of imprisonment for 14 weeks.

5. This was the Applicant's third conviction since the index offence. Later in February 2008 (shortly after sentencing for the index offence), he was also convicted of battery, and in March 2017 he was convicted of wounding/inflicting grievous bodily harm.

Request for Reconsideration

1. The application for reconsideration has been submitted by solicitors on behalf of the Applicant. It argues that the decision was procedurally unfair and/or irrational.

2. The submissions are supplemented by written arguments to which reference will be made in the Discussion section below.

---

Current Parole Review

1. The Applicant's case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent) in July 2025 to consider whether or not it would be appropriate to direct his release. This is the Applicant's second parole review since his sixth recall.

2. On 8 January 2026, his case was reviewed on the papers in a Member Case Assessment (MCA) exercise undertaken by a single member of the Parole Board (the MCA panel).

3. The MCA panel noted that the index offence was serious, involving threats to kill and formed part of a wider pattern of violent and threatening behaviour. During the sentence the Applicant has been recalled to custody on six occasions, including most recently following convictions for assaults on his mother and stepfather. This history demonstrated continuing instability and an inability to comply with licence conditions in the community.

4. The MCA panel was also concerned that the Applicant would not be open with supervising professionals when difficulties arose.

5. Although the Applicant had completed a limited course of Cognitive Analytical Therapy (CAT), the panel accepted the professional evidence that this work did not address the core risk factors identified in earlier reviews which therefore remained outstanding.

6. The MCA panel was also concerned about the Applicant's entrenched thinking, lack of insight, distrust of professionals and stated unwillingness to engage with key elements of the proposed risk management plan, including residence at specialist designated accommodation.

7. Taken together with the history of recalls and concerns about future compliance, the MCA panel was not satisfied that external controls alone would adequately manage the Applicant's risk in the community. It therefore concluded that the Applicant continued to present more than a minimal risk of serious harm and that it remained necessary for the protection of the public that he remain confined. The MCA panel concluded that the statutory test for release was not met and made no direction for release.

8. The MCA panel also noted legal representations dated 26 November 2025 seeking an oral hearing. It considered that the material issues were already clear from the written evidence. The central concern was the existence of outstanding core risk-reduction work and the Applicant's unwillingness to engage with the interventions identified by professionals as necessary to address his risk.

9. The MCA panel noted that the Applicant had previously been offered opportunities to undertake this work but had declined or withdrawn from several recommended interventions. The CAT he had completed was considered helpful but insufficient to address the identified core risks. The professional evidence in the dossier, including from the therapist and supervising officers, was consistent on that point.

10. In those circumstances, the MCA panel concluded that an oral hearing would not materially assist in resolving the key issues. The outstanding treatment needs, the Applicant's limited engagement with recommended interventions, and the history of repeated recalls were matters that could be adequately assessed on the papers.

11. The MCA panel therefore determined that further exploration of these matters through oral evidence was unnecessary and that the interests of fairness did not require an oral hearing.

12. The decision not to direct the Applicant's release on the papers was made under rule 19(1)(b). This was a provisional decision (rule 19(6)), and, following rule 20(2), the Applicant had the opportunity to apply in writing within 28 days for a panel at an oral hearing to determine the case.

13. The Applicant did so. On 5 February 2026, a Duty Member considered this application and dismissed it. The Duty Member concluded that the representations on the Applicant's behalf did not introduce any new information or considerations which were relevant to the holistic assessment of risk that were not in the dossier considered by the MCA panel. The new representations therefore did not make a material difference to the position. The Duty Member also considered Osborn, Booth & Reilly [2013] UKSC 61 judgement afresh, and noted the need for anxious scrutiny when an individual is substantially over tariff. In this case, the Duty Member was mindful that there was an oral hearing in February 2025 when such scrutiny took place. The duty member concluded that the information in the dossier was sufficient to enable the MCA member to make a robust, and fair, risk-based decision.

14. The decision not to direct release remained provisional, and subject to reconsideration by operation of rule 20(6)(a).

15. The Applicant now applies for reconsideration. For the avoidance of doubt, this must be limited to reconsideration of the MCA panel's decision not to direct release (made under rule 19(1)(b)). It cannot concern the Duty Member's decision to refuse an oral hearing under rule 20(5) which is not a decision eligible for reconsideration within rule 28(1).

The Relevant Law

1. The Parole Board will direct release if it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined.

Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

1. Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

2. Rule 28(2) of the Parole Board Rules provides the sentence types which are eligible for reconsideration. These are indeterminate sentences (rule 28(2)(a)), extended sentences (rule 28(2)(b)), certain types of determinate sentence subject to initial release by the Parole Board (rule 28(2)(c)) and serious terrorism sentences (rule 28(2)(d)).

3. A decision to recommend or not to recommend a move to open conditions is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28. This has been confirmed by the decision on the previous reconsideration application in Barclay [2019] PBRA 6.

**

Procedural unfairness

1. Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

2. In summary, an applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:

(a) express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b) they were not given a fair hearing;

(c) they were not properly informed of the case against them;

(d) they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e) the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f) the panel was not impartial.

1. The overriding objective is to ensure that the applicant's case was dealt with justly.

Irrationality

1. The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) by Lord Greene in these words: " if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere ". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

2. In R(DSD and others) v Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin) the Divisional Court applied this test to Parole Board hearings in these words (at [116]): " the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."

3. In R(Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was " to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied ". This test was adopted by the Divisional Court in R(Secretary of State for Justice) v Parole Board [2022] EWHC 1282 (Admin).

4. As was made clear by Saini J in Wells, this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

5. It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

6. Further, while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses.

The reply on behalf of the Respondent

1. The Respondent has submitted no representations in response to this application.

---

Discussion

Procedural unfairness

1. Grounds 1?3 of the application allege procedural unfairness. In substance, these grounds all concern the MCA panel's decision not to direct an oral hearing.

2. It is submitted that the panel failed to apply the principles set out in Osborn and subsequent authorities, failed to apply anxious scrutiny in light of the Applicant's significantly post-tariff status, and failed to recognise the Applicant's legitimate interest in participating in the decision-making process. It is also argued that the refusal to direct an oral hearing prevented the Applicant from properly putting his case.

3. The MCA panel had before it the full dossier together with the written legal representations submitted on the Applicant's behalf. The decision demonstrates that those representations were considered. The MCA panel summarised the central submissions advanced by the Applicant, including the contention that the CAT undertaken by him represented meaningful progress and that an oral hearing should be directed in order for him to address the panel directly.

4. The panel gave reasons for rejecting those submissions. In particular, it accepted the professional evidence that the limited CAT work undertaken by the Applicant did not address the core risk-reduction work previously identified. It also noted the Applicant's refusal in respect of other recommended interventions and his stated unwillingness to reside at specialist designated accommodation intended to manage risk on release.

5. The panel further considered whether fairness required an oral hearing. It concluded that the material issues were already clear from the written evidence and that further exploration of those issues through oral evidence would not materially assist the determination of risk.

6. The Applicant places particular reliance on the fact that he is a significantly post-tariff IPP prisoner. It is submitted that this circumstance created a presumption in favour of directing an oral hearing. However, the question is whether, in the circumstances of each individual case, fairness requires an oral hearing. The fact that a prisoner is significantly post-tariff is an important contextual factor and requires particularly careful scrutiny of the decision-making process, but it does not of itself mandate that an oral hearing is directed where the material issues can be fairly determined on the written evidence.

7. Nor does the principle of participation identified in Osborn require that a prisoner be afforded an oral hearing in every case. Participation is relevant where it may materially assist the panel in resolving disputed issues, assessing credibility, or reaching a properly informed assessment of risk. In circumstances where the relevant issues can be fairly determined from the documentary evidence and written submissions, the absence of an oral hearing will not necessarily render the process unfair.

8. The Applicant also relies on the reconsideration decision in Church [2024] PBRA 66, in which reconsideration was granted following the refusal of an oral hearing in an IPP licence termination case. While reconsideration decisions may provide useful illustrations of how legal principles have been applied in particular cases, they do not create binding precedent. Each application must therefore be determined on its own facts.

9. In Church, the reconsideration panel identified case-specific features which made the absence of an oral hearing unfair, including disputed and complex issues requiring oral evidence and matters relating to the applicant's behaviour and risk which could not properly be assessed on the papers alone. The present case is materially different. The MCA panel was not required to resolve disputed factual issues or to assess matters which depended upon evaluating the Applicant's credibility through live evidence. Rather, the panel's concerns arose from matters which were clear from the documentary evidence, including the Applicant's history of repeated recalls, his most recent conviction for assaults on his mother and stepfather, the existence of outstanding risk-reduction work, and his reluctance to engage with recommended interventions.

10. The Applicant was able to advance written submissions on his behalf, and those submissions were considered by the panel. The decision contains clear reasons explaining the conclusions reached and demonstrates that the panel addressed the central issues raised in the application.

11. In those circumstances, the process adopted by the MCA panel did not deprive the Applicant of a fair opportunity to present his case and did not render the proceedings procedurally flawed. The grounds of procedural unfairness are therefore not made out.

Irrationality

1. Ground 4 of the application argues that the MCA panel's decision was irrational.

2. The submission largely derives from the earlier arguments that the MCA panel should have directed an oral hearing. It is said that the failure to do so led the panel to reach an irrational conclusion regarding the Applicant's suitability for release.

3. The MCA panel identified a number of matters which it considered material to the assessment of risk. These included the seriousness of the index offence, the Applicant's history of violent and threatening behaviour, the fact that he has been recalled on six occasions during the currency of the sentence, and his most recent conviction for assaults on his mother and stepfather following his release in June 2023.

4. It also considered the professional evidence concerning outstanding core risk-reduction work. It accepted the evidence that the limited CAT work undertaken by the Applicant did not address the underlying risk factors previously identified. It further noted the Applicant's reluctance to engage with other recommended interventions and his stated unwillingness to reside at specialist designated accommodation intended to manage risk on release.

5. These were plainly matters which the panel was entitled to take into account when determining whether the statutory test for release was met. The panel's conclusion that the Applicant continued to present more than a minimal risk of serious harm, and that external controls alone would not adequately manage that risk in the community, was open to it on the evidence before it.

6. The application amounts to a disagreement with the weight which the panel attached to particular aspects of the evidence. The reconsideration jurisdiction does not permit a rehearing of the merits of the case or the substitution of the reconsideration panel's view of the evidence for that of the original decision-maker.

7. The MCA panel's decision was plainly one which a reasonable panel could properly reach on the material before it. The ground of irrationality is therefore not made out.

---

Decision

1. For the reasons set out above, the application for reconsideration is refused.

---

---

Stefan Fafinski

19 March 2026

BAILII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback | Donate to BAILII
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/PBRA/2026/63.html