Products And Ideas India Pvt. Ltd vs Nilkamal Limited - Delhi High Court Judgment

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M/S Products And Ideas India Pvt. Ltd vs Nilkamal Limited And Ors on 23 March, 2026

Author: C. Hari Shankar

Bench: C. Hari Shankar

$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 23 January 2026
Pronounced on: 23 March 2026

              +      FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025, CM APPL. 41897/2025 & CM
                     APPL. 41898/2025

                     M/S PRODUCTS AND IDEAS
                     INDIA PVT. LTD.                           .....Appellant
                                     Through: Mr. J. Sai Deepak, Sr. Adv.
                                     with Mr. Aditya Kumar Yadav, Mr. Vijay
                                     Kasana, Mr. Chirag Verma, Mr. Vaibhav
                                     Sharma, Mr. Vaibhav Chaudhary, Mr.
                                     Gaurav Chaudhary, Mr. Alok Yadav, Ms.
                                     Neha Verma, Advs.

                                           versus

                     NILKAMAL LIMITED
                     AND ORS                                 .....Respondents
                                  Through: Mr. Jayant Mehta, Sr. Adv.
                                  with Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh, Mr. Sajid
                                  Mohammad, Mr. Hitesh Mutha, Ms. P.R.
                                  Mala, Mr. Paras Sharma, Ms. Shubhanginee
                                  Singh, Advs. for R-2
                                  Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
                                  Sanjeev Kumar Singh, Mr. Rahul Chitnis,
                                  Mr. Ankur Kashyap, Mr. Devansh Shekhar,
                                  Ms. Umang Motiyani, Ms. Nandini Kaushik
                                  and ⁠Mr. Labeeb Faaeq, Advs. for R-5

                     CORAM:
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
              %                             JUDGMENT
                                             23.03.2026

Signature Not Verified
FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
Digitally Signed By:AJIT Page 1 of 20
KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
C. HARI SHANKAR, J. A. The lis

1.    This appeal assails order dated 1 July 2025 passed by a learned
             Single Judge of this Court, whereby IA 37339/2024 and IA
             49076/2024, preferred by the appellant under Order XXXIX Rules 1
             and 2 [of the Code of Civil Procedure](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), 19081, have been dismissed, and
             IA 41504/2024, filed by Respondent 2 under [Order XXXIX Rule 4 of
             the CPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), has been allowed. Resultantly, the prayer of the appellant for
             interim injunction, pending disposal of the suit, has been rejected and
             the existing ad interim injunction granted vide order dated 27 August
             2024 has been vacated.
   

2.    We have heard Mr. J Sai Deepak, learned Senior Counsel for
             the appellant, Mr. Jayant Mehta, learned Senior Counsel for
             Respondent 2 and Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel
             for Respondent 5, at length. Learned Counsel have also filed written
             submissions.
   

B. Facts

              I.        Submissions of appellant before learned Single Judge 3.        An Exclusive Agency Agreement2 was executed between Stella
              Industrial Co. Ltd3 and the appellant Products & Ideas on 1 April

              1 " [CPC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/) " hereinafter
              2 "EAA" hereinafter
              3 "SIC" hereinafter

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
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12:49:33
2017. SIC was the holder of the "STELLA "4 trade mark,
registered in China. The EAA appointed the appellant as SIC's
exclusive agent for distribution, sale and promotion of STELLA
branded commercial induction cookers5 in India. The appellant was
given the authority to decide the designs and logos under which the
induction cookers would be sold in India. According to the appellant,
the EAA was periodically renewed, with the last renewal being till 31
March 2027, though SIC asserts that the EAA was terminated on 13
November 2024.

1.    In exercise of the authority granted by the EAA, the appellant
             was selling induction cookers, under the STELLADEXIN mark, since
             2017.
   

2.    Purportedly under permission granted by SIC, the appellant
             obtained registrations of the word mark STELLADEXIN with effect
             from 5 February 2022, under [Section 23](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1187731/) of the Trade Marks Act,
             19996 in Classes 7, 9 and 117. Commercial induction cookers fall
             under Class 11, and are specifically covered by the registration. In the
             suit, from which this appeal emanates, the appellant relied on the
             following communication, as evidence of the permission granted by
             SIC to the appellant to obtain registrations for the STELLADEXIN
             mark:
   

4 Transliterates into English as "STELLADEXIN"
5 Referred to, in the EAA, as "inductions"

6 "the Act" hereinafter
7 Of the NICE classification of trade marks

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

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12:49:33
The appellant further submitted that, from conversations which had
taken place between the appellant and SIC on the WeChat platform, it
was clear that SIC was always aware of the registrations obtained by
the appellant for the word mark STELLADEXIN.
6. The appellant also holds a registration dated 12 July 2024,

              under the [Copyright Act, 1957](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1136195/), for the logo             .

1. The appellant claims that the STELLADEXIN mark, as used by the appellant for induction cookers had, over a process of time, amassed considerable goodwill and reputation, as is apparent from the appellant's sales turnover for the period 2015-2016 to 2022-2023, with the turnover in the year 2022-2023 alone being ₹ 16.27 crores.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1. Respondent 1 Nilkamal Ltd and Respondent 2 Cambro- Nilkamal Pvt. Ltd. constitute a joint venture and that Respondent 2 was selling induction cookers using the infringing mark "STELLA" on its website. The appellant claims to have come to learn of the said mark in June 2024. The use of the mark STELLA by Respondents 1 and 2, alleged the plaint, amounted to infringement of the appellant's registered STELLADEXIN word marks within the meaning of Section 29(2)(b) 8 of the Act. The appellant also alleged that Respondent 2 was seeking to pass of its products as those of the appellant. A comparison of the rival marks, and rival products, was thus provided in the plaint, to emphasize the point:

Appellant's Mark Respondent 2's mark

              8 (2)      A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which because of--

---

(b) its similarity to the registered trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or
services covered by such registered trade mark;

---

              is likely to cause confusion on the part of the public, or which is likely to have an association with the
              registered trade mark.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

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12:49:33
Appellant's product Respondent 2's product

1. Predicated on these assertions, the appellant instituted the suit, seeking a decree of permanent injunction, restraining the respondent from manufacturing or selling induction cookers or any other allied or cognate products using the mark STELLA or any other mark which was confusingly or deceptively similar to the appellant's registered STELLADEXIN word mark.

II. Submissions of Respondent 2 before the learned Single Judge

1. Before the learned Single Judge, Respondent 2 contended that the EAA only permitted the appellant to use the STELLADEXIN mark, and not to obtain any registration in respect thereof. Respondent 2 also contested the genuineness and veracity of the alleged letter of permission dated 21 June 2024, pointing out that the letter even misspelt the mark as "STELLADIXEN". Moreover, submitted Respondent 2, the letter was not signed by any authorised signatory of SIC.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1. Respondent 2 also invoked Section 349 of the Act in its defence. It was submitted that SIC was using the STELLADEXIN mark in India prior to the registration and prior to the use of the mark by the appellant, as the appellant had applied for registration only on proposed to be used basis. As such, it was contended that no infringement of the mark could be alleged to have been committed by SIC. Inasmuch the appellant and Respondent 2 were both importers of goods bearing the STELLADEXIN mark from SIC, no case of infringement could lie against Respondent 2 either.

III. Submissions of SIC before the learned Single Judge

1.   SIC echoed the submission of Respondent 2 that SIC was the
              prior adopter of the STELLADEXIN mark in India. It was submitted
              that STELLADEXIN is merely an English translation of the mark
   
              "STELLA                     ".
   

2.   SIC acknowledged, however, that it had applied under [Section
              23](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1187731/) of the Act for the registration of the mark STELLA/                                                        as
   
              well as device mark                                                 in Class 11, but that the
              application was abandoned.
   

9 34. Saving for vested rights. - Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of
registered trade mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a trade mark identical with or
nearly resembling it in relation to goods or services in relation to which that person or a predecessor in title of
his has continuously used that trade mark from a date prior--

(a) to the use of the first-mentioned trade mark in relation to those goods or services be the
proprietor or a predecessor in title of his; or

(b) to the date of registration of the first-mentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or
services in the name of the proprietor of a predecessor in title of his;
whichever is the earlier, and the Registrar shall not refuse (on such use being proved) to register the second
mentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of the first-mentioned trade mark.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1.   SIC further submitted that it had been selling its branded
             products in India through M/s Mittal International since 2013, by way
             of evidence of which SIC placed on record invoices and shipping
             receipts. The appellant was merely a re-seller of SIC's products, with
             whom SIC had no subsisting exclusive contractual relationship. On
             the other hand, it was asserted that Respondent 2 was authorised by
             SIC to import and sell its products, for which purpose reference was
             made to letters addressed by SIC to Respondent 2 on 5 March 2024
             and 5 June 2024. It was also pointed out that the EAA between SIC
             and the appellant was terminated on 13 November 2024.
   

2.   On 27 August 2024, a learned Single Judge of this Court
             granted ex parte ad interim injunction in favour of the appellant and
             against the respondents, restraining the respondents from using the
             mark STELLA or STELLADEXIN or any other mark which would be
             deceptively similar to the appellant's registered trade marks.
   

C. The Impugned Judgment

1. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the appellant's Order XXXIX application solely by invoking Section 34 and Section 30(3) 10 of the Act.

10 (3) Where the goods bearing a registered trade mark are lawfully acquired by a person, the sale of the
goods in the market or otherwise dealing in those goods by that person or by a person claiming under or
through him is not infringement of a trade by reason only of --

(a) the registered trade mark having been assigned by the registered proprietor to some other
person, after the acquisition of those goods; or

(b) the goods having been put on the market under the registered trade mark by the proprietor

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1. Apropos Section 34, the learned Single Judge holds that SIC
   was the prior adopter and user of the STELLA mark in China since
   2002 and had been selling its branded products in India since 2013
   through Mittal International, as was apparent from the invoices placed
   on record. As against this, the earliest invoice placed on record by the
   appellant was of 2017. As such, the learned Single Judge holds that
   SIC has been using the mark in India prior to the registration of the
   mark in favour of the appellant and prior to the commencement of
   user of the mark by the appellant in India.

2. Inasmuch as there was continuous user by the SIC prior to the
   registration and the commencement of use of the mark by the
   appellant, Section 34 operated as a proscription against any grant of
   injunction in favour of the appellant and against the respondent.

3. If sale of the goods by SIC could not be treated as infringing,
   the learned Single Judge holds that, ipso facto, no infringement could
   be alleged against Respondent 2 either, as Respondent 2 was merely a
   re-seller of the branded goods of SIC. It was not the case of the
   appellant that Respondent 2 was using the mark in its own right.

4. As Respondent 2 was only an authorised distributor of SIC, the
   finding that SIC was not guilty of infringement would also extend to
   Respondent 2.

5. The learned Single Judge also invokes the principle of
   international exhaustion of trademark rights vis-à-vis Section 30(3) of
   the Act. Applying the said provisions, and invoking the judgment of

                FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
   

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
the Division Bench of this Court in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd.11, the learned Single Judge holds that a sale by an
authorized distributor cannot be treated as infringing.

1. Premised on these reasons, the learned Single Judge holds that no case for grant of stay in favour of the appellant existed. Accordingly, the existing ex parte ad interim order of injunction was vacated and the appellant's application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC stands dismissed by the impugned judgment.

D. Issues that arise for consideration

1.  As was noted by this Court in its order dated 17 July 2025, only
           three issues arise for consideration in the present matter.
   

2.  The first is whether the invocation, by the learned Single Judge,
           of [Section 34](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1478365/) of the Act was legal and proper.
   

3.  Assuming SIC was entitled to the benefit of [Section 34](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1478365/), the
           second issue is whether, therefore, no action for infringement would
           lie against Respondent 2.
   

4.  The third is whether the appellant's claim was rightly rejected
           by applying the principle of international exhaustion, invoking [Section
           30(3)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928889/) of the Act.
   

11 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5172

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1. There can be no dispute about the fact that if either Section 30(3), or Section 34, applies, then, even if the respondents' acts are otherwise infringing within the meaning of Section 29, the appellant would not be entitled to any injunction. Section 30(3) engrafts an exception to infringement, and Section 34 proscribes grant of any injunction against the defendant, if the circumstances envisaged therein apply.

E. Analysis and findings

1. All the three issues, to our mind, have necessarily to be answered in the negative.

I. Re. Section 34

1. Apropos the first issue, i.e., the applicability of Section 34 of the Act, the findings of the learned Single Judge read thus:

"12. The undisputed position obtaining in the present case is that
the defendant no. 5 company is the prior adopter and user of the
Stella Marks in China since 2002. Defendant no. 5, Stella
Industrial Company Limited, was established in 1983 in Taiwan
and has a global presence.

1. It is also the case of the defendant no.5 that its products
   

   bearing the aforesaid marks have been sold in India since the year
   2013 through M/s Mittal International. In this regard, the defendant
   no. 5 has placed on record invoices to show that the products
   bearing the impugned marks were being sold by the defendant no.
   5 in India since 2013 (filed as document no. 2 of the defendant no.
   5's documents).

2. As per the case set up by the plaintiff, the dealings between
   

   the plaintiff and the defendant no. 5 began in 2015 and the first

agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant no.
FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
5 was in the year 2017. Even though the plaintiff claims use since
2015, the earliest invoice filed by the plaintiff is of the year 2017.

1. The position that emerges from the aforesaid narration is
   

   that the defendant no. 5 has been selling goods in India under the
   Stella Marks much before the plaintiff's use of the impugned mark
   in India or its trademark registrations in India.

2. Accordingly, the defendant no. 5 would be entitled to the
   

   defence under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act being a
   continuous prior user since 2013, before the use by the plaintiff or
   the date when the plaintiff obtained registration."

3. We find ourselves unable to sustain these findings.

1. Para 13 of the impugned order refers to user of the mark by SIC
   in China, which has no relevance to the aspect of infringement, or
   passing off, in India. User outside India is relevant only in cases of
   passing off in which percolation of trans border reputation into India
   is pleaded. No such case is pleaded by the appellant.

2. Para 14 of the impugned judgment acknowledges
   commencement of user of the asserted mark, by the appellant, at least
   since 2017. The learned Single Judge has found SIC to be a prior user
   of the mark, within the meaning of Section 34 of the Act, on the basis
   of four invoices placed on record by SIC which, according to the
   impugned judgment, reflect prior user in the form of sales in India
   through Mittal International.

3. On its plain words, Section 34 requires not mere prior user by
   the respondent, but prior continuous user, antedating both registration
   and user of the asserted mark by the plaintiff. Though the learned
   Single Judge has held that there was proof of prior continuous user,

                FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
   

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
we are unable to uphold this finding, even within the limited confines
of appellate interference charted by the Supreme Court in Wander
India Ltd v. Antox (India) P. Ltd12 and Pernod Ricard v. Karanveer
Singh Chhabra13. It is prima facie clear, to us, that there is no
evidence even of prior user of the STELLA or STELLADEXIN mark
by SIC in India, much less proof of prior continuous user.

1.  The proof of prior user, by SIC, as per the impugned judgment,
           is in the form of invoices evidencing sale of SIC's goods through
           Mittal International.
   

2.  These invoices are a mere four in number, spanning the period
           2012 to 2016. Of these four invoices, the invoices dated 25 December
           2012 and 23 September 2015 make no reference to the mark STELLA
           or STELLADEXIN. The remaining two invoices are mere proforma
           invoices, which cannot be representative of any concluded commercial
           transaction. A Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala, in [Karn
           Vir Mehta v. Collector of Customs14](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/449267/), held, thus, with respect to
           proforma invoices:
   

"10. ... Proforma invoice is nothing more than a tentative
statement of the seller for sale of the goods at the price mentioned
therein. Until the buyer accepts it and enters into the actual
transaction of sale and purchase, there can be no presumption that
the goods must have been sold at that price."
12 1990 Supp (1) SCC 727
13 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701
14 1997 SCC OnLine Ker 238

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
We respectfully agree with the High Court of Kerala that proforma
invoices cannot be treated as proof of sales, in the absence of any
other corroborative evidence to that effect.

1. Even if, arguendo, the four invoices, on which the respondents
   rely, were to be treated as credible, they do not, prima facie, evidence
   continuous user of the STELLA or STELLADEXIN mark by SIC
   prior to 2017 when, even as per the impugned judgement, user by the
   appellant, of the mark, commenced.

2. The invocation of Section 34 by the learned Single Judge is,
   therefore, to our mind, unsustainable.

II. Re. finding that, therefore, no infringement could be alleged
against Respondent 2

1. The decision of the learned Single Judge on the second issue is a consequence of the first. The learned Single Judge holds thus:

"17. In fact, the plaintiff has been one of the re-sellers of
defendant no. 5's products in India, similar to the defendant no. 2,
who is importing products from the defendant no. 5 and selling the
same in India. Since, the sale of the products bearing the impugned
marks by the defendant no. 5 cannot amount to infringement,
axiomatically, the sale of the said goods by defendant no. 2, who is
nothing but an authorized re-seller of the defendant no. 5, cannot
amount to infringement."
(Emphasis supplied)

1. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, rejected the plea of
   infringement, as advanced against Respondent 2, on the sole ground
   that, if SIC could not be held guilty of infringement, Respondent 2, as

                FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
   

KUMAR
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12:49:33
an authorized reseller of SIC, could also not be held guilty of
infringement.

1.  This finding cannot sustain for three reasons.
   

2.  In the first place, the finding that SIC is not guilty of
             infringement is predicated on [Section 34](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1478365/) of the Act. We have already
             held that the finding is unsustainable.
   

3.  Secondly, even if SIC were not to be regarded as guilty of
             infringement, that would not ipso facto mean that no case of
             infringement could lie against Respondent 2. Import of goods bearing
             the registered trademarks bearing the registered trademark of another
             independently constitutes "use" of the registered trademark, within the
             meaning of [Section 29(6)(c)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1482778/) [15](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1217525/) of the Act, for the purposes of
             infringement.
   

4.  The finding that, as SIC was not an infringer, ipso facto
             Respondent 2 would also not be an infringer is also, therefore, not
             sustainable.
   

III. Re. Section 30(3) and the principle of international exhaustion

              15 (6)   For the purposes of this section, a person uses a registered mark, if, in particular, he--

(a) affixes it to goods or the packaging thereof;

(b) offers or exposes goods for sale, puts them on the market, or stocks them for those
purposes under the registered trade mark, or offers or supplies services under the registered trade
mark;

(c) imports or exports goods under the mark; or

(d) uses the registered trade mark on business papers or in advertising.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
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12:49:33

1. The third issue is as to whether the invocation, by the learned Single Judge, of the principle of international exhaustion, and the invocation of Section 30(3) of the Act, is sustainable in law. The finding of the learned Single Judge, on this aspect, reads thus:

"19. At this stage, it would be useful to appreciate the legal
position with respect to import and resale of goods bearing the
trademark of the registered proprietor. The principle of
international exhaustion is duly recognized under Section 30(3) of
the Trade Marks Act. Any person in India has the right to legally
import goods from abroad bearing the trademarks of an entity and
sell the same in India. Such sale of original goods by an authorized
reseller/importer would not amount to trademark infringement.
Reference in this regard be made to judgment passed by the
Division Bench of this Court in Kapil Wadhwa v. Samsung
Electronics Co. Ltd., which was followed by the Coordinate Bench
in Seagate Technology LLC v. Daichi International16.

1. Keeping in view the aforesaid, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case for grant of interim injunction." (Emphasis supplied)

1.  International exhaustion of trademarks rights does not expressly
           find mention in the Act. The judgment of the Division Bench in Kapil
           Wadhwa, on which the learned Single Judge relies, itself notes that
           the principle of international exhaustion is contained in [Section 30(3)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928889/) of the Act.
   

2.  Though we have had occasion to examine the effect of [Section
           30(3)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928889/) in some detail in our recent decision in [Western Digital
           Technologies            Inc.   v.   Geonix       International       (P)        Ltd.17](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/2026630/),
           the provision is, in the present case, completely inapplicable on facts.
   

16 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3767
17 2026 SCC OnLine Del 901

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

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12:49:33

1. Section 30(3) states that if goods bearing a registered
   trademark are lawfully acquired by a person, the sale of the goods in
   the market or otherwise dealing in those goods by that person would
   not be infringing if the goods have been put in the market by the
   proprietor of the registered trademark or with his consent. SIC does
   not have any registration, in India, of any trade mark. The only
   registered proprietor of the mark is the appellant. Respondent 2 was
   not importing the goods, bearing the appellant's registered trademark,
   with the consent of the appellant. As such, Section 30(3) would not
   apply.

2.  The sentences from para 19 of the impugned judgment,
             italicized in the paragraph as extracted above, to our mind, reflect the
             error in the view adopted by the learned Single Judge. The learned
             Single Judge observes that "any person in India has the right to legally
             import goods from abroad bearing the trademarks of any entity and
             sell the same in India" and that "such sale of original goods by an
             authorized reseller/importer would not amount to trademark
             infringement". With respect, the observation is incorrect in law. The
             import can only be by the proprietor of the registered trade mark or
             with his consent, absent which the import would certainly be
             infringing within the meaning of [Section 29](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/84096/) of the Act.
   

3.  SIC has sought to contend that [Section 30(3)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928889/) would be
             applicable as Respondent 2 had purchased the goods from SIC, which
             was the registered owner of the STELLADEXIN mark in China. The
             submission is unsustainable in law. [Section 30(3)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1928889/), on its plain words,
   
                FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
   

KUMAR
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applies "where the goods bearing a registered trade mark are lawfully
acquired by a person". In such a case, the provision would apply
where the goods are sold by the lawful acquirer with the consent of
the proprietor of the registered trade mark. The words "registered
trade mark" cannot include registration outside India, as Section 2(w) defines "registered trade mark" as meaning "a trade mark which is
actually on the register and remaining in force" and "register" is
defined, in Section 2(t), as meaning "the Register of Trade Marks
referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 6 ". A trade mark which is
registered in India alone is, therefore, a "registered trade mark" for the
purposes of the Act and, therefore, for the purposes of Section 30(3) thereof as well.

1. For this reason, the third finding of the learned Single Judge can also not sustain.

F. The Sequitur

1. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that
   the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is not sustainable
   on facts or in law.

2. As the learned Single Judge has proceeded only on the basis of
   the above three issues - on which, we concede, had the findings of the
   learned Single Judge been acceptable on principle, no other issue
   would arise for consideration - we deem it appropriate, while setting
   aside the impugned judgment, to remand IA 37339/2024, IA
   4906/2024 and IA 41504/2024 for consideration afresh to the learned

                FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025
   

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33
Single Judge, uninfluenced by any observation contained in the
impugned judgment.

1. Needless to say, as the impugned judgment stands set aside, the ex parte ad interim order dated 27 August 2024, which was in existence and stands vacated by the impugned judgment, would revive and remain in force till a de novo decision is taken by the learned Single Judge.

G. Conclusion

1. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the impugned judgment
   dated 1 July 2025 passed by the learned Single Judge.

2. IA 37339/2024, IA 49706/2024 and IA 41504/2024 are
   remanded for consideration and decision de novo by the learned
   Single Judge. In order to expedite matters, we direct the parties to
   appear before the learned Single Judge on 2 April 2026.

3. We request the learned Single Judge to take up the aforenoted
   applications for consideration and decision afresh in terms of the
   judgment passed by us today and to decide the applications as
   expeditiously as possible.

4. No party would be entitled to seek adjournment on the date
   fixed by us before the learned Single Judge.

FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33

1. The appeal stands allowed in the aforesaid terms with no orders as to costs.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.

MARCH 23, 2026
dsn/AR

                 FAO(OS) (COMM) 111/2025

KUMAR
Signing Date:23.03.2026
12:49:33