Pintas v. Bruce – DPR Transfers Defamation Case to Illinois, Denies Dismissal

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April 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

William George Pintas v. Seth Bruce

District Court, D. Puerto Rico

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-01445

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.9K)

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Trial Court Document

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

WILLIAM GEORGE PINTAS,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 25-01445 (MAJ)
SETH BRUCE,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

I. Introduction

This is a defamation case brought by William George Pintas (“Plaintiff”) against
Seth Bruce (“Defendant”). Plaintiff charges Defendant with defamation for allegedly
making false statements regarding Plaintiff in relation to Plaintiff’s involvement with a
homeowners association in Chicago, Illinois. (ECF 6 at 1). Before the Court is
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and
failure to state a claim. (ECF 12 at 1–2). For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss is DENIED and this case is TRANSFERRED to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
II. Background
According to the allegations in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff is an attorney
and real-estate investor domiciled in Dorado, Puerto Rico. (ECF 6 at 1–2 ¶¶ 2, 4).
Defendant is domiciled in Chicago, Illinois. (ECF 6 at 2 ¶ 5). Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant made false and defamatory statements about Plaintiff regarding his status and
conduct as an officer of a homeowners association (“HOA”) managing a condominium in
Chicago, Illinois. (ECF 6 at 3 ¶ 10).
According to the Amended Complaint, on July 15, 2025, Plaintiff received a
demand letter from an agent of Defendant. (ECF 6 at 3 ¶ 11). The demand letter accused
Plaintiff of making several false statements, “including (i) a “false HOA President claim,”

(ii) a “false reserve statement,” and a “false ‘no special assessments’ claim[.]” (ECF
6 at 3 ¶ 11). The demand letter also raised concerns regarding a series of “alarming
transactions evidencing potential embezzlement and misappropriation.” (ECF 6 at 3 ¶
11). The Amended Complaint provides no further detail as to the contents of the demand
letter.
That same day, according to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s counsel
responded in writing to the demand letter with detailed factual refutations to the
allegations in the letter. (ECF 6 at 3 ¶ 12). However, Plaintiff contends that Defendant
knowingly continued to publish the allegedly false statements contained in the demand
letter to third parties. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant spread these
allegations to other residents of the condominium and to “related circles.” (ECF 6 at 4 ¶

14). Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the original demand letter from July 15, 2025
was sent to a representative of Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices Chicago. (ECF 6 at 4
¶ 18). Plaintiff claims that he has suffered reputational harms and economic losses as a
result of these allegedly defamatory acts. (ECF 6 at 4 ¶ 17).
Plaintiff does not claim that the alleged defamatory statements were ever
published to any person or entity residing or doing business in Puerto Rico. Plaintiff also
does not allege that Defendant’s conduct physically occurred in Puerto Rico. Nor does
Plaintiff claim that the subject matter of any alleged defamatory statement concerned
matters related to Puerto Rico in any way. Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges that “Plaintiff
knew that harm resulting form (sic) the defamation would be felt in Puerto Rico and that
Puerto Rico was the place of injury.” (ECF 6 at 4 ¶ 15) (emphasis added). To substantiate
this claim, Plaintiff alleges broadly that, “on information and belief, Defendant repeated
and promoted [the defamatory statements] to third parties with ties to Puerto Rico, with

knowledge and intent that they would be shared among Plaintiff’s colleagues and
professional contacts in Puerto Rico.” (ECF 6 at 2 ¶ 3). The Amended Complaint does
not identify such third parties, the nature of their purported “ties” to Puerto Rico, or the
basis of the claim that Defendant knew such information would be disseminated in Puerto
Rico. The Amended Complaint goes on to allege that the purported acts of defamation
have “chilled interest in Plaintiff’s real-estate assets,” and resulted in “lost or impaired
business opportunities, and other pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, with injury felt
in Puerto Rico.” (ECF 6 at 4 ¶ 17). There are no further allegations in the Complaint
which specifically relate to Puerto Rico.
III. Applicable Law and Analysis
Defendant contends that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Defendant and

that venue is improper. (ECF 12 at 1–2).1 Accordingly, Defendant moves to dismiss this
case in its entirety or, in the alternative, requests a transfer to the Northern District of
Illinois. Id. at 15. In response to this Motion, Plaintiff argues that the effects of the alleged
defamatory statements in Puerto Rico allow this Court to exercise specific personal

1 Defendant also contends that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(ECF 12 at 2). However, absent personal jurisdiction over Defendant, the Court will not address this
argument. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. V. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (explaining
that a federal court has discretion to decide on which threshold grounds to deny audience to a case on the
merits, and that “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause[.]”) (citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
jurisdiction over Defendant, thereby making this a proper venue. (ECF 30 at 2, 7). In
addition, Plaintiff requests leave of Court to conduct limited jurisdictional discovery in
order to establish that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant is permissible.
(ECF 30 at 4). Finally, in the alternative, instead of dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
improper venue, Plaintiff requests a transfer to an appropriate forum. (ECF 30 at 10).

The Court will address each issue in turn.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
“Personal jurisdiction implicates the power of a court over a defendant.” Foster-
Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Canada, 46 F.3d 138, 143 (1st Cir. 1995). Without this
power, “the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quotations omitted). As such, “for the Court to adjudicate the case at hand,
personal jurisdiction over [Defendant] must first be established.” Dessus-Medina v. Hotel
Wyndham San José Herradura – Costa Rica, No. 19-cv-1492 (ADC), 2021 WL 4509088,
at *2 (D.P.R. Sept. 30, 2021).
Personal jurisdiction may be exercised “by virtue of either general or specific

jurisdiction.” Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 34 (1st
Cir. 1998). “General jurisdiction exists when the litigation is not directly founded on the
defendant's forum-based contacts, but the defendant has nevertheless engaged in
continuous and systematic activity, unrelated to the suit, in the forum state.” United
Electrical Workers et al. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp. et al., 960 F.2d 1080, 1088 (1st Cir.
1992). Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, depends on the relationship between the
forum and the underlying controversy. Goodyear Dunlop Ties Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). In this case, Plaintiff makes no argument for general jurisdiction
but rather asserts a theory of specific jurisdiction. (ECF 30 at 2).
A court may assert specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant only when
they are shown to have certain minimum contacts with the forum “such that maintenance
of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” See

Int’l. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations and quotations
omitted). To subject a non-resident defendant to its jurisdiction in a diversity case, courts
have a two-part test to determine if these minimum contacts, “in the aggregate, satisfy the
requirements of both the forum state's long-arm statute and the [Due Process Clause of
the] Fourteenth Amendment.” Ticketmaster-New York, Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 204 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).2 Given that Puerto Rico’s long-arm statute is
coextensive with the reach of the Due Process Clause, this two-step analysis “merge[s]
into one[.]” Carreras v. PMG Collins, LLC, 660 F.3d 549, 552 (1st Cir. 2011).
In determining the existence of sufficient minimum contacts to assert specific
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the constitutional analysis requires
courts to apply a three-prong test, which looks at: (1) relatedness; (2) purposeful

availment; and (3) reasonableness. Rodríguez-Rivera v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols., Inc., 43 F.4th 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). “Failure to make any one of these
showings dooms any effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction.” Scottsdale Capital
Advisors Corp. v. The Deal, LLC, 887 F.3d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 2018). Moreover, when personal
jurisdiction is contested, it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of showing that all three

2 “In determining whether a non-resident defendant is subject to its jurisdiction, a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction,. . . ‘is the functional equivalent of a state court sitting in the forum state.’”
Rodríguez-Rivera v. Allscripts Healthcare Sols., Inc., 43 F.4th 150, 160 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations and
quotations omitted). A federal court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction therefore must not exceed the limits
of the forum’s long-arm statute. Id. prongs are satisfied. See Hynes v. Forde & O'Meara LLP, No. 23-cv-1140 (MDM), 2024
WL 3360377, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 15, 2024) (citations omitted) (Report and
Recommendation adopted by No. 23-cv-1140 (SCC), 2024 WL 3360378 (D.P.R. Mar. 26,
2024)). While Plaintiff does not even attempt to go through these three prongs, the Court
will address each in turn.

i. Relatedness
The relatedness prong requires a plaintiff’s cause of action to “arise out of or relate
to” the defendant’s contacts with the forum. See Rodríguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 160
(citations omitted). Plaintiff must show “a nexus between [his] claims and [Defendant’s]
forum-based activities.” A Corp. v. All American Plumbing, Inc., 812 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.
2016) (citing Adelson v. Hananel, 652 F.3d 75, 81 (1st Cir. 2011)). The relatedness test is
a relatively relaxed standard. See Rodríguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 162. Nevertheless, there
must be a sufficient relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the forum itself.
See Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014).
The record does not indicate that this case “arises out of” or is “related to”
Defendant’s contacts with Puerto Rico. The fatal issue for Plaintiff is that no forum

contacts are alleged to begin with. The Complaint only alleges that Defendant repeated
defamatory statements to unidentified third parties with unidentified ties to Puerto Rico,
as well as the unsupported claim that Defendant intended these statements to be
disseminated in Puerto Rico. (ECF 6 at 2 ¶ 3). It goes on to provide conclusory
allegations regarding reputational harm that occurred in Puerto Rico and Defendant’s
purported knowledge that this injury would occur in Puerto Rico. (ECF 6 at 4 ¶ 15). The
Complaint does not, however, allege any facts that would tie Defendant to Puerto Rico. It
does not allege any physical presence of Defendant in Puerto Rico, any direct
dissemination of the alleged statements in Puerto Rico, any specificity as to the indirect
effects suffered by Plaintiff in Puerto Rico, nor any alleged statements whose subject-
matter concerned matters related to Puerto Rico. Ultimately, based on the Complaint, the
only connection between Defendant and Puerto Rico is Plaintiff. Contra Walden, 571 U.S.
at 285 (“[T]he plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.”).

Plaintiff argues that “jurisdiction can properly be asserted when a person knew an
act or statement would have a devastating effect in the forum state.” (ECF 30 at 3) (citing
Noonan v. Winston, 135 F.3d 85, 91 (1st Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff reads the First Circuit’s case
law out of context. Mere knowledge of a plaintiff’s “strong forum connections” or domicile
in a particular state, combined with the foreseeability of harm, does not alone satisfy the
minimum contacts inquiry. Walden, 571 U.S. at 289; see also U.S. v. Swiss American
Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 610, 623 (1st Cir. 2001). Such an approach would shift the analytical
focus from Defendant’s contacts with the forum to Defendant’s contacts with Plaintiff,
“impermissibly allow[ing] a plaintiff's contacts with the defendant and forum to drive the
jurisdictional analysis.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 289. At bottom, no minimum contacts can be
discerned from the record. “[S]ince there can be no requisite nexus between the contacts

and the cause of action if no contacts exist[,]” Plaintiff necessarily fails to satisfy the
relatedness prong. Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 621. While this failure alone dooms any
finding of specific personal jurisdiction, the Court discusses why Plaintiff also fails to meet
the remaining two prongs.
ii. Purposeful Availment
Assuming, arguendo, that specific facts had been alleged to show related contacts
between Defendant and Puerto Rico, Plaintiff must still show that Defendant
“purposefully availed [him]self of the privilege of conducting activities within Puerto
Rico, thus invoking the benefits and protections of Puerto Rico's laws.” Rodríguez-
Rivera, 43 F.4th at 163 (citing Bluetarp Fin., Inc. v. Matrix Constr. Co., 709 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir. 2013)). The purposeful availment prong requires a finding of intentional conduct,
where “defendants must have acted toward the forum state with sufficient intent to make
them ‘reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Noonan, 135 F.3d at 90 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). In
general, “contacts must show that the defendant deliberately reached out beyond [his]
home.” Rodríguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 163 (citations and quotations omitted). While the
cornerstones of this intentionality are voluntariness and foreseeability, both elements
assume contacts with the forum-state exist to begin with. Id.
Despite the lack of contacts made by Defendant with Puerto Rico, Plaintiff
attempts to establish “purposeful availment” under the “effects doctrine” articulated in
Calder v. Jones. (ECF 30 at 2); see 465 U.S. 783, 789 (1984). In that case, the Supreme
Court found that a court in California could assert specific jurisdiction over two Florida
reporters who wrote a libelous article about California entertainer Shirley Jones for the
National Enquirer. Calder, 465 U.S. at 783. While the Supreme Court adopted this effects

test “for determining purposeful availment in the context of defamation cases[,]”
Plaintiff’s reliance on Calder is misplaced. Noonan, 135 F.3d at 90 (1st Cir. 1998). In
Calder, the Court found that the intentional conduct in question was “calculated to cause
injury to [the plaintiff] in California,” as the defendant’s intentional and tortious actions
were “expressly aimed” at the forum state. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789, 791 (emphasis added).
As the Supreme Court summarized in Walden, the defendants in Calder made “ample”
contacts with California: defendants had relied on California sources for the information
in their allegedly libelous story; the story itself referred to the plaintiff’s California
activities; and the story was widely circulated in California, the state where the publication
had its largest circulation. Walden, 571 U.S. at 287 (citations omitted). In the present case,
no factual allegations indicate that any defamatory statements were focused on, aimed at
or even related to Puerto Rico. In other words, here there are no contacts to speak of, let
alone “ample” contacts like those in Calder.

Based on the Amended Complaint, the allegedly defamatory statements concerned
Plaintiff’s business activities in Illinois; were centered around real property located in
Illinois; and were communicated in Illinois to Illinois residents. (ECF 6 at 3–4). Arguing
Defendant’s statements would “predictably reverberate through Plaintiff’s Puerto Rico-
based business and professional network” is too conclusory for a finding of purposeful
availment. (ECF 39 at 11). According to the allegations in the Complaint, therefore, the
Court cannot conclude that the Defendant expressly aimed the allegedly defamatory
statements at Puerto Rico.
iii. Reasonableness
“The jurisdictional inquiry is not a mechanical exercise.” Ticketmaster-New York,
Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 209 (1st Cir. 1994). “[E]ven where purposefully generated

contacts exist, courts must consider a panoply of other factors which bear upon the
fairness of subjecting a nonresident to the authority of a foreign tribunal.” Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 209 (quoting Pleasant St., 960 F.2d at 1088). Five of these factors, labelled the
“Gestalt Factors”, control the analysis: (1) the defendant's burden of appearing, (2) the
forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief, (4) the judicial system's interest in obtaining the most
effective resolution of the controversy, and (5) the common interests of all sovereigns in
promoting substantive social policies. See Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 209 (citing Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)). In general, “the weaker the plaintiff's
showing on the first two prongs (relatedness and purposeful availment), the less a
defendant need show in terms of unreasonableness to defeat jurisdiction.” Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 210. The Court will address each factor in turn.
When assessing the burden of appearance on Defendant—a resident of Illinois—

in Puerto Rico, the Court recognizes that “traveling to Puerto Rico isn't overly
burdensome in the modern era.” Rodríguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 166 (citing Pritzker v.
Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 1994)). However, it is also true that courts in the past have
dismissed on grounds of unreasonableness where “defendant's center of gravity. . . was
located at an appreciable distance from the forum.” Ticketmaster, 26 F.3d at 210–211
(collecting cases) (weighing the factor of inconvenience to the defendant as a means to
guard against harassment). In this case, Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction in Puerto Rico, as it
is his place of domicile and alleged injury, whereas Defendant highlights his complete lack
of contacts with the forum. Given that Defendant is an Illinois resident, coupled with a
dearth of support for any connection that may exist between him and Puerto Rico, this
factor to weighs in favor of Defendant.

Next, the Court considers Puerto Rico’s interest in adjudicating this dispute. While
“[a] forum state has a demonstrable interest in exercising jurisdiction over one who
causes tortious injury within its borders[,]” this interest is lessened by doubts regarding
whether the defendant’s acts were actually committed within the forum. Id. at 211.
Because the Complaint alleges that Defendant’s acts squarely took place in Illinois
regarding an Illinois dispute, Puerto Rico’s interest in regulating the subject matter of this
dispute is relatively mild.
The third factor–regarding Plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective and convenient
relief–also favors Defendant. On the one hand, a plaintiff’s choice of forum must be
afforded deference in terms of convenience. See Id. However, the Complaint otherwise
indicates that Puerto Rico would be an inefficient and inconvenient forum for this matter.
Based on the specifically alleged facts on the record, the majority of potential witnesses

who could be called to testify are likely residents of Illinois. The subject matter of the
alleged defamatory statements also exclusively concerns Illinois-related conduct and
property. This creates a reasonable expectation that any potential counterclaims would
arise under Illinois law. For these reasons, the judicial system’s interest in an effective
resolution of this controversy weighs against litigating Plaintiff’s claims in Puerto Rico.
Finally, the Court finds no strong policy arguments toward either side. While
Puerto Rico may have an interest in “protecting its citizens from out-of-state [agents] that
cause harm,” Plaintiff’s weak showing of any contacts between Defendant and this forum
render this consideration a makeweight at best. See Rodríguez-Rivera, 43 F.4th at 167.
Taken altogether, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to
establish that the exercise of jurisdiction over Defendant would be reasonable.

Given that all three prongs of the test for specific jurisdiction weigh in favor of
dismissal, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to establish jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdictional Discovery
In the alternative to a finding of specific jurisdiction over Defendant, Plaintiff
argues that he should have an opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. (EC 30 at
4). As this Court has previously recognized, “[t]he inquiry into minimum contacts is [...]
highly idiosyncratic, involving an individualized assessment and factual analysis of the
precise mix of contacts that characterize each case.” Mgmt. Group Investors, LLC v.
Aeropuertos Dominicanos Sigo XXI, S.A., No. 24-cv-1285 (MAJ), 2024 WL 4953979, at
*5 (D.P.R. Dec. 3, 2024) (quoting Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 60 (internal quotations omitted)).
However, while this inquiry may warrant an examination of the record beyond the
pleadings, district courts have “broad discretion in determining whether to grant
jurisdictional discovery.” Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d at 626.

In lieu of allowing jurisdictional discovery, a district court may resolve a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under the “prima facie” standard. Swiss Am.
Bank, 274 F.3d at 618 (citations and quotations omitted). Under this approach, the Court
looks to whether the plaintiff has proffered evidence as to the existence of every specific
fact required to satisfy the jurisdictional analysis. Id. Accepting these properly supported
proffers of evidence as true, the Court “construe[s] these proffers in a light most favorable
to plaintiff's jurisdictional claim.” Mgmt. Group Investors, 2024 WL 4953979 at *5
(quoting Bluetarp Fin., 709 F.3d at 79).
According to Plaintiff, Defendant “made, published, and disseminated defamatory
statements that produced reputational harm in Puerto Rico.” (ECF 30 at 4). Plaintiff
argues that this “factual dispute” justifies jurisdictional discovery. Id. However, Plaintiff

is not able to provide any specific facts, or proffer evidence, regarding any contacts
Defendant may have developed with Puerto Rico. While Plaintiff alleges that unnamed
third-parties heard the allegedly defamatory statements in Illinois, he provides no factual
basis to explain how these statements could have reached Puerto Rico. Based on what is
alleged, there is no jurisdictional discovery which would aid Plaintiff to establish personal
jurisdiction over Defendant. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to make a “prima facie” case for
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. It may be true that the threshold for granting
jurisdictional discovery is low. See Motus, LLC v. CarData Consultants, Inc., 23 F.4th 115,
128 (1st Cir. 2022). It is also true that Plaintiff does not meet that threshold today.
C. Transfer of Venue
The absence of personal jurisdiction triggers a rebuttable presumption in favor of
transferring the case to a proper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Federal Home Loan Bank

of Boston v. Moody's Corp., 821 F.3d 102, 119 (1st Cir. 2016) (citing Britell v. United
States, 318 F.3d 70, 73 (1st Cir. 2003)).3 “Only if an inquiring court determines that a
transfer is not in the interest of justice is the presumption rebutted." Id. (citing Britell, 318 F.3d at 74) (internal alterations omitted). In determining whether a transfer would
be in the interest of justice or not, courts consider the totality of the circumstances and
may examine factors such as whether transferring the case would (1) unfairly benefit the
proponent, (2) impose an unwarranted hardship on the objector or (3) unduly burden the
judicial system. Morales v. BAH Logistics LLC, 25-cv-1106 (FAB), 2026 WL 765609, at
*6 (D.P.R. Mar. 18, 2026) (citing Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2003)).
Neither party objects to the transfer of this case to the Northern District of Illinois.4
Defendant does not provide support to rebut the existing § 1631 presumption in

favor of transfer instead of dismissal. In evaluating whether transfer is in the interest of
justice, there is no unfair benefit to Defendant or unwarranted hardship on Plaintiff.
Based on the pleadings, the Northern District of Illinois would have personal jurisdiction
over Defendant, as he is an Illinois resident. (ECF 27 at 2 ¶ 5). Similarly, Plaintiff has
clear forum contacts in Illinois, including “[holding] controlling votes for years” in the

3 This statute "permit[s] transfer when there's a lack of either personal or subject matter
jurisdiction." Id.
4 While Defendant requests transfer to the Northern District of Illinois if dismissal is unwarranted,
Plaintiff also requests transfer to an "appropriate forum rather than dismissal" if this district is determined
to be an improper venue. (ECF 30 at 10).
condominium association at the heart of this dispute, corresponding to real property
located in in Chicago, Illinois. (ECF 6 at 3 ¶ 12(b)). This longstanding contact is directly
related to the alleged statements giving rise to the defamation cause of action. In short,
venue would be proper in the Northern District of Illinois because Defendant resides in
that district and is subject to that court's personal jurisdiction, and a substantial part, if

not all, of the events giving rise to this claim occurred in that district. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391 (b). Finally, transfer to the Northern District of Illinois would not unduly burden the
judicial system, nor does the Court believe this case to be "frivolous or brought in bad
faith" at this time. See Morales, 2026 WL 765609, at *6 (citations omitted). On the
contrary, as discussed in the preceding reasonableness analysis, a large part of the
evidence and potential witnesses in this case are in Illinois, making Illinois a more
convenient forum for this litigation. Accordingly, the Court adopts the parties' requested
transfer.
IV. Conclusion

Crediting the specific factual allegations in the Complaint and viewing those
allegations in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court finds that it lacks personal
jurisdiction over the Defendant. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction is therefore DENIED, Plaintiff's request for leave to conduct jurisdictional
discovery is DENIED, and this case is TRANSFERRED to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 20th day of April, 2026.
/s/ María Antongiorgi-Jordán
MARIA ANTONGIORGI-JORDAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE