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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Matter of David F. Stoddard

Supreme Court of South Carolina

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 2025-002184

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.3K)

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Syllabus

In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Court imposes a definite suspension.

Combined Opinion

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court

In the Matter of David F. Stoddard, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2025-002184

Opinion No. 28323
Submitted February 20, 2026 – Filed March 18, 2026

DEFINITE SUSPENSION

Disciplinary Counsel William M. Blitch, Jr., and
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Connor J. Parker, both of
Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary Counsel.

David F. Stoddard, of Anderson, pro se.

PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent and the Office
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admits misconduct, agrees to pay
costs and consents to the imposition of any sanction up to a nine-month definite
suspension. We accept the Agreement and suspend Respondent from the practice
of law in this state for nine months. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as
follows.

I.

Respondent was admitted to practice in 1985. He operates a solo practice in
Anderson handling personal injury, family, and criminal defense matters. His
disciplinary history includes a public reprimand, and three letters of caution—one
in 2008 citing Rule 1.3, which requires diligence, and two more in 2014 and 2017
citing Rule 1.4, which requires adequate communication. In re Stoddard, 391 S.C.
447, 706 S.E.2d 505 (2011) (publicly reprimanding Respondent for failing to
conduct monthly trust account reconciliations, failing to maintain adequate funds
in his trust account to cover bank charges and fees, failing to prepare settlement
statements on all of his contingency cases, and failing to properly supervise his
nonlawyer staff); see Rule 2(s), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR (providing a letter of
caution may be considered in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding if the caution or
warning contained therein is relevant to the misconduct alleged in the subsequent
proceedings). This Agreement involves five complaints pending against
Respondent.

Matter A

In January 2018, client E.G. and Respondent entered into an engagement
agreement for representation in seeking joint custody and visitation of E.G.'s child.
Respondent filed a summons and complaint seeking temporary relief on behalf of
E.G. A temporary hearing was scheduled for March 7, 2018. The parties reached
an agreement as to the issue of visitation prior to the temporary hearing, and the
agreement was approved by the family court on a temporary basis.

Mediation was held in November 2018. Respondent did not attend the mediation.
E.G. attended with his father and authorized the mediation to go forward without
representation. Respondent represents he did not attend the mediation because
E.G. told Respondent he would prefer to go to mediation without Respondent
rather than paying Respondent to attend. Respondent further represents that clients
attending mediation without their attorney present was common among his
colleagues in the past. The mediation was held and an agreement was reached, but
E.G. subsequently told Respondent that he and the opposing party had conflicting
interpretations of a material term regarding the location of visitation exchange.
E.G. asked Respondent to clarify the exchange location in the mediated agreement
to make the exchange location fairer. Respondent represents he contacted
opposing counsel to discuss changing the agreement, but opposing counsel refused
to consider changing the mediated agreement. The mediated agreement also
required the parties to exchange pay information within a specified timeframe
before the final hearing.

A final uncontested hearing was scheduled for January 10, 2019. The day of the
hearing, Respondent realized he had not prepared a financial declaration for E.G.
Respondent represents he tried to reach E.G. to advise him of the necessary
financial declaration and assist in preparation of a financial declaration but was not
successful in reaching E.G. Respondent represents the judge allowed the hearing
to proceed without E.G.'s financial declaration but required it to be furnished later.
The opposing party had prepared a financial declaration for the hearing; however,
both opposing counsel and Respondent neglected to exchange this information
prior to the final hearing as required in the mediated agreement. The opposing
party's financial declaration contained income figures that differed from the
income figures in the mediated agreement. Respondent did not know which
monetary figures applied to the agreement—either from the opposing party's
financial declaration or the figures set out in the mediated agreement. Respondent
represents that he sought clarification during the hearing because the income
figures bore on the child support calculation, which the court may have interpreted
as an objection to the agreement. The court adjourned the hearing for lack of
agreement.

On February 7, 2019, Respondent submitted a proposed order for continuance of
the final hearing. The court administratively dismissed the case pursuant to the
365-day rule but provided the case could be restored for purposes of putting an
agreement on the record. However, the opposing party was not willing to seek
approval of the mediated agreement. In May 2019, Respondent filed another
summons and complaint and obtained temporary relief for E.G. In December
2019, Respondent filed a motion to be relieved as counsel in the subsequent case,
which was granted in February 2020.

Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.3 (requiring
diligence and promptness in representing a client); and Rule 3.2 (requiring
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client).

Matter B

In September 2018, Respondent and client V.L. entered a contingent fee agreement
for representation regarding a medical malpractice claim. Respondent believed the
statute of limitations would expire on February 18, 2019. On February 18, 2019,
Respondent had not retained an expert witness to provide an affidavit as required
by the relevant statute. Respondent represents he had provided the records to a
nurse in January or February 2019 for review, and the nurse provided Respondent
with the names of potential experts, including a neurosurgeon and an orthopedist.
Respondent was unable to contact either of the experts and get them to agree to
render an opinion prior to February 18, 2019.

Despite lacking the required medical exert affidavit, Respondent filed a Notice of
Intent to Sue (NOI) with the clerk of court. Respondent believed there was a
statutory basis for filing the NOI without the medical expert affidavit so long as the
affidavit was filed within forty-five days, which was April 4, 2019. Respondent
represents that he retained an expert witness on March 29, 2019, who gave his
verbal opinion that there was no deviation from the standard of care. The expert
witness did not prepare a written report or affidavit. Respondent did not pursue a
second opinion. Respondent first told V.L. about the medical expert's verbal
opinion on June 4, 2019.

V.L. terminated Respondent by letter on June 10, 2019. However, Respondent did
not formally withdraw from the case. One week after he was terminated,
Respondent offered, in an email communication with the client, to serve the NOI
on the defendants. Additionally, approximately a week later, the clerk of court's
office called Respondent to advise that V.L. was attempting to file a pro se motion
which the clerk would not accept because Respondent was still listed as attorney of
record. Respondent told the clerk's office he would take over despite knowing he
was terminated June 10, 2019. On June 19, 2019, Respondent then served the NOI
on one of the named defendants knowing it was defective because Respondent had
not filed the required affidavit within 45 days of filing the NOI. Respondent did
not believe good cause could be shown to extend the deadline to file the affidavit.
Furthermore, June 19, 2019, was one day after the expiration of the 120-day
timeframe specified in Rule 3, SCRCP, for service of the filed NOI.

Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1 (requiring
competence, including thoroughness and preparation); Rule 1.3 (requiring
diligence and promptness in representing a client); Rule 1.4 (requiring prompt
communication that keeps the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter); Rule 1.16(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation if
discharged by the client); and Rule 3.2 (requiring reasonable efforts to expedite
litigation consistent with the interests of the client).

Matter C

Respondent and C.L. entered into an engagement agreement for representation of
C.L. in a divorce case. The parties reached a settlement agreement in mediation,
and a final order adopting the agreement was filed February 4, 2020. The final
order required C.L. to satisfy a mortgage within a specific timeframe. In the event
C.L. did not satisfy the mortgage within that timeframe, the order required C.L. to
sell the mortgaged property to satisfy the mortgage.
C.L. did not satisfy the mortgage within the specified timeframe or sell the
mortgaged property. The opposing party filed a new proceeding seeking
temporary relief, and the court issued a temporary order on August 6, 2020,
authorizing the opposing party to sell the property. The order further authorized
the opposing party to recoup any expenses and costs incurred for the upkeep of the
property from the proceeds of the sale.

The opposing party sold the property. Respondent obtained a disbursement sheet
from opposing counsel itemizing several of the opposing party's costs and expenses
that had been deducted from the sale proceeds. C.L. wanted Respondent to contest
the amount of costs and expenses deducted from the sale. C.L. claimed he was
entitled to a greater distribution because the opposing party had inflated costs and
expenses. Respondent corresponded with opposing counsel attempting to resolve
the issue; however, his attempts were unsuccessful. Despite C.L. raising the issue
to Respondent and Respondent's attempts to resolve it with opposing counsel being
unsuccessful, Respondent did not take any legal action on C.L.'s behalf to litigate
the issue. Respondent did not pursue a mediation, which was required before
having a final hearing on the merits. Without consulting C.L., Respondent allowed
the case to be administratively dismissed. Approximately two to three months
after the case was administratively dismissed, Respondent represents that he told
C.L. that he "would need to file a complaint for contempt, but likely need[ed] some
discovery, which is unusual in a contempt matter." Respondent further represents
he later changed his mind and now believes "a new action to enforce the order,
rather than contempt might be a better way to proceed." However, Respondent
failed to timely communicate with C.L. about this strategy.

Respondent represents he attempted to contact C.L. after becoming aware that C.L.
filed a disciplinary complaint; however, C.L. has not responded.

Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.2(a) (requiring a
lawyer to consult with a client and to abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation); Rule 1.3 (requiring diligence and promptness in
representing a client); Rule 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with
the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished);
Rule 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter); Rule 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation); and Rule 3.2 (requiring reasonable efforts to
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client).
Matter D

In May 2022, client F.W. consulted with Respondent over the telephone regarding
a DUI charge, and Respondent quoted a retainer fee. Respondent's paralegal
emailed F.W. a client questionnaire and a retainer agreement. The retainer
agreement provided that Respondent would commence representation upon
payment of $2,000. F.W. filled out the questionnaire, signed the retainer
agreement, and paid $2,000. Respondent's paralegal handled the transaction
unbeknownst to Respondent, and Respondent did not know he had been retained.

In July 2022, F.W.'s trial was held on the DUI charge, and neither F.W. nor
Respondent appeared. A bench warrant was issued, and F.W. was arrested, which
caused him to lose his job. Respondent represents that he relied on his paralegal to
transmit notices of appearance, requests for jury trials, and discovery requests
when he was retained. Respondent represents that when these documents are
transmitted, the court usually continues the client's initial court appearance
indefinitely. Respondent further represents his paralegal left the firm three weeks
after F.W. retained him that the paralegal did not send a notice of appearance,
request for jury trial, or discovery request to the court for F.W.'s case before she
left. Respondent represents he was unaware of his paralegal's failure to transmit
the documents until he learned F.W. had been arrested for failing to appear at trial.
Respondent represents that as soon as he learned F.W. was in jail, he secured
F.W.'s release, filed a motion for a new trial, which was granted, and served a
discovery request.

Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1 (requiring
competence, including thoroughness and preparation); Rule 1.3 (requiring
diligence and promptness in representing a client); and Rule 5.3(a) (requiring a
lawyer to supervise his nonlawyer staff to ensure conduct compatible with the
lawyer's professional obligations).

Matter E

In June 2022, client A.M. retained Respondent for representation in a divorce case.
A.M. had been served with a summons and complaint and had filed an answer and
counterclaim pro se. Equitable division of property and debt were in dispute.
A.M. signed an engagement agreement in June 2022 and finished paying
Respondent's retainer in August 2022; however, Respondent did not notify the
court of his representation until January 2023.

Between July 2022 and December 2022, A.M. emailed Respondent four times and
wrote to Respondent once to request information on the status of her case.
Respondent did not respond to A.M.'s emails or letter until January 7, 2023, when
Respondent forwarded A.M. emails showing he had scheduled a mediation for
March 2023.

An imperative issue for A.M. was the valuation of real property in dispute for
equitable distribution. A.M. sought Respondent's assistance in determining a
valuation for the real property. Respondent represented to A.M. that a realtor
could provide a valuation. In February and March 2023, A.M. emailed
Respondent three times requesting information about how to prepare for mediation
and how to proceed with obtaining a valuation from a realtor. After not receiving
any response from Respondent, A.M. obtained a valuation from a realtor and sent
it to Respondent. In the weeks leading up to mediation, A.M. emailed Respondent
three more times to request Respondent's help to prepare for her mediation, but
these requests went unanswered. Respondent emailed A.M. the web link to attend
the mediation virtually a few days before the mediation. The mediation was held
as scheduled and resulted in an impasse.

Respondent did not file a request for a final hearing. Respondent represents he
"cannot recall whether it was an oversight on my part or if there was a reason for
not filing the request." In May 2023, A.M.'s case was administratively dismissed.
The week after the case was dismissed, Respondent emailed opposing counsel to
request consent to file a motion to restore, but Respondent was unsuccessful in
obtaining opposing counsel's consent. In June and July 2023, A.M. emailed
Respondent three times requesting an update on the status of her case and pursuing
a second mediation, but Respondent did not respond. In July 2023, Respondent
told A.M. that her case had been dismissed. A.M. terminated Respondent, hired
other counsel, and requested that Respondent refund her retainer. Respondent
never responded to A.M.'s request.

Respondent admits his conduct in this matter violated the following provisions of
the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.2(a) (requiring a
lawyer to consult with a client and to abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation); Rule 1.3 (requiring diligence and promptness in
representing a client); Rule 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with
the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished);
Rule 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client reasonably informed about the
status of the matter); and Rule 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to explain a matter to the
extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation).

II.

In the Agreement, Respondent admits his misconduct as set forth above constitutes
grounds for discipline pursuant to Rule 7(a)(1), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR
(providing a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct is a ground for
discipline). As a sanction for his misconduct, Respondent agrees to a letter of
caution, a confidential admonition, a public reprimand, or a definite suspension of
up to nine months. He also agrees to pay costs, complete LEAPP Ethics School
within one year, and reimburse the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any
future claims paid related to these matters.1 In mitigation, Respondent submitted
two character letters attesting that he is committed to his clients and seeks to be
diligent and professional in handling cases.

III.

Given Respondent's disciplinary history, which involves instances of similar
misconduct, we find a nine-month suspension is appropriate in this matter. See In
re Toney, 396 S.C. 303, 721 S.E.2d 437 (2012) (imposing a nine-month definite
suspension for misconduct including failing to diligently handle client matters,
failing to timely return client files, failing to appear for a hearing, failing to
adequately communicate, and failing to timely refund unearned fees); In re Newell,
349 S.C. 40, 562 S.E.2d 308 (2002) (imposing a nine-month definite suspension
including failing to competently and diligently handle client matters, failing to
abide by client's decision concerning objectives of the representation, failing to
properly communicate, and failing to properly refund unearned fees).
Accordingly, we suspend Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a
period of nine months.2

Within fifteen days, Respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court
showing that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. Within

1
The Agreement also notes that, in the event a suspension is imposed, appointment
of the Receiver will be necessary to protect the interests of Respondent's clients.
2
The request to appoint the Receiver is addressed in a separate order of today's
date. Appellate Case No. 2026-000273.
thirty days, Respondent shall pay the costs incurred in the investigation and
prosecution of this matter by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. As a
condition of discipline, Respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice
Program Ethics School within one year. Respondent shall also reimburse the
Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection for any future claims paid related to the above-
referenced matters.

DEFINITE SUSPENSION.

KITTREDGE, C.J., FEW, JAMES, HILL and VERDIN, JJ., concur.