Curtis Classen et al. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company et al. — Motion to Remand Denied

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April 10, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Curtis Classen, et al. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, et al.

District Court, W.D. Oklahoma

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 5:25-cv-00910

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17.9K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CURTIS CLASSEN, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-910-D
)
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY )
COMPANY, et al., ) (Case Remanded to
) Oklahoma County District
Defendants. ) Court, CJ-25-4743)

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 11]. Defendant State
Farm Fire and Casualty Company (“State Farm”) filed a response [Doc. No. 12], to which
Plaintiffs filed a reply [Doc. No. 13]. Thereafter, the Court permitted State Farm to file a
sur-reply [Doc. No. 18]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs owned property located in Oklahoma County, Oklahoma, which was at all
relevant times insured under a State Farm policy. [Doc. No. 1-2, at p. 8, 26]. Plaintiffs
purchased the insurance policy through Defendant Jeremy Henley, d/b/a Jeremy Henley
Insurance Agency Inc., which took effect on July 6, 2023. Id. at p. 26-27. The property was
damaged by a storm on or about July 9, 2023. Id. at p. 8, 27. Plaintiffs reported a loss to
State Farm, and inspections were performed by State Farm adjusters on or about April 16,
2024 and September 6, 2024. Id. at p. 28-30.
Plaintiffs allege that State Farm wrongfully denied their insurance claim for the
damage. Id. at p. 29-31. In addition to their claims against State Farm, they also assert
claims against Henley for fraudulent concealment, negligent procurement of insurance,
constructive fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. [Doc. No. 1-2].
In support of their negligent procurement claim, they allege that in procuring the

policy, Henley “independently selected and calculated full replacement cost coverage” and
“conveyed that such full replacement cost coverage limit was accurate . . . and represented
100% of the Insured Property’s insurance to value.” Id. at p. 18. They further assert that
prior to the issuance of the policy, Henley did not verify the condition of the property; did
not disclose to them that the property was ineligible for the requested replacement cost

coverage for any reason; did not advise them that the property had any defect or pre-
existing damage that would exclude it from replacement cost coverage; did not inform
them of any condition that would exclude the property’s roof from full replacement cost
coverage; and did not disclose to them that the replacement cost value calculated for the
property did not in fact represent 100% insurance to value. Id. at p. 19-20.

State Farm timely removed the case to this Court. [Doc. No. 1]. In its notice of
removal, State Farm alleges that complete diversity exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and the
amount in controversy exceeds the threshold for diversity jurisdiction. Id. Although Henley
is a non-diverse party, State Farm contends that he was fraudulently joined by Plaintiffs to
defeat diversity jurisdiction. Id. at p. 2, 25-27.

Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion, arguing that State Farm cannot meet its “heavy
burden” to show fraudulent joinder. [Doc. No. 11].
STANDARD OF DECISION
Subject-matter jurisdiction over this case turns on the issue of fraudulent joinder.
“To establish fraudulent joinder, the removing party must demonstrate either: 1) actual

fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or 2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a
cause of action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d
980, 988 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation omitted). As the removing party, State Farm
must establish that federal jurisdiction exists. McPhail v. Deere & Co., 529 F.3d 947, 955 (10th Cir. 2008).

“Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, and all doubts are to be resolved
against removal.” Fajen v. Found. Rsrv. Ins. Co., 683 F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir. 1982)
(internal citation omitted). To satisfy the “heavy burden,” the party asserting fraudulent
joinder must show under the “actual fraud” prong that the plaintiff essentially “lied in the
pleadings.” Sanelli v. Farmers Ins. Co., Inc., No. CIV-23-263-SLP, 2023 WL 3775177, at

*2 (W.D. Okla. June 2, 2023) (internal quotation omitted). Under the “inability to establish
a cause of action” prong, the party asserting fraudulent joinder must show that there is no
possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the
purportedly fraudulently joined party in state court. See Montano v. Allstate Indem., No.
99-2225, 2000 WL 525592, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2000) (unpublished)1 (internal

quotations and citation omitted); Brazell v. Waite, 525 F. App'x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2013)

1 Unpublished opinions are cited pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a) and 10th Cir. R.
32.1(A).
(unpublished) (citation omitted) (“[T]he removing party must show that the plaintiff has
‘no cause of action’ against the fraudulently joined defendant.”).
“[U]pon specific allegations of fraudulent joinder the court may pierce the

pleadings, ... consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means
available.” Dodd v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964) (citations
omitted); see also Smoot v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 881-82 (10th Cir.
1967). The Court may not, however, “pre-try . . . doubtful issues of fact to determine
removability; the issue must be capable of summary determination and be proven with

complete certainty.” Smoot, 378 F.2d at 882. “This standard is more exacting than that for
dismissing a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).” Montano, 2000 WL 525592, at *2.
“[A]ll factual and legal issues must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Dutcher, 733 F.3d
at 988.
DISCUSSION

I. Inability to State a Cause of Action
Under Oklahoma law, “[a]n agent has the duty to act in good faith and use
reasonable care, skill and diligence in the procurement of insurance and an agent is liable
to the insured if, by the agent’s fault, insurance is not procured as promised and the insured
suffers a loss.” Kutz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2008 OK CIV APP 60, ¶ 16, [189 P.3d

740, 744-45](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5325424/kutz-v-state-farm-fire-casualty-co/#744) (citation and emphasis omitted). To that end, agents must “offer coverage
mandated by law and coverage for needs that are disclosed by the insureds....” Rotan v.
Farmers Ins. Grp. of Companies, Inc., 2004 OK CIV APP 11, ¶ 3, 83 P.3d 894, 895 (emphasis omitted).
Upon careful consideration of the record, the Court finds that State Farm has not
met its heavy burden to show – with complete certainty – that Plaintiffs cannot state a
negligent procurement claim against Henley in state court.2 See Oliver v. State Farm Fire

& Cas. Co., 765 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1250 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 11, 2025) (remanding case
involving negligent procurement claim where the plaintiff alleged in part that “State Farm’s
denial was contrary to the [agents’] representations that all underwriting requirements had
been met and that there were no preexisting issues with the roof that would limit or restrict
coverage”); see also Kyger v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 649 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1202,

1206 (W.D. Okla. 2022) (remanding negligent procurement claim where the plaintiff
alleged that “she requested from [her agent] ‘full replacement cost coverage for her roof’
which was not procured as promised, ... that [the agent] represented that ‘there was nothing
about the condition of the roof that would preclude full replacement[,]’” and that the agent’s
representation was “inconsistent with State Farm’s denial of her claim because the hail

damage ‘[did] not penetrate the shingle mat.’”).
State Farm cites to this Court’s decision, Rain Drop Found., Inc. v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., No. CIV-24-1101-D, 2025 WL 582562 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 21, 2025). However,
Rain Drop is distinguishable from this case. In Rain Drop, the Court found that the agent
could not be liable for negligent procurement of the insurance policy. Id. at *4. In support

2 Given this determination, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ fraud and constructive
fraud claims against Henley. See Nerad v. AstraZeneca Pharms., Inc., 203 F. App'x 911,
913 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (explaining that a fraudulent joinder analysis turns on
“whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the plaintiff might succeed in at least one
claim against the non-diverse defendant.”).
of its finding, the Court distinguished Rain Drop from other cases in which it was alleged
that 1) the insurer denied the claim in part due to preexisting damage; and 2) the “insurance
agent had allegedly underwritten the policy and may have, through negligence or

constructive fraud, failed to communicate the consequences of the preexisting damage.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs alleged both.
Indeed, the Court finds this matter is more similar to Pruitt v. State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co., No. CIV-25-43-D, 2025 WL 1030353 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2025), in which the
Court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand. In Pruitt, the Court based its determination

largely on the plaintiff’s assertion that the defendant insurer’s denial was in reliance on
pre-existing damage, the defendant agent’s negligent performance of his procurement
duties, and the defendant’s failure to show with certainty otherwise. Id. at *4. Thus,
construing the issues of fact in the plaintiff’s favor without pre-trying them, the Court found
that the defendant insurer did not carry its heavy burden to show with complete certainty

that the plaintiff could not state a negligent procurement claim against the defendant
insurance agent. Id. Here, Plaintiffs contend that preexisting damage was the basis for State Farm’s
policy denial. Further, they allege that Henley was negligent in performing his procurement
duties. Thus, the Court finds that this case is less analogous to Rain Drop, and more

analogous to Pruitt, Kyger, and Oliver, cited above. Upon careful consideration of
Plaintiffs’ allegations, and construing factual issues in their favor, the Court finds State
Farm has failed to show with complete certainty that Plaintiffs cannot establish a negligent
procurement claim against Henley in state court. Accordingly, State Farm has not met its
“heavy burden” to establish fraudulent joinder.
II. Actual Fraud in the Pleading of Jurisdictional Facts

As stated above, showing actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts
“basically requires a showing that plaintiff lied in the pleadings.” Sanelli, 2023 WL
3775177, at *2. In its notice of removal, State Farm contends that Plaintiffs have engaged
in fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts. In support, State Farm primarily argues that
Plaintiffs’ counsel has brought an increasing number of cases against State Farm and other

insurers based on identical underwriting failures, and that this is indicative of fraud.
As State Farm is likely aware, several judges in this district have found that
allegations of cookie-cutter complaints are, alone, insufficient to establish fraudulent
joinder. See Norman v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1104-05 (W.D.
Okla. 2025) (“[T]he Court is not persuaded that the similarity in the allegations or the

number of cases filed by Plaintiffs’ counsel is necessarily suggestive of fraud in this action.
Moreover, as Plaintiffs note, the Petition alleges that the agents are an essential component
of State Farm’s scheme to wrongfully deny claims, and some similarity in statements or
conduct is therefore conceivable.”); Stacy v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. CIV-22-883-
PRW, 2023 WL 11915451, at * 2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2023) (granting remand in the face

of an “apparent pattern of ‘cookie cutter’ petitions”); Pruitt, 2025 WL 1030353, at *4 (“The
Court is not persuaded that the sheer quantity of similar claims alleged against insurance
agents is enough to satisfy the high burden necessary to prove fraudulent joinder.”)
(quotation and citation omitted); Martin v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop., Ins. Co., No. CIV-23-
739-SLP, 2024 WL 3510301, at *2 (W.D. Okla. July 23, 2024) (“[T]his Court, and multiple
other federal district courts within the state of Oklahoma have rejected claims of fraudulent
joinder on substantially similar allegations made in support of virtually identical claims for

relief.”).
Upon consideration, the Court finds that State Farm has not met its high burden to
show actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts based on the growing number of
similar allegations against State Farm and other insurers. The Court further finds that State
Farm’s remaining examples of actual fraud – to include its argument that Plaintiffs have

failed to allege how the agent is involved in the alleged insurance scheme – instead speak
to the merits of their underlying claims, not whether they committed actual fraud in the
pleadings. Accordingly, the Court finds that State Farm has insufficiently demonstrated
actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts for purposes of fraudulent joinder.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that Defendant State Farm Fire and
Casualty Company has not established fraudulent joinder, and the Court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [Doc. No. 11]
is GRANTED, and the case is REMANDED to the District Court of Oklahoma County,

Oklahoma. The Clerk of Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order to the clerk of the
District Court of Oklahoma County. Each side shall bear their own attorneys’ fees, costs,
and expenses incurred as a result of the removal and remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 10" day of April, 2026.

□□ Q.QyPt
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge