Peo v. Novak - Criminal Appeal Affirmed, CO Court of Appeals

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Novak

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24CA0646

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.3K)

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Combined Opinion

24CA0646 Peo v Novak 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0646
La Plata County District Court No. 21CR354
Honorable Suzanne F. Carlson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

William Edward Novak,

Defendant-Appellant.

ORDER AFFIRMED

Division A
Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN
Martinez, and Ashby, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Jessica E. Ross, Senior Assistant Attorney
General and Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Robin Rheiner, Deputy State
Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, William Edward Novak, appeals the district court’s

restitution order. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Novak’s arm was in a cast when, around midnight on August

25, 2021, he hit John Dunn in the head multiple times with that

arm. Dunn’s injuries were catastrophic. He suffered skull and

facial fractures, plus traumatic brain injury including hemorrhages

and “pulverized” brain tissue. Dunn was continuously hospitalized

for nearly two years as he was treated for these injuries while

relearning, among other bodily functions, how to swallow, speak,

move his hands and feet, and walk short distances without

assistance.

¶3 Originally charged with first degree assault, Novak pled guilty

to second degree assault and agreed to a sentence of up to eight

years in prison. He also agreed to pay restitution.

¶4 Before sentencing, the prosecution requested restitution in the

following amounts: (1) $27,653.04 to Dunn’s parents for their

housing costs while tending to Dunn in the hospital; (2) $3,000 to

reimburse the Victim’s Compensation Program (VCA); and (3)

$1,600,140.07 to reimburse Conduent, on behalf of Cigna, for

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medical payments. See § 18-1.3-602(4)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2025 (insurers

may be “victims” for the purpose of restitution). The prosecution

attached invoices from Dunn’s parents, an award letter from the

VCA, and a fourteen-page document from Conduent listing medical

claims and benefits paid for services provided between May 2022

and June 2023, “related to the date of loss on or around

08/25/21.” The Conduent document named Dunn as the patient,

noted “Date Of Accident: 8/25/2021,” and showed nearly 270 line

items with claim numbers, “Misc” codes, provider names, dates of

service, claim amounts, and benefit amounts.

¶5 At sentencing, Novak admitted that his actions caused the

“damage and pain” that changed Dunn’s life. The court considered

letters and statements in support of Novak, victim impact letters

and statements describing Dunn’s injuries and medical treatments,

and four video clips (the contents of which are not part of the

appellate record) before sentencing Novak to eight years in prison

and ordering him to pay the full amount of restitution requested.

Novak objected only to the amount of restitution requested to

reimburse Conduent.

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¶6 The district court held an evidentiary hearing. There, the

prosecution largely relied on documents including, as relevant here,

Dunn’s patient intake form from Craig Hospital, which summarized

his injuries and medical treatment through August 2, 2022; Dunn’s

sister’s “consolidated report of medical care and issues,” describing

the medical procedures and complications Dunn endured “as a

result of the injuries he sustained”; many victim impact statements

from friends and family; and the Conduent document. The

prosecution also called Dunn’s mother to testify about housing

expenses and Dunn’s movement between various hospitals during

his twenty-three-month hospitalization.

¶7 Novak did not cross-examine Dunn’s mother or present any

evidence. He simply argued that the Conduent document was not

specific enough to show that each of the medical services charged

were related to the injuries Novak caused.

¶8 The court found that (1) the Conduent document was

corroborated by the date of Novak’s offense plus numerous

documents and statements including evidence presented at

sentencing; (2) Novak had presented no evidence in rebuttal; and (3)

the prosecution had established the amount requested by a

3
preponderance of the evidence. It once again ordered restitution in

the full amounts requested by the prosecution.

II. Discussion

¶9 On appeal, Novak contends that the prosecution presented

insufficient evidence “to establish that . . . Novak caused the

amount of restitution awarded for medical expenses.” In other

words, he argues that neither the Conduent document nor any

other evidence before the district court adequately connected the

medical claims to the injuries he caused. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 10 The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is de

novo — the standard that applies to a true

sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge. See Martinez v. People, 2024

CO 6M, ¶¶ 19-20. In reviewing the record de novo, we “draw every

inference fairly deducible from the evidence in favor of the court’s

decision.” People v. Dyson, 2021 COA 57, ¶ 15 (quoting People in

Interest of S.G.L., 214 P.3d 580, 583 (Colo. App. 2009). And we ask

“whether the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, when viewed

as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant

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caused that amount of loss.” People v. Barbre, 2018 COA 123,

¶ 25. Awardable losses include amounts paid for long-term and

ongoing medical expenses. § 18-1.3-603(2)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 11 Because convicted defendants should be obliged to “make full

restitution to those harmed by their misconduct,”

§ 18-1.3-601(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, every judgment of conviction must

include consideration of “any pecuniary loss suffered by a

victim . . . [and] proximately caused by an offender’s conduct.”

§§ 18-1.3-602(3)(a); 18-1.3-603(1). A defendant’s actions

proximately caused a loss if, in the natural and probable sequence

of events, they produced the claimed injury. Martinez, ¶ 13. This

causal connection may be broken by an independent intervening

event that was not reasonably foreseeable. See People v. Lopez, 97

P.3d 277, 282 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 12 The prosecution bears the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, both the amount of restitution owed

and that the victim’s losses were proximately caused by the

defendant. People v. Perez, 2017 COA 52M, ¶ 10. This burden is

met when the prosecution demonstrates that the existence of a

contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. Dyson, ¶ 14.

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B. Application

¶ 13 The crux of Novak’s argument, as we read it, is that the

prosecution failed to prove that the injuries he inflicted caused each

line item of medical treatment shown on the Conduent document.

He does not dispute that he seriously injured Dunn, question

whether Dunn was continuously hospitalized following the injuries

he admittedly caused (during which time the medical expenses

accrued), challenge any particular line item on the Conduent

document, or assert that an intervening event caused any of Dunn’s

medical charges. We perceive ample evidence to support the

restitution order.

¶ 14 First, we disagree that the prosecution must prove that each of

hundreds of continuous medical claims was proximately caused by

Novak. See People in Interest of A.V., 2018 COA 138M, ¶ 24 (“[T]he

prosecution is not required to prove restitution by the same quality

of evidence required in a trial on the merits of the case.”). We

instead agree with a division of this court that, when an offender

proximately causes a victim’s injuries and presents no

countervailing evidence as to the amount of the loss, as in this case,

medical bills with the detail provided on the Conduent document,

6
plus a diagnosis description, are sufficient to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the offender caused the amount

of loss shown on the medical bills. See People v. Babcock, 2023

COA 49, ¶¶ 30-31 (where the bills showed “the date of service,

medical provider, claim type, diagnosis code, diagnosis description,

billed amount, and amount paid”), aff’d, 2025 CO 26. Although the

prosecution did not provide a translation of the “Misc” codes here,

as provided in Babcock, Novak concedes that these are medical

codes.1

¶ 15 Second, the prosecution’s evidence of medical costs did not

wholly rely on the Conduent document, as Novak seems to suggest.

Dunn’s mother named the four institutions that received benefits in

excess of $10,000 when she told the court where Dunn received

1 Novak’s opening brief specifically questions the code “Z48.811,”

which, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
corresponds to “aftercare following surgery (for) (on) nervous
system.” https://perma.cc/QS9U-6N52; see CRE 201(2)(b), (c)
(permitting a court, in its discretion, to take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact “capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned”); see also People in Interest of T.T., 2019 CO 54, ¶ 25,
n.4 (taking judicial notice of the recordkeeping system used by
Colorado courts). That Novak proximately caused that loss was
corroborated by substantial evidence that Dunn required multiple
brain surgeries.

7
medical care during the time period in question. The prosecution

also presented many victim impact statements from Dunn’s friends

and family that described Dunn’s ongoing recovery from the brain

injuries that Novak admittedly caused. See A.V., ¶ 33 (“To meet its

burden of proof, a prosecutor may rely solely on victim impact

statements.”). This evidence detailed that during the time period in

question, Dunn required an eighth or ninth brain surgery; the

removal, replacement, and re-removal of a tracheostomy tube; the

removal of a feeding tube; treatment for several seizures and

infections, and therapy to redevelop numerous basic cognitive and

physiological functions.

¶ 16 Finally, Novak presented no evidence and contested no

particular medical expense. He did not dispute that the described

medical care, in the natural and probable sequence of events,

resulted from the traumatic brain injury he caused. See Martinez,

¶ 13.

¶ 17 For these reasons, we conclude that the evidence, viewed as a

whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Novak caused

$1,600,140.07 in losses to Cigna.

8
III. Disposition

¶ 18 The restitution order is affirmed.

JUSTICE MARTINEZ and JUDGE ASHBY concur.

9