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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Samuel Crimaldi v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-00075

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (55.1K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 24-cv-00075-PAB-NRN

SAMUEL CRIMALDI,

Plaintiff,                                                           

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.                                                           

                        ORDER                                        

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment [Docket No. 44] and Defendant’s Fed. R. Evid. 702 Motion with Respect to
Plaintiff Expert Damian Arguello [Docket No. 41]. Plaintiff Samuel Crimaldi filed
responses, Docket Nos. 51, 42, and defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company filed replies. Docket Nos. 56, 43. The Court has jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

On August 31, 2019, plaintiff Samuel Crimaldi and his wife, Lois Winegarner,
were rear-ended by another automobile. Docket No. 51 at 4, ¶ 2. On that same day,
Ms. Winegarner reported a claim to State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(“State Farm”).2 Docket No. 44 at 3, ¶ 4. Ms. Winegarner reported that Mr. Crimaldi

1 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.         
2 Mr. Crimaldi purports to deny this fact, Docket No. 51 at 2, ¶ 4, but does not 

deny that Ms. Winegarner reported the claim on August 31, 2019. Therefore, the Court
deems this fact admitted.

suffered injuries in the form of “back sprain/strain (soft tissue injury), neck sprain/strain”
and received medical care in the form of “ambulance to Emergency Room Only.”3 Id. at
3, ¶ 6. A letter from State Farm addressed to Mr. Crimaldi indicated that a claim was
submitted, with the insured being Mr. Crimaldi, and with an August 31, 2019 date of
loss. 4 Docket No. 51 at 4, ¶ 3. State Farm followed up with Ms. Winegarner for

additional information, and on September 19, 2019, Ms. Winegarner indicated that
another insurance company “handled everything for the vehicle no estimate coming
from Caliber,” leading to State Farm closing the claim handling.5 Docket No. 44 at 3,
¶ 7.

3 Mr. Crimaldi denies this fact on the ground that, while the claim notes do state 

that, it is “unknown exactly what Ms. Winegarner said.” Docket No. 51 at 2, ¶ 6. On
summary judgment, a party opposing an asserted fact needs to either admit or deny the
statement and cite evidence in support of any denial. A denial cannot be based on the
party’s lack of knowledge. See Torres-Harris v. New Mexico, 2010 WL 11619107, at *6
n.5 (D.N.M. Aug. 13, 2010) (“Ignorance of a fact is an improper basis on which to
dispute a properly supported proposed fact for summary judgment purposes. If Plaintiff
seeks to dispute a fact at the summary judgment stage, she must come forward with
specific evidence that creates a question of fact for trial.”); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832
F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Importantly, in opposing a motion for summary
judgment, the non-moving party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on
suspicion.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Therefore, the Court deems this
fact to be admitted.

4 State Farm admits to statements found elsewhere in this letter, but does not
admit or deny the statements asserted by Mr. Crimaldi. However, pursuant to the
Court’s Practice Standards, “[a]ny party opposing the motion for summary judgment
shall . . . admit or deny the asserted material facts set forth by the movant.” Practice
Standards (Civil Cases), Judge Philip A. Brimmer, § III.F.3.b.iv. Therefore, the Court
deems this fact to be admitted.

5 Mr. Crimaldi denies this fact, Docket No. 51 at 2, ¶ 7, but bases his objection on
his view that it was inappropriate for State Farm to close the claim. The Court finds that
this is legal argument and does not constitute an appropriate denial. The Court
therefore deems this fact admitted.

Mr. Crimaldi was previously in a motor vehicle accident on January 27, 2018. Id.,
¶ 1. Mr. Crimaldi sued the tortfeasor for the January 27, 2018 accident.6 Id. at 4, ¶ 13.

Before the end of 2021, Mr. Crimaldi retained Dr. David Reinhard to perform a “Medical
Records Review.”7 Id., ¶ 14. Dr. Reinhard’s report apportioned Mr. Crimaldi’s injuries
with respect to Mr. Crimaldi’s 2013, 2018, and 2019 crashes. Docket No. 51 at 4-5, ¶ 8.

Mr. Crimaldi ultimately settled with the tortfeasor for the January 27, 2018 accident for
$1,000,000. Docket No. 44 at 3, ¶ 2. Between August 31, 2019 and February 24,
2022, Mr. Crimaldi was being treated for injuries from both accidents. Id. at 4, ¶ 11. At
least as of September 5, 2019, Mr. Crimaldi was telling providers he had “different” pain
after the August 31, 2019 accident than what he was attributing to the January 27, 2018
accident. Id., ¶ 12. Mr. Crimaldi and his attorneys did not give State Farm any details
about Mr. Crimaldi’s alleged injuries, treatment, or other information between
September 1, 20198 and March 8,9 2022.10 Id. at 5, ¶ 18.

6 Mr. Crimaldi denies this fact, but cites no evidence to support his denial.  The 

Court deems this fact to be admitted. Docket No. 51 at 3, ¶ 13.

7 State Farm claims that Dr. Reinhard was retained on December 23, 2021.

Docket No. 44 at 4, ¶ 14. Mr. Crimaldi claims that Dr. Reinhard was first retained before
September 2, 2021, but does not dispute that Dr. Reinhard performed a “Medical
Records Review.” Docket No. 51 at 3, ¶ 14.

8 State Farm claims this date is September 1, 2018. Docket No. 44 at 5, ¶ 18.
State Farm does not dispute that it received information about Mr. Crimaldi’s August 31,
2019 injuries when the August 31, 2019 claim was reported. Id. at 3, ¶ 6; Docket No. 56
at 2, ¶ 18. Thus, State Farm did receive information from Mr. Crimaldi after September
1, 2018. The Court presumes 2018 is a typographical error and the pertinent date is
September 1, 2019.

9 State Farm writes March 9, 2022. Docket No. 44 at 5, ¶ 18. The Court
presumes this is also a typographical error because it is undisputed that, on March 8,
2022, State Farm received a letter from Mr. Crimaldi regarding a potential UIM claim.

Id. at 3-4, ¶ 9. Thus, the Court presumes the pertinent date is March 8, 2022.

10 Mr. Crimaldi denies this fact, stating that, on August 31, 2019, Mr. Crimaldi
informed State Farm of the August 31, 2019 crash, injuries, and treatment. Docket No.
51 at 3, ¶ 18. Evidence that Mr. Crimaldi provided State Farm with information on
On March 8, 2022, Mr. Crimaldi sent a “Notice of Potential Underinsured Motorist
Claim” to State Farm. Id. at 3-4, ¶ 9. In April 2022, Mr. Crimaldi provided State Farm
with a medical records release, an injury questionnaire, and a provider list.11 Docket
No. 51 at 4, ¶ 5. On April 22, 2022, Mr. Crimaldi’s attorney submitted information to
State Farm including, among other things: 184 pages of expert reports Mr. Crimaldi

obtained in previous litigation, medical records, and bills.12 Id., ¶ 7. State Farm refused
to schedule an independent medical examination (“IME”) until it obtained records from
Dr. Ken Gable from 2014-2019.13 Id. at 5, ¶ 11.

Mr. Crimaldi settled the underlying liability claim from the August 31, 2019
accident in June 2022 for $50,000. Docket No. 44 at 6, ¶ 24. On January 16, 2025,
State Farm advised Mr. Crimaldi that, based upon the information it had, it appeared

August 31, 2019 does not support the proposition that Mr. Crimaldi informed State Farm
of his injuries or treatment between September 1, 2019 and March 8, 2022. The Court
therefore deems it admitted that Mr. Crimaldi did not give State Farm information about
his alleged injuries and treatment between September 1, 2019 and March 8, 2022.
11 State Farm denies this fact, Docket No. 56 at 2, ¶ 5, arguing that the
information was incomplete and inaccurate. This is legal argument and does not
constitute an appropriate denial. Thus, the Court deems it admitted that Mr. Crimaldi
sent a medical records release, an injury questionnaire, and a provider list to State
Farm.

12 State Farm admits that “[s]ome documents were sent on 4/22/22,” but
emphasizes that the records were not complete. Docket No. 56 at 2, ¶ 7. This
comment is nonresponsive and does not constitute a denial.

13 State Farm denies this fact on the ground that Mr. Crimaldi’s cited exhibits that
indicated it was waiting on records from multiple providers, not just Dr. Gable. Docket
No. 56 at 3, ¶ 11. The fact that State Farm was waiting on records from multiple
providers does not establish that State Farm was not also waiting on records from Dr.
Gable. Therefore, the Court deems this fact admitted. However, Mr. Crimaldi also
asserts in this fact that Mr. Crimaldi “did not treat” between 2014 and 2019. Docket No.
51 at 5, ¶ 11. State Farm properly disputes this fact on the ground that the exhibits Mr.
Crimaldi cites do not establish that Mr. Crimaldi “did not treat” between 2014 and 2019.

Docket No. 56 at 3, ¶ 11. Therefore, the Court does not deem it admitted that Mr.
Crimaldi did not treat between 2014 and 2019.

that Mr. Crimaldi was fairly compensated by the underlying policy limits of the tortfeasor.

Id., ¶ 25.

Mr. Crimaldi’s State Farm policy provides the following language:

7. Other Duties Under . . . Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, . . .

A person making claim under:

a. . . . Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage, . . . must:

(1) notify us of the claim and give us all the details about the death, injury,
treatment, and other information that we may need as soon as reasonably
possible after the injured insured is first examined or treated for the injury.

Id., ¶ 26. Mr. Crimaldi’s policy also provides that “A person making claim under:
a. . . . Uninsured Motor Vehicle Coverage . . . must: (3) provide written
authorization for us to obtain: (a) medical bills; (b) medical records.” Id., ¶ 27.
II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is warranted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when
the “movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986). A disputed fact is “material” if,
under the relevant substantive law, it is essential to proper disposition of the claim.

Wright v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1231–32 (10th Cir. 2001). Only disputes
over material facts can create a genuine issue for trial and preclude summary judgment.

Faustin v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 423 F.3d 1192, 1198 (10th Cir. 2005). An issue is
“genuine” if the evidence is such that it might lead a reasonable jury to return a verdict
for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir. 1997).
A movant who bears the burden at trial must submit evidence to establish the
essential elements of its claim or affirmative defense. Harper v. Mancos Sch. Dist. RE-
6, 837 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 1217 (D. Colo. 2011). By contrast, where “the moving party
does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial, it may satisfy its burden at the
summary judgment stage by identifying a lack of evidence for the nonmovant on an
essential element of the nonmovant's claim.” Bausman v. Interstate Brands Corp., 252
F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). “Once the moving party meets
this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue

for trial on a material matter.” Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & Cnty. Of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1518 (10th Cir. 1994). The nonmoving party may not rest solely on the
allegations in the pleadings, but instead must designate “specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)
(quotations omitted). “To avoid summary judgment, the nonmovant must establish, at a
minimum, an inference of the presence of each element essential to the case.”

Bausman, 252 F.3d at 1115. When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court
must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. III. ANALYSIS14

In his complaint, Mr. Crimaldi brings claims for breach of contract, common law

bad faith delay or denial of his claim, and statutory bad faith delay or denial of his claim.

Docket No. 5 at 9-11, ¶¶ 54-81.

State Farm argues that Mr. Crimaldi’s failure to comply with his policy precludes
his recovery. Docket No. 44 at 8. Specifically, State Farm notes that “[t]he right to
recovery under an insurance policy may be forfeited when, in violation of a policy

14 Because jurisdiction is based on diversity, the Court applies Colorado law in 

resolving the motion. See Essex Ins. Co. v. Vincent, 52 F.3d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1995)
(“In a case in which jurisdiction is founded on diversity, we apply the law of the forum
state.”). The parties also assume that Colorado law applies. See generally Docket
Nos. 44, 51, 56.

provision, the insured fails to cooperate with the insurer in a substantial and material
respect and this failure to cooperate causes a substantial disadvantage to the insurer.” Id. In the alternative, State Farm argues that Mr. Crimaldi’s claims for common law bad
faith and statutory bad faith fail as a matter of law. Id. at 12.

A. Failure to Cooperate

State Farm argues that Mr. Crimaldi failed to cooperate with State Farm 

because, in contravention of his policy, Mr. Crimaldi did not timely notify State Farm of
his claim or give State Farm details about his injuries and treatment. Id. at 9. State
Farm asserts that these failures prevented it from participating in the investigation of Mr.
Crimaldi’s injuries. Id. at 9-10. State Farm notes that its participation was particularly
important considering the challenges that arose in properly attributing Mr. Crimaldi’s
injuries given he was in two separate accidents. Id.

“Under Colorado law an insured may forfeit the right to recover under an
insurance policy if he or she fails to cooperate in violation of a policy provision.” Walker
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 16-cv-00118-PAB-STV, 2017 WL 1386341, at *3 (D.

Colo. Feb. 23, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 1386346 (D. Colo.
Mar. 17, 2017). “When an insurer asserts a noncooperation defense, the insured will
likely be held to have forfeited his or her right to recover under an insurance policy
when, in violation of a policy provision, the insured fails to cooperate with the insurer in
some material and substantial respect and this failure to cooperate materially and
substantially disadvantaged the insurer.” Soicher v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 351
P.3d 559, 564 (Colo. App. 2015) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Secrist, 33
P.3d 1272, 1275 (Colo. App. 2001)). The insurer bears the burden to prove failure to
cooperate. Id. “Material and substantial disadvantage” is determined by
whether the insurer has been able to complete a reasonable investigation
with regard to whether the insured’s claim is valid. If the insured’s refusal
to cooperate prevents the insurer from completing such a reasonable

investigation, prejudice should be found to exist. Specifically, it has been
held that the insurer can deny coverage, following an insured’s refusal to
provide documents reasonably requested by the insurer, on the basis that
the insurer has been prejudiced because the insured’s refusal prejudices
the insurer by putting the insurer in the untenable position of either
denying coverage or paying the claim without the means to investigate its
validity.

Walker, 2017 WL 1386341, at *4 (quoting 1 Allan D. Windt, Insurance Claims &
Disputes § 3.2 (6th ed. 2016)). Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1118 “requires an insurer to satisfy specific requirements
before asserting an insured’s failure to cooperate as a defense to a claim for benefits in
‘litigation that occurs on or after’ September 13, 2020.” Dale v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 699 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1223 (D. Colo. 2023). These requirements include,
among other things, submitting a written request for information which is not available
by other means, giving the insured 60 days to respond, and giving the insured an
opportunity to cure the alleged failure to cooperate. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1118 (1)(a)-
(b), (e). State Farm has not established any undisputed facts that it met the
requirements of § 10-3-1118. Thus, State Farm is barred from raising a failure to
cooperate defense.15 Wenzell v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 552 P.3d 1121, 1129
(Colo. App. 2024); Dale, 699 F. Supp. 3d at 1223; Worley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., No. 23-cv-00337-DDD-MDB, 2025 WL 580493, at *5-6 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 2025).

15 In framing its failure to cooperate defense, State Farm does not formally raise 

an affirmative defense, but states that Mr. Crimaldi failed to comply with conditions
precedent. Docket No. 44 at 11. “This is a distinction without a difference” and State
Farm still must adhere to the requirements set out in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1118.

Worley, 2025 WL 580493, at *5 (citing Wenzell, 552 P.3d at 1127).

In its reply, State Farm argues that § 10-3-1118 is inapplicable. Docket No. 56 at
5-6. Specifically, State Farm argues that § 10-3-1118’s requirements are “premised on
the carrier’s knowledge that a claim has been made and that records are missing.” Id.
at 6. However, in its statement of undisputed facts, State Farm admits that Ms.
Winegarner reported a claim on August 31, 2019—the day of the automobile accident.

Docket No. 44 at 3, ¶ 4. Ms. Winegarner informed State Farm of the automobile
accident and that Mr. Crimaldi was physically injured. Id., ¶¶ 4, 6. Ms. Winegarner also
informed State Farm that Mr. Crimaldi was taken to the Emergency Room. Id., ¶ 6.

Thus, State Farm knew as of August 31, 2019 that Ms. Winegarner made a claim
involving property damage and physical injuries to Mr. Crimaldi, and had reason to
know that there would be medical records from the Emergency Room. Thus, State
Farm knew that a claim had been made and knew, as time passed, that it had not
received Emergency Room records. State Farm could have asked Mr. Crimaldi for the
emergency room records.16

16 State Farm also argues that Mr. Crimaldi has a duty to disclose certain 

information under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-1003. Docket No. 44 at 11. Specifically,
State Farm notes that, “[u]nder the Colorado Insurance Fraud statute, there is a duty to
disclose relevant information, including ‘material relating to the investigation of the loss,
including . . . any proof of such loss.’” Docket No. 44 at 11 (quoting Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 10-4-1003 (2)(d)). However, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-1003 (2)(d) states, in full: “(2) Any
authorized agency may, in writing, require the insurer having an interest in a fire loss or
other claim to release to the authorized agency specific, relevant information or
evidence deemed important by the authorized agency which the insurer has in its
possession and which relates to the fire loss or other claim in question. Relevant
information may include, but shall not be limited to: . . . (d) Any other material relating to
the investigation of the loss, including statements of any person who may have
information about the loss and any proof of such loss.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4 -
1003(2)(d). Thus, § 10-4-1003 sets forth duties for the insurer to disclose information,
not for the policyholder.

State Farm argues that it was prejudiced because the August 31, 2019 claim was
not a UIM claim, and Mr. Crimaldi did not give State Farm notice of his UIM claim until
he sent his “Notice of Potential UIM claim” on March 8, 2022. Id. at 8-10. Thus, State
Farm argues that it did not receive timely notice of the UIM claim, in contravention of the
policy. Id. at 9. Mr. Crimaldi, however, asserts that the August 31, 2019 claim was a

UIM claim. Docket No. 51 at 2, ¶ 7.

The Court does not find it necessary to determine whether the August 31, 2019
claim was a UIM claim because State Farm fails to establish that notice was untimely
either way. “The duty to give notice under a UIM policy arises when an insured, with
reasonable diligence, can ascertain that the alleged tortfeasor is underinsured.”

Clementi v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 16 P.3d 223, 226 (Colo. 2001) (citation
omitted). State Farm put forward no evidence as to when Mr. Crimaldi should have
known that the August 31, 2019 tortfeasor was underinsured.

In Hauger v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-cv-02438-LTB-KMT, 2016 WL

164678, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2016), the insurer argued that the insured breached her
obligation to promptly notify the insurer of her UIM claim. It was undisputed that the
insured did not notify the insurer of the UIM claim until 19 months after the accident
occurred. Id. However, the court noted that the circumstances of the claim arguably
supported an inference that the timing of the insured’s notice was nonetheless
reasonable. Id. Specifically, the court emphasized that there was no litigation relating
to the March 12, 2009 accident until February 2012.17 Id. Similarly, here, Mr. Crimaldi

17 The insurer in Hauger claimed it was prejudiced by the purportedly late notice 

because the insured was in two other accidents that also caused injuries. Hauger, 2016
did not settle the underlying liability claim for the August 31, 2019 accident until June
2022, months after the March 8, 2022 notice of potential UIM claim letter was sent.

State Farm presents no undisputed facts that Mr. Crimaldi knew that the August 31,
2019 tortfeasor was underinsured prior to sending his notice of UIM claim letter. Thus,
State Farm is not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. See Stoole v. Metro.

Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-0613-NYW, 2018 WL 3126112, at *7 (D. Colo. June
26, 2018) (stating that, while it was undisputed that the insured did not notify the insurer
of her potential UIM claim until approximately 13 months after her accident, the parties
“put forth no evidence as to when [the insured] should have reasonably known about
her UIM claim.”); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. LaRose, 919 P.2d 915, 918 (Colo.
App. 1996) (affirming the denial of an insurer’s motion for summary judgment when the
insurer “failed to present evidence in support of its motion that established the date from
which the insureds knew or with reasonable diligence should have known that the
alleged tortfeasor’s liability insurance would provide insufficient coverage.”). In

summary, the Court finds that State Farm is not entitled to summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claims based on plaintiff’s alleged failure to cooperate.

B. Statutory Bad Fatih

Mr. Crimaldi brings a statutory claim for unreasonable denial and delay of
benefits. Docket No. 5 at 10-11, ¶¶ 79-81. Colo Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1116(a) provides that
people who suffer an unreasonable delay or denial of benefits, as defined in Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 10-3-1115, may bring an action for twice the covered benefit and attorneys’ fees.

See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1116. Pursuant to § 10-3-1115, an insurer may not

WL 164678, at *3. The court found that this claim alone did not dictate a finding that the
insured was prejudiced as a matter of law. Id.

“unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits owed to or on behalf of any
first-party claimant.”18 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115 (1)(a). An insurer’s conduct is
unreasonable “if the insurer delayed or denied authorizing payment of a covered benefit
without a reasonable basis for that action.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115 (2). The
determination of whether an insurer has breached its duties to the insured is one of

reasonableness under the circumstances. Estate of Morris v. COPIC Ins. Co., 192 P.3d
519, 523 (Colo. App. 2008). Acting “without a reasonable basis” has been construed to
mean pursuing a groundless position that is not supported by credible evidence.

Cooper v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 3d 873, 878 (D. Colo. 2023) (quoting
Masters v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-00631-PAB-NRN, 2021 WL 4326269, at
*5 (D. Colo. Sept. 23, 2021)). The question is whether a reasonable insurer under
similar circumstances would have denied or delayed payment of the claim. Estate of
Morris, 192 P.3d at 523. The reasonableness of an insurer’s conduct must be
determined objectively, based on proof of industry standards. Schultz v. GEICO Cas.

Co., 429 P.3d 844, 847 (Colo. 2018). Whether an insurer’s conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. Zolman v. Pinnacol
Assurance, 261 P.3d 490, 497 (Colo. App. 2011). However, in appropriate

18 Mr. Crimaldi discusses how State Farm unreasonably delayed handling his 

claim in respect to his common law bad faith claim. See Docket No. 51 at 10-13. When
discussing his statutory bad faith claim, Mr. Crimaldi argues that State Farm “provides
no support whatsoever that its delay or denial were reasonable” Id. at 14. However,
“[t]he burden to establish unreasonableness lies with plaintiff.” Vansky v. State Farm
Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-01062-PAB-NRN, 2022 WL 900160, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 28,
2022) (citing Williams v. Owners Ins. Co., 621 F. App’x 914, 919 (10th Cir.
2015) (unpublished)). Thus, the Court will examine Mr. Crimaldi’s arguments as to his
common law bad faith claim to determine if Mr. Crimaldi meets his burden on his
statutory bad faith claim.

circumstances, as when there are no genuine disputes of material facts,

reasonableness may be decided as a matter of law. Estate of Morris, 192 P.3d at 524.
Mr. Crimaldi claims that State Farm unreasonably delayed his UIM claim from the
day Ms. Winegarner submitted it, on August 31, 2019, to the time he sent the notice of
potential UIM claim letter, on March 8, 2022. Docket No. 51 at 12. Specifically, Mr.

Crimaldi argues that State Farm unreasonably delayed payment by not investigating his
UIM claim when State Farm first found out that Mr. Crimaldi was injured on August 31,
2019. Id. The Court is unconvinced. Although, as discussed earlier, State Farm could
have asked Mr. Crimaldi for records regarding his emergency room visit on August 31,
2019, that issue is relevant to whether § 10-3-1118 bars State Farm’s failure to
cooperate defense. However, no reasonable jury could find that State Farm acted
unreasonably in not investigating Mr. Crimaldi’s claim when State Farm followed up with
Ms. Winegarner and she told State Farm, on September 19, 2019, that the other
insurance company was handling the vehicle damage. She apparently did not mention

personal injuries or medical bills. As a result of this conversation, State Farm closed the
claim with Ms. Winegarner. After closing the claim file based on that conversation,
State Farm heard nothing from Mr. Crimaldi for two and a half years.19 Despite Mr.
Crimaldi’s assertion that the August 31, 2019 claim was a UIM claim, the undisputed

19 In its statement of undisputed material facts, State Farm asserts that, after 

closing the claim on September 19, 2019, State Farm heard nothing from Mr. Crimaldi
until receiving the notice of potential UIM claim letter on March 8, 2022. Docket No. 44
at 3, ¶ 8. Mr. Crimaldi denies this fact on the basis that his attorneys called State Farm
on November 12, 2019 requesting information State Farm collected for the 2018 crash.

Docket No. 51 at 2, ¶ 8. A call regarding the 2018 crash could not reasonably put State
Farm on notice that Mr. Crimaldi intended to pursue a UIM claim related to the 2019
crash.

facts provide no basis for State Farm to believe Mr. Crimaldi made a UIM claim, as
opposed to a collision and personal injury claim. Thus, Mr. Crimaldi fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether State Farm acted unreasonably by not
investigating his UIM claim before March 8, 2022.

Mr. Crimaldi also claims that State Farm unreasonably delayed his UIM claim

after he sent his March 8, 2022 letter. Docket No. 51 at 12. First, Mr. Crimaldi argues
that State Farm unreasonably delayed its handling of his claim by not considering Dr.
Reinhard’s report until State Farm conducted its own IME20 and by refusing to schedule
an IME until obtaining records from Dr. Gable.21 Id. As to Dr. Reinhard’s report, Mr.
Crimaldi does not suggest that State Farm knew of the Reinhard report before April

20 Mr. Crimaldi asserts that State Farm was “deliberately indifferent” to Dr. 

Reinhard’s apportionment until it received its own IME, but does not explain what the
term deliberately indifferent means. See Docket No. 51 at 12. The Court construes this
phrase as stating that State Farm did not consider the apportionment until receiving its
own IME.

21 Mr. Crimaldi does not explicitly argue that State Farm delayed handling of his
claim by waiting an unreasonable amount of time to schedule his IME; rather, his
arguments are based on State Farm’s failure to consider Dr. Reinhard’s report until
conducting its own IME and not scheduling the IME until it received records from Dr.
Gable. Docket No. 51 at 12. However, Mr. Crimaldi mentions in passing that State
Farm did not schedule an IME until 2024, stating that, “[a]fter it opened the UIM
exposure in March 2022, it was deliberately indifferent to Dr. Reinhard’s apportionment
for years until it got its own IME in October 2024.” Id. Waiting over two and a half years
to schedule an IME could potentially be considered unreasonable. But Mr. Crimaldi’s
assertion that the IME was not scheduled until October 2024 is entirely unsupported.

Mr. Crimaldi provides no citation to support his assertion that the IME was not
scheduled until October 2024. See id. Moreover, no undisputed fact establishes that
an IME was not scheduled until October 2024. See Docket No. 44 at 3-6; Docket No.
51 at 4-5. “Unsubstantiated allegations carry no probative weight in summary judgment
proceedings.” Upchurch v. Wastequip, LLC, 2022 WL 4099433, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 8,
2022) (quoting Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1997 (10th Cir. 2007)). Thus, the
Court does not find Mr. Crimaldi’s allegation probative as to the date State Farm
conducted its IME. There are no other allegations or facts which establish when State
Farm conducted its IME.

2022. Moreover, Mr. Crimaldi does not explain how State Farm acted unreasonably in
not considering Dr. Reinhard’s report until it received its own IME. However, to the
extent Mr. Crimaldi is arguing that State Farm acted unreasonably in conducting its own
IME rather than solely relying on Dr. Reinhard’s report, the Court is unpersuaded. The
undisputed facts show that Mr. Crimaldi was undergoing treatment for injuries sustained

from both the January 27, 2018 accident and the August 31, 2019 accident. Docket No.
44 at 4, ¶ 11. Mr. Crimaldi was attributing certain pain exclusively to the August 31,
2019 accident. Id., ¶ 12. Mr. Crimaldi retained Dr. Reinhard, who wrote a report
apportioning Mr. Crimaldi’s injuries. Id., ¶ 14; Docket No. 51 at 4-5, ¶ 8. Mr. Crimaldi
provides no support for the proposition that it is unreasonable for an insurance company
to question a report apportioning injuries or to request an IME after receiving such a
report. Notably,

there is social utility in allowing no-fault insurance companies to request
independent medical examinations performed by physicians of their

choice. Insurance companies must be accorded wide latitude in their
ability to investigate claims and to resist false or unfounded efforts to
obtain funds not available under the contract of insurance. Independent
medical examinations at the insurance company’s request allow it to make
informed decisions about whether to deny benefits based on a physical or
psychological condition.

Martinez v. Lewis, 942 P.2d 1219, 1224 (Colo. App. 1996) (internal quotations,
alternations, and citation omitted). The Court finds that no reasonable juror could find
that it was objectively unreasonable for State Farm to delay payment of benefits until it
could request its own IME. Moreover, the Court finds that Mr. Crimaldi does not show
an industry standard that asserts State Farm was unreasonable in not relying solely on
Dr. Reinhard’s apportionment considering the undisputed facts indicate that
apportioning Mr. Crimaldi’s injuries was complex and that Dr. Reinhard was retained by
Mr. Crimaldi. Docket No. 44 at 4, ¶¶ 11-12, 14-15. There are no facts which
demonstrate that a different insurance provider reviewing Mr. Crimaldi’s medical records
would not have also requested an IME. Estate of Morris, 192 P.3d at 523.
As to Dr. Gable, Mr. Crimaldi argues that State Farm’s investigation was
unreasonable because State Farm “refused to schedule an IME until it obtained records

from Dr. Gable from 2014-2019, a period it knew Mr. Crimaldi did not treat.” Docket No.
51 at 12. Mr. Crimaldi does not explain why it was unreasonable for State Farm to wait
to schedule its IME until it received Mr. Crimaldi’s medical reports. Notably, “[i]t is not
unusual or unexpected that a defendant would defer the decision to conduct an IME
until it receives the full report of Plaintiff's expert medical witnesses.” Seyfang v.
DreamHome Restoration, LLC, 2018 WL 1701970, at *4 (D. Wyo. Apr. 6, 2018).

Moreover, it is not uncommon for insurers to hold off on deciding whether an insured is
entitled to benefits until after receiving the insured’s medical records. See Cody v. Am.
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., S.I., No. 23-cv-03107-STV, 2025 WL 2996632, at *11 (D. Colo. Oct.

23, 2025) (holding that it is not unreasonable as a matter of law for the defendant to
delay deciding which benefits the plaintiff was entitled to until after it had received all of
the plaintiff’s records). Thus, the Court is unpersuaded that Mr. Crimaldi’s arguments
regarding the IMEs support his theory that State Farm unreasonably delayed handling
Mr. Crimaldi’s claim after March 8, 2022.

Next, Mr. Crimaldi argues that it was unreasonable for State Farm not to
interview Mr. Crimaldi when conducting its investigation. Docket No. 51 at 12. Mr.
Crimaldi, however, provides no support for the proposition that it is an industry standard
for insurance companies to interview the insured regarding his or her injuries or that
failing to do so is bad faith conduct. See Martin-Harker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., No. 23-cv-00629-PAB-STV, 2025 WL 914297, at *8 (D. Colo. Mar. 26, 2025)
(excluding expert opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because plaintiff's expert
“offers no support for there being a ‘proactive duty’ to directly contact the insured and
the insured’s medical provider in situations, like here, where the insured is represented

by counsel and the insurer has already obtained the medical documentation, or a large
portion of it, from the insured” and noting that “[o]ther states recognize that there is no
such duty for an insurer to contact the insured's medical provider or otherwise contact
and obtain information from the insured directly where the insurer believes it already
has the necessary information”) (citing Hanson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 F.
Supp. 3d 1110, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2017); Jackson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 780 F. Supp. 2d
781, 792 (S.D. Ind. 2011); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Misra, 2024 WL 289032, at
*3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2024)). The undisputed facts indicate that State Farm received
Mr. Crimaldi’s medical records.22 Docket No. 51 at 4, ¶ 7. Mr. Crimaldi fails to explain

why it was necessary for State Farm to interview him in light of the submission of these
medical records. Therefore, Mr. Crimaldi has not established that it was unreasonable
for State Farm not to conduct an interview. See Meiman v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No.
21-cv-02568-MEH, 2022 WL 7560293, at *13 (D. Colo. Oct. 13, 2022) (“The Court
cannot find the absence of an interview to support bad faith”).

Mr. Crimaldi argues that State Farm ordered medical records in a way that it
knew would cause delay. Docket No. 51 at 12. For support, he cites the deposition of

22 State Farm argues that these records were incomplete.  Docket No. 56 at 2, 

¶ 7.

Audrey Douglas, a State Farm claim specialist. Id. In his statement of undisputed facts,
Mr. Crimaldi asserts that “Audrey Doulgas admitted State Farm was using a method she
knew could cause delay to obtain Mr. Crimaldi’s records after August 2022: addressing
their records requests using the names of the providers instead of the names of the
facilities.” Id. at 5, ¶ 16. State Farm disputes this fact, arguing, among other things, it is

an inaccurate summary of the deposition. Docket No. 56 at 3, ¶ 3. In the cited portion
of the deposition, Ms. Douglas agrees with the question that, when ordering medical
records, it is more effective to utilize the name of the facility as the addressed entity.

Docket No. 51-13 at 2, 80:18-23. Moreover, in the deposition, Ms. Douglas agrees that
not ordering medical records in that manner could delay the production of medical
records. Id. at 2-3, 80:25, 81:1-4. However, the portion of the deposition which Mr.
Crimaldi attaches to his response does not establish that State Farm failed to utilize the
name of the facility as the addressed entity. See generally id. at 1-3. Thus, the
evidence Mr. Crimaldi cites does not support his assertion, and he has failed to create a

genuine issue of material fact that State Farm ordered records in a manner which could
cause delay.

The remainder of Mr. Crimaldi’s arguments in support of post March 2022 delay
by State Farm relies on evidence which has not been properly presented to the Court.

For instance, Mr. Crimaldi argues that State Farm did not establish that it had reason to
question the 2019 crash, the allocation of Mr. Crimaldi’s injuries, and Mr. Crimaldi’s
medical treatment until July 29, 2022. Docket No. 51 at 12. For support, Mr. Crimaldi
cites Exhibit 16. Exhibit 16 is attached to Mr. Crimaldi’s response, and consists of claim
notes which appear to have been made by Ms. Douglas on July 29, 2022. See Docket
No. 51-16. Mr. Crimaldi, however, does not mention the July 29, 2022 claim notes in
his statement of additional undisputed facts. See Docket No. 51 at 4-5. The Court’s
Practice Standards state that if the party opposing the summary judgment motion

believes that there exist additional disputed questions of fact . . ., the party
shall, in a separate section of the party's brief styled “Statement of
Additional Disputed Facts,” set forth in simple, declarative sentences,
separately numbered and paragraphed, each additional, material disputed
fact which undercuts movant's claim that it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Each separately numbered and paragraphed fact shall be
accompanied by a specific reference to material in the record which

establishes the fact or at least demonstrates that it is disputed. Similarly,
if the party opposing the motion believes that there exist additional
undisputed facts, the party shall, in a separate section of the party's brief
styled “Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts,” set forth in simple,
declarative sentences, separately numbered and paragraphed, each

additional, material undisputed fact which undercuts movant's claim that it
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Each separately numbered and
paragraphed fact shall be accompanied by a specific reference to material
in the record which establishes the fact or at least demonstrates that it is
undisputed.

Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Judge Philip A. Brimmer, § III.F.3.b.v. (emphasis
omitted).

Despite his failure to properly assert facts related to the claim notes, Mr. Crimaldi
nevertheless asks the Court to consider them in determining whether State Farm
unreasonably delayed handling his UIM claim. As indicated in the Court’s Practice
Standards, the problem with this request is it deprives State Farm of the opportunity to
admit or deny Mr. Crimaldi’s assertions. See Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Judge
Philip A. Brimmer, § III.F.3.b.vii (“The sole purpose of these procedures is to establish
facts and determine which of them are in dispute”). Without adhering to the Court’s
Practice Standards, the Court’s ability to properly determine what facts are undisputed
and what facts are disputed is significantly compromised. Indeed, the claim notes do
not appear to support Mr. Crimaldi’s assertion that State Farm did not come up with
questions until July 29, 2022, indicating the importance of giving State Farm the chance
to properly dispute purported facts.23 See Docket No. 51-16.

Importantly, the requirement in the Practice Standards that a party opposing
summary judgment state its facts in the form of statements is consistent with Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e), which refers to “assertion[s] of fact.” Rule 56 distinguishes such
assertions or statements of fact from the evidence that supports the assertions. See,
e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support that assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the
record”). Thus, for Mr. Crimaldi to simply cite the claim notes in his response frustrates
the summary judgment process and violates the Court’s Practice Standards. As a
result, the Court will not consider the claim notes. As the Practice Standard on
summary judgment states, “[f]ailure to follow these procedures may result in an order
striking or denying the motion or brief or may cause the court to deem certain facts as

admitted.” Practice Standards (Civil Cases), Judge Philip A. Brimmer, § III.F.3.b.ix.

Even if the Court were to consider the claim notes and even if the claim notes
supported Mr. Crimaldi’s assertion that State Farm did not develop questions related to
the 2019 crash until July 29, 2022, the Court would still not find that State Farm acted
unreasonably. Mr. Crimaldi asserts that he provided State Farm with information to
evaluate his claim on April 22, 2022. Docket No. 51 at 4, ¶ 7. This information included

23 The claim notes contain no statement indicating that State Farm formulated 

questions relating to the 2019 crash, much less that State Farm was doing so for the
first time. See Docket No. 51-16. Instead, the case notes appear to state findings from
various documents that Mr. Crimaldi submitted. Id.

“184 pages of expert reports Plaintiff obtained for the 2018 litigation, medical records to
date, bills to date, and State Farm’s injury questionnaire completed by Mr. Crimaldi
among other things.” Id. Mr. Crimaldi does not explain why it was unreasonable for
State Farm to take until July 29, 2022 to evaluate this information when State Farm only
received it on April 22, 2022. The Court finds that State Farm taking just over three

months to evaluate 184 pages of expert reports, as well as medical records and bills, is
not inherently unreasonable, particularly considering State Farm asserts that it needed
other information not contained in the April 22, 2022 submission. See Docket No. 56 at
2, ¶ 7.

Mr. Crimaldi also improperly relies on the claim notes when asserting that State
Farm unreasonably delayed handling his claim by forwarding it to medical management.

Docket No. 51 at 12. As explained above, the Court will not consider the claim notes
because they were not presented as an undisputed or disputed fact pursuant to the
Court’s Practice Standards. Moreover, the claim notes do not indicate that the claim

was forwarded to medical management, but rather indicate that Ms. Douglas
“[r]equest[ed] to move forward with medical management to understand injuries as
related to this MVA.” Docket No. 51-16. Mr. Crimaldi does not explain what it means to
forward a claim to medical management or why such a decision would cause

unreasonable delay. See Docket No. 51 at 12.

Finally, Mr. Crimaldi relies on Exhibit 14 in support of his argument that State
Farm unreasonably delayed handling of his claim by requesting medical records from
providers it already had records from. Id. Mr. Crimaldi does not assert that State Farm
requested medical records from providers it already had records from in his statement
of additional undisputed facts. Thus, the Court will not consider this assertion. The
Court notes, however, that Exhibit 14 does not support Mr. Crimaldi’s assertion. Exhibit
14 is attached to Mr. Crimaldi’s response and appears to be a letter sent from State
Farm indicating that it is pending receipt of medical records from some of Mr. Crimaldi’s
medical providers. Docket No. 51-14. The letter does not state that State Farm is

already in possession of the records; rather, it indicates that State Farm has “requested
records from the providers, but not all have been received in the file to date.” Id. at 1.

The letter suggests that State Farm has “re-requested” records from some of the
providers. Id. at 1. Thus, the letter does not indicate that State Farm is requesting
records it already has, but instead that State Farm is following up about records it has
not received. If anything, this supports a finding that State Farm was actively
investigating Mr. Crimaldi’s claim, not that it was engaging in tactics to cause
unreasonable delay.

Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded by Mr. Crimaldi’s arguments that State

Farm unreasonably delayed handling his claim after receiving notice of the claim in the
March 8, 2022 letter. Therefore, the Court will grant summary judgment as to Mr.
Crimaldi’s statutory bad faith claim.

C. Common Law Bad Faith

To prevail on a claim for bad faith delay or denial of insurance benefits under
Colorado common law, a plaintiff must establish that her insurer (1) acted unreasonably
under the circumstances; and (2) knew of, or had reckless disregard for, the
unreasonableness of its actions. Goodson v. Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wisc., 89 P.3d
409, 415 (Colo. 2004). “The only element at issue in the statutory claim is whether an
insurer denied benefits without a reasonable basis.” Cooper, 653 F. Supp. 3d at 878
(alterations omitted) (quoting Williams, 621 F. App’x at 919). “By contrast, to prove a
first-party claim of common law bad faith, a plaintiff must show not only that the insurer’s
conduct in processing or denying a valid claim was unreasonable but also that the
insurer knew its conduct was unreasonable or recklessly disregarded the

unreasonableness of its conduct.” Id. (citing Travelers Insurance Co. v. Savio, [706 P.2d

1258](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1284323/travelers-insurance-co-v-savio/), 1275–76 (Colo. 1985)). “Accordingly, a claim of common law bad faith imposes a
more exacting standard of proof than a statutory claim.” Id. (citation omitted));
Kisselman v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 964, 975 (Colo. App. 2011) (the
“burden of proving th[e] statutory claim is less onerous than that required to prove a
claim under the common law for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing”).
When analyzing Mr. Crimaldi’s statutory bad faith claim, the Court determined
that he failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether State Farm’s
conduct was unreasonable. Thus, Mr. Crimaldi has not satisfied the first element of a
common law bad faith claim, and the Court will dismiss the claim accordingly. See

Garcia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 21-cv-01504-CMA-MEH, 2021 WL
5770229, at 3 (D. Colo. Dec. 6, 2021) (dismissing common-law bad faith claim where
plaintiff failed to identify a genuine dispute of material fact regarding defendant's
reasonableness); Stemple v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 17-cv-02381-CMA-
STV, 2019 WL 2866587, at *5 n.5 (D. Colo. July 3, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot establish the
first element of her bad faith claim, rendering it unnecessary for the Court to analyze the
second element of the claim.”).

D. 702 Motion
In addition to seeking summary judgment, State Farm seeks to exclude several
opinions from the report of Damian Arguello, Docket No. 41-1, Mr. Crimaldi’s expert on
insurance industry standards. Docket No. 41. Mr. Arguello’s report consists of opinions
on whether State Farm violated various industry standards, which relates to whether
State Farm acted in bad faith. See generally Docket No. 41-1. Because the Court has
granted summary judgment as to Mr. Crimaldi’s bad faith claims, the entire report is
rendered irrelevant. Accordingly, the Court will deny State Farm’s 702 motion as moot.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 44] is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is further
ORDERED that Mr. Crimaldi’s second and third* claims for relief as DISMISSED
with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s Fed. R. Evid. 702 Motion with Respect to Plaintiff
Expert Damian Arguello [Docket No. 41] is DENIED as moot.
DATED March 27, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
a co Lo
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

 24 Mr. Crimaldi inadvertently labelled his third claim for relief as his fourth claim 

for relief. See Docket No. 5 at 10.
24