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March 5, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Super. Ct.

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: B346062A

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.3K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/5/26; Opinion following rehearing
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B346062

Petitioner, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA107988)
v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

JOB URIAH TAYLOR,

Real Party in Interest.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Lana Kim,
Judge. Petition granted.
Nathan J. Hochman, District Attorney, Tracey Whitney,
Byron Beck and Jeffrey Herring, Deputy District Attorneys, for
Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Erika Anzoategui, Alternate Public Defender, Michael
Schensul and Nazila Shokrian, Deputy Alternate Public
Defenders, for Real Party in Interest.
Galit Lipa, State Public Defender and Teresa DeAmicis,
Deputy State Public Defender for Office of the State Public
Defender as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.

---

Penal Code section 1001.36 1 authorizes a court to grant
pretrial diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental
disorder who agrees to comply with mental health treatment
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)) and will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety “if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).)
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged Job
Uriah Taylor with several counts of attempted murder and
assault with a deadly weapon, alleging Taylor viciously attacked
four individuals with a metal pipe. The defense moved for
mental health diversion to a community facility, supported
by a psychological evaluation that Taylor suffered a treatable
schizoaffective disorder but would not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric symptoms were
controlled with treatment.”
Impliedly finding Taylor would not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated in a community facility,
the trial court granted diversion.
The People petition for a writ vacating the court’s order
on the ground that no evidence suggested, and the court did not

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
find, that Taylor would comply with a treatment regimen in a
community facility, and therefore no evidence supported the
court’s finding that he would not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if granted diversion. We agree and grant
the petition.

BACKGROUND
A. Alleged Attacks and Charges
The People allege that on the morning of March 3, 2023,
Taylor, age 25, went on a violent, racially motivated rampage
targeting multiple victims in Santa Monica. Taylor approached
Christian Hornburg, who is Black, from behind and clubbed him
over the head with a metal pipe and then stomped his head while
he was on the ground, helpless. Duane Ziegler, a witness who
attempted to protect Hornburg, heard Taylor say he was there to
“kill that nigger.”
When Jade Carter, who is also Black, tried to intervene,
Taylor attacked her with the pipe and hurled racial slurs.
Footage from a police body camera showed Taylor
continued his racist rant until he was arrested. Both Hornburg
and Carter were transported to the hospital. Hornburg sustained
life-altering injuries.
Police learned that earlier that morning, Taylor threatened
Michael Okyere, who is Black, with the metal pipe and shouted
racial slurs at him. Nearby firefighters intervened and chased
him away.
In an amended information, the People charged Taylor
with the willful, premeditated, and deliberate attempted murder
of Hornburg, with special allegations that Taylor personally
inflicted great bodily injury and that the offense constituted

3
a hate crime. The People also charged Taylor with three counts
of assault with a deadly weapon on Okyere, Ziegler, and Carter,
each count including hate crime allegations. Taylor pleaded not
guilty to the charges.

B. Motion for Diversion
In June 2024, Taylor filed a motion for mental health
diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion described
Taylor’s abusive and troubling family history and his struggle
with mental health issues beginning at the age of 12.

1. Dr. Campbell’s Report In support of the motion, Taylor offered a psychological evaluation prepared by Robin Rhodes Campbell, PhD., who evaluated him in April 2024 in response to a referral from the alternate public defender’s office. The referral asked Dr. Campbell to opine on three questions: (1) “Does the defendant suffer from a mental health condition other than antisocial personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, or pedophilia”; (2) “Would the defendant’s condition respond to mental health treatment”; and (3) “Would the defendant pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community?” Dr. Campbell reviewed the records of the 2023 incidents, including police body camera footage; the probation report; and Taylor’s records from four mental health treatment providers. The records revealed that Taylor had a history of substance abuse and danger toward others and once required five-point restraints in the hospital after he attacked staff members. His mood was labile, and there “were times when he appeared to be feigning some of his symptoms, but there were also times when

4
he appeared to be presenting with very real mood instability and
impulsivity.”
Records from the Department of State Hospitals–
Metropolitan (DSH-M) stated that Taylor was admitted to
DSH-M in September 2023 for restoration of trial competency
and was discharged in October 2023. He reported a history of
ADHD and “bipolar schizophrenia,” with psychiatric symptoms
dating back to childhood, including both auditory and visual
hallucinations, high energy, decreased need for sleep, and
irritability. Taylor had symptoms of depression, including
sadness, lack of pleasure, and disturbed sleep, and was diagnosed
with “unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic
disorder, other stimulant use, unspecified, opioid use disorder,
and hallucinogen abuse.” He reported that medication was
effective in reducing auditory hallucinations.
Records from the Iberia Medical Center indicated that
Taylor presented with suicidal and homicidal ideation, agitation,
hostility, and depression, and was prescribed Adderall and
Seroquel. His speech was tangential, and prior to his admission
he threatened his mother and destroyed the family home.
Taylor was diagnosed with bipolar disorder but did not take
his prescribed medication. He was transferred to Liberty Health
Care Systems and participated in treatment groups in 2014,
where he was diagnosed with an unspecified mood disorder
and with “oppositional defiant disorder with rule out of
conduct disorder and cannabis use disorder with a rule out of
benzodiazepine use disorder.”
Taylor’s records revealed that in 2021, law enforcement
officers brought him to the emergency department at St. Joseph
Medical Center after he threatened bystanders with a rebar club.

5
The officers reported that Taylor suffered auditory and visual
hallucinations and paranoia and talked to himself. Medical
staff indicated he was “ ‘alert, yelling, and aggressive.’ He was
internally preoccupied and not responding to questions, talking to
people who were not there, and had a labile mood. He screamed
‘that he was going to kill himself for Jesus Christ, the one
and only.’ ” After admission to the emergency department,
Taylor tested positive for amphetamine, cannabis, and cocaine.
He reported symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder,
including nightmares, was diagnosed with “bipolar disorder,
current episode manic, severe, with psychotic features,” and was
treated with quetiapine for sleep, paranoia and mood swings and
prazosin for nightmares.
In addition to reviewing his records, Dr. Campbell
interviewed Taylor for 90 minutes. He indicated he was released
from a psychiatric hospital shortly before committing the offenses
alleged in the information. He did not take his prescribed
medication but was using methamphetamine and PCP and had
been seeing things. Taylor claimed he was robbed at gunpoint
the night before he attacked Hornburg and thought Hornburg
was the robber.
Taylor told Dr. Campbell that he attempted to get mental
health treatment after coming to California but felt the intake
clinician had a “poor attitude.” Shortly before the alleged
offenses, he was taken to a hospital after a psychosis-induced
confrontation with a man in his own home. After discharge, he
did not follow the hospital’s treatment recommendations because
he left them on a bus.
In answer to the referral questions, Dr. Campbell opined
that Taylor suffered from a qualifying, treatable mental health

6
condition which played a significant role in the commission of
the offenses.
As to whether Taylor would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community, Campbell
stated: “In my opinion, the defendant would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if his psychiatric
symptoms were controlled with treatment. Given that his
untreated psychiatric disorder was a significant and proximal
cause of his behavior at the time of the alleged offense, if
his symptoms are under good control with medication and
psychosocial support, he would not present an unreasonable
risk. If the defendant abstains from substance use, his risk
would be further reduced. [¶] . . . In my opinion, the defendant
would not be at risk of committing any [offenses specified in
section 1001.36] if treated in the community and would not
present an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (Italics
added.) Dr. Campbell reserved the right to alter her opinion
upon the receipt of information contradicting the information
the alternate public defender had given her.

1. Opposition The People opposed Taylor’s motion for diversion. In support of the opposition, Dr. Chris Chen reviewed Taylor’s jail medical records and interviewed him at the Twin Towers Correction Facility. The records indicated that a jail psychologist had interviewed Taylor but, due to safety concerns, did so only at Taylor’s cell door. Taylor presented with “ ‘hostile and aggressive behaviors towards custody staff,’ ” had “ ‘poor impulse control, anxiety, and was irritable,’ ” exhibited rambling speech, attempted to bite his probation officer, was “ ‘getting into

7
fights since his incarceration,’ ” and had a “ ‘history of mood
instability.’ ”
Dr. Chen observed that Taylor would initially be calm and
cooperative but “ ‘when he started talking about his charges, he
became increasingly angry, and deputies had to terminate the
evaluation early for safety concerns.’ ” Dr. Chen noted that
Taylor’s “ ‘impulse control was poor, as he became increasingly
irritable [and] started yelling . . . , to the point that the deputies
had to escort him back to his cell due to safety concerns.’ ”
Reporting that the defense refused to provide the medical
records upon which Dr. Campbell had relied, the People argued
that based on the limited records available to them, Taylor had
no history of medical compliance or follow-up to care, and each
time he was released from a hospital he discontinued his
medication, used drugs, and became violent.

1. Hearing on the Motion The hearing on Taylor’s motion for mental health diversion took place over several days. Taylor argued he never had consistent mental health treatment, and since receiving consistent treatment had suffered no further incidents.

a. Dr. Montgomery’s Opinion
The trial court requested that Dr. Montgomery, from the
Office of Diversion & Reentry (ODR), independently evaluate
Taylor. She testified that Taylor was stable while in custody
and on medication, and his mental illness would be treatable
with medications and other modalities in the ODR program,
including long-acting injections administered every four weeks.
Dr. Montgomery testified that Taylor agreed to the recommended
treatment modalities. She disagreed with the People’s assertion

8
that Taylor had voluntarily stopped taking medications in the
past but did not explain the basis for this disagreement.
Dr. Montgomery admitted that the ODR offered no locked
program, and although staff would attempt to intervene if Taylor
decided to leave an ODR facility, he would not be stopped. ODR
would notify the court within 72 hours of any absence. Posing a
hypothetical in which Taylor left the ODR program, the People
asked Dr. Montgomery if Taylor’s medication might lose efficacy,
resulting in more incidents of extreme violence. Dr. Montgomery
responded, “In this case, yes. I don’t want to downplay the
seriousness of this case. But I don’t know that every manic
episode he has will be like that. They can vary.”
Although the People repeatedly asked Dr. Montgomery
whether Taylor would pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety if he left an ODR facility, she declined to offer
an opinion on the matter, stating she “[could not] make that
prediction.” The trial court discouraged continued inquiry in this
line, reasoning Dr. Montgomery could not “predict the future.”
The trial court denied the People’s request for the medical
records upon which Drs. Campbell and Montgomery had relied.
Dr. Campbell did not testify at the hearing.

b. Taylor
Taylor spoke at the hearing and apologized to the Black
people in the room for his behavior on the day of the offenses.

c. Argument
The People argued that Taylor steadfastly refused to
take prescribed medications and was racist and violent when
unmedicated.

9
4. Ruling
From the bench, the court granted Taylor’s motion for
diversion. The court ordered residential, medically assisted
treatment, ordered Taylor to comply with the ODR program’s
rules, set monthly appearances for progress reports, and ordered
ODR to notify the court as soon as possible if there was a problem
with Taylor or his medication. The court ordered Taylor not
to forgo his medication or leave the ODR program without
permission and admonished him that any violation of ODR
requirements would result in notification to the court. The court
made no express finding regarding any of the section 1001.36
criteria for diversion.

C. Petition
The district attorney petitioned this court for a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order granting
diversion and issue a new order denying Taylor’s motion.
The People argue that no evidence supports the trial court’s
implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety if treated in the community, and
thus the grant of diversion constituted an abuse of discretion.
The district attorney relies in part on Taylor’s family
history, in which his sister, Chloe, reported that she and his
mother admitted him into mental health facilities in Louisiana
as an adult “but he always signed himself out after the first
24 hours.”
We temporarily stayed enforcement of the order granting
mental health diversion and issued an order to show cause why
a peremptory writ should not issue directing the court to vacate
its order granting mental health diversion and issue a new order

10
denying diversion. Taylor filed a written return in opposition to
the writ, and the People filed a reply.
The Office of the State Public Defender filed an amicus
brief in opposition to the People’s petition, urging us not to issue
a peremptory writ for three reasons: (1) Such a writ would usurp
the Legislature’s authority to include certain categories of crime
for diversion by effectively excluding them from diversion; (2) The
writ would impermissibly limit the scope of the trial court’s
discretion by redefining “public safety” in a manner inconsistent
with the Legislature’s intent; and (3) The writ would infringe on
a trial court’s ability thoroughly to exercise its discretion on a
case-by-case basis.
On September 20, 2025, we issued a published opinion
granting the district attorney’s petition. On November 26, 2025,
we vacated that opinion and granted Taylor’s petition for a
rehearing. We invited further briefing, which the parties
supplied and we have considered.

DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Taylor argues that we lack subject matter jurisdiction to
consider the district attorney’s petition because an order granting
mental health diversion is unreviewable by either appeal or writ.
We disagree.
A prosecutor’s right to appeal in a criminal case is governed
by section 1238. Under subdivision (a)(1) of that section, the
People may take an appeal from “[a]n order setting aside all
or any portion of the indictment, information, or complaint.”
(§ 1238, subd. (a)(1).) “In determining whether a specific order
is appealable under this section, courts consider the form,

11
substance and effect of the order. [Citations.] While an order
may not be specifically listed as an appealable order under
section 1238, if the substance of the order has the purpose and
ultimate effect of setting aside all or any portion of the
indictment, information, or complaint, then the order is
appealable under section 1238, subdivision (a)(1).” (People v.
McClaurin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 241, 247.)
Section 1001.36, subdivision (f)(1) defines pretrial diversion
as the “postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or
permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point
at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the
defendant to undergo mental health treatment.” If the defendant
substantially complies with diversion requirements, avoids
significant new violations of law unrelated to the defendant’s
mental health condition, and has a plan in place for long-term
mental health care, the court “shall dismiss the defendant’s
criminal charges that were the subject of the criminal
proceedings at the time of the initial diversion.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (h).) The Legislature designed diversion to end
criminal prosecution for those who substantially comply with
their diversion terms, while protecting public safety. (See
section 1001.35, subd. (a).)
Pursuant to subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36, the
substance of an order granting mental health diversion has the
purpose and ultimate effect of setting aside an information or
complaint at least temporarily, and potentially permanently
depending on the defendant’s performance in diversion. The
order is therefore appealable pursuant to subdivision (a)(1) of
section 1238.

12
When an order is appealable by the People, a writ of
mandate may be granted when there is no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy at law and the lower court had an obligation to
perform an act in a manner prescribed by law but failed to do so.
(People v. Superior Court (Kaulick) (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1279,
1295.)
We turn to whether the trial court failed to act in a manner
prescribed by law.

B. Mental Health Diversion
The district attorney contends no evidence supported
the court’s implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if granted diversion,
and thus the grant of diversion constituted an abuse of discretion.
We agree.

1. Mental Health Diversion Statutes Section 1001.36 authorizes pretrial mental health diversion to a defendant with a qualifying mental disorder. The statute defines “ ‘pretrial diversion’ ” as “the postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health treatment.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) The stated purpose of the statute “is to promote all of the following: ¶ Increased diversion of individuals with mental disorders to mitigate the individuals’ entry and reentry into the criminal justice system while protecting public safety. ¶ Allowing local discretion and flexibility for counties in the development and implementation of diversion for individuals with mental disorders across a continuum of care settings. [¶]

13
(c) Providing diversion that meets the unique mental health
treatment and support needs of individuals with mental
disorders.” (§ 1001.35, subds. (a)–(c).)
A defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion if (1) the
defendant suffers from a qualifying mental disorder and
(2) the disorder played a significant role in the commission of
the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1) & (2).) A defendant
charged with certain crimes, such as murder and rape, is
ineligible for diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (d).)
If a defendant satisfies these eligibility requirements, the
court may deem him or her suitable for pretrial diversion if the
following criteria are met: (1) The defendant’s symptoms will
respond to mental health treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1);
(2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her
right to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)); and
(4) The defendant “will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
A hearing on the suitability for diversion “shall be
informal and may proceed on offers of proof, reliable hearsay,
and argument of counsel.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (e).) “The court may
consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a
qualified mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history,
the current charged offense, and any other factors that the court
deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
“If the defendant makes a prima facie showing that he or
she meets all of the threshold eligibility requirements and the
defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion, and the

14
trial court is satisfied that the recommended program of mental
health treatment will meet the specialized mental health
treatment needs of the defendant, then the court may grant
pretrial diversion.” (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627
(Frahs); see also § 1001.36, subds. (a), (b) & (c).)
In deciding whether a defendant meets the criteria for
diversion, “the ‘strong legislative preference for treatment of
mental health disorders because of the benefits of such treatment
to both the offending individual and the community’ should
inform a trial court’s discretion.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124, 138.)
The maximum period of diversion is two years. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (f)(1)(C)(i).) “If the defendant is subsequently charged
with an additional crime, or otherwise performs unsatisfactorily
in the assigned program, then the court may reinstate criminal
proceedings.” (Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 627; see also
§ 1101.36, subd. (g).) “If the defendant has performed
satisfactorily in diversion, at the end of the period of diversion,
the court shall dismiss the defendant’s criminal charges that
were the subject of the criminal proceedings at the time of the
initial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (h).)

1. Standard of Review
   A ruling on a motion for mental health diversion is
   reviewed for abuse of discretion, and the factual underpinnings
   of that decision are reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v.
   Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1147 (Whitmill).)

2. Application
   On appeal, only one of the six prongs in section 1001.36
   is at issue, namely that Taylor “will not pose an unreasonable

15
risk of danger to public safety . . . if treated in the community.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).) The court made no express finding
on this issue, but its grant of diversion necessarily included an
implicit finding that Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk
if granted diversion.
“ ‘[U]nreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means an
unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent
felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C)
of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.” (§ 1170.18,
subd. (c).) That clause lists felonies including “(IV) Any homicide
offense, including any attempted homicide offense, defined in
Sections 187 to 191.5, inclusive.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV).)
In Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, Division Eight of
this district reversed an order denying diversion where the trial
court found the defendant would present such an unreasonable
risk. The defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by
a felon, discharge of a firearm with gross negligence, and
criminal threats stemming from an incident in which the
defendant, an honorably discharged veteran diagnosed with a
severe mental disorder, threatened to kill his girlfriend and
others nearby, fired a shot into the air, then threw the gun away
and turned himself in to law enforcement. The defendant had no
prior history of violence. (Id. at pp. 1150−1154.)
Whitmill distinguished the opinion of Division Six of this
district in People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207 (Pacheco),
which affirmed an order denying diversion in which the trial
court concluded that the defendant presented an unreasonable
risk to public safety. In Pacheco, Whitmill stated, the defendant
“deliberately set a forest fire near a homeless encampment
and ranch, which could have created a mass casualty event as

16
it required 15 firefighting units, helicopters, and a specialized
airplane. This is unlike [Whitmill] who negligently fired a single
shot in the air away from those nearby and then threw the gun
away and turned himself in to [law enforcement] with ‘no
incident.’ [¶] The expert in Pacheco opined that if the defendant
‘ “does not take his antipsychotic medication as prescribed and/or
returns to using methamphetamine, then he would become
unstable and psychotic and be likely to reoffend in some bizarre
manner.” ’ ” (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155.)
Here, no expert nor any other evidence suggested that
Taylor would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if granted diversion.
Dr. Campbell concluded only Taylor would not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety “if his psychiatric
symptoms were controlled with treatment” and “if his symptoms
are under good control with medication and psychosocial
support.” Dr. Campbell was not asked and did not say that
control of Taylor’s psychiatric symptoms was likely.
Nor did Dr. Montgomery, who testified only that Taylor
was eligible for ODR services. Dr. Montgomery acknowledged
that if Taylor were to leave the unlocked facility and fail to
take his medication he would be at risk of engaging in violent
behavior.
In contrast to the lack of evidence that Taylor would
not pose a risk if granted diversion, substantial evidence either
exists or was available that he would pose such a risk. Taylor
had a history of departing facilities without completing
treatment. For example, his sister reported that although she
and his mother admitted him into mental health facilities in
Louisiana as an adult, “he always signed himself out after the

17
first 24 hours.” Taylor also had a history of noncompliance
with his psychiatric medication regimen. According to records
from the Iberia Medical Center, he refused to take prescribed
medication. Taylor admitted to Dr. Campbell that he attempted
to get mental health treatment after coming to California but was
unsuccessful because he felt that an intake clinician had a “poor
attitude,” and further admitted he was released from a hospital
shortly before the instant alleged offense but failed to follow
treatment recommendations.
In sum, the court made no express finding that Taylor
would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety
if granted diversion—indeed, the court concluded witnesses could
not “predict the future”—and no evidence supported any implied
finding to this effect. On the other hand, the record supports a
reasonable inference that Taylor would abandon aspects of the
mental health regimen experts testified were crucial for him not
to pose an unreasonable danger to the public, with potentially
catastrophic consequences. We therefore conclude that no
substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding that
Taylor was suitable for mental health diversion, and its grant
of diversion was thus an abuse of discretion.
Taylor and the Office of the State Public Defender argue
that to deny diversion in this case would create a new rule
“that would establish an abuse of discretion in every case in
which a serious injury was inflicted, racially biased language
was used, or a hate crime is charged,” and create an “undefined
threshold of ‘horribleness’ ” “unrelated to whether a defendant
poses an unreasonable risk of committing a new violent ‘super
strike’ felony.” We disagree.

18
We acknowledge that this case presents an admittedly
horrific scenario that contrasts starkly with that presented
by Whitmill, where diversion was held to be appropriate, and is
more akin to that presented in Pacheco, where it was not. Here,
Taylor attacked individuals for no reason other than the color of
their skin. Several were traumatized and two were hospitalized,
including Hornburg, who was ambushed with a metal pipe and
then stomped on as he lay helpless on the ground, suffering life
altering injuries. This was not the first time Taylor attacked
people with a metal pipe for no reason, and no evidence suggested
it would be the last.
But our reasoning turns not on the horribleness of Taylor’s
alleged actions but on the likelihood he will repeat them if he
abandons his newly efficacious mental health regimen. The
People have steadfastly raised this concern at all stages in these
proceedings and nothing in the record provides a satisfactory
answer.
Although by its express terms section 1001.36
authorizes diversion to a defendant who agrees to treatment,
the requirement that the defendant not pose an unreasonable
danger to public safety implicitly obligates the court to
determine whether the defendant will follow through on this
agreement. No evidence here suggests that Taylor will follow
through and the court made no finding that he would, instead
finding that mental health professionals could not predict the
future. Taylor’s history of departing facilities without completing
treatment and the temporary effects of his current medication
indicate he would pose an unreasonable risk if granted diversion
to a voluntary mental health program. Indeed, he was just
released from a psychiatric facility when he thereafter failed to

19
take his medications and committed the crimes that are the
subject of this appeal.
Taylor argues that requiring a trial court to determine
whether a defendant will follow through on an agreement to
be treated in the community would create a new, nonstatutory
element to the suitability analysis under section 1001.36. We
disagree. The obligation to determine whether a defendant
will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the public if
granted diversion necessarily includes determining whether
the defendant will abandon treatment.
We recognize the Legislature’s “strong legislative
preference for treatment of mental health disorders” (Sarmiento
v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892–893) and thus
the need not to unduly restrict diversion. For example, “if
diversion may be denied because a professional conditions their
opinion on treatment compliance, it opens the possibility that
entire categories of persons who otherwise meet all eligibility and
suitability criteria, including expressing a willingness to comply
with the recommended treatment, will be denied diversion even
without any evidence of prior noncompliance.” (People v. Cabalar
(2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 57.) But where there is no evidence of
prior compliance with treatment, and on the contrary a history of
noncompliance, the trial court must take the possibility of future
noncompliance into account.

20
DISPOSITION
The petition is granted. Let a peremptory writ of mandate
issue directing the superior court to vacate its order granting
petitioner’s motion for mental health diversion and enter a new
order denying the motion. Our May 12, 2025 order temporarily
staying enforcement of the order granting diversion shall be
vacated on the date this opinion becomes final.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

BENDIX, J.

M. KIM, J.

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