In re Seidling - Transfer by Affidavit Valid Under Wis. Stat. § 867.03

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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Bernard Charles Seidling

United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Wisconsin

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1-22-11191

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (286)

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Trial Court Document

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THIS ORDER IS SIGNED AND ENTERED. = ee 4

“®Diaaion of 8

Hon. Rachel M. Blise
United States Bankruptcy Judge
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

In re: Case No. 22-11191-rmb
Bernard Charles Seidling, Chapter 7
Debtor.

DECISION AND ORDER SUSTAINING DEBTOR’S OBJECTION
TO CLAIM NO. 13 OF THE ESTATE OF DOUGLAS THAKE

Debtor Bernard Seidling purchased real property from Amanda Taylor, one of
five heirs of Douglas Thake, via warranty deed. The Estate of Douglas Thake (the
“Estate’) filed a proof of claim in Seidling’s bankruptcy case asserting that Seidling
is liable for civil theft and seeking the value of the property, plus punitive damages
and attorney’s fees and costs. The Estate contends that Taylor’s transfer of the
property to herself through a Transfer by Affidavit was invalid, as was Taylor’s
transfer of the property from herself to Seidling. Seidling’s objection to the claim
presents the legal issues whether a single heir can use the Transfer by Affidavit
procedure outlined in section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes to take legal title to
real property and whether that heir can transfer the real property to a third party.

The Court concludes that the Transfer by Affidavit was valid under section 867.03,
and that Taylor had the ability to transfer the property at issue to Seidling.
Therefore, Seidling is not liable for civil theft under the theory presented by the

Estate, and the Estate’s claim must be disallowed.
BACKGROUND
The following facts appear to be undisputed. Douglas Thake died intestate
on November 15, 2015. Thake was divorced and had five adult children, including
Amanda Taylor. Under the Wisconsin intestacy rules, any property in Thake’s
estate should have been distributed equally among the five heirs. See Wis. Stat.
§ 852.01 (b). At the time of his death, Thake was the sole owner of the real property

located at 10136 Olker Rd., Hayward, WI 54843 (the “Property”). The parties
identified no other assets of any value in Thake’s estate.
On April 11, 2016, Taylor executed and recorded a “Transfer by Affidavit
($50,000 and under)” with the Register of Deeds for Sawyer County, Wisconsin. A
Transfer by Affidavit may be used to transfer property “when a decedent leaves
property subject to administration in [Wisconsin] that does not exceed $50,000.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (1g). The parties do not appear to dispute that the value of the
Property, together with any other assets owned by Douglas Thake, was $50,000 or
less.1

1 In its proof of claim, the Estate asserts that the Property was worth $87,000 on the petition date in
2022. While the Estate does argue that the Transfer by Affidavit was invalid, the Estate does not
assert that it is invalid because the value of Thake’s estate was more than $50,000 in 2016 when
Taylor executed and recorded the Transfer by Affidavit. The Court therefore has assumed that the
Estate agrees the value of the Property was less than $50,000 in 2016.
On June 28, 2017, Taylor executed a Warranty Deed through which she
conveyed the Property to LCO Trust II. This Court previously held that LCO Trust
II is the alter ego of Seidling, and that Seidling owns all property titled in the name

of LCO Trust II. See Block v. Seidling (In re Seidling), Adv. No. 23-00032-rmb, 2024
WL 3934127, *23 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. Aug. 23, 2024). Seidling says she received
“valuable consideration,” though the consideration she received is unclear. It may
be that Seidling gave Taylor a discount on her purchase of different real property
from him as a sort of trade. See Dkt. No. 634 at 1. The Estate does not argue that
the transfer to LCO Trust II was void for lack of consideration.

On June 10, 2018, Seidling entered an Option to Purchase Trust with Chad
Raasch, pursuant to which he purported to convey to Raasch an option to purchase
LCO Trust II. The same day, Seidling and Raasch signed a Rental/Lease
Agreement for the Property. Neither agreement with Raasch was recorded. On
April 27, 2021, Seidling transferred the Property to Florida Land Trust. He
transferred the Property back to LCO Trust II on August 16, 2021. The reasons for
these transfers are unknown.

In February 2021, one or more of Thake’s other children opened a probate
proceeding in Sawyer County, Wisconsin, Case No. 2021PR000015. On August 23,
2021, the Estate sued Taylor, Raasch, Seidling, LCO Trust II, Florida Land Trust,
and several other entities with a potential interest in the Property in Sawyer
County, Wisconsin Circuit Court, Case No. 2021CV000115. The Estate sought a
declaratory judgment that the Transfer by Affidavit transferring the Property to
Taylor was ineffective and that title to the Property remained with the Estate.
Seidling filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on July 26, 2022, and the case

was converted to chapter 7 on October 3, 2022. On May 9, 2023, the Estate filed a
proof of claim that the Clerk assigned as Claim No. 13. The Estate filed an
amended claim on October 28, 2024, which is listed in the Claims Register as Claim
13-3. The Estate claims that it is owed a total of $528,970.52. According to the
Estate, Seidling committed civil theft under Wis. Stat. § 943.20 in receiving the
Property. The Estate says the Property was worth $87,000 on the petition date, and

that Seidling is liable for that amount. The Estate also seeks punitive damages in
the amount of $261,000 (three times the value of the property) and attorney’s fees
and costs of $180,970.522 pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 895.446.
Seidling objected to the Estate’s claim, and his objection was amended
several times. In the amended objection filed on December 26, 2023, Seidling
asserts that LCO Trust II validly purchased the Property from Taylor, and that the
value of the Property was only $2,500 in 2017 when Taylor transferred the Property

to LCO Trust II. Dkt. No. 472.
The Court ordered briefing on the claim objection and received briefs from the
Estate and Seidling. Dkt. Nos. 826, 883, 901, 917, 947, 1190, 1205. The Court also

2 The basis for the remaining $180,970.52 of the claim is unclear. None of the information filed with
the claim indicates that the attorney’s fees and costs total that amount. A document that appears to
be a ledger of attorney’s fees has a total of $112,995.52. Without a full explanation, the Court has
presumed that the entire $180,970.52 is attributable to attorney’s fees and costs.
held hearings on the objection on July 27, 2023; July 11, 2024; and July 24, 2025.
Dkt. Nos. 359, 576, 1174.
JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction over this chapter 11 case and contested matter
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and the order of reference from the district court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 (a). See General Order No. 161 (W.D. Wis. June 12,
1984) (available at https://www.wiwd.uscourts.gov/administrative-orders) (last
visited March 17, 2026).
This matter is a core proceeding because it involves allowance of claims

against the estate. 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(B). In addition, the Estate’s claim and
Seidling’s objection to that claim implicate issues related to whether the Property is
part of the bankruptcy estate. The district court, and this Court by the order of
reference, has “exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all of the property, wherever located, of
the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate.” 11
U.S.C. § 1334 (e)(2); see also Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer, Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 3.01 (16th ed. 2026) (“Likewise, the district court has exclusive

jurisdiction to determine whether property is property of the estate to begin with.”).
To the extent the determination whether the Property was validly transferred
requires consideration of issues impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern
v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), the parties have consented to this Court’s final
adjudication of these issues by their silence. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7008, 7012; see
also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 575 U.S. 665, 683 (2015) (“Nothing in the
Constitution requires that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court be
express.”).
DISCUSSION

I
Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that proofs of claim filed by
creditors are “deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects.” 11 U.S.C.
§ 502 (a). Upon an objection, a bankruptcy court must disallow a claim that “is
unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any agreement
or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or
unmatured.” Id. § 502(b)(1).
A timely and properly filed proof of claim is “prima facie evidence of the

claim’s validity and amount.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001(f). That is, the claim itself
gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the claim is valid. “A party objecting to
the proof of claim has the initial burden to produce some evidence or legal point to
overcome this rebuttable presumption.” In re Pierport Dev. & Realty, Inc., 491 B.R.
544, 547 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2013). “The burden then shifts back to the claimant to
meet the objection and establish the claim.” Id. II
The Property was titled in the name of LCO Trust II (which is really
Seidling) on the petition date. For present purposes, the Court will disregard the
transfer to Florida Land Trust back in 2021.
The Estate attacks both relevant transfers of the Property. First, the Estate
argues that the Transfer by Affidavit was ineffective to transfer the Property to
Taylor under Wisconsin law. Second, the Estate argues that the transfer from
Taylor to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II was invalid because Taylor could transfer only
her share of the Property to a third party and she could not transfer the entire

Property. The Court considers whether each of the transfers was improper or
invalid as a matter of law based on what section 867.03 allows.
Transfer by Affidavit to Taylor
The Estate argues that Taylor could not transfer the Property to herself
using the Transfer by Affidavit process under Wisconsin law. It further argues that
if she could transfer any portion of the Property to herself, she could transfer only
her 1/5 share of the Estate. The Estate’s argument is based on a misunderstanding

of Wisconsin’s probate laws as well as the “transfer by affidavit” mechanism under
section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Probate Code.
Under the probate laws of other jurisdictions, it is often the case that the
property of a decedent who dies intestate passes automatically to the decedent’s
heirs according to the intestacy succession laws of that state. Indeed, as explained
in In re Higgins, No. 23-22024-rmb, 2023 WL 8823920 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 20,

2023), this was the law in Wisconsin prior to the adoption of Wisconsin’s probate
code in 1971. Before then, legal title to a decedent’s personal property could be
passed only by a personal representative of the decedent’s estate, but legal title to
real property passed automatically to the heirs. See Riedi v. Heinzl, 3 N.W.2d 366,
369 (Wis. 1942) (“It is elementary that real estate descends directly to the heirs as
of the date of death where the deceased owner dies intestate[.]”); Palmer v.
O’Rourke, 110 N.W. 389, 390 (Wis. 1907) (“Upon the death of any person possessed
of personal estate the legal title thereto and right to possession thereof vests in his
personal representative and can only reach the heirs, ultimately entitled thereto by
due course of administration.”); see also In re Omernik’s Estate, [332 N.W.2d 307,

310](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1924223/in-matter-of-estate-of-omernik/#310) (Wis. 1983) (“Prior to 1971, a personal representative [of a decedent’s estate]
only had title to the decedent’s personal property.”). Under that precedent, in this
case each of Thake’s children would automatically have legal title to a 1/5 share of
the Property, even in the absence of a formal instrument transferring title.
Since 1971, however, the personal representative of a decedent’s estate
“succeeds to the interest of the decedent in all property of the decedent.” Wis. Stat.

§ 857.01 (emphasis added); see also Shovers v. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37, 718
N.W.2d 130, 137. In other words, title to real property no longer passes
automatically to a decedent’s heirs. Instead, “[u]pon the death of a person, the title
to his property remains suspended until the appointment of a personal
representative, at which time it passes to that personal representative.” Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37. Until a personal representative is appointed and transfers
the property, “[h]eirs and legatees obtain no legal title to the property, but are

beneficially interested in the estate and possess an equitable title subject to
administration and payment of debts.” Id. Generally, “[t]itle can pass to those
ultimately entitled to share in the property only after administration and by the
final decree of the proper court administering the estate.” Id. Wisconsin law allows property in an estate to be transferred to an heir
through informal procedures and without appointment of a personal representative
in certain limited circumstances, one of which is through a Transfer by Affidavit. In
2016, when Taylor executed and recorded the Transfer by Affidavit, the pertinent
portion of the statute provided:

(1g) Generally. When a decedent leaves property subject to
administration in this state which does not exceed $50,000 in
value, any heir of the decedent, trustee of a revocable trust
created by the decedent, or person who was guardian of the
decedent at the time of the decedent's death may collect any
money due the decedent, receive the property of the decedent,
and have any evidence of interest, obligation to, or right of the
decedent transferred to the affiant if the heir, trustee, or
guardian provides to the person owing the money, having
custody of the property, or acting as registrar or transfer agent
of the evidences of interest, obligation to, or right, or, if the
property is an interest in or lien on real property, provides to the
register of deeds preliminary to the recording required under
sub. (2m), proof of prior mailed notice under sub. (1m) if
applicable and an affidavit in duplicate showing all of the
following:
(a) A description of and the value of the property to be
transferred.
(b) The total value of the decedent’s property subject to
administration in this state at the date of decedent’s
death.
(c) Whether the decedent or the decedent’s spouse ever
received services provided as a benefit under a long-term
care program, as defined in s. 49.496(1)(bk), medical
assistance under subch. IV of ch. 49, long-term
community support services funded under s. 46.27(7), or
aid under s. 49.68, 49.683, 49.685, or 49.875 [s. 49.7851].
. . . Release of liability of transferor. Upon the transfer to
the heir, trustee, or person who was guardian of the decedent at
the time of the decedent's death furnishing the affidavit with an
attached proof of mail delivery if required under sub. (1m)(b),
the transferor is released to the same extent as if the transfer
had been made to the personal representative of the estate of
the decedent.
(2g) Obligation of affiant. (a) By accepting the decedent’s
property under this section the heir, trustee, or guardian
assumes a duty to apply the property transferred for the
payment of obligations according to priorities established under
s. 859.25 and to distribute any balance to those persons
designated in the appropriate governing instrument, as defined
in s. 854.01, of the decedent or if there is no governing
instrument, according to the rules of intestate succession under
ch. 852, subject to par. (b). An heir or guardian may publish a
notice to creditors in the same manner and with the same effect
as a trustee under s. 701.0508. This paragraph does not prohibit
any appropriate person from requesting administration of the
decedent’s estate under s. 856.07 or ch. 865.
. . . Recording of affidavit. (a) If an affidavit under sub. (1g)
describes an interest in or lien on real property a certified copy
or duplicate original of the affidavit shall be recorded in the
office of the register of deeds in each county in this state in
which the real property is located.
(b) For purposes of a transfer under this section of an interest in
or lien on real property, the recording of the affidavit copy or
duplicate original constitutes the transfer to the affiant under
sub. (1g) of the evidence of the interest in or lien on real
property. Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (eff. July 14, 2015 to Dec. 1, 2017).
For present purposes, the import of the statute is this: one heir may transfer
title to all a decedent’s property, including his real property, to herself through an
affidavit recorded with the appropriate register of deeds if the gross value of the
decedent’s estate is less than $50,000. By accepting the property, the heir to whom
the property is transferred undertakes the obligation to pay the creditors of the
decedent and distribute the remainder of the estate to any heirs entitled to receive a
portion under the provisions of any governing instrument or according to the rules
of intestate succession.
There is no dispute that, as one of the five children of Thake, Taylor is an

heir of the Estate; that the value of the Property (combined with Thake’s other
assets) was $50,000 or less when Thake died; and that Taylor otherwise complied
with the technical or procedural requirements imposed by section 867.03.3 In other
words, the only issue in dispute is the legal effect of the Transfer by Affidavit (i.e.,
to what extent Taylor transferred to herself an interest in the Property). Based on
the plain language of the statute, Taylor could execute and record a Transfer by

Affidavit to transfer the Property to herself. When she did so, she undertook a
corresponding obligation to ensure that the remaining heirs received the portion of
the estate to which they were entitled. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
Transfer by Affidavit was sufficient to transfer legal title to the Property to Taylor.
The Estate contends that section 867.03 does not allow an heir to receive real
property in its entirety, and instead allows an affiant heir to receive only the share
of the decedent’s real property corresponding to the heir’s presumptive interest in

the estate. See Dkt. No. 1190 at 2-3. The Estate argues:
Nothing in the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 867.03 allows an
heir to transfer more than their proper share of an estate to
themselves. This statute only allows an heir to “collect” property
subject to a statutory duty to “distribute any balance . . .

3 The Estate initially argued that Taylor did not comply with the service requirements of section
867.03. See Dkt. No. 901. This argument was premised on the current version of the statute, see Wis.
Stat. § 867.03 (1p); the version in effect in 2016 did not have the same notice requirements. In its
additional brief, the Estate again argues that Taylor “never followed the statutory procedures
required by the Transfer by Affidavit statutes.” See Dkt. No. 1190 at 5. The Estate does not explain
in its supplemental brief what procedures in the 2016 statute that Taylor did not follow.
according to the rules if [sic] intestate succession.” Therefore,
the “Transfer by Affidavit” could not effectuate any transfer of
the 4/5 interest in the Property which did not belong to Amanda
Taylor under Wis. Stat. § 852.01 (1)(b) [sic]
Dkt. 1190 at 3.
The Estate misreads the statute. The statute plainly allows an affiant heir to
“receive the property of the decedent.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (1g). It does not say that
an affiant heir may receive only her presumptive share of the property of the
decedent, or that “consent from the remaining heirs would be required to effectuate
a 100% transfer to [the affiant].” Dkt. No. 1190 at 3. In exchange for “accepting the
decedent’s property,” an affiant such as Taylor “assumes a duty to apply the
property transferred for the payment of obligations according to priorities
established under s. 859.25 and to distribute any balance,” in the case of intestacy,
“according to the rules of intestate succession.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2g). If an
affiant heir could receive only her share of the decedent’s property, why would she

have an obligation to distribute any property to the other heirs? The Estate makes
no effort to answer this question.4
Moreover, in addition to heirs (who are presumptively entitled to some share
of the estate), the statute allows a qualifying trustee or guardian to accomplish a
transfer of the decedent’s property through affidavit. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (1g).
There is no requirement that such a trustee or guardian be entitled to a share of the

4 The Estate makes a non-sensical argument about a court’s ability to impose a constructive trust
under Wisconsin law. See Dkt. No. 1190 at 3-4. The Estate does not explain how the question
whether a court could impose a constructive trust on the estate property that Taylor received
pursuant to the Transfer by Affidavit is relevant to whether the statute permitted Taylor to receive
the property at all.
decedent’s estate. So it cannot be that the statute limits the scope of property
transferred through affidavit to that portion of the estate to which the affiant has
an interest.

The more reasonable interpretation of the statute is that section 867.03 is
intended to allow an affiant to function as a sort of personal representative of the
estate for the purpose of administering property valued at or below $50,000 for the
benefit of the estate. This procedure is practical for estates with such a value,
where the costs of a full probate proceeding are high in relation to the value of the
estate. Indeed, the statute states that “[u]pon transfer to the [affiant] . . . the

transferor is released to the same extent as if the transfer had been made to the
personal representative of the estate of the decedent.” Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2)
(emphasis added). If an affiant functions like a personal representative for the
limited purpose of administering certain low-value estates, then, like a personal
representative, the affiant should receive all, not just part, of the property in the
estate. See Wis. Stat. § 857.01 (“Upon his or her letters being issued by the court,
the personal representative succeeds to the interest of the decedent in all property

of the decedent.”) (emphasis added).
From a policy perspective, it might be understandable to question the
propriety of a mechanism that places the power to administer a decedent’s property
in the hands of a single, self-volunteering heir. But the statute includes guardrails
against abuse of this mechanism: it limits the value of the property that qualifies
for transfer by affidavit to $50,000, it imposes a legal duty upon the affiant to
distribute property to other heirs, and it expressly preserves the right of another
heir to initiate formal probate proceedings. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2g)(a). The
weighing of the utility of the transfer by affidavit mechanism in hastening the

resolution of small estates and lessening the costs of administering such estates
against the risks presented by a single volunteer heir assuming control of estate
property is a task that is properly left to the legislature. The state legislature made
the policy choice, and the language it chose to use in the statute is clear.5 This
Court’s role is limited to interpreting and enforcing that language.
In sum, section 867.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes enables an affiant to receive

the entire estate of a decedent by recording a Transfer by Affidavit, and the
mechanism does not limit an affiant heir to receiving just her share. The Estate
does not advance any other argument that the Property was not transferred from
Thake’s estate to Taylor under the Transfer by Affidavit. Therefore, the Court
concludes that Taylor obtained valid legal title to the property when she recorded
the Transfer by Affidavit.6

5 The Wisconsin state legislature has continued to refine the transfer by affidavit procedure in recent
years, reflecting that the legislature has, indeed, weighed and considered the benefits and risks of
the procedure. For example, the current version of the statute includes additional notice
requirements before real property can be transferred using a transfer by affidavit, and it limits the
persons to whom real property can be transferred. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (1h), (1j), (1p) (2026).
6 An additional matter bears mentioning due to the Estate’s insistence that the other heirs have an
interest in the Property. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted in Shovers that the heirs to an
estate do not take legal title to the property in the estate, but they have a beneficial interest in the
estate. Shovers, 2006 WI App 108, ¶ 37. As explained in Higgins, that beneficial interest does not
attach to the property itself; it attaches to the estate. Higgins, 2023 WL 8823920 at *7 (“[T]he
debtor’s interest in his probate estate is not the same thing as an interest in the Property.”). The
heirs to the Estate did not have a beneficial interest in the Property itself. Rather they have or may
have had a beneficial interest in the Estate, which includes all the property received by Taylor
through the Transfer by Affidavit.
As affiant, Taylor undertook a corresponding obligation to distribute to the
appropriate creditors and heirs all the property in Thake’s estate that she received
pursuant to the Transfer by Affidavit. Whether Taylor complied with her obligation

is not before the Court.
Transfer by Deed to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II
The Estate also argues that section 867.03 does not authorize an affiant who
receives real property pursuant to a Transfer by Affidavit to effectuate a subsequent
transfer of the entire property to a third party. Dkt. No. 1190 at 3-4. According to
the Estate:
The “duty” under Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2g) does not transform the
affiant into a trustee with discretion over the entire estate.
Amanda Taylor’s s [sic] decision to deed the property to Seidling
was outside the scope of that limited duty and legally ineffective
beyond her own interest. Any claim that Amanda Taylor held
the property “in trust” is a post hoc judicial fiction not supported
by the affidavit or law. Therefore, the “Transfer by Affidavit”
does not create a constructive trust or fiduciary role on the part
of the affiant. Id. The statute clearly contemplates a single recipient of the decedent’s property,
and the Court already concluded that a Transfer by Affidavit transfers the whole of
the estate to the affiant. The statute also contemplates further transfers by the
affiant to accomplish the liquidation of low-value estates for the benefit of the heirs
because it affirmatively obligates the affiant to “apply the property transferred for
the payment of obligations” of the estate and to “distribute any balance” to the
decedent’s heirs. See Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2g)(a). Once Taylor had legal title to the
Property, she could pass that title to Seidling a/k/a LCO Trust II.
The Court concludes that section 867.03 allows an affiant to take title to real
property. As owner of the legal interest in the property, the affiant has authority to
transfer the real property to a third party via a deed or any other mechanism.

Therefore, Taylor had authority to transfer the Property to Seidling.7
If the other heirs of the Estate are unhappy with Taylor’s transfer to
Seidling, then perhaps they have a claim against her; that is not for this Court to
say. They do not, however, have a claim against Seidling based on a theory that the
transfers were invalid because section 867.03 did not allow Taylor to take title to
the Property or transfer the Property to a third party.

---

The Estate has made vague assertions that Taylor and Seidling conspired to
deprive the other heirs of their interest in the Property. The Court does not address
whether the Estate or the other heirs may have a claim against Seidling based on
such an allegation. According to the Estate’s briefing in response to Seidling’s claim
objection, the Estate’s proof of claim is based on the theory that the transfers to
Taylor and then to Seidling were invalid or improper under the Transfer by

Affidavit procedure in section 867.03. As discussed herein, the Court concludes that

7 The Estate also argues that Seidling did not receive valid legal title to the Property because he is
not a bona fide purchaser. That issue is relevant only if the transfer to Taylor under the Transfer by
Affidavit was invalid; the Court would then have to consider whether an unsuspecting purchaser
could take good title to the Property. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 867.03 (2m)(c) (2023-24) (“If an interest in
real property transferred under this section is acquired by a purchase or lender in good faith, for
value and without actual notice that the transfer was improper, the purchaser or lender takes title
free of any claims of the decedent’s estate and incurs no personal liability to the estate, whether or
not the transfer was proper.”). Taylor’s transfer of the Property to herself was not improper, so it is
unnecessary to address whether Seidling qualifies as a bona fide purchaser.
Taylor did obtain legal title to the Property through the recorded Transfer by
Affidavit and that Taylor could validly transfer legal title to the Property to Seidling
(a/k/a LCO Trust II) through the recorded Warranty Deed. The Estate therefore

does not have a claim against Seidling, and the Court will disallow the Estate’s
proof of claim.8
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Seidling’s objection to Claim No. 13 filed by the Estate of Douglas
Thake is SUSTAINED.

1. Claim No. 13 is DISALLOWED in full. # # #

8 The Estate complains about Seidling’s conduct in state court litigation, Sawyer County Case No.
2021-CV-115. See Dkt. No. 330. This decision should not be read as a defense of his conduct. The
Estate also asserts that its claim against Seidling has merit and is not frivolous because it survived
three motions to dismiss in state court. Id. at 2. Just because a claim against Seidling survived a
motion to dismiss in state court does not necessarily mean that the Estate has an allowable claim
against Seidling’s bankruptcy estate.