Jump To

Top Caption [Combined Opinion

                  by Kirsch](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10809381/patrick-hartnett-v-jackson-national-life-insurance-company/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Patrick Hartnett v. Jackson National Life Insurance Company

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-1824

• Judges: Kirsch

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Kirsch

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

---

No. 25-1824
PATRICK M. HARTNETT and DANIEL J. HARTNETT,
as Successor Trustees of the Lorrayne B.
Hartnett Trust dated June 27, 1984,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JACKSON NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 23 CV 1601 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.

---

ARGUED DECEMBER 11, 2025 — DECIDED MARCH 16, 2026

---

Before RIPPLE, SCUDDER, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Lorrayne Hartnett purchased a long-
term care insurance policy covering treatment in a nursing
care facility or assisted living facility. During the COVID-19
pandemic, at the age of 94, Hartnett broke her hip. Fearing
serious illness if she contracted COVID, Hartnett received
2 No. 25-1824

post-surgical care at home. Jackson National Life Insurance
Company refused to pay for those home care expenses, so
Hartnett filed a breach of contract suit alleging coverage by
her policy. The district court disagreed and entered judgment
for Jackson National. Because we conclude that Hartnett’s
policy doesn’t provide a home health care benefit, we affirm.
I
Lorrayne Hartnett purchased a long-term care insurance
policy from Allied Life Insurance Company in 1998, which
Jackson National Life Insurance Company subsequently as-
sumed. Hartnett selected a Nursing Care Policy, which pro-
vided benefits for care in institutional settings such as a nurs-
ing care facility or assisted living facility. Relevant to this ap-
peal, her policy included an alternative plan of care benefit,
permitting coverage for care in different settings—such as
home care—under certain circumstances. Those circum-
stances required Hartnett to be receiving benefits under the
policy and for Hartnett, her health care provider, and Jackson
National to agree upon any alternative plan of care. Hartnett’s
policy also contained a conformity-with-state-statutes provi-
sion, which amended the policy to comply with Illinois re-
quirements in the event of any conflict. A different policy
available to Hartnett, which she did not select, was the Com-
prehensive Long Term Care Policy. That policy provided ben-
efits for home and community-based care in addition to nurs-
ing care.
In May 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Hartnett—
then 94 years old—fractured her hip and underwent surgery.
Her primary care physician, Phillip Sheridan, prescribed
home care because Hartnett’s age and underlying health con-
ditions placed her at significant risk if she were to enter a
No. 25-1824 3

nursing facility and contract COVID-19. Dr. Sheridan pro-
vided Jackson National with a letter to that effect, stating that
Hartnett required assistive care at home.
After being discharged from the hospital, Hartnett submit-
ted a claim to Jackson National for home health care costs.
Jackson National denied her claim, asserting that her policy
didn’t provide benefits for home care services. It further con-
cluded that such benefits weren’t available to Hartnett as an
alternative plan of care because she wasn’t receiving benefits
in a nursing care facility, as required to trigger the alternative
plan of care provision.
Hartnett sued Jackson National in federal court asserting
diversity jurisdiction, alleging breach of contract. The parties
each moved for summary judgment, and the district court
granted Jackson National’s motion. The court concluded that
Hartnett’s policy did not provide home health care benefits
and that it wasn’t bad faith for Jackson National to deny cov-
erage under the alternative plan of care provision.
II
A
We review de novo a district court’s decision on cross mo-
tions for summary judgment. Ross v. Fin. Asset Mgmt. Sys.,
Inc., 74 F.4th 429, 433 (7th Cir. 2023). “We construe all infer-
ences in favor of the party against whom the motion under
consideration is made.” Id. (citation modified). Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
We first address Hartnett’s claim that Illinois law altered
the terms of her policy to provide for home health care,
4 No. 25-1824

reviewing de novo the district court’s interpretation of state
law, Green Plains Trade Grp., LLC v. Archer Daniels Midland Co.,
90 F.4th 919, 927 (7th Cir. 2024), and of the insurance policy,
Miller v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir.
2012). We reject this claim for the same reasons articulated by
Judge Shah in his thorough and well-done order.
Hartnett bears the burden of proving that her policy co-
vers home health care. ABW Dev., LLC v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 203
N.E.3d 922, 928 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). Her argument proceeds in
two parts. First, she argues that her policy’s alternative plan
of care provision “provides benefits for home health care”
within the meaning of an Illinois regulation, which states that:
A long-term care insurance policy or certificate
may not, if it provides benefits for home health care
or community care services, limit or exclude bene-
fits … [b]y requiring that the insured/claimant
first or simultaneously receive nursing and/or
therapeutic services in a home or community or
institutional setting before home health care ser-
vices are covered[.]
Ill. Admin. Code tit. 50, § 2012.70 (a)(2) (emphasis added). Sec-
ond, she argues that because her policy must conform with
state law, it incorporates § 2012.70(a)(2). Therefore, Jackson
National couldn’t condition alternative plan of care coverage
on Hartnett first receiving treatment in a nursing facility, as it
did in its claim rejection letter.
Hartnett’s argument hinges on interpretation of
§ 2012.70(a)(2), which no Illinois court has addressed. But be-
cause there’s no ambiguity in the regulation, there’s no need
for guidance from an Illinois court. See Telamon Corp. v.
No. 25-1824 5

Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., 850 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2017) (“We
certify questions only when the answer is unclear.”). We find
that the district court properly rejected Hartnett’s argument.
Her policy does not “provide[] benefits for home health care,”
as required for § 2012.70(a)(2) to apply. Nothing in the pol-
icy’s language entitles Hartnett to a home health care benefit.
Rather, the policy says that Jackson National will pay for an
alternative plan of care if certain conditions are met, including
that the insured is already receiving benefits under the policy
and that the alternative plan of care is mutually agreed-upon
by the insurer, the insured, and the insured’s health care pro-
vider. Contrast this with the Comprehensive Long Term Care
Policy, which designates benefit amounts for nursing care as
well as home and community-based care. Because Hartnett’s
Nursing Care Policy lacks such a guarantee, it cannot be said
to “provide[] benefits for home health care.”
Hartnett responds that her policy’s alternative plan of care
provision at least contemplates home health care. But the pur-
pose of an alternative plan of care provision is to provide dis-
cretionary coverage for treatment options outside of a policy’s
normal scope. See Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs, A Shopper’s
Guide to Long-Term Care Insurance 36 (2019),
https://perma.cc/593W-86G2 (explaining that “the insurer is
agreeing only to consider such an alternative”). Interpreting
Hartnett’s policy as affirmatively providing benefits for home
health care would be “inconsistent with the flexibility inher-
ent in the concept of an alternate plan of care.” Mansur v. PFL
Life Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 1315, 1320 (10th Cir. 2009). As the district
court recognized, the alternative plan of care provision
merely presents an avenue for the insured to request, and for
Jackson National to consider, such care. The district court
6 No. 25-1824

therefore correctly found that § 2012.70(a)(2) doesn’t apply
and that there was no breach of contract.
B
Hartnett separately claims that Jackson National’s refusal
to cover her home health care expenses breached the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. We review questions
of contract interpretation de novo, applying Illinois law.
Soarus LLC. v. Bolson Materials Int’l Corp., 905 F.3d 1009, 1011
(7th Cir. 2018).
Contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, but parties “are entitled to enforce the terms of
the contract to the letter and an implied covenant of good faith
cannot overrule or modify the express terms of a contract.” N.
Tr. Co. v. VIII S. Mich. Assocs., 657 N.E.2d 1095, 1104 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995). Here, Hartnett’s policy says that Jackson National
will pay the alternative plan of care benefit if (among other
conditions) the insured is already “receiving benefits under
this policy pursuant to a plan of care prescribed by a Licensed
Health Care Practitioner[.]” It’s undisputed that Hartnett was
not receiving benefits under her policy when she requested
an alternative plan of care, so this condition was not met. Jack-
son National was therefore entitled, under the express terms
of her policy, to deny her home health care claim. That its de-
cision put Hartnett in a difficult position—entering a nursing
care facility and risking illness, or forgoing coverage—is un-
deniable. But the district court correctly found that there was
no contractual violation.
AFFIRMED
No. 25-1824 7

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. I respectfully dis-
sent from the panel majority’s decision to affirm the grant of
summary judgment to Jackson National.
A.
Deciding whether the Nursing Care Policy is a long-term
care insurance policy that provides benefits for home health
care services requires us to interpret, as a matter of first im-
pression, state law. No other court, state or federal, has inter-
preted the Illinois administrative code section in question. 1
The question here certainly meets the threshold require-
ments for certification established by Illinois. Supreme Court
of Illinois Rule 20(a) permits us to certify questions “as to the
law of [Illinois], which may be determinative of” the case at
issue, so long as there are no controlling precedents in the de-
cisions of the state courts.

1 While other courts around the Country have addressed questions involv-

ing alternative plan of care provisions, those cases did not consider
whether the benefits contemplated by alternative plan of care provisions
constitute “benefits” as defined by state law. See Mansur v. PFL Life Ins.
Co., 589 F.3d 1315, 1320 (10th Cir. 2009) (addressing a dispute between the
insured and insurer over whether an alternative plan of care provision re-
quired the parties to agree on the payment terms due under the provision
before an agreement could be reached to pay benefits); Roland v.
Transamerica Life Ins. Co., 570 F. Supp. 2d 871 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (deciding
that parties must mutually agree on the terms of a written alternative plan
of care pursuant to a long-term care insurance policy, which was also pur-
chased from PFL Life Insurance Company, before the benefits contem-
plated by the parties in negotiations can be paid), aff’d, 337 Fed. App’x 389
(5th Cir. 2009). The Illinois administrative code provision does not address
whether the benefits contemplated by an alternative plan of care provision
should be categorized as benefits provided by the policy.
8 No. 25-1824

The question is also outcome determinative. To be out-
come determinative for purposes of certification, the question
at issue need not be the sole question determining a party’s
success and failure. See, e.g., Johnson v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC,
142 F.4th 932, 944 (7th Cir. 2025). We certified a question about
whether standards from the federal Portal-to-Portal Act of
1947 (PPA) applied to the case. Id. at 943. If the PPA applied,
then the plaintiffs’ state minimum wage claims failed. If the
PPA did not apply, the claims could survive under a different
standard. “The answer to the question [was] thus dispositive”
of whether their claims could survive dismissal, even though
the parties disputed which standard would apply to the claims
in the PPA’s absence. Id. at 944.
Here, whether the Nursing Care Policy provides health
care benefits under Illinois’s administrative code is disposi-
tive of whether Mrs. Hartnett’s claim can survive summary
judgment. The administrative code provision prohibits a
long-term care insurance policy from requiring that the claim-
ant first receive nursing services in an institutional setting be-
fore home health care services are covered, if that policy “pro-
vides benefits for home health care or community care ser-
vices.” Ill. Admin. Code tit. 50, § 2012.70 (a)(2). Mrs. Hartnett’s
policy states that Jackson National “will pay” the alternative
plan of care benefit if she met five preconditions:
1. You are receiving benefits under this policy
pursuant to a plan of care prescribed by a Li-
censed Health Care Practitioner; and
2. You, your Licensed Health Care Practitioner
and we agree that an Alternative Plan of Care is:
(a) medically acceptable; and (b) the most cost
No. 25-1824 9

efficient manner in which to provide benefits for
your claim under this policy; and
3. You have not exceeded the Benefit Period or
Maximum Total Lifetime Benefit shown in the
Benefit Schedule; and
4. You have satisfied the Elimination Period
shown in the Benefit Schedule; and
5. You are not receiving payments for any other
benefits under this policy. 2
Jackson National concedes that only the first two “contrac-
tual preconditions” are material for this lawsuit. 3 The district
court addressed only the first. It decided that Mrs. Hartnett
had not met the first precondition because Mrs. Hartnett was
not currently receiving benefits for a stay at a nursing care or
assisted living facility. 4 It did not decide whether Mrs. Hart-
nett receiving care through home health services was medi-
cally acceptable and more cost-efficient than in a nursing fa-
cility.
In short, if the Supreme Court of Illinois determines that
the administrative code prohibits Jackson National from re-
fusing to pay for home care on the ground that Mrs. Hartnett
was not first in a nursing home or assisted living facility, the
company will be precluded from predicating non-payment of
benefits on her lack of residence in a nursing or assisted living

2 R.32-1 at *8.

3 Appellee’s Br. 24.

4 Other benefits were available, such as a “Bed Reservation Benefit,” but

that, too, was conditioned on Mrs. Hartnett receiving benefits for “Nurs-
ing Care” under her policy.
10 No. 25-1824

facility. It will have to justify its denial on the grounds set
forth in the second condition set out above.
B.
Having confirmed that this case meets the threshold re-
quirements, I next consider whether, under our case law, it is
an appropriate candidate for certification. “Federal courts
may ascertain the content of state substantive law while sit-
ting in diversity, but we sometimes certify a question of state
law based on several factors.” Finite Res., Ltd. v. DTE Methane
Res., LLC, 44 F.4th 680, 685 (7th Cir. 2022). “The most im-
portant factor in deciding whether to grant certification is
‘whether we feel genuinely uncertain about an issue of state
law.’” Johnson, 142 F.4th at 943 (quoting Finite Res., 44 F.4th at
685). Other factors “include whether (1) the case concerns a
matter of vital public concern, (2) the issue is likely to recur in
other cases, (3) the question to be certified is outcome deter-
minative of the case, and (4) the state supreme court has yet
to have an opportunity to illuminate a clear path on the is-
sue.” Id.
The most important factor—uncertainty—runs through
this case. The administrative code section states that a
long-term care insurance policy or certificate
may not, if it provides benefits for home health
care or community care services, limit or ex-
clude benefits […] [b]y requiring that the in-
sured/claimant first or simultaneously receive
nursing and/or therapeutic services in a home
or community or institutional setting before
home health care services are covered[.]
No. 25-1824 11

Ill. Admin. Code tit. 50, § 2012.70 (a)(2). This language pro-
duces multiple uncertainties. The section does not mention al-
ternative plan of care provisions, so it is unclear whether the
Illinois legislature views such provisions as benefits in them-
selves. Moreover, the administrative code section does not de-
fine “benefits,” generally. Therefore, we cannot analyze
whether the code’s understanding of “benefits for home
health care or community care services” extends to the bene-
fits contemplated by an alternative plan of care provision. As
for the Nursing Care Policy, it does not define “benefits,” ei-
ther, but it does identify the alternative plan of care provision
as a “benefit.” 5 Also, the benefit schedule describes the “alter-
native plan of care” as “[b]enefits for medical or non-medical
Qualified Long Term Care Services payable to end confine-
ment in a Nursing Care Facility and continue recovery at
home.” 6
Jackson National contends that the home health care ser-
vices contemplated by the alternative plan of care provision
in Mrs. Hartnett’s policy cannot be a “benefit” provided by
the policy because the policy does not guarantee that it will
provide home health care. To Jackson National, “home care
was just one possible care setting among many that were pro-
spectively available, meaning it was a variable benefit as op-
posed to a true home care benefit.” 7 But every benefit in
Mrs. Hartnett’s insurance policy was subject to up to six con-
ditions each. 8 And the policy as a whole listed another eight

5 R.32-1 at *8.

6 Id. at *5.

7 Appellee’s Br. 24.

8 R.32-1 at *7–8.
12 No. 25-1824

“general exclusions” from coverage, along with a pre-existing
conditions limitation and an elimination period—of which
Mrs. Hartnett’s was “none.” 9
Notably, the alternative plan of care provision in
Mrs. Hartnett’s policy differs from similar provisions ad-
dressed by other courts. In Mansur, the Tenth Circuit wrote
that the plaintiff’s construction of the policy, which had an al-
ternative plan of care provision, was “inconsistent with the
flexibility inherent in the concept of an alternate plan of care.”
589 F.3d at 1320. But the provision in Mansur differed from
the provision in Mrs. Hartnett’s policy. The Mansur alterna-
tive plan of care provision stated
If an Insured Person is confined in a Long Term
Care Facility and is receiving benefits under this
Certificate, We will consider, instead, paying ben-
efits for the cost of services provided under a
written, medically acceptable, alternate plan of
care.
The alternate plan of care:
(1) can be initiated by the Insured Person or by
Us;
(2) must be developed by health care profes-
sionals;
(3) must be consistent with generally accepted
medical practices; and
(4) must be mutually agreed to by the Insured Per-
son, the Insured Person’s Physician and Us.

9 Id. at *9, *5.
No. 25-1824 13

Id. at 1319 (first emphasis added). So, too, did the alternative
plan of care provision in Roland. 570 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (“If an
Insured Person is confined in a Long-Term Care Facility and
is receiving benefits under this Policy, We will consider, in-
stead, paying benefits […].” (emphasis added)).
Here, however, Mrs. Hartnett’s alternative plan of care
provision does not say that Jackson National “will consider”
paying benefits if she met the enumerated conditions. It says,
“[w]e will pay the Alternative Plan of Care Benefit if”
Mrs. Hartnett met the five listed requirements. 10 One of those
requirements provides Jackson National discretion to agree
that the home care services are medically acceptable and the
most cost efficient manner of providing benefits, but the dis-
trict court did not decide whether Mrs. Hartnett established
those requirements. Jackson National’s letter denying her
claim does not mention those issues, either. It says instead
that her policy does not provide home care benefits and home
care benefits were not available to her because “the Policy re-
quires you to be confined to Nursing Care Facility [sic] and
receiving benefits under the policy, pursuant to a plan of care
provided by a Licensed Healthcare Professional.” 11
Taking all of these issues together requires me to conclude
that it is genuinely uncertain whether the administrative code
considers the benefits contemplated by an alternative plan of
care provision to be the benefits provided by the policy itself.

10 Id. at *8.

11 R.35-8 at 2.
14 No. 25-1824

C.
Another strong reason to certify a case to the state su-
preme court, besides uncertainty, is that the issue is “likely to
recur rather than unique and fact bound.” Cothron v. White
Castle Sys., Inc., 20 F.4th 1156, 1166 (7th Cir. 2021). Also, if the
law is a “unique Illinois statute regularly applied by the fed-
eral courts,” and “one that the Illinois Supreme Court has
shown an interest in interpreting,” then certification is more
appropriate. Id. Here, Illinois’s long-term care provision is
adopted from a model insurance code that has been adopted
by other states. See, e.g., 210 Neb. Admin. Code ch. 46,
§ 0010.01(B); Idaho Admin. Code R. 18.04.11.016; 31 Pa. Code
§ 89a.111(a)(2). In that sense, the code is not unique. But, the
Supreme Court of Illinois has not interpreted the meaning of
§ 2012.70(a)(2) and has issued only one decision that even
mentions long-term care insurance policies. See Hines v. Dep’t
of Pub. Aid, 221 Ill. 2d 222, 233–34, 850 N.E.2d 148, 155 (2006)
(limiting the ability of the state to obtain reimbursement for
payments made under the Medicaid Act but noting that no
long-term care insurance policy was at issue).
Deference to the Supreme Court of Illinois is also appro-
priate because the regulation of insurance has historically
been a matter for the states to manage. The McCarran-Fergu-
son Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 et seq., was passed in 1945 to “restore
the supremacy of the States in the realm of insurance regula-
tion.” Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
40 (1996) (quoting United States Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508
U.S. 491, 500 (1993)). We need to respect this basic policy de-
termination. Rather than having a federal court interpret a
state insurance code about which there is uncertainty, I would
instead certify this question to the Supreme Court of Illinois.
No. 25-1824 15

We should respect the prerogative and obligation of Illinois
to take the lead in regulating this industry.