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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

M. McFetridge v. AFSCME, Council 13 & PA DOT

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 219 M.D. 2022
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Wolf

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (28.4K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by Wolf

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mindy McFetridge, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 219 M.D. 2022
:
American Federation of State, :
County and Municipal Employees, :
Council 13 and Pennsylvania :
Department of Transportation, :
Respondents : Argued: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: March 17, 2026

Before this Court is an original jurisdiction action filed by Mindy
McFetridge against American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, Council 13 (Union) and her employer, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (Department). Through her Petition for Review, McFetridge brings
a claim alleging that the Union breached its duty of fair representation and that the
Union and the Department, together, failed to properly follow the collective
bargaining agreement’s (CBA) seniority provisions during an approximately four-
week1 period when McFetridge was placed on leave without pay due to the COVID-

1
The exact time period is not clear from the pleadings.
19 pandemic. During this period, McFetridge alleges a skeleton crew comprised of
less senior union members continued working and that the Union failed to file a
grievance on her behalf regarding this CBA violation. McFetridge also alleges that
the actions of the Union and the Department were rooted in sex discrimination.
Presently before this Court are two Applications for Summary Relief, filed by the
Union and the Department, respectively. Concluding that there are outstanding
issues of material fact, we deny both Applications.
I. McFetridge’s Petition for Review
McFetridge’s Petition for Review alleges as follows. McFetridge is
employed by the Department as a Transportation Equipment Operator B (TEO-B)
in Venango County. Petition for Review ¶14. She is a dues-paying member of the
Union, which is an “employe organization” for the purposes of the Public Employe
Relations Act2 (PERA). Id. ¶¶8-10, 14. The Union and the Department maintain a
CBA3 governing the terms of Union member employment as well as the processing
of grievances. Id. ¶18.
McFetridge states that on or around March 2020, the Department
ceased operations at her place of work as a result of the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic. Id. ¶22. At this time, McFetridge and other employees were offered
“paid office closing time” by the Department, which ended on April 11, 2020. Id.
¶¶23-24. Following the end of paid office closing time, McFetridge and others who
were not permitted to continue working were given the option to use paid time off
(PTO) or file for unemployment. Id. ¶24. McFetridge chose to use approximately

2
Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, 43 P.S. § 1101.301(3).
3
The furlough provision that McFetridge contends was violated is found in Article 29, Section
7 of the CBA, and reads in part: “When the Employer determines that a furlough is necessary
within a seniority unit, employees will be furloughed in the inverse order of Master Agreement
seniority.” McFetridge’s Brief, Exhibit A (Collective Bargaining Agreement) at 63.

2
two weeks of PTO because she did not wish to lose any seniority rights pursuant to
the CBA. Id. ¶25. After using two weeks of PTO, McFetridge took unemployment
compensation until the Department resumed normal operations. Id. ¶26.
McFetridge alleges that during this period, one crew of TEO’s
continued work for the Department in Venango County. Pet. for Rev. ¶30. Union
and/or Department officials initially explained to McFetridge that this crew was
permitted to continue working because they had access to handwashing facilities.
Id. ¶31. Of the individuals who continued to work, McFetridge alleges that at least
three were less senior than her pursuant to the terms of the CBA. Id. ¶¶32-33. One
of the members of this crew was the president of the local Union executive board,
Jonathon Reisinger (Reisinger). Id. ¶34. The Petition further alleges that others
working on the crew were local Union executive Board members and/or relatives or
friends of Reisinger, and all were men. Id. ¶¶35-37.
After learning that the continuing work crew included members less
senior than McFetridge, she reached out to her Union representative. Id. ¶¶38. She
was told by Union officials that there was “nothing she can do about it,” and was
offered no further explanation. Id. ¶¶39-40. Eventually, Union officials told
McFetridge that the Union and the Department gave Reisinger the option to lay off
employees by seniority or by specific working crew, and he opted for the latter. Id.
¶¶42-43. McFetridge alleges that this decision was made so that Reisinger’s crew
could continue operating. Id. ¶¶43-45. She states that the Department’s and the
Union’s approval of Reisinger’s arbitrary, discriminatory and bad faith selection of
the employees that could continue to work is contrary to the seniority and furlough
provisions of the CBA. Id. ¶¶45-48. She further states that Union officials later
explained that the Department and the Union were permitted to conduct layoffs by

3
crew as opposed to seniority because this period of time did not constitute a furlough.
Id. ¶¶48-50. McFetridge disputes this characterization of the relevant time period.
Id. ¶¶51-52.
McFetridge alleges that she subsequently reached out to Union officials
requesting that it file a grievance on her behalf regarding the staffing decisions that
were contrary to the CBA. Pet. for Rev. ¶53. She was told, without explanation,
that no grievance would be filed on her behalf. Id. At some point, another Union
official told her that some paid time off may be returned to her, but that official later
stopped answering McFetridge’s phone calls. Id. ¶54-55. McFetridge maintains
that the Department did not permit all its locations to perform layoffs based on
working crew rather than seniority, and only Department employees of Venango
County and one to two other counties were subject to this procedure. Id. ¶56.
On these allegations, McFetridge submits that the Union conspired with
the Department to ignore the seniority and furlough provisions of the CBA in favor
of Reisinger’s crew’s continued work and that the Union subsequently violated its
duty of representation to McFetridge by failing to file a grievance on her behalf. Id.
¶¶58-60. She further alleges that failure was made based upon discrimination
regarding her sex. Id. ¶61. Accordingly, the Petition sets out a cause of action for
breach of the duty of fair representation against the Union and the Department, based
upon the decision not to follow seniority/furlough provisions during this period. Id.
¶¶62-75. She asks this Court to (1) enter judgment against the Union; (2) award
compensatory damages against the Union and the Department; and (3) award

4
damages against the Union for non-economic harm including but not limited to
mental anguish and distress in an amount to be proven at trial. Id., Prayer for Relief.4
The Union and the Department filed answers with new matter denying
McFetridge’s material allegations. The case proceeded to discovery.
II. Discovery
During the course of discovery, seven individuals were deposed,
including McFetridge, Reisinger, and the Department’s former Maintenance
Manager for Venango County, Paula Klingler (Klingler). We discuss the relevant
portions of the depositions in turn.
a. McFetridge’s Deposition Testimony
McFetridge testified that she is a TEO-B for the Department and a
member of the Union. McFetridge’s Brief, Exhibit A (McFetridge Dep.) at 33-34.
She testified that the staffing of crews is generally done through a bidding process,
with union members placing bids on open positions in order of seniority. Id. at 47.
She testified that she was “around the middle” of the seniority hierarchy for those
holding her position in Venango County. Id. at 50.5 She further testified that she
was the only woman in Venango County to hold her position. Id. at 55-56.
McFetridge testified that during the COVID-19 shutdown, after an initial paid leave
period, she was placed on leave without pay and given the option to expend PTO or
collect unemployment. Id. at 96, 121-24. During this time she expended two weeks
of PTO, during which time she continued to accrue seniority, and was subsequently
unpaid, but still receiving health benefits, for a period of approximately two to three

4
McFetridge’s prayer for relief also asks for costs and fees, including reasonable attorney’s
fees. She withdraws that request in her brief filed July 9, 2025. See McFetridge’s Br., 7/9/2025,
at 31 n.9.
5
She was 30th out of 46 TEO-Bs. See McFetridge Dep. at 53-55 (referring to Dep. Ex. M-4
at AFSCME 63-64).

5
weeks before returning to work. Id. at 121-24. During this period, fourteen other
TEO-Bs continued working at a “main shed” location. This crew, referred to as the
skeleton crew, was comprised of two crews already working at such location,
pursuant to an earlier seniority-based bidding process (the “winter bid”6), prior to
the COVID-19 pandemic and staffing reduction. Id. at 77-79 (discussing Dep. Ex.
M-6). McFetridge testified that she had not been part of the main shed crew prior to
the staffing reduction, but rather had been working at a different location, pursuant
to her winter bid. Id. at 74. McFetridge acknowledged that she likely would not
have been part of the skeleton crew, had it been staffed strictly according to seniority,
given her place on the seniority hierarchy. Id. at 200. McFetridge also testified that
the less senior employee closest to her in terms of seniority was approximately three
months less senior, and during the period at issue closed that seniority gap by
approximately two weeks. Id. at 167-68, 173.
McFetridge testified that she reached out to multiple Union executives
regarding the staffing decision and was told “[t]hat they were looking into it and
going to work on it” and further that “they were going to see what they could do to

6
McFetridge described this process in her deposition testimony as such:

Winter bid is [when] we have a bid day. We all come to Franklin,
Venango County garage and . . . . we go to the front office and they
have the bid sheets and the most senior person -- the three most
senior people [--] are called into the front office.

The bid sheets are laid out. The most senior person gets to pick the
top slot, any slot he chooses, he or she chooses.

The next person in seniority has one less option, so on and so forth
until the last person has bid.

McFetridge Dep. at 47.

6
get seniority time back.” McFetridge Dep. at 108. She stated that she followed up
on the issue approximately a year later, ultimately requesting a grievance be filed on
her behalf and was told by her Union staff representative, Randy Wilson, that
nothing could be done about the seniority issue and no grievance could be filed. Id.
at 109-14. She further testified that the loss of seniority and failure of the Union to
help caused her mental distress, and that as a result of the skeleton crew staffing
plan, she lost seniority relative to less senior TEO-Bs who continued to work while
she did not. Id. at 175-76, 200-01.
b. Reisinger’s Deposition Testimony
Reisinger testified that he was the president of the Union’s local
executive board during the relevant period, having been elected to such position in
summer or fall of 2019. McFetridge’s Brief, Exhibit D (Reisinger Dep.) at 21. He
testified as to the CBA’s general grievance procedure, with which he had experience
both as president and previously as chief steward of the local executive board. Id.
at 22-24. Reisinger further testified as to the decision to staff the skeleton crew,
noting that the Department presented him with a plan for the shutdown. Id. at 33.
The plan was for “A Shift” and “B Shift”, both of which currently worked at the
main shed, to continue working. A Shift would work the first week and B Shift
would work the second week. Id. Regarding staffing at the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic, Reisinger stated “[a]t the very beginning, the Local Union
wanted to go by seniority[,]” and Klingler, the Department’s maintenance manager,
rejected this idea. Id. at 62. He stated that Klingler presented him with the plan for
which crews would continue working. Id. at 33-34. He also testified that he found
Klingler difficult to work with. Id. at 30.

7
c. Klingler’s Deposition Testimony
Klingler testified in her deposition that she was the Venango County
maintenance manager at the relevant time. McFetridge’s Brief, Exhibit E (Klingler
Dep.) at 19. She also testified that in her position, her duties included negotiating
agreements with the Union as well as working through grievances. Id. at 21. She
noted with respect to the initial staffing reduction that they “were supposed to have
a skeleton crew [] of people and the only place we had running water was our main
shed.” Id. at 23. When asked about how she and the local Union leadership came
to the decision to keep the main shed crews working during the staff reduction, she
testified that the decision “was a consensus within the room” between herself and
local Union leadership. Id. at 26.
Following discovery, the Union and the Department moved for
summary relief.
III. Standard for Summary Relief
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1532(b) governs requests for
summary relief in cases filed pursuant to this Court’s original jurisdiction. Pa.R.A.P.
1532(b). This Court has explained that:

Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b) provides that “[a]t any time after the
filing of a petition for review in an appellate or original
jurisdiction matter[,] the court may on application enter
judgment if the right of the applicant thereto is clear.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b). “An application for summary relief is
properly evaluated according to the standards for summary
judgment.” Myers v. Commonwealth, 128 A.3d 846, 849
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). That is, in ruling on a motion for
summary relief, the evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and the court may
enter judgment only if: (1) there are no genuine issues of

8
material fact; and (2) the right to relief is clear as a matter
of law.

Flagg v. Int’l Union, Sec., Police, Fire Pros of Am., Local 506, 146 A.3d 300, 305
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (emphasis added). Simply put, we grant an application
for summary relief only if the applicant’s right to relief is clear, meaning the only
remaining questions are legal rather than factual. Phantom Fireworks Showrooms,
LLC v. Wolf, 198 A.3d 1205, 1220 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (en banc). A genuine dispute
of fact precludes summary relief. Id. The record for purposes of considering a
motion for summary judgment consists of pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, admissions and affidavits. Meggett v. Dep’t of Corr., 892 A.2d 872,
879 n.13 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 106 (certain Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure apply to appellate courts in matters brought in the court’s original
jurisdiction)); Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 1035.1 (defining the record for considering a request
for summary judgment).
IV. Union’s Application for Summary Relief
The Union seeks summary relief on the basis that McFetridge has failed
to adduce any evidence that she was harmed by the Union’s actions during the
relevant time period, and thus she lacks standing to bring the instant action.
Specifically, it asserts that she lacked the seniority to have been offered work on the
skeleton crew even if positions were filled by seniority alone. It further contends
that McFetridge has suffered no harm from her loss of approximately two-to-three
weeks of seniority relative to a small number of less senior TEO-Bs, as none of these
less senior employees “leapfrogged” over McFetridge in terms of seniority.
The Union also contends that McFetridge has failed to establish a claim
for a breach of duty of fair representation as the staffing decisions made at the onset

9
of the COVID-19 pandemic were not arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad faith.
The Union rejoins that these decisions properly considered safety, certifications, and
seniority, which were prudent given the unprecedented circumstances presented by
the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the Union maintains that McFetridge was
not “furloughed” as contemplated in the CBA, as she was offered paid office closing
leave for a period, and after that ended, given the options to use accrued leave or
take unpaid leave while retaining health benefits. Accordingly, it argues that the
seniority/furlough provisions of the CBA were not applicable. It also contends,
presumably in the alternative, that the local executive board members of the Union
were entitled to “superseniority” in the event of a furlough, so some of the employees
less senior to McFetridge who continued working would have continued working
pursuant to such superseniority. The Union submits that any testimonial conflict as
to who made the decision to staff the skeleton crew does not create an issue of
material fact that precludes a grant of summary relief. Finally, the Union asserts that
McFetridge is not entitled to compensatory damages or a jury trial and asks this
Court to strike those requests from the Petition for Review.
a. Standing
As it is a threshold issue, we turn first to the Union’s contention that
McFetridge lacks standing to bring the instant action because she has not suffered
any actual harm as a result of the staffing decisions made at the onset of the COVID-
19 pandemic.
A litigant has standing if she has a “substantial, direct, and immediate
interest in the outcome of the litigation.” Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228, 243 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2016) (internal brackets, quotation marks and citations omitted). “An
interest is substantial when it surpasses the interest of all citizens in procuring

10
obedience to the law; it is direct when the asserted violation shares a causal
connection with the alleged harm; and it is immediate when the causal connection
with the alleged harm is neither remote nor speculative.” Ball v. Chapman, 289 A.3d
1, 19 (Pa. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). “While the harm alleged must
be substantial, it need not be pecuniary in nature.” Funk, 144 A.3d at 244 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). “[S]ome interests will suffice to confer
standing even though they are neither pecuniary nor readily translatable into
pecuniary terms.” Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d
269, 281 (Pa. 1975). “Similarly, even when the interest is pecuniary there is no
minimum threshold on its magnitude.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We disagree with the Union that McFetridge lacks standing to bring the
instant claim. Even if McFetridge would not have been part of the skeleton crew
had seniority rules been followed, and while she has not been “leapfrogged” in terms
of seniority, her relative loss of seniority to some less senior bargaining unit
members during the time she was not permitted to work constitutes an alleged harm
that is not merely speculative. It is clear from the evidence of record that during this
period, McFetridge was forced to expend PTO in a manner that less senior
employees did not, in spite of the CBA provisions. As a result, she is now at greater
risk of being leapfrogged in the future by less senior employees.7 This relative loss

7
Respondents argue that of the five employees less senior than McFetridge who remained
working, two were executive board members for the Union, and therefore entitled to superseniority
(meaning they would continue working in a furlough). Regardless of the number of less senior
union members who gained seniority on McFetridge during this period, this is still a harm to
McFetridge. We need not nitpick over the amount of harm (whether it relates to the number of
less senior employees gaining seniority on McFetridge or the number of days gained) at this stage,
simply finding that actual harm exists allows McFetridge’s suit to survive the Union’s standing
challenge. See, e.g., Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 346 A.2d 269 (Pa.
1975).

11
of seniority, which essentially allowed less senior employees to “close the gap” in
terms of seniority, is an actual concrete result of the staffing decisions. That such
harm may not be quantifiable in a pecuniary manner does not mean it is insufficient
to establish standing. Accordingly, we reject the Union’s contention that
McFetridge lacks standing here.
b. Breach of Duty of Fair Representation
We turn next to the Union’s claim that McFetridge has failed to show
that the Union’s staffing decisions were arbitrary, discriminatory, or made in bad
faith.
It is well settled that a union “bears a heavy duty of fair representation
to all those within the shelter of its protection.” Falsetti v. Local Union No. 2026,
United Mine Workers of America, 161 A.2d 882, 895 (Pa. 1960). The “[U]nion
breaches [its] duty of fair representation if its actions towards its members are due
to ‘arbitrariness, discrimination or bad faith.’” Connelly v. Steel Valley Educ. Ass’n,
119 A.3d 1127, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Casner v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty. and Mun. Emps., 658 A.2d 865, 870 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)).
McFetridge rejoins that the Union acted arbitrarily and in bad faith by
prioritizing the interests of Union leaders and their favored coworkers over
contractually mandated seniority rights. She further argues that the Union’s failure
to file a grievance on her behalf and the Union’s misleading assurances of
rectification demonstrate a breach of its duty of fair representation. She further
contends that there are outstanding issues of material fact that preclude a grant of the
Union’s request for summary judgment, especially as it relates to conflicts in the
deposition testimony as to whether the Union or the Department made the decision
to staff the skeleton crews.

12
Mindful of the standards applicable to a request for summary relief and
resolving doubts as to the existence of disputes of material fact in favor of the non-
moving party (here, McFetridge), we agree with McFetridge’s contention that there
are multiple issues of material fact outstanding that preclude us from granting the
Union’s request for summary relief on the basis that she cannot state a claim for the
breach of duty of fair representation. As noted by McFetridge, there is conflicting
deposition testimony as to who made the decision to staff the skeleton crews that
continued to work during the relevant period. Further, there is conflicting testimony
as to why the staffing decisions were made, with McFetridge arguing bad faith and
self-dealing by Union leadership and their friends, and the Union and the
Department citing pandemic-related safety concerns. Additionally, the nature of the
period at issue – whether it be a furlough or something else – is also subject to dispute
and is material to whether the CBA’s seniority/furlough provisions apply to this
matter. While the Union contends that McFetridge was not furloughed, McFetridge
contends that she was.8

8
Here, the temporary cessation of work and payment is functionally very similar to a furlough
in spite of the fact that employees continued to receive benefits and were permitted to use PTO.
As a popular adage instructs: a bird that walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a
duck may be appropriately called a duck. At the very least, whether the leave at issue was a
furlough subject to the furlough provisions of the CBA is a disputed material fact. While not
controlling on the instant case, we find the Superior Court’s reasoning in Kelly v. Montour
Railroad Company, 171 A.2d 632, 634 (Pa. Super. 1961), influential. In determining the nature
of an employee’s absence from employment under an insurance agreement, our sister court stated:
“To try to distinguish between ‘lay-off’, ‘temporary lay-off’, ‘furlough’ and ‘leave of absence’ is
a play on words.” Id.
Notably, this is also another point of dispute between the Department and the Union, with the
Department explicitly referring to this period as a “temporary furlough” and taking issue with
references made by McFetridge to this period as a “layoff.” Department’s Brief at 13.

13
c. Compensatory Damages/Jury Trial
Last, the Union asks this Court to strike the demands in McFetridge’s
Petition for Review for compensatory damages and a jury trial. McFetridge
responds that where there is evidence tending to show that the Department actively
participated with the Union’s bad faith staffing decisions, a jury trial and demand
for damages is proper.
McFetridge’s contention that a jury trial and damages may be
appropriate where the Department actively participated in the Union’s bad faith is
supported by our case law. See Garzella v. Borough of Dunmore, 62 A.3d 486, 493
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (discussing a jury trial for damages held in a breach of duty of
fair representation case). As discussed above, there are material issues of fact as to
whether the Union acted in bad faith. Moreover, as addressed in Section V below,
there are issues of material fact as to how the decisions to staff the skeleton crew
were made and by whom, including whether the Department actively participated in
such decision making alongside the Union. Therefore, summary relief denying
McFetridge’s jury trial and damages demands9 is not appropriate at this time.
V. Department’s Application for Summary Relief
The Department’s application for summary relief, while mirroring
some of the Union’s assertions, varies based on its position as McFetridge’s
employer. For its part, the Department argues that McFetridge has failed to show
that the Department conspired, colluded, or actively participated in the Union’s

9
At oral argument, McFetridge’s counsel suggested that a jury trial and damages are not
the relief actually sought by McFetridge. Rather, it appears that the relief she seeks sounds in
equity, namely a reinstatement of her PTO. It is unclear if McFetridge believes that this Court can
offer that relief directly or if she simply asks this Court to order that the Union engage in the
grievance process with this result as her goal. Because no dispositive motion by McFetridge is
currently before us, we decline to further speculate.

14
alleged bad faith. The Department also argues generally that McFetridge has failed
to show harm as a result of the staffing decisions at issue.10
This Court has previously explained that an employer may become
liable for a union’s breach of its duty of fair representation only where an employee
shows “by specific facts, that the employer actively participated in the union’s bad
faith or that the employer conspired or colluded with the union to deny the employee
his rights under the labor contract.” Garzella, 62 A.3d at 494.
In support of its application, the Department argues that there is no
evidence that it conspired, colluded, or actively participated with the Union in the
Union’s alleged breach of the duty of fair representation owed to McFetridge. The
Department contends that staffing decisions during the pandemic were made by the
Union, and contrary to Klingler’s testimony, the Department had no role in selecting
the skeleton crew. The Department further contends that McFetridge’s claims are
speculative and lack factual support, as she admitted that even under normal
seniority rules, she would not have been selected for the skeleton crew.
Additionally, the Department argues that McFetridge’s allegations of gender
discrimination are not substantiated and do not relate to the claims of conspiracy or
collusion. The Department concludes that McFetridge has failed to meet the burden
of proof required to demonstrate any breach of duty or harm caused by the
Department’s actions. Thus, it seeks summary relief dismissing it from the case.
McFetridge responds that there is testimony that the Department
participated with the Union in making the decision as to how the skeleton crew was

10
Because we have already disposed of the Union’s assertion that McFetridge failed to show
adequate harm to bring the instant action, we do not separately discuss the Department’s similar
claim. Instead, we incorporate our discussion found in Section IV.a, supra.

15
to be staffed, particularly Klingler’s testimony that the decision was made based
upon consensus between herself and local Union leadership.
The extent of the Department’s involvement in the staffing decisions is
disputed and material to the issue of whether the Department conspired, colluded, or
actively participated with the Union. As shown by a fulsome review of the
deposition testimonies recounted above, there is conflicting testimony as to who
made the decision to staff the skeleton crews and the reasons therefor. Moreover,
there is testimony tending to show that the Department actively participated with the
Union in the decision to staff the skeleton crew in a manner that did not follow the
CBA’s furlough and seniority protocols. While Reisinger testified that the skeleton
crew staffing plan was implemented by the Department against the Union’s wishes,
Klingler testified that the decision was made by consensus between herself and local
Union leadership, including Reisinger. This ongoing dispute in material facts
forecloses the possibility of the Department’s request for summary relief at this time.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Applications for Summary Relief are
denied.

---

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

Judge Dumas did not participate in the decision in this matter.

16
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mindy McFetridge, :
Petitioner :
:
v. : No. 219 M.D. 2022
:
American Federation of State, :
County and Municipal Employees, :
Council 13 and Pennsylvania :
Department of Transportation, :
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of March 2026, the Applications for
Summary Relief filed by the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees, Council 13 and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation are
DENIED.

---

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge