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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

M.C. Romig v. PA DOC, Sec'y. Dr. L.R. Harry

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 249 M.D. 2023
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Covey

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.9K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by [Anne E. Covey](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8201/anne-e-covey/)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael C. Romig, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Department of :
Corrections, Secretary Dr. Laurel :
R. Harry, et al., : No. 249 M.D. 2023
Respondents : Submitted: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: March 19, 2026

Before this Court are the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’
(Department) and Department Secretary Dr. Laurel R. Harry’s (Secretary)
(collectively, Respondents) Preliminary Objections (Preliminary Objections) to
Michael C. Romig’s (Romig) pro se Amended Petition for Review in the nature of
a complaint (Amended Petition). After review, this Court overrules Respondents’
first Preliminary Objection, sustains Respondents’ second Preliminary Objection,
and dismisses the Amended Petition.
Romig is currently an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at
Frackville.1 On May 23, 2023, Romig filed a pro se Petition for Review in the nature
of a complaint (Petition) generally challenging the Department’s Inmate Mail and

1
See https://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/Result (last visited Mar. 18, 2026).
Incoming Publications Policy, DC-ADM 803 (Policy 803),2 as it relates to general
mail and legal/privileged mail.
On June 21, 2023, Respondents filed preliminary objections to the
Petition, asserting, inter alia, that the Petition lacked specificity. Romig filed an
answer to the preliminary objections on July 13, 2023. On May 6, 2025, following
submission of the parties’ briefs, this Court held that the Petition was defective in
that it lacked specific factual allegations describing the alleged Department action
Romig challenged. Accordingly, this Court sustained Respondents’ preliminary
objection, dismissed the Petition without prejudice, and granted Romig 30 days to
file an amended petition for review.
On June 2, 2025, Romig filed the Amended Petition in this Court’s
original jurisdiction. On June 11, 2025, Respondents filed the Preliminary
Objections to the Amended Petition, therein averring that the Amended Petition
lacks specificity and that Romig failed to state a claim for which relief may be
granted (demurrer). On August 13, 2025, Respondents filed their brief in support of
the Preliminary Objections. On September 19, 2025, Romig filed his brief in
opposition to the Preliminary Objections.
Initially,

“[i]n ruling on . . . preliminary objections, [this Court]
must accept as true all well-pleaded material allegations in
the petition for review” and any reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from those averments. Meier v.
Maleski, . . . 648 A.2d 595, 600 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1994).
[This Court is] not, however, bound by legal conclusions,

2
See https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-
policies/803%20Inmate%20Mail%20and%20Incoming%20Publications.pdf (last visited Mar. 18,
2026). Policy 803 generally requires all incoming non-privileged inmate mail be sent to the
Department’s contracted processing center (operated by Smart Communications in Florida) to be
opened and scanned by processing center staff. The staff then forwards paper copies of the mail
to inmates. In contrast, all incoming, privileged inmate mail must be sent to the inmate at the
institution where the inmate is housed and must contain a Department issued control number.
2
expressions of opinion, unwarranted inferences from facts,
or argumentative allegations. [This Court] may sustain
preliminary objections only where the law makes clear
that the petitioner cannot succeed on the claim, resolving
any doubt in the petitioner’s favor. “[This Court]
review[s] preliminary objections in the nature of a
demurrer under the above guidelines and may sustain a
demurrer only when a petitioner has failed to state a claim
for which relief may be granted.” Armstrong C[n]ty.
Mem’l Hosp. v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 67 A.3d 160, 170
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

Pa. AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth, 219 A.3d 306, 313-14 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)
(citations omitted).
Relative to Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection, Respondents
argue that the Amended Petition must be dismissed because it lacks the requisite
specificity. This Court has explained:

[Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule)]
1028(a)(3) permits a preliminary objection based on
insufficient specificity of a pleading. To determine if a
pleading is sufficiently specific, a court must ascertain
whether the facts alleged are sufficiently specific to enable
a defendant to prepare his defense. Preliminary objections
in the nature of a motion for a more specific pleading raise
the sole question of whether the pleading is sufficiently
clear to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. Further,
in pleading its case, the complaint need not cite evidence
but only those facts necessary for the defendant to
prepare a defense.

Hill v. Dep’t of Corr., 271 A.3d 569, 578 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (underline emphasis
added) (quoting Unified Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 950 A.2d 1120,
1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008) (bold emphasis added; citation omitted)).

3
Here, Romig alleges in the Amended Petition:3

On January 20[,] 2023[, Romig] received opened
privileged mail that had been sent through Smart
Communications (Smart). The contents of the same was [sic] multiple
transcripts and other legal documents relating to
[Romig’s] criminal conviction and ongoing appeals. This
information was forced to be sent in this manner by the
[D]epartment[’]s enhanced 2020 measures thus violating
the inmates [sic] Bill of Rights and U[nited] S[tates]
[c]onstitutional [r]ights. Additionally[,] there have been
numerous other incidents on other occa[s]ions as a result
of these changes, where [Romig] believes it also [a]ffects
others within the . . . [D]epartment . . . .

Amended Petition at 2, ¶4.

3
Importantly, “[t]he allegations of a pro se [petitioner] are held to a
less stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by
attorneys. If a fair reading of the [petition for review] shows that
the [petitioner] has pleaded facts that may entitle [him] to relief, the
preliminary objections will be overruled.” Danysh v. Dep’t of Corr.,
845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, . . . 881 A.2d 1263
([Pa.] 2005).
Hill, 271 A.3d at 578.
4
Romig further avers that he grieved Respondents’ actions and
exhausted the grievance process.4 In Grievance No. 1017998 (Grievance), which
Romig attached to the Amended Petition,5 Romig claimed:

On January 20, 2023, I received opened mail at my cell
that went through Smart []. This method is for non-
privileged mail, not documents pertaining to a current
[l]egal litigation. These type[s] of documents should be
sent directly to the facility through privileged mail[.]
Smart [] should not accept these type[s] of documents.
The mail in question was from Deputy Attorney General
Gregory Simatic [(Deputy AG Simatic)], who is
representing Respondents against this inmate[’]s . . . writ
of habeas corpus [(Habeas Corpus Action)], challenging

4
Romig states in the Amended Petition that “[d]uring the grievance process, when [Romig]
appealed to the [Department] Secretary’s Office of Inmate Grievance and Appeals (SOIGA), the
[D]epartment defaulted by failing to respond timely within 30 working days of the appeal.”
Amended Petition at 2, ¶5. Department Policy DC-ADM 804 (Policy 804), Inmate Grievance
System Procedures Manual, states: “The SOIGA will ensure that . . . an appeal to final review is
responded to within 30 working days of receipt unless otherwise extended and/or referred[.]”
Policy 804 at 2-7, https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/cor/documents/about-
us/doc-policies/804%20Inmate%20Grievances.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2026). However, Policy
804 also states:
This policy does not create rights in any person nor should it be
interpreted or applied in such a manner as to abridge the rights of
any individual. This policy should be interpreted to have sufficient
flexibility to be consistent with law and to permit the
accomplishment of the purpose(s) of the policies of the Department
....
Id. at 2. Romig does not provide additional information regarding his SOIGA appeal, and this
Court does not conclude that SOIGA’s alleged failure to timely respond is a default.
5
Courts reviewing preliminary objections may consider not only the
facts pleaded in the [petition for review], but also documents or
exhibits attached to the [petition for review], and based upon the
averments and documentary support may address challenges to the
legal sufficiency of the [petition for review].
Diess v. Dep’t of Transp., 935 A.2d 895, 903 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).

5
the reliability of the criminal conviction of which this
inmate is being detained for.
Smart [] is cop[y]ing these documents violating the right
to privacy, and causing delays that violate due process
rights. This mail was sent December 30, 2022, where it
was not received by [Romig] until January 20, 2023. This
makes it impossible for [Romig] to reply to
Respondents[’] Answer within 21 days, per . . . Rules of
Court.
For all of the above reasons[,] . . . [P]olicy [803] is
unconstitutional, violating all inmates[’] rights under the
control of the Department . . . per [the United States]
Constitution First[6] and Fourteenth Amendments.[7]

Amended Complaint, Attachment.
In the Amended Petition and Grievance, Romig sets forth concise and
specific facts, alleging that, on January 20, 2023, he received mail from Deputy AG
Simatic that had been opened before it reached him. He further asserts that because
the mail related to ongoing litigation, it was privileged and should have remained
unopened. In addition, Romig complains that the Department’s policies caused his
privileged mail to be improperly screened, thereby violating his constitutional right
to privacy, and delaying receipt which impaired his ability to litigate his case,
violating his due process rights. Such information is sufficient for Respondents to
prepare a defense. Accordingly, this Court concludes that Romig’s Amended
Petition is sufficiently specific and overrules Respondents’ first Preliminary
Objection.
Concerning the second Preliminary Objection, Respondents contend
that Romig failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Respondents
specifically assert that Romig does not make any arguments in support of his

6
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

6
allegation as to how Policy 803 is in violation of the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. Nonetheless,

courts are presumed to know the law, and plaintiffs need
only plead facts constituting the cause of action, and the
courts will take judicial notice of the statute involved.
Accordingly, a plaintiff filing a complaint in the courts of
this Commonwealth is not required to specify the legal
theory or theories underlying the complaint. He or she
may merely allege the material facts which form the basis
of a cause of action.

Heinly v. Commonwealth, 621 A.2d 1212, 1215 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (emphasis
added).
With respect to Romig’s claim that the Department and/or Smart
violated his right to privacy because Smart opened his incoming privileged
correspondence, this Court observes that Romig identifies the opened mail as
correspondence from Respondents’ counsel, Deputy AG Simatic, regarding Romig’s
Habeas Corpus Action. Notably, Policy 803 defines incoming privileged
correspondence as

incoming inmate mail as described below:
a. Mail from an inmate’s attorney that is either hand-
delivered to the facility by the attorney or delivered
through the mail system. This correspondence shall
contain the attorney’s issued control number and
secondary authentication number, which was issued to
the sender by the Department’s Office of Chief Counsel,
in order to be accepted, processed, and delivered to the
inmate.
b. Mail from a court.
c. Mail from an elected or appointed federal, state, or local
official who has sought and obtained a control number
issued by the Department’s Office of Chief Counsel.
NOTE: Not all correspondence between an inmate and
elected or appointed federal, state, or local official will
require privileged correspondence processing. Control
7
numbers will only be issued when the underlying matter
involves matters related to a confidential investigation
process or similar concerns.

Policy 803, Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications Procedures Manual, Glossary
of Terms at 4 (underline emphasis added).
Romig does not allege in the Amended Petition that Deputy AG Simatic
is or was Romig’s attorney (and, in fact, acknowledges that Deputy AG Simatic is
opposing counsel in the Habeas Corpus Action). Further, although Deputy AG
Simatic may be an “elected or appointed federal, state, or local official[,]” Romig
does not aver that Deputy AG Simatic “sought and obtained a control number issued
by the Department’s Office of Chief Counsel.” Id. Therefore, the mail Romig
received from Deputy AG Simatic was not incoming privileged correspondence. As
Romig is aware, this Court has “held that the handling of non-privileged mail does
not implicate a right to privacy.” Romig v. Wetzel, 309 A.3d 1108, 1113 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2024), aff’d, 326 A.3d 849 (Pa. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S.Ct. 1969 (2025).
Accordingly, Romig has failed to state a claim for a violation of his right to privacy.
Regarding Romig’s claim that the Department has violated his due
process rights by delaying his mail, Romig characterizes the Department’s actions
as interfering with his ability to respond to court filings and, thus, sounds in a claim
for denial of access to the courts. This Court has found that “[i]nmates have a
‘fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts.’” Bussinger v. Dep[’t] of
Corr[.], 29 A.3d 79, 84 (Pa. Cmwlth 2011) (quoting Bronson v. Horn, 830 A.2d
1092, 1095-96 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003), aff’d, . . . 848 A.2d 917 (Pa. 2004), cert. denied,
543 U.S. 944. . . (2004)).

[I]n order to state a cognizable claim for
violation of the right to access to the
courts, a prisoner must allege and offer
proof that he suffered an “actual injury” to
court access as a result of the denial. Oliver

8
v. Fauver, 118 F.3d 175, 177-78 (3d Cir.
1997). The [United States] Supreme Court
has defined actual injury as the loss or
rejection of a nonfrivolous legal claim
regarding the sentencing or the conditions
of confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343. . . (1996).
Hackett [v. Horn,] 751 A.2d [272,] 275-76 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2000) (quoting Robinson v. Ridge, 996
F. Supp. 447, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1997), aff’d, 175 F.3d 1011
(3d Cir. 1999)).
Recently, this Court explained:
While a prisoner’s right to access the courts
is derived from an express provision of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and multiple
provisions of the [United States]
Constitution, the analysis under both federal
and state law is the same. See, e.g., Bronson
....
. . . .[A]t a minimum, [p]etitioner would have
needed to (1) allege he had a nonfrivolous,
arguable underlying claim, and (2) describe
how the [p]olicy frustrated his ability to
pursue that claim. See Christopher v.
Harbury, 536 U.S. 403. . . (2002) (“Like any
other element of an access claim, the
underlying cause of action and its lost remedy
must be addressed by allegations in the
[petition for review] sufficient to give fair
notice to a defendant.”); see also Lewis, 518
U.S. at 351 (“the inmate therefore must go
one step further and demonstrate that the
alleged shortcomings in the [Policy] hindered
his efforts to pursue a legal claim”).
Wishnefsky v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 191
M.D. 2021, filed May 19, 2023), slip op. at 5-6 (emphasis
added; footnotes omitted). Thus, “[i]n order to survive
dismissal of a complaint, a prisoner must describe an
underlying claim and explain why it possesses arguable
merit.” Nifas v. Sroka (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 422 C.D. 2016,
filed July 29, 2016), slip op. at 7 (emphasis added). The
9
prisoner “must demonstrate ‘that the ‘arguable’ nature
of the underlying claim is more than hope.’
Christopher . . . , 536 U.S. [at] 416 . . . .” Horan v.
Newingham (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 2622 C.D. 2015, filed Oct.
24, 2016), slip op. at 15 (emphasis added).

Rytsar v. Overmyer, (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 571 M.D. 2022, filed September 9, 2024),
slip op. at 9-11 (footnotes omitted).8
Romig’s Amended Petition does not describe any actual injury
resulting from the delay in receiving his mail. Rather, he simply states in the
Grievance that the Department’s application of Policy 803 “ma[de] it impossible for
[Romig] to reply to Respondents[’] Answer within 21 days, per . . . Rules of Court.”
Amended Complaint, Attachment. However, he provides no further information
about the underlying claim’s substance or merit, or a resulting lost remedy.
Therefore, Romig’s Amended Petition fails to state a claim for which relief can be
granted.
For all of the above reasons, Respondents’ first Preliminary Objection
is overruled, Respondents’ second Preliminary Objection is sustained, and Romig’s
Amended Petition is dismissed.

---

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

8
This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited
“for [their] persuasive value, but not as binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth
Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (a). The unreported cases cited
herein are cited for their persuasive value.

10
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Michael C. Romig, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Pennsylvania Department of :
Corrections, Secretary Dr. Laurel :
R. Harry, et al., : No. 249 M.D. 2023
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 19th day of March, 2026, the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections’ (Department) and Department Secretary Dr. Laurel R. Harry’s
(collectively, Respondents) first Preliminary Objection is OVERRULED;
Respondents’ second Preliminary Objection is SUSTAINED; and Michael C.
Romig’s Amended Petition for Review is DISMISSED.

---

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge