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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

K. George v. Com. of PA, DOC

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 409 M.D. 2021
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Fizzano Cannon

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.2K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by Fizzano Cannon

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kareem George, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Corrections, :
Records Supervisor, Kathleen :
Witmer, SCI Rockview, :
Superintendent, Bobi Jo Solomon, : No. 409 M.D. 2021
Respondents : Submitted: February 3, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON FILED: March 16, 2026

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction is an application for
summary relief filed pro se by Petitioner Kareem George (George) concerning his
pending petition for writ of mandamus (mandamus petition). The mandamus
petition avers that Respondents, primarily the Department of Corrections and its
personnel (collectively, the Department), wrongly amended the effective date of
George’s prison sentence for offenses committed in 2002 while he was on parole
from a prior conviction. George asks this Court to direct the Department to correct
the sentence to reflect an effective date of August 27, 2007, the date of his guilty
plea and colloquy. Upon review, we deny George’s application for summary relief.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In December 2002, George, who was on parole at the time from a 1995
conviction, was involved in a dispute that began in a Harrisburg nightclub and ended
in a nearby parking garage where he shot at several individuals, one of whom was
killed. Guilty Plea Colloquy at 11.1 He fled, was ultimately arrested in New York
State on January 6, 2005, and has been in Department custody since then. Id. at 11
& 25.
On August 27, 2007, George appeared at his guilty plea and sentencing
colloquy for the 2002 offenses. The prosecutor stated that a plea agreement had
been reached: George would serve 15 to 30 years on a third-degree murder charge
to run concurrently with sentences on lesser charges from the same incident. Guilty
Plea Colloquy at 2 & 8. The prosecutor did not state that any time related to
George’s back time on the 1995 conviction or his parole violations from the 2002
incident would run concurrently with his new sentence; the prosecutor stated only
that “discussions” had taken place and that “any questions that [George] has” could
be “cleared up” at the colloquy. Id. at 3.
George’s counsel asked that the sentence on the 2002 offenses be
effective as of the August 27, 2007, colloquy date and run concurrently with a one-
year sentence that had already been imposed for George’s technical parole violations
on his 1995 conviction. Id. at 9-10. The sentencing court responded:
The sentence will be effective today. That was no
question. Mr. George, I just want to be crystal clear, to the
extent that I can make it concurrent with your technical
violations I would do that. But I’m not even so sure I can
do that. I just want to be clear with you that that may not
happen. Do you understand that?

1
The colloquy transcript is appended to George’s mandamus petition.

2
....

I’m recommending it. I’m stating that for the record. But
that can be ignored by the Parole Board. Do you
understand that?

Id. at 10. George nodded his agreement. Id. at 10.
At the colloquy, after George formally pleaded guilty, the court
confirmed that a plea agreement had been reached for George to serve 15 to 30 years
on the 2002 offenses. Guilty Plea Colloquy at 14. The sentencing court reiterated
that it was uncertain whether George’s parole violation or back time could run
concurrently with his sentence on the new charges and stated that “even though I’m
going to do what you ask” and recommend that George’s parole violation sentence
run concurrently to the new sentence, “that’s not part of the plea agreement, that if
the Parole Board does not give [George] credit that’s not a condition of the plea
agreement?” Id. at 14-15. George’s counsel responded “Right.” Id. at 15.
Near the end of the colloquy, the sentencing court reiterated that the
sentence on the 2002 offenses “is effective today’s date” and that “[t]o the extent
that the Court can, this sentence can run concurrently with” George’s parole
violation sentence: “That seems to me to comply not with the plea agreement but
with what our discussion was. The full understanding that that’s – the Court may
not have the authority to do that. And if we don’t, we’ll give [George] the
appropriate time credit.” Guilty Plea Colloquy at 27. The sentencing court lastly
advised George that he had 10 days to file a post-sentence motion and 30 days from
the outcome of that motion to further appeal to this Court. Id. at 29. The record
before this Court does not indicate that George filed a post-trial motion or notice of
appeal after the colloquy.

3
In December 2012, George filed a Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)2
petition raising issues regarding his August 27, 2007, sentencing for the first time.3
See Commonwealth v. George (Pa. Super., No. 465 MDA 2013, filed Jan. 23, 2014),
2014 WL 11016401 (unreported) (George I). The PCRA petition challenged the
validity of his plea based on Commonwealth v. Zuber, 353 A.2d 441 (Pa. 1976).
In Zuber, the sentencing court expressly adopted the prosecutor’s
“specific promise” to recommend to the Parole Board that the defendant’s back time
run concurrently with his sentence on new charges. Id. at 444-45. The
Commonwealth acknowledged that the promise was void because “a parole violator
convicted and sentenced to prison for another offense must serve his or her back
time and the new sentence in consecutive order” and the Board had no power to
grant such a request but asked that the matter be returned for an administrative
remedy. Id. at 443. The Court instead reinstated the defendant’s original plea terms
because “the natural and obvious underlying inference that the Parole Board had, at
the least, the [o]ption to accept or reject such a request thereby became an integral
part of the bargain” made by the defendant. Id. at 445-46.
In George I, the Superior Court did not address the merits of George’s
contentions regarding his plea because it concluded that the petition was untimely,

2
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

3
George’s first PCRA petition, filed in August 2008, pertained to the substance of the 2002
offenses but did not raise any issues regarding his sentence for those offenses. The Superior Court
upheld the PCRA court’s dismissal of that petition. See Commonwealth v. George (Pa. Super.,
No. 66 MDA 2010, filed Oct. 18, 2010) (unreported). Previous unreported Superior Court
decisions regarding George’s earlier filings are cited herein pursuant to the Superior Court’s
Internal Operating Procedures, which allow citation of an unreported memorandum decision of
that court filed prior to May 2, 2019 “when the memorandum is relevant to a criminal action or
proceeding because it recites issues raised and reasons for a decision affecting the same defendant
in a prior action or proceeding.” 210 Pa. Code § 65.37 (B)(2).

4
having been raised more than five years after his sentence became final in September
2007; moreover, his “discovery” of Zuber did not meet the after-discovered evidence
exception to the PCRA’s time bar rules. Id., slip op. at 6-9, 2014 WL 11016401, at
*3.
In February 2016, George filed another PCRA petition.
Commonwealth v. George (Pa. Super., No. 202 MDA 2017, filed Dec. 8, 2017), 2017
WL 6163492 (unreported) (George II). He asserted that his plea agreement was for
his parole violation and back time to run concurrently with his sentence on the 2002
offenses, that he learned in December 2015 that this was not the case, and that he
was not receiving the benefit of his agreement.4 Id., slip op. at 1, 2017 WL 6163492,
at *1.
The Superior Court concluded in George II that George’s 2016 petition
did not fall within the PCRA but was instead an action seeking to enforce the terms
of his plea agreement; the matter was remanded to the sentencing court to be treated
as a petition to modify his sentence. George II, slip op. at 5, 2017 WL 6163492, at
*2. On that remand and relevant to this appeal, the sentencing court held a hearing
at which George testified and both sides submitted post-hearing briefs.
Commonwealth v. George (Pa. Super., No. 316 MDA 2019, filed Apr. 3, 2020), slip
op. at 3, 2020 WL 1656148, at *2 (unreported) (George III). In January 2019, the
sentencing court held that running George’s “back time” on the old sentence
concurrently with his new sentence was not a term of his plea agreement and denied
his petition. Id., slip op. at 3, 2020 WL 1656148, at *2. The Superior Court reviewed

4
George’s prior PCRA petition raised issues regarding the concurrency of his parole
violation and back time and relied on Zuber, which pointed out that such concurrency is not legally
proper. This suggests that George was aware as of filing that petition in 2012 that his sentences
were not running concurrently. Nevertheless, he asserted in his 2016 petition that he believed his
sentences were running concurrently until he learned otherwise in December 2015.

5
the colloquy and affirmed in April 2020, agreeing with the sentencing court that
George’s plea agreement did not include his back time running concurrently to his
new sentence. Id., slip op. at 7-9, 2020 WL 1656148, at *3-4.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, George filed the subject mandamus
petition in this Court’s original jurisdiction in November 2021. He maintained that
the original sentencing court stated in the colloquy that the effective date for the
sentence on the 2002 offenses would be the colloquy date of August 27, 2007, which
George stated would result in a minimum release date in August 2022 and a
maximum release date in August 2037. Mandamus Petition at 2. George asserted
that in December 2015, when he received a copy of his DC-16E sentence status
summary form5 for the 2002 offenses, it indicated an effective date of July 21, 2013,
not August 27, 2007. Id. He averred that the Department lacked authority to change
or “interfere with” the sentencing court’s order setting the effective date as August
27, 2007, and asked this Court to direct the Department to change the effective date
to August 27, 2007. Id. at 3.
In January 2022, the Department filed preliminary objections
challenging the legal sufficiency of George’s mandamus petition. The Department
asserted that once George pleaded guilty to the 2002 offenses at the August 2007
colloquy, he “became a convicted parole violator and thus was required to serve a
significant back time parole violation hit” on his prior sentence before beginning the
15-to-30-year sentence on the 2002 offenses. Preliminary Objections at 5. The
Department acknowledged that the original sentencing court deemed the new

5
Form DC16E lists an inmate’s offenses and the minimum and maximum sentences for
each, the minimum and maximum release dates, and any remarks relevant to the inmate’s sentence.
See Butler v. Dep’t of Corr. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 271 M.D. 2017, filed Feb. 14, 2018), slip op. at 3-
4, 2018 WL 845010, at *2 (unreported).

6
sentence’s effective date to be August 27, 2007. Id. However, the Department
averred that any impression that this meant the sentencing court definitively ordered
concurrent sentences was refuted by the sentencing court’s repeated statements, to
which George assented on the record, that while the sentencing court could
recommend that result, any such decision was not part of the plea agreement for the
2002 offenses and would be determined by parole authorities. Id. at 5-7.
On August 15, 2023, this Court issued a single-judge memorandum
opinion and order overruling the Department’s preliminary objections. The opinion
rejected the Department’s contention that George’s guilty plea to the 2002 offenses
automatically rendered him a convicted parole violator because the Parole Board
retained discretion to make any such determination. Id., slip op. at 5-6. The opinion
added that even if the Parole Board had formally deemed George a convicted parole
violator, the Department could not assert facts outside of George’s mandamus
petition, which alleged only that the Department wrongly changed the effective
sentence date from the sentencing court’s order of August 27, 2007, to July 21, 2013,
and that this violated the terms of his plea agreement. Id. at 6-7.
In September 2023, the Department filed an answer and new matter to
George’s mandamus petition. The Department denied George’s allegations
regarding his sentence for the 2002 offenses and maintained the propriety of its
calculations. Dep’t Answer at 3-7. In its new matter, the Department averred that
when George committed the 2002 offenses, he was on parole from a prior 6-to-15-
year sentence imposed in 1995; that in February 2005, the Parole Board imposed a
12-month sentence for George’s technical parole violations associated with the 2002
offenses; and that in October 2007, several months after the August 2007 colloquy,
the Parole Board deemed George a convicted parole violator and sentenced him to

7
36 months of back time on his prior sentence, to run concurrently with the 12 months
he received for his technical parole violations. Id. at 9-10. The Department
explained that this resulted in a maximum date of December 8, 2015, for George’s
time still due on the 1995 offenses and his parole violations. Id. at 10. The
Department averred that including credit for time served after his January 2005 arrest
and prior to his August 2007 plea on the 2002 offenses and then for time served
between the April 2005 criminal complaint on the 2002 offenses and the August
2007 colloquy for those offenses, George became available to begin his sentence on
the 2002 offenses on July 21, 2013, because back time must be completed before the
a parole violator may commence a new sentence and cannot be credited towards the
new sentence.6 Id. at 10-13.
The Department added that George’s proper remedy would have been
to timely appeal the Parole Board’s October 2007 post-revocation calculations that
determined his parole violation and back time would end in December 2015, rather
than by filing a mandamus petition 14 years later. Answer at 14. Lastly, the
Department maintained that George’s claim seeking concurrency of his parole
violation and back time was previously litigated and rejected by the Superior Court
in George III. Id. George answered the Department’s new matter, acknowledging
the Department’s calculations but maintaining that the Department was bound to
follow the sentencing court’s statements at the colloquy that his sentence on the 2002
offenses would be effective as of the August 27, 2007, which meant that his parole
violation and back time would be concurrent to the new sentence beginning on that
date. George’s Answer at 1-3.

6
The Department attached copies of the DC-16E sentence status summary forms for
George’s 1995 convictions and 2002 offenses as well as documentation reflecting his formal parole
violations.

8
In August 2025, George filed the subject application for summary
relief, asserting that his right to the sentencing court’s stated effective date of August
27, 2007, was legally clear and that mandamus relief was proper. Application for
Summary Relief at 1-3. He asked this Court to declare that his sentence for the 2002
offenses began on August 27, 2007, and would “run concurrently with his prior
term” and to order the Department to amend its records accordingly. Id. at 4.
The Department answered George’s application, maintaining its
position that George’s sentence for the 2002 offenses was properly calculated and
that he had not established a legal right to have that sentence run concurrently with
his parole violation or back time sentences associated with his 1995 convictions.
Dep’t Answer to Application for Summary Relief at 1-9. Briefing is now complete
and this matter is ripe for disposition.

II. Issue
George maintains that the sentencing court expressly ordered that his
sentence on the 2002 offenses would begin on August 27, 2007, the colloquy date,
which meant that the sentencing court intended any outstanding parole violation or
back time from the 1995 convictions to run concurrently with the new sentence. He
asserts that mandamus relief is warranted to correct the Department’s unauthorized
determination that his sentence on the 2002 offenses would not start until after he
completed his parole violation and back time sentences.

III. Discussion
An application for summary relief may be granted if a party’s right to
judgment is clear and no material issues of fact are in dispute. See Pa.R.A.P.

9
1532(b); Eleven Eleven Pa., LLC v. Commonwealth, 169 A.3d 141 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2017). When ruling on an application for summary relief, this Court “view[s] the
evidence of record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and enter[s]
judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the right to
judgment is clear as a matter of law.” Eleven Eleven, 169 A.3d at 145 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“[M]andamus is an extraordinary writ which lies to compel
performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right
in the petitioner, a corresponding duty in the respondent, and a want of any other
appropriate and adequate remedy.” Cooper v. City of Greensburg, 363 A.2d 813,
815 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976). “The purpose of mandamus is not to establish legal rights
but only to enforce those legal rights that have already been established.” Orange
Stones Co. v. City of Reading, Zoning Hearing Bd., 32 A.3d 287, 290 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2011). “Mandamus will lie only to compel public officials to perform their duties
in accordance with the law [when] those duties are ministerial in character and not
discretionary.” Rakus v. Robinson, 382 A.2d 770, 772 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978) (citing
Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 244 A.2d 754 (Pa. 1968)).
“Mandamus can only be used to compel performance of a ministerial duty and will
not be granted in doubtful cases.” Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 370 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2014).
In our original jurisdiction, this Court has “routinely entertained”
mandamus petitions seeking orders to compel the Department to “honor particular
sentencing orders.” Saunders v. Dep’t of Corr., 749 A.2d 553, 555 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2000). However, in accordance with the above, the right to relief must be clearly
established. Orange Stones, 32 A.3d at 290; Cooper, 363 A.2d at 815. Here, George

10
must establish a clear legal right to the relief he seeks, specifically that the sentencing
court ordered his new sentence to run concurrently with the back time on his prior
sentence.
Generally, back time on an old sentence and the time due on a new
sentence cannot run concurrently. The parole violation statute in effect when George
was sentenced for the 2002 offense in 2007 stated:
If a new sentence is imposed upon such parolee, the
service of the balance of said term originally imposed shall
precede the commencement of the new term imposed in
the following cases: (1) If a person is paroled from any
State penal or correctional institution under the control and
supervision of the Department of Justice and the new
sentence imposed upon him is to be served in any such
State penal or correctional institution.

Section 21.1.(a) of the former Parole Act, former 61 P.S. § 331.21a(a), repealed by
the Act of August 11, 2009, P.L. 147.7 Accordingly, the parole violator must “serve
his back[ ]time and then his new state sentence in consecutive order, regardless of a
guilty plea agreement and sentence directing that the parole violator’s back[ ]time
on his original sentence run concurrently with his new sentence. . . . In short, any
agreement . . . indicating that his new criminal sentence would run concurrently with
his back[ ]time was invalid.” Palmer v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 134 A.3d 160,
165 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citing Zuber).
However, our Supreme Court also held in Zuber that the
Commonwealth, including its agencies, must abide by the terms of a negotiated plea
agreement even if doing so contravenes a statutory directive. 353 A.2d at 443-45.

7
When the Parole Code was reenacted in 2009 as the Prisons and Parole Code, the
successor provision separated the state and federal aspects of the former provision into separate
provisions, but the requirement that a parole violator serve his back time before his new sentence
can begin remains the same. See 61 Pa.C.S. § 6138(5).

11
More recently, in Commonwealth v. Martinez, 147 A.3d 517 (Pa. 2016), the Court
relied on Zuber’s reasoning in the context of sexual offender registration
requirements and concluded that the defendants were entitled to the requirements in
effect when they entered their plea agreements rather than the requirements that
came into effect when the law subsequently changed. Id. at 532-33. The Court
concluded that when an “alleged term is part of the parties’ plea agreement,” it is
enforceable even if it may not be legally authorized:
Indeed, despite the unenforceable nature of the agreed-
upon sentence in Zuber, this Court determined that Zuber
was entitled to the benefit of his bargain. In other words,
the Zuber Court did not simply conclude that Zuber was
not entitled to the bargained-for sentence because the
sentence was unenforceable. Instead, the Court examined
the parties’ agreement, found that the agreement included
the unenforceable sentence, and held that Zuber was
entitled to that sentence.

Martinez, 147 A.3d 517, 533 n.19 (Pa. 2016).
Keeping these concepts in mind, we note that in the sentencing context,
“mandamus can be maintained to have the Department comply with the clear
instructions of the trial court.” Oakman v. Dep’t of Corr., 893 A.2d 834, 837 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2006). There, in a dispute over credit associated with a parole violation
sentencing order, we stated that when a sentencing court issues an order “that is
clear, . . . mandamus would then be available to an inmate to have the Department
carry out that clear direction.” Id. However, if an order is unclear or ambiguous
with regard to a term, “the defendant is required to express his concerns about this
matter by raising an objection to the sentencing court to clarify its sentence, not seek
mandamus.” Id.

12
In Duncan v. Department of Corrections, 137 A.3d 575 (Pa. 2016), our
Supreme Court held that while mandamus was not available to compel the
Department to enforce a concurrent sentencing order that conflicted with the
statutory scheme and precedent, the defendant could “seek modification of his
sentence nunc pro tunc before the sentencing court, asserting [that] he has not
received the benefit of the guilty plea bargain negotiated with the Commonwealth
and approved by the court.” Id. at 576. “[T]he critical query in a mandamus action
is what did the sentencing court actually intend.” Allen v. Dep’t of Corr., 103 A.3d
365, 371 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).
Here, the prosecutor at George’s guilty plea colloquy stated that the
offer for George’s plea was 15 to 30 years on the 2002 third-degree murder charge,
concurrent with sentences on the lesser included charges from the incident. Guilty
Plea Colloquy at 3 & 8. He advised that “discussions” had taken place regarding
“any potential parole hit” and that through the colloquy, “we can clear up any
questions” that George might have; however, the prosecutor did not state that an
agreement had been reached in that regard. Id. at 3 & 9. George’s counsel asked if
George’s sentence on the 2002 offenses could run concurrently with the one-year
technical parole violation sentence he had already received and if the effective date
of the sentence could be the colloquy date of August 27, 2007. Id. at 9. The
sentencing court expressly agreed that the colloquy date would be the effective
sentence date but did not agree to order the sentence on the 2002 offenses to run
concurrently with George’s technical parole violation sentence. Id. at 10. The
sentencing court did agree to recommend that arrangement but advised George that
the Parole Board could “ignore” the recommendation. Id. George indicated his
assent. Id.

13
The sentencing court then stated that the plea agreement was limited to
the 15-to-30-year sentence on the murder charge, concurrent with the sentences on
the lesser included offenses from the same incident, but it would recommend
concurrency with George’s parole violations. Guilty Plea Colloquy at 14. However,
any issue regarding George’s parole violation or back time was “not part of the plea
agreement.” Id. at 14-15. George’s counsel responded “Right.” Id. at 15. The
sentencing court twice repeated that even though it would recommend concurrency,
this was “not a condition of the plea agreement.” Id. George again indicated that he
understood. Id. at 15-16. Near the end of the colloquy, the sentencing court
reiterated that on the parole violation and back time issue, its agreement to
recommend concurrency “seems to me to comply not with the plea agreement but
with what our discussion was.” Id. at 27. Thereafter, the sentencing court restated
that the agreement was limited to sentencing on the 2002 offenses and George stated
that he understood. Id. at 27-29.
George relies on Oakman, which states that mandamus is available if
the Department fails to give credit as instructed by a sentencing court’s order. 893
A.2d at 837. George also relies on Commonwealth v. Andrews (Pa. Super., No. 3452
EDA 2019, filed Dec. 18, 2020), 2020 WL 7419534 (unreported),8 where the
Superior Court, citing Zuber and Martinez, determined that the record supported the
defendant’s claim that his plea agreement expressly included that his back time
would run concurrently with his new sentence; although the agreement “was one
which the law did not permit,” it was enforceable. Id., slip op. at 2 & 6-9, 2020 WL
7419534, at **1-4. George also relies on Commonwealth v. Gillins (Pa. Super. No.
1145 EDA 2019, filed Dec. 24, 2020), 2020 WL 7663839 (unreported), where the

8
Unpublished memorandum decisions of the Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may
be cited for persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); 210 Pa. Code § 65.37 (B).

14
Superior Court remanded for appointment of PCRA counsel and reconsideration of
the defendant’s claims where the record supported the defendant’s assertion, which
the Commonwealth conceded had arguable merit, that his plea agreement stated that
his new state sentence would run concurrently to a federal sentence he was already
serving, even though no legal authority existed for such an arrangement. Id., slip
op. at 1 & 11-12, 2020 WL 7663839, at *1, *5.
The Department responds that its calculations are correct, that George
has not established a right to mandamus relief directing that his sentence on the 2002
offenses should run concurrently with his parole violation or back time, and that this
issue was previously litigated and found meritless by the Superior Court in George
III. Dep’t Br. at 10-17.
As noted, the record before us does not include a copy of the sentencing
court’s written order, which the docket indicated was filed on the colloquy date of
August 27, 2007. Ex. B to Answer & New Matter at 9. Nevertheless, the guilty plea
colloquy transcript, as quoted above, does not reflect that the prosecutor and
sentencing court ever agreed with George’s counsel’s request that George’s sentence
for the 2002 offenses would run concurrently with any prior time due.9 In fact, the
sentencing court stated three times that it would recommend concurrency but would
do so only separately from the plea agreement for the 2002 offenses. See Guilty
Plea Colloquy at 14-15 & 27. As such, George cannot establish that his plea
agreement included an agreed-upon and court-ordered concurrency arrangement that

9
At the guilty plea colloquy, George’s counsel did not even ask for back time to run
concurrently with the new sentence. At that time, the only additional time of record was the one-
year sentence for George’s technical parole violation, which was issued in February 2005. Ex. E
to Answer & New Matter.

15
could be enforced even if it did not comply with the relevant statutory provision
directing that such sentences must be served consecutively.
We acknowledge that in Zuber, our Supreme Court determined that the
sentencing court’s promise to recommend concurrency created a “natural and
obvious underlying inference that the Parole Board had, at the least, the [o]ption to
accept or reject such a request” and “thereby became an integral part of the bargain”
made by the defendant. Id. at 445. However, in Zuber, the prosecutor’s “specific
promise” in open court that he would recommend concurrency was expressly
adopted by the sentencing court and became part of the agreement. Id. at 443. Here,
the prosecutor made clear that the agreement pertained only to George’s new
sentence and the sentencing court made equally clear that its recommendation to the
Parole Board regarding concurrency was not part of the plea agreement. In the
absence of record evidence that the prosecutor and sentencing court agreed to
concurrency, George has not established that such an arrangement, which is contrary
to the relevant statutory provision, is enforceable under Zuber or, by extension,
Martinez. This also negates George’s reliance on Oakman, Andrews, and Gillins,
where record evidence supported the defendants’ allegations that their plea
agreements and sentencing orders included a concurrency arrangement concerning
their “other” sentences.
Given the lack of evidence that the prosecutor and sentencing court
agreed to a concurrency arrangement as part of George’s plea, the sentencing court’s
statement that George’s new sentence would be effective as of the August 27, 2007,
colloquy date cannot be read as tacitly encompassing or directing that George’s
pending parole violation and back time sentences would run concurrently with his
new sentence. Rather, the sentencing court’s announcement reflected that with

16
George’s August 27, 2007, guilty plea and conviction, he was officially returned to
Department custody to begin serving his parole violation and back time sentences
on his 1995 convictions, as indicated on the October 2007 DC16E sentence status
summary form issued by the Department. Ex. A to Answer & New Matter at 2
(indicating August 27, 2007, as the date of George’s return to custody for parole
violation purposes regarding the 1995 convictions).
Relatedly, although the DC-300B form for George’s 2002 offenses,
which he appended to his mandamus petition, states that August 27, 2007, is the
effective date of George’s sentence for the 2002 offenses, that form “does not
constitute part of the trial court’s sentencing order; rather, it is simply a document
generated by the Common Pleas Criminal Court Case Management System that must
be provided to the [Department] upon the commitment of an inmate.” Gibbs v. Pa.
Parole Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 308 C.D. 2023, filed Apr. 18, 2024), slip op. at 18,
2024 WL 1673347, at *8 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9764(a)) (unreported). As in Gibbs,
George has not “provided authority or any other basis to conclude that the DC-300B
form associated with an original sentence provides or commemorates any rights or
privileges on its own, much less may serve as the basis for leniency or credit in a
future parole revocation matter.” Id., slip op. at 18, 2024 WL 1673347, at *8.
Moreover, the DC-300B form has a space to indicate whether sentences are
concurrent, and the only reference here to concurrency reflects the sentencing court’s
direction, which it stated at the colloquy, that the lesser included offenses from the
2002 offenses will run concurrently with the 15 to 30 years on George’s third-degree
murder conviction. Ex. D to Mandamus Petition; Guilty Plea Colloquy at 8 & 14.
Once August 27, 2007, was formally established as George’s the date
of his return to custody, he could begin serving his parole violation and back time

17
for the 1995 convictions, which pursuant to settled law, would run before his
sentence for the 2002 offenses could begin. See Palmer, 134 A.3d at 165. The DC-
16E form for the 2002 offenses shows that the Department began with the maximum
date of December 8, 2015, for the parole violation and back time due on the 1995
conviction, then derived the July 21, 2013, “effective date” for George to begin his
sentence on the 2002 offenses by awarding George pre-sentence credit time from the
April 2005 criminal complaint on the 2002 offenses through his August 2007 plea
and subtracting that figure from December 8, 2015. Although George challenges
the Department’s “failure” to run his parole violation and back time to the sentence
for his 2002 offenses, he does not challenge the Department’s calculations that
resulted in the actual effective date of his latter sentence.
Given the foregoing discussion, George has not established on the
record here that even though the sentencing court ordered his new sentence to be
effective as of the August 27, 2007, colloquy, the sentencing court clearly and
unambiguously intended that the back time due on his prior sentence was to run
concurrently to his new sentence. See Oakman, 893 A.2d at 837. That intent would
have to be clear because the statutory scheme and relevant precedent preclude
concurrency of back time on a prior conviction with a new sentence. See Duncan,
137 A.3d at 576; Palmer, 134 A.3d at 165.
Even if the record here suggested a lack of clarity in the sentencing
court’s intent when it ordered George’s sentence in 2007, the sentencing court made
its position clear in the post-conviction litigation that resulted in George III. There,
the sentencing court held a remand hearing on this very question at which George
testified and briefs were submitted, after which the sentencing court expressly held
that running George’s “back time” on the old sentence concurrently with his new

18
sentence was not a term of his plea agreement. George III, slip op. at 3, 2020 WL
1656148, at *2. The Superior Court agreed:
[George] was informed multiple times during that hearing
that the parole board could ignore the sentencing court's
request to run the parole back time concurrently with the
sentence it was imposing on Appellant’s guilty plea. The
sentencing court also unambiguously stated that the only
term of the plea agreement was that [George] would
receive a sentence of fifteen to thirty years of
imprisonment at the third-degree murder charge and that
the other sentences imposed at this case would run
concurrent to the murder charge. Finally, the [sentencing]
court explicitly reminded [George] that the parole back
time issue was not a part of the plea agreement and that,
while the [sentencing] court could request that his
sentence be run concurrent with the parole back time, it
could not guarantee that result. Throughout, [George]
repeatedly indicated that he understood the terms of his
plea agreement and agreed to be bound by them.

....

Since [George] has failed to persuade us that he did not
receive the full benefit of the bargain to which he was
entitled, we affirm the lower court’s denial of his motion
to modify sentence.

Id., slip op. at 7-9, 2020 WL 1656148, at *3-4. As noted, “the critical query in a
mandamus action is what did the sentencing court actually intend.” Allen, 103 A.3d
at 371. There is simply no indication in either past litigation or the record here that
the sentencing court intended George’s back time on his prior sentence to run
concurrently with his new sentence. In fact, it is clear that the sentencing court did
not intend such a result and George’s arguments are meritless. As such, he has not
established a legal right to the relief he seeks or a Department duty to provide that
relief, which are necessary for mandamus. Cooper, 363 A.2d at 815. Nor has he

19
shown that genuine issues of material fact remain or that his right to judgment is
clear as a matter of law, which are necessary for the summary relief he seeks in the
instant matter. See Eleven Eleven, 169 A.3d at 145.

IV. Conclusion
In light of the foregoing, George’s application for summary relief is
denied.

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CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

20
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Kareem George, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Corrections, :
Records Supervisor, Kathleen :
Witmer, SCI Rockview, :
Superintendent, Bobi Jo Solomon, : No. 409 M.D. 2021
Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 16th day of March, 2026, the Application for Summary
Relief filed in this Court’s original jurisdiction by Petitioner Kareem George on
August 20, 2025, is DENIED. The Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed in this
Court’s original jurisdiction by Petitioner Kareem George on November 8, 2021, is
also DENIED.

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CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge