SR Aviation Ltd v. Advocate General for Scotland - Revenue Pay Case

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  SR Aviation LTD against The Advocate General for Scotland (Court of Session) [2026] CSOH 28 (25 March 2026)

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**** OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION [2026] CSOH 28 A215/25 OPINION OF LADY POOLE In the cause SR AVIATION LIMITED Pursuer against THE ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR SCOTLAND Defender Pursuer: Welsh; Aberdein Considine LLP Defender: Webster KC, Tosh; Office of the Advocate General **** 25 March 2026 Background and outcome [1] The defender ("HMRC") seeks revenue payments from the pursuer. The pursuer contends it is entitled to certain reliefs because of losses sustained by a predecessor company, Spring Salmon and Seafood Limited ("SSS"). SSS traded in seafood between the late 1990s until it ceased trading on 31 January 2005. SSS's goodwill passed to the pursuer (which was previously called Spring Seafoods Limited, then Spring Capital Limited, and now Spring Aviation Limited). The same family have interests in both SSS and the pursuer. In proceedings in the tax tribunals, HMRC has not accepted the pursuer's position. 2 [2] The present action in the Court of Session is an action for declarator. It centres round an undertaking given in petition proceedings brought in the Court of Session by HMRC in 2008 to restore SSS to the register of companies. SSS was struck off the register on 17 August 2007, the same year HMRC opened enquiries in relation to revenue properly due from SSS between 2003 and 2005. Mr Roderick Christopher Thomas, a member of the family with interests in SSS and the pursuer, was a respondent in the petition proceedings. During the course of the petition proceedings, others sought to intervene. HMRC gave an undertaking to the Court of Session in terms set out below on 19 May 2010 (the "undertaking"). As a result of the undertaking, Mr Thomas no longer insisted on one particular basis of opposition to the petition. The Court of Session ordered the return of SSS to the register of companies (Advocate General for Scotland, Petitioner [2010] CSOH 117). SSS was returned to the register on 16 March 2011, following an unsuccessful appeal against the decision of the Lord Ordinary (Lord Glennie). [3] The undertaking HMRC gave in the Court of Session refers to "Company". It is common ground this is a reference to SSS. The undertaking is in the following terms. "That upon the restoration of the Company to the Register HMRC will forthwith (that is to say as soon as is practicable within the requirements of the Taxes Acts and applicable regulations and procedures) issue closure notices and assessments in respect of the outstanding enquiries into the Company's liabilities. The Revenue will a) make not further demands b) raise no further enquiries into the Company's trade to the date that ceased namely 31 January 2005. The Company may appeal any assessments made on the issue of the said closure notices, if so advised. Apart from assessments made on the closure of the said enquiries the Revenue will have no power to, and will not, raise any assessments on the Company in relation to the said trade to the said date save on the discovery of fraudulent or negligent conduct on the part of the taxpayer within the meaning of s. 29 of the Taxes Management Act 1970, and has no present reason to anticipate making any such discovery or discovery assessment". [4] The pursuer contends that the undertaking was a unilateral obligation, on which it is entitled to rely. It wishes declarator to that effect, because HMRC does not agree that the 3 pursuer is entitled to rely on the undertaking. The pursuer also seeks declarator that, as a result of the undertaking, HMRC may not make any enquiries into the trading of SSS for any period prior to 31 January 2005. The pursuer then hopes to rely on declarators granted in this court to underpin its position before the tax tribunals that it is entitled to reliefs relating to SSS's losses. HMRC on the other hand, in otherwise skeletal defences, takes a number of preliminary pleas and seeks dismissal of this action. [5] The case came before the court for debate assigned by the court's interlocutor dated 26 November 2025 on two of HMRC's preliminary pleas, and the pursuer's plea to the relevance and specification of HMRC's defences. Notes of argument and parts of oral submissions also addressed HMRC's third preliminary plea concerning title and interest, and in those circumstances it is appropriate also to determine that preliminary plea. HMRC's three preliminary pleas considered in this decision are therefore: (i) the action is incompetent because it should have been an application to the supervisory jurisdiction and it is barred by the availability of alternative remedies (ii) lis alibi pendens (a lawsuit pending elsewhere) (iii) no title and interest. Also before the court was an opposed motion for summary decree enrolled by the pursuer, which relied on the same arguments as the pursuer's preliminary plea to the relevance and specification of HMRC's defences. [6] The outcome is that the court finds this action of declarator is competently brought in the Court of Session. The motion for summary decree is refused in hoc statu. 4 Preliminary observations [7] Disputes between SSS, the pursuer and HMCTS have continued over an extensive period of time. Ten separate decisions from the tax tribunals were produced to the court, some in cases between SSS and HMRC, and others between the pursuer and HMRC, at both First-tier and Upper Tribunal levels. Currently, one set of Upper Tribunal proceedings between the pursuer and HMRC is sisted pending determination of conjoined First-tier Tribunal proceedings, which are in turn sisted until determination of the present action. [8] Of concern to the court was what appeared to be a misalignment between HMRC's position before the First-tier Tribunal and this court. In a skeleton argument dated 24 August 2020 in conjoined proceedings between HMRC and the pursuer before the tax tribunal (TC/2016/01479 and TC/2018/07912), HMRC states that the tribunal does not have jurisdiction to determine whether the undertaking is a reason to preclude HMRC collecting tax. HMRC submits that the administrative court is the correct venue to decide those matters (paragraphs 38-40, 51). HMRC also submitted in a skeleton argument dated 16 September 2025, in the same conjoined proceedings, that it was common ground between the parties that the substantive hearing of the appeals ought not to be listed until these declarator proceedings had been concluded. Yet before this court, HMRC submits that the tax tribunal can determine issues arising incidentally in proceedings before it. HMRC further submits that the Court of Session should not in fact determine matters about the undertaking, on various grounds discussed further below. 5 HMRC's argument that an ordinary action of declarator is incompetent Summary of the parties' arguments [9] HMRC first argues that the action should have been brought as an application to the court's supervisory jurisdiction, and that this ordinary action is incompetent. HMRC asks the court to dismiss the action because, if it had been brought by judicial review, the petition would have been barred by alternative remedies, namely the ongoing proceedings in the tax tribunals. [10] The pursuer on the other hand argues that an ordinary action for declarator is both competent and appropriate. If that is wrong, the court should exercise its discretion to transfer the action to judicial review procedure in the Court of Session, and proceed to determine it. Decision on competence of an ordinary action [11] The court finds that this ordinary action of declarator is the appropriate form of action in which to determine the questions raised, for the following three reasons. [12] First, the cases of Wi g htman v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2018] CSIH 62 (paras [21] to [22]) and Keatings v Advocate General for Scotland [2021] SC 329 (paras [51] to [54]) recognise that declarators of this nature may be granted by the court. The principle of access to justice requires that, as a generality, anyone can apply to the court to determine what the law is in a given situation. Although there are limits on the principle of access to justice set out in those cases, none apply in this case. Despite HMRC's submissions to the contrary, a declarator of the nature sought in this action is not a bare declarator with no practical effect. The parties are not agreed as to whether the pursuer may rely on the undertaking or if it prevents HMRC making further enquiries in relation to SSS for any 6 period prior to 31 January 2005 in its dispute with the pursuer. Determination of that issue may assist the parties and the First-tier and Upper Tribunals in concluding cases currently before the tribunals, and in bringing to an end a long running dispute between the parties. It is also recognised that declarators of this nature may be granted in an ordinary action (Wightman para [26]). [13] Second, the classic case about the extent of the supervisory jurisdiction, West v ** Secretary of State for Scotland 1992 SC 385, recognises that there are cases involving the exercise of functions by public bodies which do not fall within the supervisory jurisdiction. For example, contractual rights and obligations, such as those between employer and employee, are not as such amenable to judicial review (West p 43 paragraph (d)). It is true that HMRC is given powers by statute to collect and manage revenue, including tax and national insurance (Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 sections 1, 4 and 5, Social Security Contributions (Transfer of Functions, etc) Act 1999 section 8 and the Income Tax (Pay As You Earn) Regulations 2003 Regulation 80). It is also true that the questions for determination in this action arise during the course of the exercise of those statutory functions by HMRC. However, this case raises no question of whether it was within the powers of HMRC to grant the undertaking, or if there has been some sort of procedural impropriety in it doing so, or if it acted irrationally in some way. Rather, the case is about whether the undertaking is a unilateral obligation, who may rely on it, and its effect. Those are issues more akin to contractual rights and obligations than classic questions of judicial review. This ordinary action for declarator is an appropriate form of procedure in which they may be determined. [14] Third, although tax tribunals are the primary venue for disputes about revenue, it is appropriate to bring this particular matter before the Court of Session for determination. It 7 is beyond question that tribunals are an important part of the justice system. The expertise of tax tribunals is of great value in the determination of disputes about revenue properly payable. However, while the courts have been astute to recognise the area of jurisdiction Parliament has entrusted to the tax tribunals, they have also recognised that there are some exceptional situations in which it is appropriate for there also to be recourse to the courts (Autologic Holdings Plc v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2006] 1 AC 118 paragraphs 11 - 15, 44, Finucane v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2021] CSOH 38 paras [22] - [23]). [15] The issues arising in this particular case are appropriate for determination in this action in the Court of Session. The court is not being asked to determine the amount of revenue properly due to HMRC. That matter remains for the tax tribunals. This action is a request to the Court of Session to interpret an undertaking given to that court by HMRC, and decide whether the pursuer is entitled to rely on it. That is a matter suited to the jurisdiction of this court in relation to obligations. [16] There has been a protracted dispute between the parties about the undertaking, which remains live, despite some guidance about the undertaking from the Upper Tribunal in SSS v HMRC [2016] UKUT 313 (TCC) (see below). The action has practical effect, because it may assist the parties and the tax tribunals in the determination of revenue properly due. The court notes that the First-tier Tribunal is in charge of its own procedure under its governing rules. Whether to sist the conjoined cases before it or not was a matter within its discretion. Rather than determine the dispute between the parties about the undertaking, the First-tier Tribunal decided to sist its proceedings so that this action of declarator could be determined by the Court of Session. 8 [17] This combination of circumstances makes this case exceptional, and it is appropriate that the issues it raises are determined in the Court of Session. For these reasons the action for declarator is competently brought. Supervisory jurisdiction and alternative remedies [18] Further, even if the court were to be wrong that this ordinary action of declarator is competent, and instead there should have been an application to the supervisory jurisdiction of the court, the court would have exercised its powers to transfer this action to the supervisory jurisdiction rather than finding it incompetent (Rule 58.15 of the Rules of the Court of Session). The court would also have been unpersuaded by HMRC's argument that it should then dismiss the action because an alternative remedy is available in the tax tribunals. [19] The law has moved on since cases cited by HMRC such as Sleigh v Edinburgh DC 1987 SC 70, Sidey Ltd v Clackmannanshire Council 2010 SLT 607. Rule 58.15 of the Rules of the Court of Session provides as follows: "58.15.--(1) The Lord Ordinary may order that a cause raised as an action should proceed as a petition for judicial review, if satisfied that-- (a) it should proceed in that way; and (b) the requirements of section 27B(2) or (3) (as the case may be) of the [Court of Session Act 1988] are met." [20] Rule 58.15(1)(b) means that the case must pass the test for permission in judicial review before it may be transferred to the supervisory jurisdiction. That is not a high hurdle, and this action would pass it. The pursuer has a sufficient interest as discussed in more detail in the title and interest section of this decision below, and the case has a real prospect of success. The normal time limit for judicial review is not expressly part of the statutory test that must be met for transfer under Rule 58.15. However, the test in 9 Rule 58.15(1)(a) "if satisfied that it should proceed in that way" gives the court discretion to consider a wide range of factors. Those could include delay, in the context of the usual three month time limit applicable in judicial review, particularly if a dispute has been raised as an ordinary action to try to avoid time limits in judicial review. In this particular case, the court would not have considered the time lapse since the undertaking was given to have prevented the case being determined now. That is essentially because the undertaking is not time limited and, without prejudice to the final determination of matters within this action, appears to have continuing effect. The pursuer's position is that the undertaking affects liability to payments of revenue in the present day. [21] Further, if the action had been transferred to the supervisory jurisdiction, the court would not have found it barred by alternative remedies. The general rule is that the supervisory jurisdiction is ordinarily a remedy of last resort and the availability of an alternative statutory remedy will bar a petition for judicial review being permitted to proceed (Bridgeport Estates Ltd v Highland Council [2025] CSOH 69 (para [20], Finucane v ** HMRC [2021] CSOH 38). That generality is subject to exceptions for appropriate cases. In this case, tax tribunals could in principle determine the nature and extent of the undertaking, as an incidental matter to determining liability for revenue, as the Upper Tribunal did in SSS v HMRC [2016] UKUT 313 (TCC). [22] However, there are a number of exceptional features of this case, meaning that this dispute about the enforceability of the undertaking by the pursuer, and its extent, would have been permitted to proceed in the Court of Session. A number of these exceptional features have already been discussed in paras [14] - [16] above. In short, the dispute concerns the nature and extent of an undertaking given to this particular court, not the tribunal. It concerns the extent of a private law obligation of the type suited to this court's 10 jurisdiction. It would not usurp the statutory function of determining revenue due given to the tax tribunal, because the amounts payable by the pursuer will remain a matter for the tax tribunals. The dispute arises in a case where the tribunal has sisted its proceedings for this court to determine the matter. The context is one of protracted proceedings in the tax tribunals, where there remains a dispute about the undertaking despite a previous Upper Tribunal decision about it, and the decision of this court may assist bringing those proceedings to a conclusion. In this highly unusual combination of circumstances, if the action had proceeded as an application to the court's supervisory jurisdiction, the court would not have found the case barred by alternative remedies. **** Lis alibi pendens Summary of the parties arguments [23] HMRC next argues that the action should be dismissed, because there is a prior action in another competent judicial body in Scotland in which the same question is raised. As outlined above, there are currently various cases in the tax tribunals. In conjoined proceedings in the First-tier Tribunal, although the actions are currently sisted, there are already directions in place, of consent, for the future determination of the proceedings there, which commence after the present proceedings have come to an end. [24] The pursuer argues that in the First-tier Tribunal, both parties suggested the actions should await determination of these Court of Session proceedings. The statutory specialism of the tax tribunals is tax assessments, not unilateral obligations. There are different causes of action between the two separate sets of proceedings. The requirements for a successful plea of lis alibi pendens are not met. 11 Decision on lis alibi pendens [25] It is helpful to start with the rationale for the plea of lis alibi pendens. It is to avoid an improper and oppressive accumulation of diligence (Arqiva Ltd v Kingsbeck Ltd 2020 WL 04572703 (Lands Tribunal for Scotland) paragraphs 60 - 63). [26] There are a number of elements of a successful plea of lis alibi pendens (Court of Session Practice, Bloomsbury Professional (2013) para [114]). There must be other proceedings in a Scottish court or tribunal, in this case the tax tribunal. Those other proceedings must still be depending, which in this case they are. The proceedings in which the plea is raised must be in a different court or tribunal, in this case the Court of Session. The proceedings must be between the same parties, which they are. [27] However, the final matter which must be established for a successful plea of lis alibi pendens is that the two proceedings are to determine the same issue, or precisely the same point. It is this final requirement which the court finds is not met in the particular circumstances of this case. The proceedings in the tax tribunals concern tax assessments and liability to tax. Ultimately, they will determine revenue due from the pursuer. The Court of Session proceedings concern whether the undertaking given to the Court of Session is a unilateral obligation on which the pursuer may rely, and whether the undertaking means there can be no further enquiries into the trading of SSS for any period prior to 31 January 2005. They will not determine the revenue due from the pursuer. The proceedings in the tax tribunal are brought under legislation governing those proceedings. The proceedings in the Court of Session do not concern that legislative regime, but a private law obligation. They do not raise for determination precisely the same issue. [28] Returning to the rationale of the plea of lis alibi pendens, this is not a situation in which permitting this action to proceed in addition to the proceedings in the tax tribunals 12 may properly be described as oppressive of either party. HMRC has previously submitted in proceedings before the tax tribunals that they have no jurisdiction to determine matters relating to the undertaking, and that the Court of Session (albeit sitting in its administrative capacity) does have such jurisdiction (see para [8] above). The sist of the tax proceedings, for these proceedings to be determined, appears to have been a joint application. The plea of lis alibi pendens does not succeed. **** Title and interest Summary of the parties' arguments [29] The third plea-in-law for HMRC is that the pursuer has no title and interest to sue and the action should be dismissed. HMRC relies on a dictum in D & J Nicol v Dundee Harbour Trustees 1915 SC (HL) 7 to the effect that for A to have title to sue B, A must be a party (using that word in its widest sense) to some legal relation which gives A some right which B either infringes or denies. HMRC argues that because the pursuer was not a recipient of the undertaking and was not a party to the proceedings in which it was given, it has no title and interest. [30] The pursuer argues that its title to sue derives from the unilateral obligation created by the undertaking. The pursuer is not required to demonstrate that it is a contractual counterparty. It also has a valid interest in the promise made by HMRC not to raise further enquiries into SSS's trading in the periods prior to 31 January 2005, because it has the potential to affect the pursuer's own tax affairs. 13 Decision on title and interest [31] HMRC's preliminary plea of no title and interest fails. As far as title to sue is concerned, the pursuer argues that the undertaking is a unilateral obligation or promise, on which it is entitled to rely. In the case of Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland Plc 2013 SC 331 paras [33] to [38], the court stated that a promise is a unilateral juristic act, which acquires binding force by the expression of the declarer's expression of their will to be bound. It has serious consequences and so can be created only by clear words. Among other consequences, a promise is irrevocable, and binding even if unknown to the promisee. It is binding even without consideration passing (Carlyle v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2015] UKSC 13 at paragraph 35). A unilateral obligation of this nature is capable of being enforced by a person who was not involved in making it. D & J Nicol expressly states that a wide interpretation of "party" is intended for the purposes of title to sue. The undertaking is relied on as a unilateral obligation, which if the pursuer is correct would create a legal relation which HMRC is denying. That is sufficient for the pursuer to have title to bring these proceedings. [32] Turning from title to interest, whether or not the pursuer may rely on the undertaking may affect what revenue is properly due from the pursuer to HMRC, and the outcome of actions about that in the tax tribunal. The overall context is that as far back as 28 August 2008, HMRC wrote to the clerk to the commissioners (the predecessors to the tax tribunals). In that letter HMRC stated that "The enquiries into the accounts and computations submitted on behalf of [the pursuer] are therefore directly related to the accounts on behalf of [SSS]". The undertaking which is the subject matter of this action was given in relation to SSS's trading. The revenue properly due from the pursuer depends in 14 part on whether it is entitled to claim reliefs based on results of SSS's trading. The pursuer has an interest in seeking the declarators in this action. Motion for summary decree and the pursuer's first plea-in-law as to relevance and specification of the defender's averments Summary of the parties' arguments [33] The final matters for determination are the pursuer's motion for summary decree, and whether the pursuer's first plea-in-law should be sustained at this stage. That plea-in-law seeks decree de plano on the basis that the defences are irrelevant and lacking in specification. The motion for summary decree is brought under Rule 21.2 of the Rules of the Court of Session. The pursuer asked for the motion for summary decree to be determined alongside the issues in the debate, because of an overlap of arguments. [34] The pursuer argues that the defender has made various significant admissions, including that it gave the undertaking. The pursuer relies in part on a decision the Upper Tribunal taken by Lord Glennie (SSS v HMRC [2016] UKUT 313 (TCC) about the scope of the undertaking in proceedings between SSS and HMRC. HMRC had argued that because the undertaking was given to the court, not SSS, SSS could not rely on it. Lord Glennie rejected HMRC's argument, saying (para [33]): "This argument was rejected, and rightly so, by the FTT and I say no more about it". He went on to opine, about the undertaking: "[37] The undertaking was an undertaking given to the Court. It should be construed in the same way as any legal document, adhering as far as possible to the plain meaning of the words used in the way in which they would have been understood by the interested parties. In circumstances such as prevailed at the time the undertaking was given, it cannot have been intended or understood in an unduly technical sense, containing traps for the unwary. It seems obvious that the reference to outstanding enquiries' was intended to be a reference to the enquiries into the Company's corporation tax liabilities initiated by the letter of 4 January 2007... <a href=""></a> 15 The clear intention of the undertaking was that the outstanding enquiry could be brought to a conclusion and then that would be that. [38] On that basis HMRC are precluded by their undertaking from seeking to claim the sums which are the subject of this appeal". [35] The pursuer argues it is clear from Lord Glennie's decision that the undertaking may be relied on by people with an interest such as the pursuer, in addition to the court. It is a unilateral obligation, and establishes that HMRC may not make any enquiries into the trading of SSS for any period prior to 31 January 2005. Although there are exceptions in the undertaking for the discovery of fraud and negligence, given that over 20 years have elapsed since the undertaking was given, those exceptions no longer have any practical effect due to the operation of prescription and limitation. [36] HMRC resists summary decree. It points to Rule 18.2(1) of the Rules of Court which entitles a party to lodge defences contesting only jurisdiction. Under Rule 18.2(2), if the plea is repelled then the defender has the opportunity to amend to include any defence on the merits. HMRC also argues that it is entitled to put the pursuer to proof on the circumstances in which the undertaking was given, as part of the context against which its extent falls to be construed. Further, it wishes to advance an argument as to whether the undertaking contained sufficiently clear words to create the obligation on which the pursuer sought to rely. ***Decision on relevance and specification of the defences and on summary decree*** [37] While it is true that there is no substantive defence in the pleadings as they currently stand, Rule 18.2 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: <a href=""></a> 16 "18.2.-(1) Where a defender seeks to contest the jurisdiction of the court, he may- (a) lodge defences relating both to jurisdiction and the substantive issues of the action without submitting to the jurisdiction of the court; or (b) lodge defences relating only to the question of jurisdiction in the first instance. (2) Where a defender lodges defences under paragraph (1)(b) and is unsuccessful in contesting jurisdiction, the court shall allow the defender to amend his defences to defend on the substantive issues of the action within such period as the court thinks fit". [38] HMRC in this case contested the jurisdiction of the court. Under Rule 18.2, HMRC was entitled to lodge defences relating only to the question of jurisdiction in the first instance. Although HMRC has been unsuccessful in contesting jurisdiction, in terms of Rule 18.2(2) of the Rules of Court, it is now entitled to amend its defences to include answers on the substantive issues of the action. It is premature to determine the pursuer's first plea-in-law until the content of any amended defences is known. [39] Turning to the motion for summary decree, the test in Rule 21.2 of the Rules of the Court of Session is that there is no defence to the action, or a part of it, disclosed in the defences. It has been said that: "the wide scope of the rule is circumscribed by *Henderson v 3052775 Nova Scotia* Ltd [2006 SC (HL) 85](https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/redirect.cgi?path=/uk/cases/UKHL/2006/21.html) which confines it (Lord Rodger at paras [19] and [35]) to cases in which the defender is, after a hypothetical proof,bound to fail'. On this approach, the highly implausible defence may well survive until proof" (Promontoria (Chestnut) Ltd v Ballatyne Property Services [2022] CSIH 17 para [17]). If a motion for summary decree is granted, it is appropriate to grant decree de plano (Promontoria para [2]). [40] During the debate, HMRC mentioned two matters in particular that it considered to be substantive defences to the pursuer's contentions about the undertaking. First, HMRC wishes to put the pursuer to proof on the circumstances in which the undertaking was given, because it does not accept what the pursuer has averred in its entirety in Article 6 of 17 condescendence about the undertaking being given to persuade the Court of Session that it was not necessary for additional parties to be admitted to the restoration proceedings. HMRC considers that is part of the context against which the remit of the unilateral undertaking must be construed. Second, HMRC wishes to rely on dicta in Regus (Maxim) Ltd v Bank of Scotland Plc 2013 SC 331 paras [37] to [38] that clear words are required to create a unilateral obligation. HMRC wishes to argue that there are no such words creating a promise on which the pursuer may rely. [41] Against that background, HMRC have advanced a legitimate reason why the defences on the merits are currently skeletal. The position may change if HMRC amends to include a defence on the substance of the action. In those circumstances, the court makes no order in relation to the pursuer's preliminary plea to the relevance and specification of the defences at this stage of the action. Further, while Lord Glennie's comments in SSS v ** HMRC [2016] UKUT 313 (TCC) about the undertaking are undoubtedly of assistance to the pursuer's case, it is not possible to say at this stage that a defence is bound to fail. It is premature to grant a motion for summary decree. The motion is refused in hoc statu. Conclusion [42] The first three pleas-in-law for HMRC are repelled. The next stage of procedure in this action is for HMRC to lodge any minute of amendment in terms of Rule 18.2(2) of the Rules of Court, and the court will allow it 14 days to do so, together with the appropriate motion for it to be received with a 2 week period for answers followed by a 4 week period of mutual adjustment. The court will also fix a by order hearing to determine any further procedure in this action in 10 weeks' time, which may be discharged if the court has been 18 able to determine any motion enrolled for amendment in terms of any minute of amendment and answers and further procedure in the case before then. [43] In concluding, the court acknowledges that HMRC carries out important functions collecting revenue for the public purse. In doing so, it acts in the public interest. A proportionate approach to litigation of revenue disputes is likely to be appropriate. Given the involved and unusually lengthy nature of all proceedings relating to the parties' disputes, parties may wish to consider whether mediation is an option to try to reach final resolution of all underlying disputes.

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