Chapman v. United States - Court Denies Habeas Corpus Petition

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Khadijah X. Chapman v. United States of America

District Court, D. Idaho

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-00075

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (24)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

KHADIJAH X. CHAPMAN,
Case No. 1:25-cv-00075-AKB
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
v. AND ORDER

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Khadijah X. Champman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. 1) and Motion to Compel a Ruling (Dkt. 8). Having
reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions, the Court finds that the facts and legal argument
are adequately presented, and that oral argument would not significantly aid its decision-making
process, and it decides the motion on the parties’ briefing. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B);
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and
determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court
will deny the petition and deny the motion as moot.
I. BACKGROUND1
On July 13, 2022, a grand jury indicted Chapman on one count of bank fraud in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Dkt. 1 at 5–6). Because of a conflict with the Federal Defenders, CJA attorney

1 For brevity, all docket citations in this Background section referring to the underlying
criminal case, United States v. Chapman, No. 1:22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho), are cited in
simplified form (e.g., “Dkt. 1 at 2”); this convention applies only to events preceding Chapman’s
§ 2255 petition.
Greg Silvey was appointed to represent Chapman (Dkt. 28). Following three motions to continue,
trial was set for November 13, 2024 (Dkt. 46).
One business day before trial was scheduled to commence, Chapman moved to substitute
counsel, asserting that her attorney was unprepared and that there had been a breakdown in
communication (Dkt. 71 at 2). On November 13, 2023—the morning trial was set to begin—the

Court held a sealed, ex parte hearing during which both Chapman and her counsel were questioned
regarding the nature of their communications and counsel’s preparedness for trial (Dkt. 75 at 1).
From the bench, the Court denied the motion, finding that it was untimely; substitution would
result in delay; and the conflict was not so severe as to prevent an adequate defense (Dkt. 117 at
23:20–27:12).
On November 16, the jury returned a verdict, finding Chapman guilty of Count One of
bank fraud (Dkt. 85). She was sentenced on February 6, 2024 (Dkt. 108). Chapman filed two
objections to the presentence report (PSR), arguing that the amount of loss calculation was
incorrect and that the sophisticated means enhancement should not apply (Dkt. 99). At sentencing,

the Court considered the PSR and Chapman’s objections and sustained the loss amount objection
(Dkt. 118 at 27:25–28:7), but it overruled the sophisticated means objection (id. at 29:22–30:19).
Ultimately, Chapman was sentenced to forty-six months imprisonment followed by five years of
supervised release (Dkt. 112) and permitted to self-surrender (Dkt. 108).
After sentencing, the Court granted Chapman two extensions of her self-surrender date
(Dkt. 123; Dkt. 129). The Court denied a third request for an extension on July 19, 2024 (Dkt.
131). Six days later, Chapman filed a document styled as a “rescission affidavit,” asserting that
she was no longer subject to the Court’s jurisdiction (Dkt. 132). Chapman did not report to the
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) as ordered (Dkt. 135 at 1). Instead, she failed to surrender and remained
at large for several months before being taken into custody (Dkt. 138).
On February 7, 2025, Chapman filed a pro se motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
challenging her conviction and sentence on several grounds, including ineffective assistance of
counsel and the denial of her motion to substitute counsel (Dkt. 1). The Government opposed (Dkt.

5; Dkt. 6). The petition is now ripe for a decision.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Petition for Habeas Corpus
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 provides four grounds under which a federal court may grant relief
to a federal prisoner who challenges the imposition or length of her incarceration: (1) “the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) “the court was
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence”; (3) “the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law”; and (4) the sentence is otherwise “subject to collateral attack.” § 2255(a).
Rule 4(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings provides that a federal district
court judge may summarily dismiss a § 2255 motion “[i]f it plainly appears from the motion, any

attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief.”
“Under this standard, a district court may summarily dismiss a § 2255 motion only if the
allegations in the motion, when viewed against the record, do not give rise to a claim for relief or
are ‘palpably incredible or patently frivolous.’” United States v. Withers, 638 F.3d 1055, 1062–63
(9th Cir. 2011) (citation modified).
If the petition is not dismissed, the Court shall order the government “to file an answer,
motion, or other response within a fixed time, or to take other action the judge may order.” Rule 4,
Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings. The Court need not hold an evidentiary hearing if the issues
can be conclusively decided based on the evidence in the record. See Frazer v. United States, 18
F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Ellis v. Harrison, 891 F.3d 1160 (9th
Cir. 2018).
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The well-established two-prong test for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims
is deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

To establish deficient performance, a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance “fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688. Under the performance prong, there is a strong
presumption that counsel’s performance falls “within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance.” Id. at 689. The prejudice prong is established if petitioner demonstrates that “there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 697; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002).
Both prongs of the Strickland test must be met “before it can be said that a conviction (or
sentence) ‘resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that render[ed] the result [of the
proceeding] unreliable’ and thus in violation of the Sixth Amendment.” United States v. Thomas, 417 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). The Court need not

consider one component if there is an insufficient showing of the other. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
697.
III. ANALYSIS
Chapman first contends that the Court applied an incorrect amount of loss that she was
accountable for, which she argues resulted in a miscalculation of the specific loss enhancement
under the Sentencing Guidelines (Dkt. 1 at 3–4). Next, Chapman claims her Sixth Amendment
right to effective counsel was violated because her attorney was unprepared, failed to file key
pretrial motions, and agreed to false assertions in the Government’s trial brief, and because the
Court denied her attorney’s motion to withdraw (id. at 4). Chapman also argues that the Court’s
decision not to allow her attorney to withdraw prevented her from presenting exculpatory evidence
(id. at 4–5). Finally, Chapman contends that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to hold her
because her conviction is invalid and that she provided a valid rescission affidavit to the Court,
requiring her immediate release from custody (id. at 5). The Court addresses these arguments in
turn.

A. First Ground: Sentence Incorrect
Chapman claims that the Court, for purposes of sentencing, used a loss amount of
$3,500,000, while the total in the PSR was $3,133,877, resulting in a two-point increase (Dkt. 1 at
3–4). Chapman argues that the Court should have used either the $833,276 amount that she was
found guilty for at trial or the $338,958 loan in Count One of the indictment as the loss amount
(id. at 4). According to Chapman, if the Court used the $833,276 loss amount, then her total offense
level would have been 21 with a guideline range of 37 to 46 months (Dkt. 7 at 3).
The Government, however, correctly points out that Chapman was held accountable for a
loss amount of $833,276 (Dkt. 5 at 9); see also Transcript of Sentencing Hearing Proceedings at
27:25–28:3, United States v. Chapman, No. 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2024), Dkt. 118

(rejecting the Government’s argument that Chapman be accountable for a loss of $3,133,877 and
instead limited her loss to the four fraudulently obtained loans totaling $833,276). It appears that
Chapman’s arguments are based on the mistaken belief that she was held accountable for
$3,133,877 because the sentencing minutes noted that the total offense level was 25 and her
guideline range was 57 to 71 months (Dkt. 7 at 4 (citing Sentencing Minutes, Chapman, No. 22-
cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Feb. 6, 2024), Dkt. 108). The sentencing minutes, however, are not
controlling. Indeed, the statement of reasons confirms that the Court determined Chapman’s total
offense level was 21, with a criminal history of I, resulting in a guideline range of 37 to 46 months.
Statement of Reasons, Chapman, No. 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Feb. 8, 2024), Dkt. 113.
Therefore, Chapman’s argument that her loss amount should have been $833,276 is moot.
Chapman also raises in her reply that the Court’s application of the sophisticated means
enhancement was “unwarranted and unfounded” because “Chapman was a minor participant and
had less culpability, if any” (Dkt. 7 at 3). The Court, however, need not consider arguments raised

for the first time in reply in a § 2255 proceeding. United States v. Estrada, No. CV-07-367-BLW, 2008 WL 5069083 at *2 (D. Idaho July 3, 2008); see Eberle v. City of Anaheim, 901 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that generally appellants cannot raise issue for first time on reply). Even if
the Court considered Chapman’s claim, it still fails. At sentencing, the Court conducted an
individualized assessment of Chapman’s conduct to determine whether the enhancement should
apply. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing Proceedings, Chapman, No. 22-cr-00154-AKB
(D. Idaho Mar. 4, 2024), Dkt. 118. It found that Chapman’s actions of making up “employee
numbers, payroll taxes, gross revenue documents, profit-and-loss statements for her company, and
[falsification of] numerous tax forms” constituted sophisticated means. Id. at 29:12–24. Moreover,

the Court rejected Chapman’s contention that she had only engaged in “garden variety bank fraud,”
finding that her “actions demonstrated a much greater level of planning and creation of fraudulent
documents.” Id. at 29:22–30:5. Furthermore, other courts have upheld application of a
sophisticated means enhancement in Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) cases where the
fraudulent scheme involved a very similar one to Ms. Chapman’s in this case. United States v.
Redfern, No. 22-4196, 2023 WL 2823064 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2023); United States v. Bruey, No. 22-
12532, 2023 WL 9016349 (11th Cir. Dec. 29, 2023). Therefore, the Court rejects Chapman’s
assertion that the sophisticated means enhancement was incorrectly applied at sentencing.
B. Second Ground: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Chapman next argues she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her attorney
was unprepared, did not file key pretrial motions, and agreed to false assertions that undermined
her defense (Dkt. 1 at 4). She also contends that the Court abused its discretion when it denied her
motion to withdraw as counsel (Dkt. 4 at 7). She maintains that competent representation would

have likely resulted in a different outcome at trial (id.).
The first three claims are meritless on the face of the record. First, Chapman claims that
her attorney was unprepared because he “did not file any important pretrial motions, besides
continuances, such as a Request for Discovery, a Bill of Particulars, [] a Motion for Limine,” or a
trial brief (Dkt. 1 at 4). Chapman, however, does not identify specific evidence that her counsel
failed to receive in discovery or evidence her counsel should have sought to be excluded via
motions in limine. “The failure to raise a meritless legal argument does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.” Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir. 1982). Furthermore,
a defendant cannot request a bill of particulars without showing that the indictment was
“insufficient to permit the preparation of an adequate defense.” United States v. DiCesare, [765

F.2d 890, 897](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/454363/united-states-v-dario-dicesare-united-states-of-america-v-kathleen/#897) (9th Cir.), amended 777 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Fed. R. Cr. P. 7. Additionally,
defense counsel was not required to file a trial brief. As the Government notes, Chapman’s attorney
likely made a strategic decision not to do so because it “would have previewed his defense theories
for the Court and the government” (Dkt. 5 at 13).
Chapman’s claim that counsel did not thoroughly investigate her financial transactions,
“which would have revealed exculpatory evidence demonstrating that [she] lacked the requisite
intent to defraud the government” (Dkt. 3 at 3), is also unavailing. Chapman offers no evidence
that her financial transactions indeed demonstrate that she lacked the requisite intent. Without such
evidence, the Court cannot conclude that counsel’s performance was deficient or that Chapman
suffered prejudice.
Finally, Chapman accuses counsel of agreeing to false and prejudicial facts in the
Government’s trial brief (Dkt. 1 at 4). While Chapman does not identify which stipulations she is
referring to, the Court notes the following stipulations were contained in the Government’s trial

brief: (1) “A10 Capital was a “financial institution” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 20”; (2) “Connecting
the Dots and MBM Group and Network LLC (with EIN 82-3476123) did not report employee
information to the Georgia Department of Labor in 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021”; (3) “Connecting
the Dots was administratively dissolved on or about September 7, 2018, and was reinstated on or
about May 30, 2019,” and “Defendant filed an annual registration for Connecting the Dots for
registration periods of 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 in which Defendant is listed as the company’s
registered agent, Chief Executive Officer, Secretary, and Chief Financial Officer”; (4) “certain
individuals were Defendant’s relatives and did not work for Connecting the Dots in a professional
capacity”; (5) and “Connecting the Dots, MBM Group, MBM Group & Network, David Chapman

(Defendant’s son), and Defendant did not file certain tax forms with the IRS in 2019, 2020, and
2021.” Government’s Trial Brief at 7, Chapman, No. 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Nov. 6, 2023),
Dkt. 69. The Court previously inquired into defense counsel’s decision to stipulate to certain facts
during a hearing on his motion to withdraw (see Dkt. 6). Counsel explained that there was
“overwhelming evidence in [Chapman’s] case” that was “going to come into evidence” and that
“it[] [was] not going to look good [for] Chapman” (id. at 20:9–10, 21:4–5). Knowing that the
evidence was admissible, counsel worked together with the Government and agreed “long ago of
what was coming in and what wasn’t coming in” (id. at 20:11–15). The Court finds now, as it did
then, that counsel’s decision to stipulate reflected a strategic choice intended to avoid “contentious
relations” and instead “reach a stipulation that is fair and adequate” (id. at 22:19–22). In other
words, counsel’s stipulation to admissible facts was a reasonable strategic decision, given the
weight of the evidence against Chapman. United States v. Cassini, 207 F. App’x 787, 788 (9th Cir.
2006) (holding counsel’s agreement to various stipulations “was well ‘within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687)).

Accordingly, Chapman has failed to demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient or that
any alleged deficiency resulted in prejudice, and her ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails
under Strickland.
1. Denial of Motion to Withdraw
Chapman further argues that the Court’s denial of her attorney’s motion to withdraw
violated her Sixth Amendment right to counsel (Dkt. 4 at 8). The denial of a motion to substitute
counsel implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is therefore properly
considered in a habeas proceeding. Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 20 F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 2000). The
Sixth Amendment guarantees effective assistance of counsel, not a “meaningful relationship”

between an accused and her counsel. See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). While a
defendant has the right to make a motion for new counsel based on her perception of ineffective
assistance of counsel, she does not have an automatic right to the substitution of counsel simply
because she is dissatisfied with appointed counsel’s performance. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882,
888 (9th Cir. 1990). The ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the petitioner’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1024–25. That is, the habeas
court considers whether the trial court’s denial of or failure to rule on the motion “actually violated
[petitioner’s] constitutional rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and [her] attorney had
become so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment
that resulted in turn in an attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth
Amendment.” Id. at 1026.
“An irreconcilable conflict . . . occurs only where there is a complete breakdown in
communication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents effective assistance
of counsel.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2007). In evaluating whether an

irreconcilable conflict exists, the Court considers three factors: (1) the adequacy of the court’s
inquiry; (2) the extent of the conflict; and (3) the timeliness of defendant’s motion. United States
v. Moore, 159 F.3d 1154, 1158–59 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017,
1033 (9th Cir. 2010). Disagreement over litigation tactics is an insufficient reason per se to
substitute counsel. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d at 1034.
a. Adequacy of Inquiry
Chapman argues that the Court’s inquiry was inadequate because she was not questioned
privately and was challenged on the types of motions that she thought should have been filed
(Dkt. 4 at 8). “A conflict inquiry is adequate if it ‘eases the defendant’s dissatisfaction, distrust,

and concern’ and ‘provides a sufficient basis for reaching an informed decision.’” Daniels v.
Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268
F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2001)).
Here, the Court conducted a sealed, ex parte hearing and questioned both Chapman and
her counsel regarding the nature of the conflict and counsel’s preparedness for trial. Motion to
Withdraw Hearing Minutes at 1, Chapman, No. 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Nov. 13, 2023), Dkt.
75; (Dkt. 6 at 2–11). In the course of that hearing, the Court vetted counsel’s reasons for adopting
his planned trial strategy and satisfied itself as to counsel’s competence (Dkt. 6 at 20:8–24:19). It
also examined the flow of communication between Chapman and counsel and determined that
communication between the two remained open (id. at 15:12–17). The record demonstrates that
the Court considered the frequency of communication, counsel’s readiness to proceed, the source
of the breakdown in communication, and the timing of the motion. Chapman admitted that her
conversations with counsel were not antagonistic or angry (id. at 14:11–17); they had in-depth
conversations about her case and how she wished to proceed (id. at 15:12–17); and her frustration

stemmed from the Government’s trial brief that was filed the week prior—not from any breakdown
in communication or lack of preparation on counsel’s part (id. at 16:1–13). This level of inquiry
was adequate to assess whether substitution of counsel was warranted.
b. Extent of the Conflict
Chapman contends that the extent of the conflict was irreparable because counsel had not
prepared an adequate defense (Dkt. 4 at 7). Where a criminal defendant has, with legitimate reason,
completely lost trust in her attorney, and the trial court refuses to remove the attorney, the
defendant is constructively denied counsel. Adelzo–Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 779. This is true even
where the breakdown is a result of the defendant’s refusal to speak to counsel, unless the

defendant’s refusal to cooperate demonstrates “unreasonable contumacy.” Brown v. Craven, 424
F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1970); Adelzo–Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 780. This prong is satisfied if the
defendant shows that there was an “extensive, irreconcilable conflict” between herself and her
appointed counsel. United States v. Smith, 282 F.3d 758, 763 (9th Cir. 2002).
The record here does not demonstrate a conflict so severe as to prevent an adequate defense
or to constitute a complete breakdown of communication. Although some tension existed, it fell
far short of an irreconcilable conflict. Chapman’s counsel explained that there had been a
breakdown in communications primarily because Chapman was frequently “double-checking” his
advice with outside counsel without her attorney’s knowledge (Dkt. 6 at 10:5–10, 23:6–8). The
level of distrust even extended to matters as simple as whether a motion was being held in person
or via Zoom (Dkt. 6 at 23:6–11). Counsel testified, however, that he was prepared to proceed to
trial, despite Chapman’s distrust of him (Dkt. 6 at 10:11–17; 23:17–22). These circumstances
reflect a disagreement fueled by outside advice from an attorney who had not reviewed the
evidence or the full record—not from a total breakdown in communication.

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “differences in trial strategy may not arise to the
level of a serious conflict,” particularly where “the petitioner and [her] attorney continue to
communicate.” United States v. McCracken, 591 F. App’x 530, 533 (9th Cir. 2014). Based upon
the record, Chapman and her counsel remained in communication and were able to discuss the
case in detail. Accordingly, the Court finds there was not a significant breakdown of
communications and that any breakdown did not substantially interfere with the attorney-client
relationship (Dkt. 6 at 26:22–27:2).
c. Timeliness
As for timeliness, Chapman’s motion was filed on the Friday before trial was set to

commence. While a motion “made on the eve of trial alone is not dispositive,” Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 780, “[i]t is within the trial judge’s discretion to deny [such a motion] if the substitution
would require a continuance.” United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir. 1986). In
considering such motion, “the court must make a balancing determination, carefully weighing the
resulting inconvenience and delay against the defendant’s important constitutional right to counsel
of [her] choice.” Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d at 780.
The Court here did just that. At the hearing, the Court explained how continuing trial would
result in a major disruption to the Court, the parties, and scheduled proceedings (Dkt. 6 at 25:5–
26:14). For example, counsel for the Government had traveled from Washington D.C. to Idaho for
the trial and three witnesses travelled from Buffalo, Chicago, and Oklahoma (id. at 26:1–5).
Additionally, sixty-five prospective jurors had been summoned to the courthouse that morning,
with some traveling several hours from their residence (id. at 25:15–25). Given the proximity to
trial and the fact that appointment of new counsel would have significantly delayed proceedings,
this factors weighs against Chapman.

Considering all three factors, the Court denial of Chapman’s motion to withdraw did not
violate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Court conducted an adequate inquiry; the
conflict between Chapman and her counsel was not so severe as to prevent effective representation;
and the motion was untimely. Accordingly, this claim does not support relief under § 2255.
C. Third Ground: Exculpatory Evidence
Chapman also argues that the Court’s decision not to allow her counsel to withdraw
prevented her from presenting exculpatory evidence (Dkt. 1 at 4–5). This argument appears to be
a continuation of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. More specifically, Chapman
maintains her attorney’s ineffective assistance of counsel prevented her from “call[ing] the many
Witnesses she had that would have countered the Government’s main [c]ase” to demonstrate that

the elements of bank fraud were not met (Dkt. 4 at 9). She claims that she had witnesses and
evidence showing that two of her businesses—Connecting the Dots 101 and MBM Group and
Network—were viable businesses, had employees working on a daily basis, and “operations that
were up and running for many years” (Dkt. 7 at 5). She also asserts that the Small Business
Administration had several phone recordings from when Chapman called them to correct
information about her businesses (id.). According to Chapman, this evidence demonstrates that
she had legitimate businesses and that she was eligible to qualify for funding (id.).
A defendant is guilty of bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2) if the government proves
beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the defendant knowingly carried out a scheme or plan to obtain
money or property from a financial institution by making false statements or promises; (2) the
defendant knew that the statements or promises were false; (3) the statements or promises were
material, i.e., they had a natural tendency to influence, or were capable of influencing, a financial
institution to part with money or property; (4) the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and
(5) the financial institution was federally chartered or insured. While Chapman does not elaborate

on what element is defeated by her claim that she had legitimate businesses and was eligible for
funding, the Court presumes that it goes toward the allegation that she submitted fraudulent PPP
loan applications. See Indictment at 6, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho July 13, 2022),
Dkt. 1 (alleging that Chapman knowingly executed a scheme to defraud a financial lender “by
submitting the fraudulent PPP Loan Application for Connecting the Dots 101 Group & Network,
Corp.”).
The Government argues that Chapman’s claims and factual assertions are conclusory and
“have already been disproven as false” (Dkt. 5 at 14). The Court agrees. At trial, the Court received
testimony that the numbers put on the loan applications were not based on legitimate business

operations. Transcript of November 14, 2023, Jury Trial at 136:19–20, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-
AKB (D. Idaho Jan. 4, 2024), Dkt. 95. Testimony presented at trial also indicated that Chapman
actively took steps to make her company appear legitimate, such as filing tax returns. Id. at 164:25–
165:2. Furthermore, Chapman stipulated that such tax forms were never submitted to the IRS. See
Stipulation #5, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Nov. 2, 2023), Dkt. 60; Transcript of
November 15, 2023, Jury Trial at 90:3–8, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho Jan. 4, 2024),
Dkt. 96. Therefore, Chapman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel due to the failure to
present witnesses and evidence to show that her businesses were legitimate is nothing more than a
conclusory statement without merit.
D. Fourth Ground: Lack of Jurisdiction
Finally, Chapman contends that the Court does not have the authority to hold her in custody
because she filed a “rescission affidavit” (Dkt. 1 at 5). The affidavit—filed one day before
Chapman’s self-surrender date—purports to rescind “any and all judicial contracts” and declares
that Chapman is “immediately release[d]” of “all claims/liens against [her] estate.” Notice of

Rescission Affidavit at 1, 6, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho July 25, 2024), Dkt. 132;
(Dkt. 1 at 2) (arguing that the affidavit declared that Chapman was “not under [the Court’s]
jurisdiction” and thus “was free and within her rights to proceed to go about her daily life”).
According to Chapman, she did not report to the BOP on her self-surrender date because she
believed the rescission affidavit removed the Court’s jurisdiction over her (Dkt. 7 at 6). Thus,
Chapman claims the Court did not have the authority to arrest her after she failed to self-surrender
on July 26, 2024 (Dkt. 1 at 5). This contention is without merit.
Following Chapman’s sentencing, the Court granted two motions to extend Chapman’s
self-surrender date. Order Extending Self-Surrender Date, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho
Mar. 5, 2024), Dkt. 123; Second Order Extending Self-Surrender Date, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-

AKB (D. Idaho May 9, 2024), Dkt. 129. The Court, however, denied her third request to extend it
on July 19, 2024. Order Denying Third Motion to Extend Self-Surrender Date, Chapman, 22-cr-
00154-AKB (D. Idaho July 19, 2024), Dkt. 131. Six days later, Chapman filed her rescission
affidavit. Notice of Rescission Affidavit, Chapman, 22-cr-00154-AKB (D. Idaho July 25, 2024),
Dkt. 132. Based on this record, it is clear that Chapman was desperate to not face the consequences
of her actions. See United States v. Barnette, 129 F.3d 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding “intent
to flee from prosecution or arrest may be inferred from a person’s failure to surrender to
authorities”). Criminal defendants cannot avoid liability by merely declaring that they are no
longer subject to the Court’s jurisdiction. As the Government notes, Chapman’s claim that the
Court lacks jurisdiction over her is “patently frivolous and false” (Dkt. 5 at 14). Therefore, the
Court had jurisdiction to hold her in custody after she absconded.
IV. ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Petitioner Khadijah X. Chapman’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Dkt. 1) is DENIED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. Petitioner Khadijah X. Chapman’s Motion to Compel a Ruling (Dkt. 8) is DENIED
as MOOT.
3. The Court does not find its resolution of this habeas matter to be reasonably
debatable, and a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c); Rule 11 of the
Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. If Petitioner wishes to appeal, she must file a timely
notice of appeal with the Clerk of Court. Petitioner may seek a certificate of appealability from the
Ninth Circuit by filing a request in that court.

LSE DATED: April 24, 2026

□ 4s Amanda K. Brailsford
SRICTA U.S. District Court Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER — 16