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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Brown

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 949
• Docket Number: 30569

• Judges: Lewis

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (29K)

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Syllabus

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's public records request pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Appellant failed to identify a pending proceeding to which the records would be material and how the records would be material to any justiciable claim. Appellant's right to due process was not violated where he received notice and an opportunity to be heard in both the trial court and on appeal. Judgment affirmed.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Brown, 2026-Ohio-949.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO :
: C.A. No. 30569
Appellee :
: Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 01036
v. :
: (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
CHRISTOPHER DEANGELO BROWN : Court)
:
Appellant : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
: OPINION

...........

Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on March 20, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.

For the court,

RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.
OPINION
MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30569

CHRISTOPHER DEANGELO BROWN, Appellant, Pro Se
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee

LEWIS, P.J.

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Christopher Deangelo Brown appeals from a judgment of

the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court that denied his public records request

pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

I. Procedural History

{¶ 2} In August 2022, Brown was convicted of robbery, a felony of the second degree,

and sentenced to an indefinite mandatory minimum term of five years in prison to a maximum

of seven and one-half years. We affirmed Brown’s conviction. State v. Brown, 2023-Ohio-

645, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 3} On January 28, 2025, Brown, an incarcerated inmate, filed a pro se motion

requesting public records pursuant to R.C. 149.43(B)(8). Brown sought information that

allegedly involved the investigation and prosecution of his criminal case. Brown sought the

requested public records solely to review the evidence, which “may help him find something

that could have been overlooked.”

{¶ 4} On May 14, 2025, Brown filed a motion asking the court to rule on his pending

motion. The trial court overruled Brown’s motion two days later.

{¶ 5} On August 7, 2025, Brown filed a notice of appeal and motion for leave to file a

delayed appeal stating that he did not receive the trial court’s May 16, 2025 decision. A

copy of the trial court’s decision was attached to Brown’s notice of appeal. We overruled

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Brown’s motion for leave to appeal and ordered the parties to proceed in accordance with

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. As we explained, a defendant's postconviction public-

records request is civil in nature. State ex rel. Ware v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2024-

Ohio-47, ¶ 35 (10th Dist.). Although Brown’s notice of appeal was not filed within 30 days

of the order on appeal, the time in which to file a notice of appeal under App.R. 4(A)(1) is

“[s]ubject to the provisions of App.R. 4(A)(3)” in civil cases. App.R. 4(A)(3) “contains a

tolling provision that applies in civil matters when a judgment has not been properly served

on a party according to Civ.R. 58(B).” In re Anderson, 92 Ohio St.3d. 63, 67 (2001).

Because the trial court failed to direct the clerk of court to serve Brown with notice of the

judgment per Civ.R. 58(B), the time for filing had not yet begun. Therefore, Brown’s notice

of appeal was timely filed.

II. Public Records Request

{¶ 6} In his first assignment of error, Brown states:

TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING

APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR PUBLIC RECORDS, PURSUANT TO R.C.

149.43.

{¶ 7} We review trial court orders on disclosure of public records for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Morris, 2017-Ohio-1196, ¶ 29 (2d Dist.), citing State v. Atakpu, 2013-

Ohio-4392, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.). “A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes a decision that

is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary.” State v. Darmond, 2013-Ohio-966, ¶ 34,

citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 (1980).

{¶ 8} “R.C. 149.43, the Public Records Act, requires public offices to make public

records in their custody available for inspection and to provide copies thereof upon request.”

Myers v. Myers, 2002-Ohio-6380, ¶ 16 (2d Dist.). However, where the records pertain to

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public records concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution, “[t]he Public Records Act

imposes restrictions on the ability of an inmate to request records.” State ex rel. Ellis v.

Cleveland Police Forensic Laboratory, 2021-Ohio-4487, ¶ 13. Pursuant to

R.C. 149.43(B)(8):

A public office or person responsible for public records is not required to permit a

person who is incarcerated pursuant to a criminal conviction . . . to inspect or to obtain

a copy of any public record concerning a criminal investigation or prosecution . . .

unless the request to inspect or to obtain a copy of the record is for the purpose of

acquiring information that is subject to release as a public record under this section

and the judge who imposed the sentence . . . with respect to the person, or the judge's

successor in office, finds that the information sought in the public record is necessary

to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the person.

{¶ 9} “This statute ‘sets forth heightened requirements for inmates seeking public

records, and requires an incarcerated criminal defendant to demonstrate that the information

he is seeking pursuant to R.C. 149.43 is necessary to support a justiciable claim or

defense.’” State v. Carr, 2020-Ohio-42, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Gibson, 2007-Ohio-

7161, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). Until the inmate demonstrates this, “he is not entitled to receive

records related to his criminal cases.” State ex rel. Adkins v. Cantrell, 2023-Ohio-1323,

¶ 26.

{¶ 10} “A ‘justiciable claim’ is a claim properly brought before a court of justice for

relief.” State v. Wilson, 2011-Ohio-4195, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.). This court has consistently held

that the justiciable claim requirement “ordinarily involves identifying a ‘pending proceeding

with respect to which the requested documents would be material.’” State v. Wilson, 2009-

Ohio-7035, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.), quoting Gibson at ¶ 14. At least one court has disagreed and

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held that R.C. 149.43(B)(8) does not require a justiciable claim to be pending, only that the

inmate has a justiciable claim to be advanced. See State v. Askew, 2017-Ohio-1512, ¶ 12

(11th Dist.). Nevertheless, Askew still requires a defendant to allege a justiciable claim in

the public records request and identify how the evidence being sought is necessary to

advance such claim. Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 11} In his public records request, Brown did not identify any pending proceedings

or any proceeding likely to have been instituted to which the requested documents would

have been material to support a justiciable claim. Further, Brown made no argument below

about why the requested information, if it existed at all, was necessary to support a

justiciable claim. The trial court concluded that it could not discern any justiciable claim.

“A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it denies a motion under R.C. 149.43(B)(8)

made by a person who has not demonstrated that he has a justiciable claim or that the public

records he seeks are necessary to support such a claim.” Carr, 2019-Ohio-3802, at ¶ 21

(2d Dist.), citing State v. Reid, 2012-Ohio-1659, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.).

{¶ 12} Because Brown has not demonstrated that he has a justiciable claim or that

the public records he sought were necessary to support that claim, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion when it overruled Brown’s motion. Brown’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

III. Due Process

{¶ 13} Brown’s second assignment of error states:

APPELLANT WAS DENIED DUE [SIC] IN VIOLATION OF THE 14TH

AMENDANT [SIC] OF U.S. CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 16

OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.

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{¶ 14} Brown contends that the trial court’s delay in deciding his motion unduly

delayed his appeal, which violated his due process rights. We disagree.

{¶ 15} “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, as applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘No

person shall * * * be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” In re

Thompkins, 2007-Ohio-5238, ¶ 12. “Our courts have long recognized that due process

requires both notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id. at ¶ 13.

{¶ 16} Brown filed his motion requesting public records on January 28, 2025. The

State did not file a response. On May 14, 2025, Brown filed a motion asking the court to

rule on his pending motion. Two days later, the trial court overruled Brown’s public records

request. Brown argues he was prejudiced in that had the trial court timely ruled on his

motion, he would not have had to waste time and resources. “Prejudice” is defined as

“[d]amage or detriment to one's legal rights or claims.” Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed.

2024). We cannot conclude that the trial court’s three-and-one-half month delay in

rendering a decision was unreasonable or caused any detriment to Brown’s legal rights or

claims.

{¶ 17} Nor can we conclude that the failure to timely serve Brown with the trial court’s

May 16, 2025 order pursuant to Civ.R. 58(B) resulted in any due process violation. While

the right to file an appeal is considered a property interest, and “a litigant may not be deprived

of that interest without due process of law,” Brown was not deprived of his right to file an

appeal. Atkinson v. Grumman Ohio Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 80 (1988), paragraph one of the

syllabus. Brown filed a notice of appeal on August 7, 2025, and attached a copy of the trial

court’s order. We deemed the appeal timely filed. Brown therefore was provided notice

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and an opportunity to be heard in both the trial court and this court. Accordingly, Brown’s

second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

{¶ 18} Having overruled Brown’s assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed.

.............

TUCKER, J., and EPLEY, J., concur.

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