People v. Steele - Affirmation of Denial of Conviction Vacation for Immigration Consequences

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Steele CA4/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: G066090

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.5K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/26/26 P. v. Steele CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G066090, G066148
v.
(Super. Ct. No. 97HF0954)
NICOLAS STEELE,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Kevin Haskins, Judge. Affirmed.
Steven A. Brody for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
Eric A. Swenson and Tyler L. Krentz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Appellant.

In 1997 Nicolas Steele pled guilty to multiple criminal charges,
including crimes of moral turpitude and felony child endangerment. In 2025,
Steele filed a petition asking the trial court to vacate his convictions. The
trial court denied the petition and a motion for reconsideration.
We affirm. Steele did not establish prejudice arising from his
criminal defense counsel’s failure to properly advise him regarding the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Steele, a citizen of New Zealand, entered the United States
legally in 1991, but overstayed his visa. In 1997, Steele was charged with:
(1) felony theft of an automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)); (2) felony
unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
(3) felony child abuse causing great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 273a,
subd. (a)); (4) misdemeanor driving on a suspended license (Veh. Code,
§ 14601, subd. (a)); and (5) misdemeanor reckless driving (id., § 23103,
subd. (b)).
Steele pled guilty to all charges. The factual basis for his guilty
plea reads: “On or about 7/8/97 and 8/24/97, in Orange County, I unlawfully
took a vehicle from Hertz Rental with intent to deprive [the] owner of
possession. I also drove a vehicle while my CDL was suspended, drove
recklessly and endangered a child in my car.” Steele initialed paragraph 8 of
the guilty plea form: “I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United
States the conviction for the offense charged may have the consequence of
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.” (Italics added.)
Steele also initialed paragraph 22 of the guilty plea form, reading in relevant
part: “I understand each and every one of the rights outlined above and I

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hereby waive and give up each of them in order to enter my plea to the above
charge(s). I am entering a plea of guilty because I am in fact guilty and for no
other reason.” (Italics added.)
The maximum potential sentence for all charges was four years,
eight months; pursuant to the plea agreement, imposition of sentence was
suspended, and Steele was to be on probation for three years, with 30 days in
jail and 40 days of community service. Steele failed to report to probation,
however, and failed to report to jail to begin his 30-day sentence. The trial
court therefore revoked his probation and issued a bench warrant. At some
point, Steele committed another felony violation of Penal Code section 487,
and he was sentenced to 16 months in state prison by the Los Angeles
Superior Court. Steele was ordered to serve his sentence in this matter
concurrently with his sentence in the other matter, and his probation was
terminated in 2000.
In 2012, Steele married a United States citizen. He has two
children who are United States citizens.
In 2025, Steele filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code section
1473.7 asking the trial court to vacate his convictions. Steele supported that
petition with declarations from himself, an attorney who is an expert on
immigration law, and a declaration from the criminal defense attorney who
represented him at the time he entered his guilty plea.
Steele’s declaration stated he had built a life in the United States
at the time of his arrest in 1997, and he intended to remain in the United
States. Steele also stated that, despite the statements to the contrary in his
1997 guilty plea, he continued to believe he was innocent of all charges.
Steele stated he “never would have accepted the plea I was offered or any
plea, had I known that a negative immigration consequence would be a

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certainty, not merely a possibility and that there were possible alternative
pleas out there.” Steele explained that his criminal defense attorney knew he
was not a United States citizen, but never explained that pleading guilty to
crimes of moral turpitude or to felony child endangerment would subject him
to deportation. Further, his attorney never informed him there were
alternative crimes he might be able to plead guilty to that would not have the
same immigration consequences. To the contrary, Steele contends his
criminal defense attorney “informed me that there was a possibility of
immigration consequences, however, he never explained what [the] full array
of consequences was and how they might be avoided. [My attorney] advised
me to just take the plea deal and ‘keep a low profile.’ I understood this to
mean that I would not suffer negative immigration consequences if I just pled
guilty. [¶] . . . Had I known that I would suffer the immigration consequences
I now suffer, I never would have accepted the plea, particularly because I
believed in my innocence and accepted the bargain because [my attorney]
informed me that I would not suffer negative immigration consequences as
long as I completed all the terms of my probation and kept a ‘low profile.’”
The immigration law expert retained by Steele submitted a
declaration in support of the petition to vacate stating two of Steele’s felony
convictions constituted crimes involving moral turpitude, making him
inadmissible, deportable, and ineligible for adjustment of status. The expert
further declared that if Steele had sought immigration advice from him in
1997, he would have advised Steele to plead guilty to other lesser included
crimes that would not constitute crimes of moral turpitude.
Steele’s former criminal defense attorney who represented him in
1997 did not have any specific recollection of his communications with Steele.
He admitted he knew little about immigration law at that time, did not

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independently research the immigration consequences of Steele’s guilty plea,
and did not communicate with any immigration law experts. He also
admitted that at that time, his practice was to inform clients, “‘I’m not an
immigration attorney but this conviction can have an adverse effect on your
immigration status. I don’t know if it will, but it could.’”
The trial court denied the motion. “So with regard to the petition,
it’s respectfully denied. With regard to the showing, with regard to
misadvisement, I think the petitioner has met the burden of proof that he
wasn’t fully or properly advised; however, with regard to the issue of
prejudice, the Court finds that he has not established that he was prejudiced
by the misadvisement or lack of the advisement.”
Steele filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial court, after
hearing Steele’s testimony on limited issues, issued a lengthy, detailed
statement of decision. The court again concluded Steele had established he
was not fully and correctly advised of the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea, but had not established prejudicial error. The court therefore
denied the motion for reconsideration.
After the motion for reconsideration was denied, Steele filed
separate notices of appeal from both orders. This court consolidated the two
appeals on Steele’s motion.
DISCUSSION
To prevail on a motion under Penal Code section 1473.7, Steele
was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence (1) he did not
subjectively understand the immigration consequences of his guilty plea, and
(2) his lack of understanding constituted prejudicial error. (People v. Espinoza
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 311, 319.) We review the trial court’s order denying the
motion de novo. (Ibid.)

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The Attorney General does not dispute that Steele did not
understand the consequences of his guilty plea. We therefore proceed to the
issue of whether this lack of understanding prejudiced Steele.
To establish prejudicial error, Steele must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that [he] would have rejected the plea if [he] had
correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.”
(People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529.) We consider the totality of the
circumstances in determining whether Steele has demonstrated such a
reasonable probability. (Ibid.) “Factors particularly relevant to this inquiry
include the defendant’s ties to the United States, the importance the
defendant placed on avoiding deportation, the defendant’s priorities in
seeking a plea bargain, and whether the defendant had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral negotiated disposition was possible.” (Id. at pp. 529–
530.) “These factors are not exhaustive, and no single type of evidence is a
prerequisite to relief.” (People v. Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 321.) “It is
not enough for the defendant simply to declare that he or she would not have
accepted a plea that would result in deportation. [Citation.] Rather, the
defendant must ‘corroborate such assertions with “objective evidence.”’
[Citation.]” (People v. Curiel (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1178.)
The trial court prepared a thorough and thoughtful statement of
decision that is devastating to Steele’s claims of prejudicial error. The court
found the assertions in Steele’s declaration to be not credible and provided
specific reasons for making that finding. The court noted that Steele’s
automated criminal history indicated Steele was born in Italy, not New
Zealand as he claimed, he had used several aliases and dates of birth over
several years, and he had a “history of fraudulent conduct between 1992 and
1998.” The court found the discrepancies in his birth date indicated Steele did

6
not have strong ties to the United States and the use of aliases in his contacts
with law enforcement suggested “a strong desire to avoid the process of the
court and possible incarceration” and “lack of concern over his future
immigration status.”
The trial court noted Steele had not corroborated his claims that
he had entered the United States in 1991 on a lawful work visa and he
provided no specific facts about his work history or financial ties to the
United States. Steele never even stated what kind of work he was doing
between 1991 and 2005. The records before it led the trial court to believe
that “[Steele] appears to have been self-employed as an itinerant thief at the
time of the instant plea.”
The trial court found not credible Steele’s claim that he would
have insisted on an immigration neutral disposition or gone to trial if he had
been properly advised of the immigration consequences of his plea. Following
sentencing in November 1997, Steele absconded from probation and then
failed to appear at the county jail in February 1998 to serve the remaining
21 days of his sentence. That behavior, the court found, indicated a “short-
sided world view” that was “inconsistent with his current claims regarding
his long-term immigration priorities at that time.”
We apply an independent standard of review to the order denying
Steele’s petition to vacate his guilty plea, which means we are not bound to
accept the trial court’s credibility findings because Steele testified by
declaration. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 527–528.) However, we
agree with the trial court’s assessment of Steele’s credibility; indeed, we find
that assessment to be compelling.
Steele fails to offer objective, contemporaneous evidence that he
would not have accepted the plea offer if he had known doing so would have

7
made him deportable. (People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1134;
see Jae Lee v. United States (2017) 582 U.S. 357, 369.) While the immigration
expert identified other charges to which Steele might have pled guilty that
would not have had the same immigration consequences, neither Steele nor
his criminal defense attorney include in their declarations that the
immigration consequences of Steele’s guilty plea were discussed, much less
that they were of importance in his decision-making process.
Although Steele claims in his declaration that he intended to
remain in the United States and make this country his home, his declaration
does not offer any evidence he had lasting ties to the United States or had cut
off ties to New Zealand at that time. Steele offers no evidence of community
ties, ownership of property, or personal relationships in the United Sates as
of 1997. His marriage almost 15 years later, and the birth of his children
after that, does not establish his ties to the United States when he entered
his guilty plea.
Both before and after his guilty plea in the current case, Steele
had been convicted of theft-related crimes. While these convictions may not
have directly had immigration consequences, they combine with his guilty
plea in the present case to indicate Steele’s general lack of focus on ensuring
he was not going to run afoul of immigration rules. Further, Steele’s failure to
comply with the terms of his sentence in the present case and to avoid further
criminal activity for any reasonable amount of time indicates he was not
concerned about the immigration consequences of his criminal activities.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment orders are affirmed.

BANCROFT, J.*

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

SANCHEZ, J.

*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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