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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Taylor, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 569 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: King

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (15.3K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by King

J-S46036-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CALVIN MARQUIS TAYLOR :
:
Appellant : No. 569 WDA 2025

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 6, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-61-CR-0000043-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: March 17, 2026

Appellant, Calvin Marquis Taylor, appeals from the order entered in the

Venango County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition

filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

A prior panel of this Court set forth the relevant facts of this appeal as

follows:

On January 14, 2022, [Appellant] was driving 90 miles per
hour on a 65-mile-per-hour highway in Venango County.
The sun was setting, and the temperature was
approximately 15 degrees. Trooper Devin Seybert of the
Pennsylvania State Police initiated a traffic stop. The
suppression court found the following facts about the stop:

[Appellant] used his left turn signal to pullover to the
right side of the roadway in response to the lights and
sirens of the police vehicle. Trooper Seybert
approached [Appellant’s] vehicle and noted the odor

---

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S46036-25

of marijuana as well as particles of marijuana in the
vehicle. He also noticed that [Appellant’s] hand was
shaking, [Appellant] was extremely nervous and there
were multiple cell phones in the vehicle. Further, the
trooper noted that [Appellant’s] eyes were glassy and
bloodshot, and that the vehicle was a rental in a third
party’s name. [Appellant] was the sole occupant.
[Appellant] refused Trooper Seybert’s requests to
search the vehicle.

[Appellant] claimed to have a medical marijuana card
and admitted to smoking marijuana within the hour
preceding the traffic stop. The trooper noted that
[Appellant] was “gutting” cigars to smoke the
marijuana.

Trooper Seybert had Advance Roadside Impaired
Driving Enforcement training and more than 100
hours of training in narcotics investigations. The
trooper was aware that it is illegal to smoke medical
marijuana and unlawful to keep it in any other
container besides the original dispensary packaging.[2]

The trooper conducted two field sobriety tests. He
indicated that the temperature was around 15° and
he did not wish to conduct any additional field tests
with [Appellant]. Trooper Seybert concluded that
[Appellant] was under the influence of marijuana.

[Appellant] was then informed that he was under
arrest on a charge of Driving Under the Influence
[(“DUI”)]. Upon hearing this, [Appellant] pushed
away from the trooper and re-entered his vehicle and
attempted to start it. As the trooper and an additional
back-up trooper attempted to wrestle [Appellant]
from the vehicle, he slipped through his shirt and fled

---

2 This Court has “recognized the [Medical Marijuana Act] does not permit the

smoking of marijuana; therefore, the police’s knowledge that the defendant
had paraphernalia for smoking marijuana gave the officer reason to believe
the marijuana was being used illegally.” Commonwealth v. Cunningham,
287 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2022), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 302 A.3d 626
(2023).

-2-
J-S46036-25

on foot. Despite police pursuit, [Appellant] crossed
the median and eluded the troopers.

Police obtained a warrant to search the vehicle. They
found illegal drugs, an electronic scale, and a loaded
gun.

[Appellant] ran through the forest for nearly half an hour,
eventually reaching the home of Nancy and John Lunnie.
[Appellant] did not knock or ring the doorbell. He entered
through the unlocked door. Mrs. Lunnie saw [Appellant]
standing at the kitchen counter. [Appellant] told Mrs.
Lunnie that he had been in an accident and needed help.
[Appellant] asked to call his mother. Mrs. Lunnie said she
would call the police; he told her not to. He refused her
requests to leave.

Although [Appellant] denied touching her, Mrs. Lunnie
recalled that [Appellant] tried to grab her phone in a
“wrestling match” that left her bruised. Mr. Lunnie retrieved
a gun and pointed it at [Appellant]. [Appellant] left the
house and walked back to the highway. Trooper Seybert
arrested him without further incident.

Trooper Seybert filed a criminal complaint against
[Appellant]; the case was held for court. [Although the
complaint included one count of DUI—controlled substance,
the Commonwealth withdrew this charge prior to trial.]
[Appellant] moved to suppress evidence derived from the
traffic stop. The suppression court held a hearing on May
10, 2022, and it denied [Appellant’s] motion on June 27,
2022.[3]

Commonwealth v. Taylor, No. 141 WDA 2023, unpublished memorandum

at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed May 16, 2024) (record citation omitted).

---

3 The record on appeal does not include Appellant’s suppression motion.
Nevertheless, this Court’s prior decision explained that Appellant alleged “that
Trooper Seybert unlawfully prolonged [Appellant’s] detention by conducting
field sobriety tests. [Appellant] suggests this was pretext to search his car
after he had refused consent to search.” Taylor, supra at 4.

-3-
J-S46036-25

Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of burglary, carrying a firearm

without a license, attempted robbery, criminal trespass, escape, resisting

arrest, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. On

January 3, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of one

hundred five (105) to two hundred twenty-eight (228) months’ imprisonment.

On direct appeal, this Court granted partial relief on May 16, 2024, by vacating

Appellant’s sentence for escape. Specifically, we determined that the

sentence should have merged with Appellant’s concurrent sentence for

burglary. Our action did not disturb the trial court’s sentencing scheme, and

we affirmed the convictions and judgment of sentence in all other respects.

See id. Appellant did not seek further review with our Supreme Court.

Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on September 23, 2024.

The court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw and

Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter on November 27, 2024.4 By opinion and

order filed January 17, 2025, the court permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw.

The court also provided Appellant with Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to

dismiss the PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant filed a pro se response

to the Rule 907 notice on February 10, 2025. On March 6, 2025, the court

dismissed Appellant’s PCRA petition.

---

4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

-4-
J-S46036-25

On April 3, 2025, Appellant filed a pro se notice of appeal.5 In it,

Appellant did not expressly state that he was appealing from the order

dismissing his PCRA petition. On April 21, 2025, the PCRA court appointed

current counsel. In the same order, the court directed counsel to file a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Following the grant of an extension, current counsel filed the Rule 1925(b)

statement on June 2, 2025.

This Court subsequently inspected the pro se notice of appeal and

recognized that it failed to identify the PCRA court order at issue. On June 20,

2025, we instructed current counsel to file an amended notice of appeal within

ten days. We added that the amended notice of appeal should reference “a

properly docketed and appealable order.” (Order, filed 6/20/25, at 1).

Current counsel timely filed the amended notice of appeal on June 30, 2025.

Appellant now raises four issues for this Court’s review:

Appellate counsel/trial counsel were ineffective in failing to
challenge the probable cause that initiated the initial search
of the vehicle [Appellant] was driving.

Appellate counsel/trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
challenge the resisting arrest charge and the jury verdict
finding Appellant guilty thereof, when Appellant argues that
the evidence was insufficient to prove that he resisted

---

5 Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not docketed until April 8, 2025,

Appellant was incarcerated when he submitted this filing. Thus, we use the
date listed on the certificate of service for his notice of appeal as the operative
filing date. See Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d 1279 (Pa.Super.
2011) (explaining that under “prisoner mailbox rule,” we deem pro se
document filed on date it is placed in hands of prison authorities for mailing).

-5-
J-S46036-25

arrest.

[Appellate] counsel/trial counsel were ineffective in failing
to argue that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth
in this case was insufficient to prove that [Appellant] was
intending to commit a crime in the house, as required to
convict Appellant of burglary.

Appellate counsel/trial counsel were ineffective when trial
counsel did not request a jury instruction regarding the
concept of “forced entry” for the burglary charge and when
appellate counsel failed to include that issue on appeal.

(Appellant’s Brief at 1-2).

“Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. P. Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218

A.3d 850 (2019). “[W]e review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal

denied, 672 Pa. 30, 268 A.3d 386 (2021).

In his first issue, Appellant acknowledges that the police obtained a

search warrant for his vehicle. Appellant insists, however, that the police

lacked probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime.

Relying on Trooper Seybert’s preliminary hearing testimony, Appellant

maintains that the facts available to the trooper “included only the smell of

-6-
J-S46036-25

marijuana and one cell phone.”6 (Appellant’s Brief at 9). Further, Appellant

claims that Trooper Seybert “testified that from the very beginning of the stop

he suspected that more than speeding was going on—partially due to the fact

that, in his mind, it took [Appellant] some time to pull over.” (Id.) Appellant

disputes this testimony because “[t]he evidence on the dashcam from the

police cruiser showed less than a minute of time for [Appellant] to pull over

even though he was traveling at … a very high rate of speed.”7 (Id.) Under

these circumstances, Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s suppression motion

should have included a challenge to the issuance of the search warrant.

Appellant also asserts that he suffered prejudice due to counsel’s omission of

this argument. (Id.) Appellant concludes that prior counsel was ineffective

for failing to challenge the probable cause supporting the issuance of the

---

6 Appellant’s brief contains contradictory statements regarding the number of

cell phones in the vehicle. Earlier in the argument section for this issue,
Appellant summarized Trooper Seybert’s testimony and included the trooper’s
observation of “multiple cell phones in the vehicle.” (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
Our review of the record confirms that Trooper Seybert’s exact testimony was
that “multiple cell phones in the vehicle caught my attention.” (N.T.
Preliminary Hearing, 1/26/22, at 9).

7 At trial, the Commonwealth presented the dashcam video of the traffic stop.

(See N.T. Trial, 9/27/22, at 50-51). This video, however, was not included
with the record for this Court’s review. Thus, we cannot review any arguments
related to the video due to Appellant’s failure to ensure its inclusion in the
record. See Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 372 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(en banc) (reiterating that “[o]ur law is unequivocal that the responsibility
rests upon the appellant to ensure that the record certified on appeal is
complete,” and “what is not contained in the certified record does not exist for
purposes of our review”).

-7-
J-S46036-25

search warrant, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has forgone and which forms the basis

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit.” Commonwealth v.

Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 179

A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 645

A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to

pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 852

-8-
J-S46036- 25

A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 847

A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

“Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

“To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

-9-
J-S46036-25

33, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

Counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to file a motion to

suppress if the grounds asserted for that motion lack merit. Commonwealth

v. Watley, 153 A.3d 1034, 1044 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal denied, 641 Pa.

750, 169 A.3d 574 (2017). “The defendant must establish that there was no

reasonable basis for not pursuing the suppression claim and that if the

evidence had been suppressed, there is a reasonable probability the verdict

would have been more favorable.” Id. (citation omitted).

The following principles apply to our review of claims involving search

warrants:

Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution ensures
that citizens of this Commonwealth are protected from
unreasonable searches and seizures by requiring that
warrants: (1) describe the place to be searched and the
items to be seized with specificity and (2) be supported by
probable cause to believe that the items sought will provide
evidence of a crime.

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 662 Pa. 691, 706, 240 A.3d 575, 584 (2020)

(internal citations and footnote omitted).

Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances
within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has
reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that a search should be conducted.

Commonwealth v. Green, 204 A.3d 469, 482 (Pa.Super. 2019), aff’d, 671

Pa. 1, 265 A.3d 541 (2021) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

“The task of the magistrate acting as the issuing authority is to make a

• 10 - J-S46036-25

practical, common sense assessment of whether, given all the circumstances

set forth in the affidavit, a fair probability exists that contraband or evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Commonwealth v. Fletcher,

307 A.3d 742, 746 (Pa.Super. 2023), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 318 A.3d

384 (2024) (quoting Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208 A.3d 497, 505

(Pa.Super. 2019)). “In reviewing an issuing authority’s decision to issue a

warrant, a suppression court must affirm unless the issuing authority had no

substantial basis for its decision.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons,

622 Pa. 91, 110, 79 A.3d 1053, 1064 (2013)).

Instantly, the PCRA court determined that probable cause existed to

support the issuance of the search warrant due to the following facts:

Here, Trooper Seybert observed an odor of marijuana
emanating from [Appellant’s] car, as well as particles of
marijuana inside the vehicle. He also noticed that
[Appellant’s] hand was shaking, [Appellant] was extremely
nervous, and there were multiple cell phones in the vehicle.
Trooper Seybert noted that [Appellant’s] eyes were glassy
and bloodshot, and that the vehicle was a rental in a third
party’s name. [Appellant] voluntarily admitted to smoking
marijuana within the hour preceding the traffic stop.
[Appellant] fled the scene when Trooper Seybert attempted
to arrest [Appellant] for [DUI]. [Appellant] attempted to
reenter the vehicle and leave the scene prior to fleeing on
foot.

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 1/17/25, at 7). Our review of Trooper Seybert’s

testimony confirms the court’s conclusions. (See N.T. Preliminary Hearing at

• 11 - J-S46036-25

6-14; N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/10/22, at 9-21).8 Given these

circumstances, there was a fair probability that the trooper would discover

contraband inside the vehicle. See Fletcher, supra. Thus, there is no

arguable merit to Appellant’s claim that prior counsel was ineffective for failing

to challenge the issuance of the search warrant. See Poplawski, supra.

See also Watley, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant emphasizes Trooper Seybert’s belief that

Appellant was driving under the influence of a controlled substance. Despite

the evidence collected by the trooper, the Commonwealth withdrew the DUI

charge prior to Appellant’s trial. Appellant insists that the Commonwealth’s

withdrawal of the DUI charge effectively defeated the additional charge for

resisting arrest:

[T]here was no proof presented by the Commonwealth that
Appellant had violated the law when he was leaving the
scene of the stop, so there was no justification on the part
of law enforcement to detain Appellant.

(Appellant’s Brief at 15). Further, Appellant argues that the record does not

demonstrate that he was under arrest during the stop because “no handcuffs

were put on him before [the trooper] began to tase [Appellant].” (Id.) On

this basis, Appellant baldly asserts that all prior counsel had no rational basis

for failing to challenge the resisting arrest conviction, and their omissions

---

8 At the preliminary hearing, the court admitted the search warrant into
evidence. (See Preliminary Hearing at 14). The search warrant, however,
was not included with the record for this Court’s review.

• 12 - J-S46036-25

caused Appellant to suffer prejudice. Appellant concludes that all prior counsel

were ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

supporting the resisting arrest conviction. We disagree.

The Crimes Code defines the offense of resisting arrest as follows:

§ 5104. Resisting arrest or other law enforcement

A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree
if, with the intent of preventing a public servant from
effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the
person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the
public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying
or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104. “Thus, to be convicted of resisting arrest, the underlying

arrest must be lawful.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 592 Pa. 232, 236, 924

A.2d 618, 620 (2007).

“In the present context, the lawfulness of an arrest depends on the

existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant.” Id.

Probable cause is made out when the facts and
circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer
at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has
committed or is committing a crime. The question we ask
is not whether the officer’s belief was correct or more likely
true than false. Rather, we require only a probability, and
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity. In
determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a
totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Snowden, 330 A.3d 422, 431 (Pa.Super. 2025) (en

banc) (quoting Commonwealth v. Martin, 627 Pa. 623, 648-49, 101 A.3d

706, 721 (2014)).

• 13 - J-S46036-25

Instantly, the PCRA court correctly observed that the withdrawal of the

DUI charge did not impact the Commonwealth’s evidence for the resisting

arrest charge:

[T]he Commonwealth choosing not to pursue the DUI
charge does not change the testimony and evidence
presented. … Furthermore, the lawful arrest required by
the statute is analyzed by the circumstances at the time of
the arrest. A later withdrawal of the charge would not
change those facts. Here, Trooper Seybert credibly testified
that, based on his observations, he believed [Appellant] was
intoxicated and arrested him for DUI. Once [Appellant] was
told of the arrest, he attempted to get into his vehicle and
drive away. [Appellant] resisted officers’ attempts to
effectuate the arrest and wrestled with officers before
fleeing the scene.

(PCRA Court Opinion at 11) (internal citation omitted). Our review of Trooper

Seybert’s trial testimony confirms the court’s findings. (See N.T. Trial,

9/27/22, at 34-49). The evidence established that Trooper Seybert attempted

to effectuate a legal arrest, Appellant resisted, and Trooper Seybert and

backup officers needed to employ substantial force to overcome the

resistance.9 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. 5104. Therefore, there is no arguable merit to

---

9 Regarding the need for substantial force to overcome Appellant’s resistance,

Trooper Seybert explained that Appellant first attempted to leave the scene in
his vehicle. A backup officer, Corporal Pierce, tried to wrestle Appellant out
of the vehicle. At the same time, Trooper Seybert fired two “ineffective” shots
from his taser. (N.T. Trial, 9/27/22, at 45). The officers subsequently began
“to regain control of [Appellant], get him into custody.” (Id.) Such control
was fleeting. Trooper Seybert “got ahold of [Appellant’s] hood, and he slips
out of the hooded sweatshirt, leaves me holding the hooded sweatshirt in my
hand, and he takes off in an easterly direction across the travel lanes of Route
8 towards the median.” (Id. at 46). Trooper Seybert chased Appellant, who
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 14 - J-S46036-25

Appellant’s claim that all prior counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge

the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the resisting arrest conviction. See

Poplawski, supra.

In his third issue, Appellant claims that the evidence presented at trial

did not prove that he intended to commit a crime inside the Lunnies’ residence.

Appellant relies on his own, self-serving trial testimony that “he was only

asking to use the phone, and that although he did walk into the house, the

door was open and nothing was forced.” (Appellant’s Brief at 16). Further,

Appellant contends that he was “confused and emotional from being tased,”

and “he did not intend to, nor did he, steal anything from the Lunnies.” (Id.)

On this record, Appellant argues that all prior counsel had no rational basis

for failing to challenge the burglary conviction, and their omissions caused

Appellant to suffer prejudice. Appellant concludes that all prior counsel were

ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting

the burglary conviction. We disagree.

The Crimes Code defines burglary, in relevant part, as follows:

§ 3502. Burglary

(a) Offense defined.—A person commits the offense
of burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the
person:

---

---

was shirtless, for approximately “fifty yards into the median” before the
trooper determined that he would not catch up to Appellant. (Id. at 49).

• 15 - J-S46036-25

(ii) enters a building or occupied structure, or
separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is
adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time
of the offense any person is present[.]

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)(ii).

The intent to commit a crime after entry may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the incident. While this
intent may be inferred from actions as well as words, the
actions must bear a reasonable relation to the commission
of a crime. Once one has entered a private residence by
criminal means, we can infer that the person intended a
criminal purpose based upon the totality of the
circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal

denied, 569 Pa. 701, 805 A.2d 521 (2002) (internal citations omitted).

Contrary to Appellant’s argument, prior counsel raised this sufficiency

argument on direct appeal. Moreover, this Court expressly concluded that the

Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate Appellant’s

intent to commit a crime inside the Lunnies’ residence:

The evidence at trial showed that [Appellant] ran from police
custody at a traffic stop and entered the Lunnies’ house
unannounced. When Mrs. Lunnie confronted him,
[Appellant] refused to leave, told her not to call the police,
and struggled to grab her phone. We agree with the trial
court that the jury could find that [Appellant] intended to
commit a crime when he entered the house. Specifically,
the evidence supports a finding that [Appellant] intended to
aid his further escape from police. [Appellant] knew that
the police were pursuing him when he arrived at the
Lunnies’ home. Therefore, it is reasonable for the jury to
find that [Appellant] intended to continue the offense of
escape when he entered.

With respect to [Appellant’s] conviction for attempted
robbery, the jury could find that [Appellant] intended to

• 16 - J-S46036-25

commit a robbery by force when he tried to take Mrs.
Lunnie’s phone. The jury could believe Mrs. Lunnie’s
testimony that [Appellant] wrestled her for her phone, and
it was not required to accept [Appellant’s] testimony that
his intentions were innocent.

Taylor, supra at 7-8 (record citations and quotation marks omitted).

Because counsel raised this sufficiency challenge on direct appeal, Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his current ineffectiveness claim. See Poplawski,

supra.

In his final issue, Appellant contends that the court should have

instructed the jury about the concept of “forced entry” as it related to the

burglary charge. Specifically, Appellant insists that “[t]he instruction would

have cautioned that a forced entry does not immediately imply that an

individual is attempting to do something illegal within a structure.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 19). Appellant relies on Commonwealth v.

Wilamowski, 534 Pa. 373, 633 A.2d 141 (1993), for the proposition that

“more than merely breaking a door or window is required to support an

inference of intent to commit a crime inside” a residence. (Id.) Appellant

then posits that “since his [burglary] involved walking into an unlocked house,

the jury should have been instructed that they could not infer that his walking

in immediately should lead to the conclusion that he intended to commit a

crime therein.” (Id. at 19-20). Appellant argues that trial counsel had no

strategic basis for failing to seek this instruction, and Appellant suffered

prejudiced due to counsel’s omission. Appellant concludes that trial counsel

• 17 - J-S46036-25

was ineffective for failing to request this instruction. We disagree.

The following principles apply to our review of a trial court’s jury

instructions:

A jury charge will be deemed erroneous only if the charge
as a whole is inadequate, not clear or has a tendency to
mislead or confuse, rather than clarify, a material issue. A
charge is considered adequate unless the jury was palpably
misled by what the trial judge said or there is an omission
which is tantamount to fundamental error.

---

[W]e must review the jury charge as a whole to determine
if it is fair and complete. A trial court has wide discretion in
phrasing its jury instructions, and can choose its own words
as long as the law is clearly, adequately, and accurately
presented to the jury for its consideration. The trial court
commits an abuse of discretion only when there is an
inaccurate statement of the law.

Commonwealth v. B. Beatty, 335 A.3d 1236, 1245 (Pa.Super. 2025),

appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 348 A.3d 1039 (2025) (internal citations

omitted).

Instantly, the court provided the jury with the following burglary

instruction:

[Appellant] has been charged with burglary. To find
[Appellant] guilty of this offense, you must find that all of
the following elements have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. First, that [Appellant] entered the
residence of John and Nancy Lunnie … in Victory Township,
Pennsylvania. So, first, did [Appellant] enter that
residence? Second, that [Appellant] entered that residence
with the intent to commit a crime. So, for it to be burglary,
he needs to enter the residence with the intent to commit a
crime.

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So, the third element is that the residence was not open to
the public at the time [Appellant] entered the—fourth, that
[Appellant] did not have permission or lawful authority to
enter that residence.

(N.T. Trial, 9/28/22, at 122-23).

Here, the court’s instruction accurately presented the law for the jury’s

consideration. See B. Beatty, supra. Although the instruction did not

address the concept of forced entry, the PCRA correctly noted that “forcible

entry is not an element of burglary. Presenting the jury with an instruction

requiring forcible entry … would mislead the jury.” (PCRA Court Opinion at

10). We agree with this conclusion and add that Appellant’s own testimony

established that a forced entry did not occur:

[COUNSEL:] Did you have to—did you have to break
the door or did it just open?

[APPELLANT:] No. The door was just open.

(N.T. Trial, 9/28/22, at 20). Because Appellant’s testimony conceded that a

forced entry did not occur, a jury instruction regarding this concept would

have palpably misled the jury. See B. Beatty, supra. We conclude that trial

counsel was not ineffective for failing to request this instruction, and Appellant

is not entitled to relief on his final claim. See Poplawski, supra.

Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

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DATE: 03/17/2026

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