Commonwealth v. Robert Sanderson, Sr. - Witness Intimidation Conviction Vacated

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Commonwealth v. Robert Sanderson, Sr.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0495

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-495

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

ROBERT SANDERSON, SR.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in the Superior Court, the

defendant, Robert Sanderson, Sr., was convicted of one count of

assault and battery on a family or household member, in

violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a), and one count of witness

intimidation, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 13B (b).1 This

appeal only concerns the latter conviction which arose from

separate incidents that occurred on July 13, 2021, and August 2,

1. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence

1The defendant also was charged with kidnapping and
strangulation or suffocation. At the close of the
Commonwealth's case, the defendant moved for a required finding
of not guilty on the kidnapping charge. The judge denied the
motion, and the jury acquitted the defendant of both kidnapping
and strangulation or suffocation.
and contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he

committed the crime of intimidation of a witness on either day.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond

a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense on

July 13, but was insufficient to sustain a conviction based on

the events which occurred on August 2. Because the jury

returned a general verdict, it is not possible to discern the

basis on which the jury concluded that the defendant was guilty.

Consequently, the judgment of conviction of witness intimidation

is vacated and the verdict set aside.

Background. We summarize the evidence presented at trial

in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). The

victim and the defendant began a romantic relationship in

September 2018. By the summer of 2021, the two lived in

separate residences but were still romantically involved.

During the course of the relationship, the defendant introduced

the victim to Percocet, which she began to take regularly.

Later, the defendant provided the victim with cocaine, fentanyl,

and heroin. The victim became dependent on the defendant to

supply her with drugs and endured his verbal and physical abuse

to protect that supply.

On the morning of July 13, 2021, the victim and the

defendant were in the victim's apartment. The defendant had

2
stayed over the night before and when the victim attempted to

wake him up, the defendant became angry, shouted profanities,

and punched the victim in the face. The ring on the defendant's

finger cut the victim's cheek, causing significant bleeding.

The victim then left the apartment to drive her eleven year old

daughter to a friend's house. She told her daughter that she

had fallen and did not disclose that the defendant had hit her.

When she returned home, the defendant realized that the victim

needed stitches and reluctantly drove her to the hospital.

While en route, the defendant told the victim that she

"better not tell [the hospital staff] . . . what happened." He

then instructed her to say that she had become dizzy, fallen,

struck her head on the counter, and he had found her

unconscious. The defendant rehearsed the false story with the

victim multiple times on the way to the hospital. While the two

were in the emergency room, the defendant remained beside the

victim as she repeated the falsehood to medical personnel. At

one point the defendant was asked to leave the room while the

victim received stitches. He did not go far. He stood outside

the door and gestured to the victim in a way that signaled to

her that she should continue lying. The victim testified that

she lied because she was afraid of the defendant's reaction if

she told the truth, which she believed would include him

yelling, belittling, and hitting her.

3
A few weeks later, on the morning of August 2, 2021, the

victim and the defendant were sitting in her parked car with a

third person when a police officer approached them to conduct a

wellness check prompted by the victim's mother. The defendant

was annoyed and asked the victim "[w]hat the fuck are they here

for" and then stated "[y]our Mom is a bitch[,] [s]he called the

cops on us." The victim and the defendant were both aware that

the mother had filed petitions seeking the victim's involuntary

commitment due to her substance abuse and they both suspected

that the police were coming to apprehend the victim. The victim

got out of her car and spoke to the officer. She told him that

she was fine and that her mother was "just making things up."

After she returned to the car, the defendant asked, "what did

they say to you?" and the victim relayed what she said to the

officers. The defendant responded, "[g]ood job getting rid of

them." The victim testified that once again she lied because

she was afraid of what the defendant might do to her if she told

the truth.2,3

2 The defendant called two witnesses in his defense -- his
son and his sister -- both of whom testified that they had not
seen the defendant commit any acts of violence against the
victim.

3 The victim also testified about a separate incident that
occurred a few months later in which the defendant allegedly
attempted to strangle her. She testified that she felt as
though she was going to black out and that it "felt like
forever." She did not report that incident to police at the

4
Discussion. When reviewing the denial of a motion for a

required finding of not guilty, we "consider the evidence

introduced at trial in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth [to] determine whether a rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Oberle, 476 Mass. 539, 547

(2017). To sustain a conviction for witness intimidation, the

Commonwealth must prove that

"(1) a possible . . . violation occurred that would trigger
a criminal investigation or [criminal or civil]4 proceeding;
(2) the victim would likely be a witness or potential
witness in that investigation or proceeding; (3) the
defendant engaged in intimidating behavior, as defined in
the statute, toward the victim; and (4) the defendant did
so with the intent to impede or interfere with the
investigation or proceeding."
Commonwealth v. Fragata, 480 Mass. 121, 126-27 (2018).

The defendant first argues that the Commonwealth failed to

establish that any reasonable juror could find that he

intimidated the victim based on the events that occurred on July

13, 2021. He contends that he did no more than ask the victim

to lie and that the absence of evidence of a direct threat or

threatening gestures rendered the evidence insufficient to prove

time because she was afraid. This incident was the basis for
the charge of strangulation or suffocation of which the
defendant was acquitted.

4 In 2018, the Legislature amended the statute to include
"civil proceeding[s] of any type." G. L. c. 268 § 13B (b), as
amended by St. 2018, c. 69, § 155.

5
that his conduct was intimidating. This argument is unavailing

because it ignores the definition of intimidation and views the

evidence in a light favorable to the defendant instead of the

Commonwealth. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, evidence

of a direct threat or threatening gestures is not required to

satisfy the required element of intimidation. See Commonwealth

v. Carvalho, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 840, 845-846 (2016) (conduct may

fall within statute even where defendant's words are not

"expressly intimidating, threatening, or harassing" [citation

omitted]). Rather, conduct is intimidating if the "acts or

words . . . would instill fear in a reasonable person."

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 530, 535 (2010). See

Commonwealth v. Ruano, 87 Mass. App. Ct. 98, 100 (2015)

(question whether certain conduct is intimidating depends on

whether defendant "put[s] a person in fear for the purpose of

influencing his or her conduct" [citation omitted]). Here,

particularly in light of the defendant's prior verbal and

physical abuse, the defendant's threat "not [to] tell [the

doctors] . . . what happened" and pressuring the victim to lie

could reasonably be viewed as intimidating. See Commonwealth v.

Gardner, 102 Mass. App. Ct. 299, 304 (2023) ("pressuring the

victim to recant her allegations against him" qualifies as

intimidating behavior under statute). See also Commonwealth v.

Sholley, 432 Mass 721, 725 (2000) ("jury may consider the

6
context in which the allegedly threatening statement was made

and all of the surrounding circumstances").

Next, the defendant argues that even if the Commonwealth

met its burden of proving that the defendant engaged in

intimidating conduct toward the victim, a rational jury could

not find that he did so with the intent to interfere with a

criminal investigation or proceeding.5 We disagree. The

evidence supported a rational inference that the defendant,

having struck the victim in the face causing a serious injury (a

laceration requiring nine stitches), was aware that if the

victim told the truth to medical personnel, he would be subject

to criminal liability. It matters not, as the defendant

contends, that there was no pending criminal investigation at

that time. See Fragata, 480 Mass. at 125 ("investigation need

not have already begun when the intimidation occurred"). The

jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's conduct, namely

insisting that the victim lie and ensuring by his gestures that

she would not reveal the truth, established that the defendant

intended to prevent the victim from furnishing information that

could lead to an investigation into her injuries. See Ruano, 87

Mass. App. Ct. at 101, quoting Commonwealth v. King, 69 Mass.

5 The defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the other elements of the offense with
respect to the July 13, 2021, incident.

7
App. Ct. 113, 120 (2007) ("[a] fact finder may evaluate the

circumstances in which the statement was made, including its

timing, to determine whether the defendant in fact intended to

intimidate the victim").

The defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the

Commonwealth's evidence regarding the incident that occurred on

August 2, 2021. Although the evidence established that the

victim lied to the police about her wellbeing due to her fear of

the defendant, there was insufficient evidence that the

defendant acted with the "intent to or with reckless disregard

for the fact that [his actions] may . . . impede, obstruct,

delay, prevent or otherwise interfere with . . . [a] criminal

investigation . . . or any other civil proceeding of any type."

G. L. c. 268, § 13B (b). The defendant's statements questioning

the arrival of the police and blaming the victim's mother were

not aimed at the victim and did not convey any explicit or

implicit directive that the victim refrain from speaking with or

mislead the police to obstruct a potential civil commitment. At

best, the evidence demonstrated only that "the defendant engaged

in [nothing] more than abusive speech." Fragata, 480 Mass. at

128. Insulting remarks, even those exacerbated by expletives,

do not suffice and we therefore conclude that the Commonwealth

did not meet its burden of proof.

8
As previously noted, the jury returned a general verdict.

Thus, although the jury was instructed that it must unanimously

agree that the Commonwealth had proved that the defendant

committed the offense on at least one of the two specific dates,6

"it is impossible to tell on which [date] the jury relied."

Fragata, 480 Mass. at 129. "It is well established in this

Commonwealth that a verdict cannot stand unless it appears that

the jury reached their verdict on a theory for which there was

factual support." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422

Mass. 634, 635 (1996).

Conclusion. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction of

intimidation of a witness is vacated, and the verdict set aside.

Since sufficient evidence was introduced to support a conviction

of intimidation of a witness based on the events of July 13, the

Commonwealth may retry the defendant as to that incident should

6 The judge instructed as follows:

"If you believe there were acts -- multiple acts of
intimidation, you must be unanimously convinced of one of
those particular acts . . . . It's not necessary that the
Commonwealth to prove or for you all to be agreed that the
offense was also committed on other occasions. But you
must unanimously agree that the Commonwealth has proved
that the defendant committed the offense on at least one of
the specific occasions that have been charged."

9
it wish to do so. The judgment of conviction of assault and

battery on a family or household member is affirmed.

So ordered.

By the Court (Vuono, Neyman &
Sacks, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: April 24, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

10