Commonwealth Court Affirms Summary Judgment for Township on Due Process

Jump To

Top Caption [Lead Opinion

by Wolf](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10847161/j-barris-v-stroud-twp/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

J. Barris v. Stroud Twp.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 671 C.D. 2020
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Wolf

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (873)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

by Wolf

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jonathan Barris, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 671 C.D. 2020
:
Stroud Township : Submitted: August 8, 2025

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: April 23, 2026

This appeal returns to us on remand from the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court’s decision in Barris v. Stroud Township, 310 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2024) (Barris III).
Jonathan Barris appeals from the May 26, 2020 order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Monroe County (trial court). The trial court granted summary judgment to Stroud
Township (Township) on all of Barris’s claims challenging the constitutionality of
the Township’s Ordinance No. 9-2011, which restricts the discharge of firearms
within the Township. This Court had earlier determined that Barris was entitled to
summary judgment on his claim under the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Barris v. Stroud Twp., 257 A.3d 209, 226 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021)
(Barris II), rev’d by Barris III, 310 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2024). Our Supreme Court
reversed that determination and instructed us on remand to address Barris’s
remaining arguments on appeal. We find those arguments without merit and we
affirm the trial court’s order.
Our Supreme Court explained the relevant facts. See Barris III, 310
A.3d at 190-98. To summarize: Barris purchased a 4.66-acre lot in the Township’s
residential zoning district in 2009. Id. at 191. Several neighbors complained to
police that Barris was target shooting with firearms on his property, but police
determined no laws or ordinances were violated. Id. In 2011, the Township passed
Ordinance 9-2011 (Ordinance). The Ordinance prohibits discharge of firearms
except at indoor or outdoor shooting ranges and effectively prohibits target shooting
in 65% of the Township, including all of the residential district. Id. at 177. Barris
filed a zoning permit application to build a shooting range on his property, which
the Township’s zoning officer denied. Id. at 195. Rather than appeal the denial,
Barris filed the instant action for declaratory and injunctive relief in the trial court.
Id. at 196.
Barris’s original complaint alleged the Ordinance violates his right to
bear arms under the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, as well as the
preemption clause of the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms Act of 1995 (UFA), 18 Pa.
C.S. § 6120, and other Pennsylvania statutory law. The trial court sustained the
Township’s demurrer and dismissed the complaint in its entirety. On appeal, we
affirmed the dismissal as to the state statutory claims, but vacated the trial court’s
dismissal of Barris’s constitutional claims and remanded. See Barris v. Stroud Twp.
(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 218 C.D. 2016, filed November 17, 2017) (Barris I).
Barris amended his complaint on remand in the trial court, claiming the
Ordinance violates the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment and his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
among other claims.1 See Barris II, 257 A.3d at 216. After discovery, the trial court

1
The amended complaint included claims under the Pennsylvania Constitution, but Barris
(Footnote continued on next page…)

2
initially denied summary judgment to both parties, and the Township submitted
further evidence. In its May 26, 2020 opinion and order, which is on appeal in this
matter, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Township. Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 143-58. Barris appealed, and we reversed based on the Second
Amendment claim alone. Barris II, 257 A.3d at 226. We concluded that the
Ordinance impermissibly burdened the right to become proficient in the use of
firearms, and thus facially violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 226 n.18. We
did not address Barris’s other arguments, including his due process claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment and whether the trial court erred in denying his as-applied
constitutional challenges for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.
The Supreme Court granted allocatur as to the facial Second
Amendment challenge only, and it reversed our decision on that question. Barris
III, 310 A.3d 215 -16. The Court concluded that the Township had shown the
Ordinance is consistent with the historical tradition of firearm regulation, and thus
satisfies the test for the Second Amendment recently set forth by the United States
Supreme Court. Id. (citing N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S.
1 (2022)). The Court remanded for this Court to consider Barris’s “other claims,
including under substantive and procedural due process.” Id. at 215 n.59
The remaining issues on appeal2 are as follows:

abandoned those claims on appeal to this Court and they are not at issue. Barris III, 310 A.3d at
180 n.4.
2
“On appeal from a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment, our
standard of review is de novo[,] and our scope of review is plenary.” Carpenter v. William Penn
Sch. Dist., 295 A.3d 22, 29 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Summary judgment
is properly entered only when, “after examining the record in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, and resolving all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact against
the moving party, the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See
id. (internal citation omitted).

3
[First,] Barris argues that the trial court erred when it
determined that the Township’s Ordinance did not violate
his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights
to use his residential property for target practice. [Second,]
Barris submits that the trial court erred when it determined
that the Township did not violate his Fourteenth
Amendment procedural due process rights when it passed
the Ordinance. [Third,] Barris argues that the trial court
erred in concluding that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies in challenging the
constitutionality of the Ordinance.

Barris II, 257 A.3d at 217.
Barris first argues the Ordinance violates his Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process rights because the Ordinance serves no legitimate
governmental interest in safety. R.R. at 33 (Am. Compl.); Barris’s Br. at 4, 11-12.
He argues the Township has not shown a legitimate basis for the Ordinance. The
Township responds that the Ordinance is presumed to be constitutional and that
Barris, not the Township, bears the burden to show otherwise. The Township argues
the Ordinance is within the ordinary police powers of a municipality, and because
the record amply shows that, the Township was not required to further explain or
document the legitimate reasons for the Ordinance.
As the trial court correctly explained, when a municipal use of police
powers is challenged under substantive due process, the ordinance is presumed
constitutional, and the challenger bears a heavy burden. See Berwick Area Landlord
Ass’n v. Borough of Berwick, 48 A.3d 524, 537 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). It is “only
where the exercise of the police power is so palpably unreasonable as to suggest that
its real object is not to protect the community or to promote the general well-being
that a law is subject to judicial rejection.” Id. at 537 (quoting McSwain v. Com., 520
A.2d 527, 529 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (en banc)). We agree with the Township that it
has legitimate interest in regulating the discharge of firearms for public safety. As

4
the trial court noted, “[t]here is a substantial relationship between that goal and the
[O]rdinance’s limitations on discharge of firearms in the [T]ownship.” R.R. at 158.
We reject Barris’s argument that the Township was required to produce further
evidence to show that relationship, because the legitimacy of the interest here is clear
from the record. Cf. Com. v. Creighton, 639 A.2d 1296, 1301 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994).
As to his procedural due process claim, Barris argues that when passing
the Ordinance, the Township did not include sufficient investigation or research, and
its discussion was “cursory.” Barris’s Br. at 12. The amended complaint alleges the
Township’s passage of the Ordinance singled out Barris individually, but Barris does
not develop that point in his brief. R.R. at 33, see generally Barris’s Br. The
Township responds that the Ordinance was supported by legitimate governmental
interests. We agree with the Township. As the trial court noted, “procedural due
process only attaches where there is an alleged deprivation of a protected property
or liberty interest.” Mun. Auth. of Borough of W. View v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 41
A.3d 929, 936 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). A person does not have a protected property or
liberty interest in conduct that is “reasonably limited by zoning ordinances that are
enacted by municipalities pursuant to their police power.” C & M Devs., Inc. v.
Bedminster Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 820 A.2d 143, 150 (Pa. 2002). Barris does
not allege any irregularity or failure of public notice in the process of enacting the
Ordinance. His procedural due process claim is without merit.
Finally, Barris argues the trial court erred in finding he failed to
preserve an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Ordinance by failing to appeal
from the denial of the zoning permit. The trial court concluded Barris failed to
exhaust that administrative remedy. Barris asks us to apply the “exception to this
rule . . . for a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.” Barris’s Br. at 13

5
(quoting Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 839 A.2d 265, 274 (Pa. 2003)). The Township
points out that in failing to appeal, Barris did not seek a variance or curative
amendment that might have addressed an as-applied constitutional challenge. The
Township relies on the reasoning of the trial court, which aptly distinguished facial
from as-applied challenges for exhaustion purposes and noted that as-applied
challenges must “be heard at the administrative level” so the agency can “exercise
its expertise and develop the factual record necessary to resolve the claim.” R.R. at
152 (quoting Lehman, 839 A.2d at 275). Parties are required to exhaust as-applied
challenges to an ordinance before the administrative body. Lehman, 839 A.2d at
275; see also Barris III, 310 A.3d at 203 n.35. Accordingly, we agree the trial court
did not err in finding any as-applied challenge to the Ordinance waived.
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting
summary judgment to the Township in Barris’s Fourteenth Amendment claims and
his as-applied constitutional claim. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

6
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jonathan Barris, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 671 C.D. 2020
:
Stroud Township :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 23rd day of April 2026, the May 26, 2020 order of the
Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County is AFFIRMED.

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge