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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Coleman, A.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2916 EDA 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Sullivan

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by Sullivan

J-A30042-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ALVIN COLEMAN :
:
Appellant : No. 2916 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 18, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0004655-2023

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED MARCH 16, 2026

Alvin Coleman (“Coleman”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

following his conviction for person not to possess.1 Because Coleman’s sole

appellate issue, in the nature of a Rule 600 challenge, merits no relief, we

affirm.

The trial court provided the following overview of the factual and

procedural history:

1. CRIMINAL ACT:

On March 11, 2022, at approximately 7:52 P.M. a
Philadelphia Housing Authority (hereinafter “PHA”) officer, Carl
Hickey [(“Officer Hickey”)], was patrolling at 45th and Market
Streets near the Westpark Apartments. Officer Hickey was in his
marked patrol car in a parking lot and “heard about 25 to 30
gunshots coming from behind me at, like, 400 Busti, 300 Busti
area.”

---

1 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
J-A30042-25

Officer Hickey reported gunshots fired over police radio in
order to notify both Philadelphia Police and PHA Police. After a
scan of the immediate outside area Officer Hickey waited for
backup and then proceeded into the high-rise building located at
400 North Busti Street. Officers conducted a scan of the lobby,
stairwells, and back door of the building but did not locate any
gunshot victims or potential offenders. However, upon exiting the
back door police located 28 fired cartridge casings.

The PHA dispatcher in contact with Officer Hickey, who has
access to surveillance cameras at 400 North Busti Street, provided
officers with flash information for the suspected offender. Police
were then provided still images of the alleged offender from the
surveillance camera. . . . [B]ased on this information and
information from a PHA confidential informant, Philadelphia Police
identified [Coleman] as the offender. [Detective Gregory Jara of
the Philadelphia Police Department (“Detective Jara”) obtained an
arrest warrant for Coleman on March 22, 2022.]

1. ATTEMPTS TO APPREHEND:

After Philadelphia police identified [Coleman] as the
offender, Philadelphia police officers and detectives attempted to
arrest [him]. Multiple attempts to apprehend were made by
members of the Philadelphia Police Department and the United
States Marshal Service.

At [a later hearing on Coleman’s motion to dismiss pursuant
to Pa.R.Crim.P.] 600(A) . . ., State Parole Agent Ernest Jones
[(“Agent Jones”)], who supervised [Coleman] between December
2020 and March 2022, testified that [Coleman’s] parole was
“maximum supervision” which required two in person contacts per
month. One of these monthly contacts was required to be at
[Coleman’s] verified address on file at 336 North 53rd Street. The
other location where Agent Jones frequently met with [Coleman]
was Westpark Apartments at 400 North Busti Street, notably,
where the March 11, 202[2], shooting occurred. Agent Jones
testified at trial that his last contact with [Coleman] at 336 North
53rd Street was February 2, 2022, which was 37 days prior to the
shooting. Agent Jones further testified that his last contact overall
with [Coleman] was at 400 North Busti Street on March 2, 2022,
which was 9 days prior to the shooting.

-2-
J-A30042-25

Detective [] Jara . . . was the assigned detective to the
shooting case. In his capacity as the assigned detective, Detective
Jara coordinated attempts to apprehend [Coleman] with the
United States Marshal[] Service. On March 23, 2022, Detective
Jara attempted to serve the arrest warrant on [Coleman] at both
336 North 53rd Street and 400 North Busti Street. [Coleman] was
not present at either location.

On March 24, 2022, after being notified of the criminal
charges and ongoing investigation by Southwest Detectives, State
Parole Agent Jones went to [Coleman’s] residence at 336 North
53rd Street. Upon entering the residence Agent Jones
“established that [Coleman] was not at the residence and no
longer had any belongings at that residence.”

Detective Jara further testified that these coordination
efforts with the United States Marshal Service included speaking
to the United States Marshal Service on a monthly basis and
receiving updates on their fugitive investigation. After each of
these conversations with the United States Marshal Service
Detective Jara entered notes into his investigation file regarding
the United States Marshal Service updates.

Detective Jara testified as to these attempts to apprehend
made by members of the United States Marshal Service.
Specifically, according to testimony and notes entered by
Detective Jara, multiple attempts to apprehend were made by
detectives and the United States Marshal Service.

Th[e] court determined that attempts to apprehend were
made on March 23, 2022, when police first attempted to serve the
arrest warrant on [Coleman]. On March 29, 2022, a United States
Marshal Service Task Force Officer obtained a court order
authorizing disclosure of historical call data, mobile
communication tracking data, and use of a trap and trace device.
On April 7, 2022, a welfare account activity check was conducted
on Appellant’s account. On April 11, 2022, members of the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Violent Crime Fugitive Task Force
conducted surveillance at two addresses Appellant was known to
frequent. On May 5, 2022, a CLEAR [d]atabase search was
conducted to determine potential new addresses for [Coleman].
On May 16, 2022, a United States Marshal Service Task Force
Officer executed a court order to obtain call records believed to be
associated with [Coleman]. On July 12, 2022, the Philadelphia

-3-
J-A30042-25

Police Department - Southwest Detective Division received a
citizen tip regarding [Coleman’s] whereabouts and shared this
information with the United States Marshal Service’s Fugitive Task
Force. On July 19, 2022, the United States Marshal Service’s
Fugitive Task Force executed a court order on a Meta Platforms
account.

[Coleman] was located and arrested by members of the
United States Marshal Service in Johnstown, P[ennsylvania] on
August 3, 2022. The arrest was . . . based upon the state parole
detainer.

1. EXTRADITION:

After [Coleman’s] parole arrest on August 3, 2022, [he] was
extradited to Philadelphia on December 1, 2022. Detective Jara
testified that this delay in extradition was because the state would
not release [Coleman] to Philadelphia County until parole
conditions were satisfied to make him releasable. Once [Coleman]
was releasable an extradition request was made on October 24,
2022. On October 31, 202[2], Prisoner Transportation Service
was contacted, and the pick-up of Appellant was arranged through
this private company. This is the practice used by the Philadelphia
Police Department whenever an extradition is required from
another county according to Detective Jara’s testimony. The
request gained “final approval from the police department on
November 8, 2022.”

During this timeframe Prisoner Transportation Services was
following COVID protocols. Because of these protocols [Coleman]
was not extradited until December 1, 2022. Detective Jara
testified, regarding the timing of [Coleman’s] extradition to
Philadelphia, that the Philadelphia Police Department:

[W]as unable to have him brought to Southwest
Detectives in Philadelphia until the state had finished
their matters. And then once the state was finished
with their matters, arrangements were made with the
private prison company, and at that time, you’re at
the mercy of their schedule.

N.T. 1/5/24 at 67.

-4-
J-A30042-25

A preliminary hearing was scheduled for December 16,
2022, but was continued because a necessary police officer failed
to appear. A second preliminary hearing was scheduled on
January 5, 2023. At this hearing a necessary police officer was
sick and failed to appear. On January 5, 2023, the Commonwealth
withdrew charges as is the practice of the Philadelphia District
Attorney’s Office when not ready at two consecutive preliminary
hearing listings.

Upon withdrawal of the charges on January 5, 2023, State
Parole Agent Jones testified that [Coleman] was released from
custody. However, because [Coleman] did not have a valid home
plan “he was released to a parole halfway house, which was
Gaudenzia DRC (Diagnostic and Rehabilitative Center), 3200
Henry Avenue.” Given [Coleman] was still on parole, [his] release
to Gaudenzia DRC required [him] to remain there until a valid
home plan was established.

Charges were re-filed in the instant matter on January 16,
2023. A preliminary hearing was scheduled for February 7, 2023.
Agent Jones further testified that on February 6, 2023, [Coleman]
absconded from Gaudenzia DRC. Agent Jones stated that under
the “statistical code that [State Parole Supervision will] utilize to
identify offenders . . . [Coleman] would be listed as . . . a 29 . . .
[which represents] an absconder.” After absconding from
Gaudenzia DRC on February 6, 2023, in violation of parole
conditions, [Coleman] was rearrested in Johnstown, PA, on May
31, 2023. [Coleman later filed a Rule 600 motion, after which the
trial court held a hearing and ultimately denied the motion.]

---

On April 5, 2024, [Coleman] was found guilty[,] after a jury
trial[,] of possession of firearm prohibited. . .. On June 18, 2024,
th[e] court sentenced [him] to ten to twenty years of . . .
incarceration . . .. On June 26, 2024, [Coleman] filed a post-
sentence motion . . .. The . . . motion was denied by operation of
law on October 28, 2024. . . . [Coleman] timely filed [a] notice
of appeal . . .. [T]he court ordered [Coleman] to file a statement
of errors complained of on appeal[, with which he timely
complied].

-5-
J-A30042-25

Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/25 (unnumbered at 2-7) (some paragraphs re-

ordered for clarity; some unnecessary capitalization and citations to the record

omitted).

Coleman raises the following issues for our review:

1. Did the lower court err in overruling objections to the
   Commonwealth’s inadmissible hearsay evidence at the Rule
   600 hearing?

2. Did the lower court err and abuse its discretion when it denied
   [] Coleman’s [Rule 600] motion . . . where the
   Commonwealth’s lack of diligence resulted in more than 365
   days of pre-trial delay?

Coleman’s Brief at 2-3 (issues re-ordered for ease of disposition).

In his first issue, Coleman asserts the trial court erred in overruling his

objections to what he asserts was hearsay evidence offered by the

Commonwealth.2

Our standard of review for evidentiary issues is as follows: “We review

such determinations for an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is the

overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of judgment that is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-will, or partiality,

as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v. Vance, 316 A.3d

183, 189 (Pa. Super. 2024) (internal citations, quotations, and brackets

---

2 Hearsay is defined as a statement that “(1) the declarant does not make
while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Pa.R.E.
801(c). See also Commonwealth v. Manivannan, 186 A.3d 472, 482 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (defining hearsay).

-6-
J-A30042-25

omitted), appeal granted, 332 A.3d 1182 (Pa. 2025). It is well settled that

we may affirm a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if correct on grounds other than

those relied on by the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160

A.3d 127, 144 n.15 (Pa. 2017).

Coleman argues the trial court erred in admitting hearsay evidence, via

Detective Jara, of efforts by the U.S. Marshals to locate him. See Coleman’s

Brief at 33. He argues that while, if properly admitted, efforts by federal

authorities to locate him could have shown the Commonwealth’s diligence, the

evidence was improperly admitted, and, consequently, “the Commonwealth

failed to prove its diligence before [] Coleman’s eventual arrest.” Id. at 35.

The trial court considered Coleman’s argument and concluded that

because the hearing on the Rule 600 motion was a pre-trial hearing, the rules

of evidence were relaxed, and, consequently, it could consider hearsay

evidence. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/25 (unnumbered at 15-20). The

court likened a Rule 600 hearing to a preliminary hearing at which, consistent

with our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233

A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020), some hearsay is admissible for purposes of determining

whether the Commonwealth has put on a prima facie case against a

defendant.

The Commonwealth argues the evidence was not hearsay because it

was admitted not for the truth of the matter asserted but to show its effect on

-7-
J-A30042-25

the listener; as such, it is not hearsay. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 22

(citing, inter alia, In re Shahan, 631 A.2d 1298, 1304 (Pa. Super. 1993)).

Before we review these assertions of error on the merits, we must

determine whether Coleman preserved them. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)

(providing that issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). See also

Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 451 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that

a failure to make a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the

appropriate stage of the proceedings will result in waiver of the issue).

Our review of the record discloses that Detective Jara offered testimony

about the U.S. Marshals’ attempts to apprehend Coleman, and he also put

together a log of these attempts, introduced and admitted as Commonwealth’s

Exhibit C-6. As Coleman indicates in his appellate brief, he lodged a single

hearsay objection during Detective Jara’s testimony. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 45;

see also Coleman’s Brief at 33. The objection occurred the first time

Detective Jara stated generally that, “Attempts . . . were made by members

of the United States Marshal Service.” N.T., 1/5/24, at 45. Commonwealth’s

Exhibit C-6 was not marked for identification until further in Detective Jara’s

testimony, and Coleman made no objection at that time. See id. at 46.

Further, Coleman made no hearsay objection when Detective Jara began to

flip through the report and explain in detail the various attempts by the U.S.

Marshals to apprehend him. See generally id. at 46-51. The only objection

Coleman made during Detective Jara’s reading of, and reference to, the report

-8-
J-A30042-25

concerned whether the detective was reading from the report or refreshing

his recollection. See id. at 49. When the Commonwealth moved to introduce

Exhibit C-6 into evidence, Coleman made no objection, hearsay or otherwise.

See id. at 50. Thus, Coleman failed to make a timely and specific objection

to Commonwealth’s Exhibit C-6. Accordingly, Coleman’s hearsay challenge to

Exhibit C-6 is waived for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a); Houck, 102 A.3d

at 451.3 Having settled Coleman’s evidentiary challenge, we proceed to the

merits of his Rule 600 issue.

In his second issue, Coleman asserts the trial court erred in denying his

Rule 600 motion to dismiss the criminal charges against him.

---

3 In any event, we find persuasive the Commonwealth’s argument that the
evidence was non-hearsay, but offered for the effect on the listener. A Rule
600 analysis of whether police exercised due diligence in attempting to
apprehend a defendant focuses on whether,

considering the information available to the police, they have
acted with diligence in attempting to locate the accused.
Deference must be afforded the police officer’s judgment as to
which avenues of approach will be fruitful. In considering the
information available to the police, we do not ask whether the
police had available all the information they might have had
available-in other words, whether they did all they could have
done. Instead, we ask whether what they did do was enough to
constitute due diligence.

Commonwealth v. Laurie, 483 A.2d 890, 892 (Pa. Super. 1984). Here, the
evidence about the U.S. Marshal’s attempts to locate Coleman established
what information was available to Detective Jara, which pertains to whether
he acted with due diligence based on the information available to him. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Rayner, A.3d 1049, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2016) (evidence is
not hearsay if “offered to show why the police took the investigation in the
direction that they did, not for the truth of the matter asserted”).

-9-
J-A30042-25

Our standard of review for Rule 600 claims is as follows:

Appellate courts “review Rule 600 decisions for an abuse of
discretion[.]” Commonwealth v. Lear, [] 325 A.3d 552, 557
(2024) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). A trial
court does not abuse its discretion when it merely makes an error
of judgment. Rather, a court abuses its discretion if it misapplies
the law or exercises judgment that is manifestly unreasonable or
the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. [See]
Commonwealth v. Burno, 638 Pa. 264, 154 A.3d 764, 793
(2017) (citation omitted). “Our scope of review is limited to the
record evidence from the speedy trial hearing and the findings of
the lower court, reviewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party.” Id. (citation omitted).

Commonwealth v. Walker, 331 A.3d 43, 46 (Pa. Super. 2025), appeal

denied, 343 A.3d 727 (Pa. 2025).

In relevant part, Rule 600 provides:

(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence
on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the
defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.

(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed
against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from
the date on which the complaint is filed.

---

(C) Computation of Time

(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage
of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
included in the computation of the time within which trial must
commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from
the computation.

• 10 - J-A30042-25

---

(D) Remedies

(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time
periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial,
the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented,
may file a written motion requesting that the charges be
dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been
violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney
for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge
shall conduct a hearing on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

This Court has recently summarized the law relevant to Rule 600

motions as follows:

The “mechanical run date” in a Rule 600 analysis falls 365
days after the complaint was filed. See [] Lear, [] 325 A.3d [at]
560[], citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a)). Periods of delay caused
by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to
exercise due diligence are included in the computation of time to
commence trial; any other periods of delay, meaning any periods
of delay the Commonwealth did not cause or not resulting from a
lack of due diligence, are “excludable time” and “shall be excluded
from the computation.” See Lear, 325 A.3d at 560, citing
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Excludable time is added to the
mechanical run date to produce an “adjusted run date,” “which is
the deadline for the Commonwealth to bring the defendant to trial
under Rule 600.” See id.

Rule 600 serves the purpose of protecting both a
defendant’s speedy trial rights and society’s right to the effective
prosecution of criminal cases. See Commonwealth v.
Bradford, [] 46 A.3d 693 ([Pa.] 2012). A Rule 600 analysis
requires a court to consider whether the Commonwealth exercised
due diligence and whether the circumstances causing the delay
were beyond the Commonwealth’s control. See id. If the
Commonwealth has not committed misconduct to evade the
accused’s speedy trial rights, “Rule 600 must be construed in a
manner consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime,”
because Rule 600 “was not designed to insulate the criminally

• 11 - J-A30042-25

accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of
the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743,
748 (Pa. Super. 2022)). Due diligence does not demand
perfection but does require the Commonwealth to put forward a
reasonable effort. See Bradford, 46 A.3d at 697.

Excludable time includes, but is not limited to, delays caused
by: 1) the suspension of Rule 600 during the COVID-19 pandemic,
without regard to the Commonwealth’s diligence, see
Commonwealth v. Malone, 294 A.3d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super.
2023); 2) defense unavailability or continuance request; 3) the
adjudication of a defendant’s pretrial motion; 4) court congestion,
judicial delay, or court transfer; and 5) the failure to bring a
defendant to court from state custody.

Commonwealth v. Robinson, 339 A.3d 1030, 1035–36 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(footnote and some citations omitted).

Additionally, with respect to whether time is attributable to the

Commonwealth and non-excludable, this Court has elaborated:

Our Supreme Court recently explained that the first sentence of
Rule 600(C)(1) provides “the general rule” and establishes “two
requirements that must be met for delay to count toward the 365-
day deadline: (1) [the Commonwealth caused] the delay . . . and
(2) the Commonwealth . . . failed to exercise due diligence.” Lear,
325 A.3d at 560 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Lear Court clarified that “the causation analysis precedes
the due diligence inquiry, and it is only when the
Commonwealth both caused the delay and lacked due
diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule 600
calculation.” Id. at 560 n.7.

Walker, 331 A.3d at 46 (emphasis in original). It is the Commonwealth’s

burden to demonstrate due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence to

avail itself of an exclusion under Rule 600. See Commonwealth v.

Womack, 315 A.3d 1229, 1239 (Pa. 2024).

• 12 - J-A30042-25

Where the Commonwealth withdraws an original criminal complaint and

re-files, the following principles are relevant for determining whether the Rule

600 time begins from the first or second complaint:

If, for example, the Commonwealth withdraws the first
complaint in an attempt to avoid an imminent Rule 600 violation
and then re-files the charges in hopes of circumventing that rule,
then the Rule 600 time for the second complaint will be calculated
from the filing of the first complaint.

However, if the Commonwealth is diligent in prosecuting a
complaint, and if the complaint is withdrawn or dismissed because
of factors beyond the Commonwealth’s control, then the
Commonwealth, upon re-filing the charges in a second complaint,
is entitled to have the time under Rule 600 run from the date of
that second filing. Accordingly, in cases of subsequent
complaints, the law requires that Rule 600 courts evaluate
whether the Commonwealth was diligent with respect to the initial
complaint.

Commonwealth v. Dixon, 140 A.3d 718, 723 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Claffey, 80 A.3d 780, 786–787 (Pa. Super. 2013)).

Lastly, periods of time when a defendant absents himself “despite duly

diligent efforts by the police to locate him” must be “chalked up to

unavailability and excluded” from the Rule 600 calculation. Commonwealth

v. Fisher, 483 A.2d 537, 538 (Pa. Super. 1984). Accord Commonwealth

v. Barbour, 189 A.3d 944, 956 (Pa. 2018) (a defendant’s absence, from pre-

trial proceedings at which his appearance is required, results in the time being

excludable).

Coleman argues the trial court erred in using the date the second

complaint was filed in January 2023 rather than the initial date in March 2022.

• 13 - J-A30042-25

See Coleman’s Brief at 15. He asserts, additionally, the following times were

not excludable: the delay between his arrest on August 3, 2022 and his

preliminary arraignment on December 2, 2022, see id. at 21; the period

between the first and second preliminary hearing dates, i.e., from December

16, 2022 through January 5, 2023, see id. at 24; the period between the

preliminary hearing on February 2, 2023, at which Coleman did not appear

allegedly because he lacked notice, and his arrest date on June 6, 2023, see

id. at 27. Coleman concedes the trial court correctly calculated the remaining

time. See id. at 28. Based on his calculations, Coleman asserts the adjusted

Rule 600 date was June 28, 2023. See id. at 29. He asserts there were 534

days of includable time by the time he filed his motion. See id. at 31.

The trial court considered Coleman’s issue and concluded it merits no

relief. The trial court first concluded the Rule 600 computation should begin

with the Commonwealth’s re-filing of the complaint on January 16, 2023,

which would put the mechanical run date on January 16, 2024, such that

Coleman’s filing of his Rule 600 motion in December 2023 was premature.

See Trial Court Opinion, 2/25/25 (unnumbered at 14). 4

---

4 The court additionally, in the alternative, reasoned that the initial complaint

was filed on December 2, 2022, which is the date from which the Rule 600
computation could alternatively begin to run, notwithstanding that the
criminal complaint was sworn out on March 22, 2022. See Trial Court Opinion,
2/25/25 (unnumbered at 9). From the December 2022 date, the trial court
found several delays were excludable and ultimately placed the adjusted run
date on May 12, 2024. See id. (unnumbered at 14).
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 14 - J-A30042-25

Following our review, we conclude Coleman’s Rule 600 issue merits no

relief. We begin with the swearing out of the arrest warrant on March 22,

1. See Warrant of Arrest, 3/22/22. The mechanical run date fell on March

22, 2023. We proceed to consider whether the Commonwealth exercised due

diligence such that the Rule 600 computation should begin with the refiling of

the complaint in January 2023.

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Parole Agent Jones testified

that at the time Detective Jara obtained an arrest warrant for Coleman in

March 2022, Coleman was on parole, and up to March 2022, Agent Jones was

Coleman’s supervising parole agent. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 20. At the time,

Coleman was on “maximum supervision,” which required two face-to-face

meetings a month. Id. at 22. The address on file for Coleman was on North

53rd Street. See id. at 21.5 Between March 11, 2022 (prior to the issuance

of the arrest warrant) and August 3, 2022, Agent Jones had no contact with

Coleman. See id. at 24. More specifically, Agent Jones learned about the

charges against Coleman on March 23, 2022, and the next day, on March 24,

2022, Agent Jones went to the North 53rd Street residence with a team,

---

The Commonwealth indicates it is constrained to concede the trial court erred
in concluding the complaint should be dated according to its docketing rather
than when it was sworn. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 14 n.1.

5 One other location where Agent Jones would meet Coleman was “in the
parking lot” of a residence on North Busti Street. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 21.

• 15 - J-A30042-25

gained access to the residence, and learned Coleman was no longer there and

his belongings were gone. See id. at 25. At no point between March 11,

2022 and August 3, 2022 did Coleman make contact with Agent Jones,

notwithstanding it was Coleman’s responsibility to let Agent Jones know of

any changes of address within 72 hours. See id. at 27. Upon learning that

Coleman had fled, Agent Jones “established delinquency,” after which a

warrant was issued for Coleman, and his case was transferred to the Fugitive

Apprehension Unit, which works with the U.S. Marshal Service. Id. at 25.

Prior to transferring Coleman’s case to the fugitive unit, Agent Jones ran a

search to make sure Coleman was not in custody in another jurisdiction. See

id. at 36-37.

Detective Jara also attempted to serve the arrest warrant on Coleman.

He testified that on March 23, 2022, he went to both the North 53rd Street

and the North Busti Street addresses, and Coleman was not at either location.

See id. at 44. Detective Jara, aware that the U.S. Marshals were searching

for Coleman, took no further action, apart from logging attempts by the U.S.

Marshals to locate Coleman.

The U.S. Marshals obtained Coleman’s phone records on March 29,

2022, and discovered his phone service was terminated as of March 23, 2022.

See id., Ex. C-6. On April 7, 2022, Coleman emptied his welfare funds access

card of $318 and the card was deactivated later that month. See id. Also in

April 2022, members from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Violent Crimes

• 16 - J-A30042-25

Fugitive Task Force surveilled two other locations Coleman was known to

frequent, and did not find him. See id. A confidential informant later

indicated Coleman had fled the Philadelphia area. See id. In May 2022,

Detective Jara searched the CLEAR database to determine whether Coleman

had new addresses. See id. Also in May 2022, the U.S. Marshals executed a

search warrant to obtain call detail records, apparently to no avail; in July

2022, police obtained a citizen tip regarding Coleman’s whereabouts, which

they forwarded to the U.S. Marshals, who also that same month executed a

court order on Meta Platforms, Inc. seeking information about Coleman. See

id. Coleman was eventually apprehended on August 3, 2022 in Johnstown,

Pennsylvania. See N.T., 1/5/24, at 51.

As noted above, our standard of review requires our examination of the

evidence of record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. See

Walker, 331 A.3d at 46. The Commonwealth’s burden at a Rule 600 hearing

is to prove due diligence by a preponderance. See Womack, 315 A.3d at

1. Where a defendant’s whereabouts are unknown, the question is

whether police, using the information available to them, did enough to

constitute due diligence. See Laurie, 483 A.2d at 892. Relevantly, where a

defendant makes himself unavailable, that time is attributable to him for Rule

600 purposes. See Fisher, 483 A.2d at 538.

Here, the evidence shows that from March 23, 2022 through August 3,

2022, Coleman fled from Agent Jones and Detective Jara and affirmatively

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attempted to avoid apprehension by turning off his cell phone service. The

time between March 22 and August 3, 2022 is 134 days.

Once Coleman was apprehended, Detective Jara was unable to have

Coleman transported to Philadelphia for the case sub judice because he was

not “releaseable” until the completion of his parole matters. N.T., 1/5/24, at

1. Notably, members of Detective Jara’s Southwest Detectives Unit, filled

out an extradition request on October 24, 2022. See id. at 53-54. Police

used Prisoner Transportation Services, a private company, to transport

Coleman, but transport did not occur until December 1, 2022. See id. at 52-

1. Detective Jara testified that he had no control over when Prisoner

Transportation Services picked Coleman up. We conclude that, in the light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, it established by a preponderance

Detective Jara’s due diligence from at least the time he filled out the

extradition request to the time Prisoner Transportation Services delivered

Coleman, which is 38 days. 6

---

6 Additionally, Coleman concedes the court properly excluded 11 days between

the second preliminary hearing and withdrawal on January 5, 2023, and
January 16, 2023, when charges were refiled, because the delay occurred on
account of a sick witness unavailable for court. See Coleman’s Brief at 25
(citing Commonwealth v. Walker, 331 A.3d 43, 49 (Pa. Super. 2025)).

Coleman also rightly acknowledges the 80 days resulting from his demand for
a jury trial which occurred for the first time on September 19, 2023, up
through the filing of his Rule 600 motion on December 8, 2023, was excludable
because the Commonwealth was “ready for trial and was obliged to wait
because of a congested court calendar that did not allow for a jury trial to start
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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The total number of days between March 22, 2022 and the withdrawal

of the criminal complaint on January 5, 2023 was 289 days. The excludable

time, from the swearing out of the arrest warrant on March 22, 2022, through

Coleman’s flight and up to his apprehension on August 3, 2022, was 134 days.

The time between when Detective Jara requested a transport for Coleman and

when Coleman was transported, October 24, 2022 and December 1, 2022,

was 38 days. Accordingly, the excludable time up to the withdrawal of the

criminal complaint was 172 days, meaning the Rule 600 time attributable to

the Commonwealth at that point was 117 days. Thus, the record supports the

trial court’s conclusion that the Commonwealth’s withdrawal of charges on

January 5, 2023 and re-filing on January 16, 2023 was not an attempt to avoid

an imminent Rule 600 violation by withdrawing and re-filing the charges.

See Dixon, 140 A.3d at 723. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in using the date of the re-filed criminal complaint, January

16, 2023, for purposes of the Rule 600 analysis. The applicable mechanical

run date, accordingly, was January 16, 2024. Coleman filed his Rule 600

motion on December 8, 2023. Thus, it was premature. See Commonwealth

v. Brandt, 337 A.3d 973, 981-82 (Pa. Super. 2025) (affirming denial of a

prematurely filed Rule 600 motion where the adjusted run date was after the

filing of the motion).

---

until January 9, 2024.” Coleman’s Brief at 28-29 (citing Commonwealth v.
Mills, 162 A.3d 323, 325 (Pa. 2017)).

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Having concluded Coleman’s Rule 600 challenge merits no relief, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/16/2026

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