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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Taylor

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23CA1936

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (49.2K)

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Combined Opinion

23CA1936 Peo v Taylor 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA1936
El Paso County District Court No. 21CR5246
Honorable Marcus Henson, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lamar Frederick Taylor,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Majid Yazdi, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Joseph Paul Hough, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Defendant, Lamar Frederick Taylor, appeals the trial court’s

judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of two

counts of first degree murder (intentional murder after deliberation)

and one count of attempted extreme indifference first degree

murder. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 Taylor owned Union Cuisine, a restaurant that leased the

kitchen at an Elks lodge. Union Cuisine would use the space until

9 p.m., and the Elks (Club) would use it after that time. Within the

first year of a two-year lease, the relationship between Taylor and

the Club soured. Taylor testified at trial that the Club made new

rules and added provisions to the contract between the two parties.

Taylor also had issues with the bathrooms flooding, his equipment

breaking, a stockpot missing, and employees quitting. Taylor

testified that he would only work during the daytime and carried a

weapon because of the lodge’s location.

¶3 Per the terms of the lease, Taylor had permission to hang a

sign outside the lodge advertising Union Cuisine, but when he

arrived at the lodge on September 9, 2021, he noticed the sign had

been taken down. Taylor was there that day to prepare for a large

1
event and to meet with two Club members, James Love and Kevin

Patterson, to discuss concerns that Taylor was having with two

disgruntled employees. Taylor brought his fiancee with him.

¶4 When Taylor and his fiancee arrived, they found that the

lodge’s doors were locked, the shades were drawn, and the building

was empty, which Taylor thought was strange because there were

usually employees at the lodge at that time. Taylor unlocked the

front door, entered the lodge, and saw one of the bartenders, Karen

Williams. After a while, Love, the Club’s “exalted ruler,” walked into

the lodge; Taylor asked him if he had taken down the sign. Love

admitted that he had removed the sign. In response Taylor said,

“[H]ey, man, you can’t take the sign down. I got paperwork.”

¶5 Shortly thereafter, Taylor attended his meeting. At that time,

Taylor, his fiancee, Williams, Love, and Patterson were the only

people in the building. Taylor, Patterson, and Love then went into

the center dining room. Taylor testified that Patterson told him

they were “shutting [him] down.” Taylor responded that they

couldn’t do that because of the two-year contract, to which

Patterson replied that the “exalted ruler overrides all of this.”

Taylor replied, “[L]et’s just go to court.” Taylor testified that Love

2
got upset and said, “I’ll take your life like I took your business, and

I know you don’t want nothing to happen to that pretty little bitch

of yours.” Taylor testified that at this point in the interaction, he

glanced back and saw Williams with a bottle in her hand positioned

as if she was going to hit his fiancee in the head with it.

¶6 Taylor testified that Love made the following threats to his

family, including his sons and daughter:

• “I know you don’t want a situation where your son gets in

another fender bender, but this time it won’t be a fender

bender.”

• “I know you don’t want another overdose to happen at

your house. This time it will be [Taylor’s daughter].”

• “Didn’t [Taylor’s son] just move to Louisiana?”

¶7 Taylor testified that he then said, “[S]o this is what we’re doing

now, threatening my family?” Taylor testified that Love responded,

“Oh, he thinks we’re playing with him. Get him.” Taylor then

flipped over the table the men were sitting at and reportedly blacked

out. Taylor initially testified that Patterson stood up and was

moving toward him, but after viewing the surveillance footage while

testifying at trial, he said that Patterson was not. When reviewing

3
the video on the stand with the prosecutor, Taylor said that Love

was pointing and that Patterson was looking down at his phone

before Taylor flipped the table.

¶8 Taylor then shot Love and Patterson. After shooting the two

men, Taylor left through the kitchen, walked to his car, unlocked

the trunk, and removed a shotgun with a loaded magazine. Taylor’s

fiancee left the building with Taylor but drove away in her own car.

Williams ran out of the building.

¶9 Jesus Manual De Santiago Martinez1 was working

construction near the lodge when he encountered Taylor. De

Santiago Martinez had stopped working to find a bathroom and

walked toward the lodge. De Santiago Martinez saw Taylor, who

was approximately ten yards away, walking toward him and made

eye contact with Taylor. Taylor then fired toward De Santiago

Martinez. Taylor shot the lodge’s sign twice. De Santiago Martinez

testified that the sign was behind him but that he was not hit by

the shots. De Santiago Martinez ran toward the construction site

1 De Santiago Martinez’s name is spelled and referred to

inconsistently in the record. We use the spelling from the
complaint and refer to De Santiago Martinez in the manner he was
addressed during trial.

4
where he was originally working and said that he and his coworker

ran behind a tractor. Taylor shot at the windows and door of the

building and then drove away.

¶ 10 Police officers responded to a call reporting shots fired at the

lodge with two potential victims inside the building. When officers

arrived, they noticed the glass door was shattered. After entering

the building, responding officers found Love and Patterson lying on

the floor. Both men had gunshot wounds and were still breathing

but unconscious. The first officers on scene attempted to render

aid. Love and Patterson were taken to the hospital, where both died

two days later from the gunshot wounds. No weapon was recovered

at the scene, and no weapon was found near the victims.

¶ 11 Police apprehended Taylor in Miami, Florida, on September

1. Police recovered a handgun, a shotgun, and shotgun shells in

the trunk of Taylor’s car. The handgun recovered from Taylor’s car

was not the same caliber as the one that was used to kill Patterson

and Love; that weapon was never recovered.

¶ 12 Taylor was charged with two counts of first degree murder

under section 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; four counts of criminal

attempt to commit first degree murder under sections 18-3-

5
102(1)(a) and 18-2-101, C.R.S. 2025; and three counts of menacing

under section 18-3-206(1)(a), (b), C.R.S. 2021.

¶ 13 Taylor was convicted of one count of first degree murder after

deliberation for Love, one count of first degree murder after

deliberation for Patterson, and one count of attempted first degree

murder (extreme indifference) of De Santiago Martinez. The court

sentenced Taylor to two consecutive life sentences without parole in

the custody of the Department of Corrections for the murder

convictions and twenty years for the attempted murder conviction,

to run consecutively to the other sentences.

II. Analysis

¶ 14 Taylor contends that (1) the trial court erred by excluding

evidence of his prior experience of witnessing and being a victim of

violence because it informed his subjective mental state and use of

force; (2) the court erroneously excluded evidence of Patterson’s

conviction for sexual assault on a child; (3) the court improperly

provided a flight instruction to the jury; and (4) the errors

cumulatively require reversal. We address and reject each

contention in turn.

6
A. Taylor’s Past Experience with Violence

¶ 15 Taylor asserts that the trial court violated CRE 401 and his

constitutional right to present a defense by excluding testimony

that he witnessed domestic abuse against his mother and was the

victim of domestic violence. Specifically, Taylor argues that his past

childhood “experiences of being exposed to threats and violence by

adult men” were relevant because these experiences informed his

subjective mental state during his encounter with Love and

Patterson and his belief that the use of force was reasonable.

Taylor argues that his theory of defense was plausible and that the

excluded evidence would have made the subjective reasonable belief

component of his self-defense theory more persuasive. We disagree.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 16 At trial, defense counsel asked Taylor if he had ever been in a

situation where he or someone he cared about was attacked. Taylor

said “absolutely,” and defense counsel asked if it was something he

had experienced more than once. The prosecutor objected based on

relevance, and defense counsel argued that it concerned the totality

of the circumstances and Taylor’s state of mind. The court

sustained the objection.

7
¶ 17 The next day of trial, defense counsel asked the court to

reconsider, arguing that evidence about Taylor’s past life experience

was admissible to prove the subjective aspect of self-defense.

Defense counsel had the following exchange with the court:

Defense counsel: At the time of the incident,
. . . Taylor indicated that specific experiences
that he had had as a child essentially
reminded him of those moments in the sense
of what the atmosphere was, what the
environment was, and what led to the attack,
and how he felt similar in this situation with
similar environment, and that’s kind of what
brought him back to that situation, knowing
what it was like in that time, and bringing that
present to what it was like on September the
9th.

Court: Some sort of childhood experience in a
darkened building? What are we talking
about, Counsel?

....

Defense counsel: So in speaking with him, the
circumstances that he was specifically pointing
to was as he was growing up, his mother
suffered severe abuse from other men, and he
was around for the tactics, predatorial tactics
that they would use against her, and the
environment that that built up being similar to
the predatorial tactics that were used by . . .
Love and . . . Patterson against . . . Taylor.
And in doing so, it brought him back to that
memory, which brough him back, in the time
of September the 9th, to feel the environment

8
of being in a position where he could be
attacked and have to save himself or his
family’s lives.

¶ 18 The court again sustained the prosecutor’s objection,

concluding that there was insufficient relevance to get into “what

sound[ed] like a very remote set of circumstances involving a family

member’s experiences.” The court clarified that it would permit

defense counsel’s questions elucidating “the types of feelings . . .

Taylor was having, and how that maybe . . . inform[ed] his choices,”

but it found Taylor’s mother’s experiences were

insufficiently relevant . . . to the point where
. . . relevance would be certainly outweighed by
the confusion potentially that the jury might
experience as far as trying to figure out what
that tells us, again, about these unique
circumstances and . . . Taylor’s response to
those circumstances.

Thus, the court allowed “additional questioning about what . . .

Taylor was feeling, how he was experiencing . . . the circumstances

that he was in” but not questions “going down a road of domestic

violence involving his mother and things like that.”

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 19 We review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of law

governing the admissibility of evidence. People v. Johnson, 2021 CO

9
35, ¶ 15. Trial courts have “considerable discretion in deciding

questions concerning the admissibility of evidence and . . . broad

discretion to determine the relevancy of evidence, its probative value

and its prejudicial impact.” People v. Ibarra, 849 P.2d 33, 38 (Colo.

1993). We therefore review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is

manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it

misinterprets or misapplies the law.” People v. Strickler, 2022 COA

1, ¶ 21.

¶ 20 A defendant in a criminal proceeding has the constitutional

right to present a complete defense. People v. McCoy, 944 P.2d 584,

587 (Colo. App. 1996). This includes a reasonable opportunity to

present evidence that may tend to create doubt on the defendant’s

guilt. People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53, ¶ 26. However, this right is

not absolute and is subject to the limits on the admissibility of

evidence. Id. at ¶ 27; People v. Salazar, 2012 CO 20, ¶ 17.

Evidence must be relevant to be admissible, CRE 402, and evidence

is relevant where it has “any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more

probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence,”

10
CRE 401. But even relevant evidence may be excluded if its

probative value “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.” CRE

1. These considerations “affect even a criminal defendant’s

constitutional right to present a defense.” Salazar, ¶ 17.

¶ 21 If a trial court “erroneously rules on an evidentiary matter and

thereby causes the defendant to refrain from presenting a defense,

the ruling can cast ‘an impermissible chill on the defendant’s

freedom of decision.’” People v. Gonzales-Quevedo, 203 P.3d 609,

611-12 (Colo. App. 2008) (quoting People v. Kreiter, 782 P.2d 803,

805 (Colo. App. 1988)). “A defendant’s right to present a defense is

violated only where the defendant was denied virtually his only

means of effectively testing significant prosecution evidence.”

People v. Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 93.

¶ 22 Preserved errors of constitutional dimension are reviewed for

constitutional harmless error. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 63, ¶ 11.

Under this standard, if we conclude that the error violated the

defendant’s right to present a defense, “we must reverse unless we

are confident beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not

contribute to the guilty verdict.” Conyac, ¶ 94. Preserved errors

11
that are not of a constitutional dimension are reviewed for harmless

error. Hagos, ¶ 12. Under that standard, we only reverse if “the

error substantially influenced the verdict or affected the fairness of

the trial proceedings.” Conyac, ¶ 94.

¶ 23 Section 18-1-704(2), C.R.S. 2025, provides that “[d]eadly

physical force may be used only if a person reasonably believes a

lesser degree of force is inadequate” and, as relevant here, “[t]he

actor has reasonable ground to believe, and does believe, that he or

another person is in imminent danger of being killed or of receiving

great bodily injury.” The statute addresses both subjective and

objective aspects of self-defense. See People v. Luna, 2020 COA

123M, ¶ 26 (“Although the affirmative defense of self-defense takes

into account the actual belief or state of mind of a defendant, it

ultimately requires that a reasonable person would have believed

and acted as the defendant did.”); People v. Willner, 879 P.2d 19, 22

(Colo. 1994) (“Section 18-1-704 takes into account the reasonable

belief and actual belief of an individual who has exercised physical

force in self defense.”).

12
3. Analysis

¶ 24 The court didn’t abuse its discretion by excluding testimony of

Taylor’s experience witnessing domestic violence against his mother

for several reasons. First, Taylor sought to introduce evidence

related to violence perpetrated against his mother, not himself.

These circumstances, describing his impressions of abuse against

his mother and “predatory tactics,” weren’t relevant to his claim

that he acted reasonably against any alleged threats posed by Love

or Patterson. Simply put, Taylor’s testimony that he witnessed

domestic violence against his mother wouldn’t have made his claim

of self-defense more or less probable because the past violence that

he witnessed wasn’t perpetrated against him, and it didn’t involve a

situation similar to one resulting in his use of force — an escalated

verbal altercation between business associates.

¶ 25 Second, the trial court correctly recognized that any marginal

relevance the evidence did have was outweighed by the potential of

juror confusion because the jury wouldn’t know how to treat

evidence of Taylor’s mother’s experience in the context of Taylor’s

case.

13
¶ 26 Third, the court didn’t prohibit Taylor from discussing how his

experience made him feel or informed his choices during the

altercation; it just prevented him from discussing the specifics of

domestic abuse his mother experienced. Indeed, Taylor was able to

testify that he feared Patterson because he had “seen this before,

because [his] mother was preyed on by a predator.” Likewise, prior

to the court’s ruling, Taylor testified that he had experienced

situations where he or someone he cares about had been attacked.

¶ 27 Thus, contrary to his argument, Taylor was not “denied

virtually his only means of effectively testing” the prosecution’s

evidence. Conyac, ¶ 93. He was permitted to and did testify how

his experience impacted his mental state. Because we hold that the

court didn’t err by excluding the evidence and because Taylor was

permitted to testify about how his experience informed his mental

state, the court’s exclusion of evidence regarding Taylor’s witnessing

violence during his childhood didn’t violate his right to present a

defense.

B. Patterson’s Past Criminal Activity

¶ 28 Taylor contends that the trial court erred by excluding

evidence of Taylor’s knowledge and revelation of Patterson’s

14
conviction for sexual assault on a child. Taylor argues that this

evidence was relevant because it related to Taylor’s subjective and

reasonable belief that the use of force against him was imminent

and that his own use of force was reasonable.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 29 Before trial, Taylor’s counsel filed a motion in limine asking

the court to permit the defense to introduce evidence of Patterson’s

prior criminal convictions, Taylor’s awareness of the convictions,

and the impact that Patterson’s prior criminal history had on Taylor

the day of the shooting. Taylor’s counsel sought to introduce

Patterson’s convictions for attempted assault, misdemeanor

assault, and sexual assault on a child. The motion asserted that

Patterson’s history of violence amplified the threats Patterson and

Love had made during the encounter and caused Taylor to fear for

his life and the lives of his loved ones. With respect to Patterson’s

conviction of sexual assault on a child, Taylor’s counsel sought to

introduce testimony that Taylor confronted Patterson about how

that specific conviction made Patterson ineligible for Club

membership and that this confrontation led to Patterson verbally

15
threatening Taylor with deadly force, which necessitated Taylor’s

reasonable use of force.

¶ 30 The court permitted testimony on “the purported attempted

second-degree assault and the purported class 1 misdemeanor

assault.” It also permitted testimony involving a “confrontation [on]

criminal history that might result in somebody not being eligible for

club membership and . . . the response that was given.” But the

court prohibited the parties from discussing sexual assault on a

child because it did “not believe that the evidence regarding some

sexual assault on a child conviction is appropriately relevant or

admissible.” Specifically, the court noted that it didn’t find such

evidence “sufficiently relevant as it relates to a reasonable belief of

imminent injury in connection with these prior purported acts.”

And it was “not sufficiently relevant for it to outweigh the prejudicial

effect otherwise that I find that that type of reference would have in

this context.”

¶ 31 Defense counsel countered that because he was deceased,

Patterson wasn’t “susceptible to prejudice” but that Taylor was

“prejudiced by being precluded from providing the full context of the

situation so that the jury c[ould] decide how violent [Patterson’s]

16
response was.” The court clarified that it was not doing some sort

of “balancing test solely based on relevant versus prejudicial effect”

of the evidence. Rather, the court said that it was referencing

prejudicial effect to establish the primary way the evidence would

be viewed and that, “because of [its] diminished relevance,” the

evidence would “have very little potential relevance to [Taylor’s]

reasonable belief of imminent unlawful physical force being used by

. . . Patterson.” The court clarified that it would permit “Taylor to

testify about what his reasonable belief was in the context of the

response, but not so much in the context of what may have

prompted those initial statements or that initial . . . threat being

made by . . . Patterson.”

¶ 32 Taylor then testified that when he first learned about

Patterson’s criminal history, it scared him. He also testified that

“the predatorial tactics and actions . . . fit[] the narrative” and that

he was scared “because I’ve seen this before, because my mother

was preyed on by a predator.” Defense counsel asked Taylor if he

ever mentioned Patterson’s criminal history to Patterson, to which

Taylor responded, “I was scared to.” Defense counsel further asked

Taylor what he did with the information of Patterson’s convictions,

17
and Taylor said he spoke to another Club member and “wanted to

expose the whole situation and remove and try to at least just get

rid of the bad apples and continue to move forward.” When

recounting what occurred during the meeting before the shooting,

Taylor didn’t testify that he confronted Patterson about the prior

convictions.

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 33 As stated above, we review de novo the court’s interpretation of

law governing the admissibility of evidence, Johnson, ¶ 15, and its

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Ibarra, 849 P.2d at 38.

A defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense is not

absolute and is subject to limitations on the admissibility of

evidence. Elmarr, ¶ 27; Salazar, ¶ 17.

¶ 34 A defendant is entitled to present evidence of a victim’s prior

violent act if (1) the defendant contends that he acted in self-

defense and there is competent evidence to support the contention;

(2) either the act occurred or the defendant became aware of its

occurrence within a reasonable time of the homicide; and (3) the

defendant knew of the victim’s prior violence at the time of the

homicide. People v. Ferrell, 613 P.2d 324, 326 (Colo. 1980).

18
“Without a nexus between the deceased’s prior violent acts and the

actions of the defendant, the occurrence of these prior violent acts

would be of no consequence in the determination of the guilt or

innocence of the defendant.” People v. Lyle, 613 P.2d 896, 898

(Colo. 1980). Where a defendant knew of the victim’s acts of

violence at the time of the events, they are admissible as evidence of

“the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the imminent use of

unlawful physical force against him.” People v. Jones, 675 P.2d 9,

17 (Colo. 1984). But as mentioned above, relevant evidence may be

excluded if the probative value of the evidence “is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading jury.” CRE 403.

1. Analysis

¶ 35 Taylor argues that evidence of Patterson’s prior conviction for

sexual assault on a child was relevant because it related to Taylor’s

subjective and reasonable belief that the use of force was imminent

and his own use of force was reasonable. However, the trial court

ruled — and we agree — that the evidence of sexual assault on a

child wasn’t relevant to the reasonable belief of imminent injury.

Patterson’s history of sexual assault did not make it more likely

19
that Taylor acted reasonably, or believed that he acted reasonably,

as the circumstances of a sexual assault on a child are factually

distinct from the encounter Taylor had with Love and Patterson.

And the court permitted testimony on Patterson’s convictions for

assault and attempted assault. Moreover, the trial court

determined that the introduction of Patterson’s conviction of sexual

assault on a child was not sufficiently relevant to outweigh the

prejudicial effect that information would have. See Merritt v. People,

842 P.2d 162, 170 (Colo. 1992) (Erickson, J., dissenting) (“It is the

function of the trial judge to channel the admission of evidence in a

criminal case so as to prevent prejudice to both the prosecution and

the defense.”).

¶ 36 Taylor also argues that the evidence was relevant to show why

Patterson and Love threatened him and became enraged and violent

prior to the shooting, prompting Taylor to believe it was reasonable

and necessary to defend himself. We are unpersuaded. The court

permitted Taylor to testify that he confronted Patterson about his

criminal history and how that history made him ineligible for Club

membership; it just prohibited Taylor from specifying that the

20
ineligibility was based on Patterson’s conviction for sexual assault

on a child.

¶ 37 Lastly, Taylor argues that the court’s exclusion of evidence of

Patterson’s criminal history violated his constitutional right to

introduce evidence in support of his defense. We disagree. As

mentioned, Taylor was permitted to introduce evidence of

Patterson’s criminal history. Thus, his constitutional right to

present a complete defense was not violated.

C. Flight Instruction

¶ 38 Taylor contends that the trial court erred by providing a flight

instruction to the jury because there was insufficient evidence that

he was fleeing or intending to evade law enforcement and because

flight instructions are disfavored.

1. Additional Facts

¶ 39 After leaving the lodge on September 9, Taylor drove straight

to New Iberia, Louisiana, where his sons lived and where he stayed

until September 12. On September 13, Taylor drove to Atlanta,

where he stayed at a place he shared with his fiancee until

September 15. Taylor then arrived in Miami on September 16 and

21
stayed there until United States Marshals contacted him at his

brother’s house on September 17.

¶ 40 During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel

objected to the proposed flight instruction, arguing that the

instruction was prejudicial and that there was no evidence that

Taylor’s intent was to flee rather than to warn his family. Defense

counsel was also concerned that the instruction could be

“misconstrued in regards to premeditation and deliberation” and

could confuse the jury. Defense counsel proposed an instruction

that there was “no obligation” to remain at the scene.

¶ 41 The court noted that there had been ample discussion during

jury selection and presentation of evidence “for it to be clear that

what . . . Taylor did after the events is absolutely relevant to maybe

the jury’s understanding not only of what . . . Taylor may have been

experiencing at the time of the incident, but also relevant to their

understanding . . . of what . . . Taylor was thinking after the

incident.”

¶ 42 After reviewing the cases cited by the parties and making a few

modifications, including replacing “fled” with “left the scene” and

“flight” with “conduct,” the court instructed the jury as follows:

22
If you find from the evidence, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the crime charged in
the information was committed by some
person, and that immediately after such crime
was committed the defendant left the scene,
such conduct would be a circumstance, not
sufficient in itself to establish the guilt of the
defendant, but a circumstance which you may
consider, in connection with all the other facts
and circumstances proven at the trial, in
determining the question of the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. It is for you to
determine from the evidence whether such
conduct was caused by a consciousness of
guilt or by some other innocent motive.

This instruction was immediately followed by the instruction

requested by defense counsel — that “[t]here is no affirmative

obligation to remain at a scene or report an act of self-defense to

law enforcement.”

1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 43 We review de novo whether sufficient evidence exists to

support giving a requested jury instruction. People v. Stone, 2020

COA 23, ¶ 55. We review the trial court’s decision whether to give a

proposed jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Trujillo, 2018 COA 12, ¶ 11. The trial court has broad discretion in

formulating jury instructions as long as they are correct statements

of the law. People v. Garcia, 169 P.3d 223, 230 (Colo. App. 2007).

23
¶ 44 Providing a flight instruction is generally disfavored because it

puts undue emphasis on only one piece of the evidence. People v.

Sanchez, 253 P.3d 1260, 1264 (Colo. App. 2010). Whether a flight

instruction is proper depends on the facts of a particular case.

People v. Fletcher, 566 P.2d 345, 348 (Colo. 1977). But it is not

reversible error for a court to provide a flight instruction where “(1)

the defendant had reason to believe he committed a crime; (2) he

had reason to believe his identity was known; (3) he had reason to

believe his pursuit and apprehension were likely; and (4) he fled or

concealed himself to frustrate his apprehension.” Sanchez, 253

P.3d at 1264-65.

1. Analysis

¶ 45 Taylor argues that while he may have believed that he

committed crimes, the People failed to demonstrate that he was

aware that police had identified him or were pursuing him or that

he fled to frustrate apprehension. We aren’t persuaded.

¶ 46 First, Taylor testified that he “went to Miami because I needed

an unbiased ear to hear my side of the story.” This testimony

indicates that he knew people could believe that he had committed

some crime and wanted someone to hear his perspective. Taylor

24
also testified that he intended to contact a private investigator he

knew in Miami who was familiar with the problems between the

Club and Union Cuisine and was helping Taylor prepare a lawsuit

to file against the Club. But instead of meeting him in person,

Taylor could have called or contacted the investigator, which Taylor

had done before, including to obtain Patterson’s criminal history.

¶ 47 Second, Taylor had reason to believe his identity was known

because several witnesses who knew him were present at the lodge

during the shooting. For instance, Taylor testified that he saw

Williams at multiple points before and during the meeting, and

Taylor’s fiancee walked out of the building with him after the

shooting. Also, Taylor made eye contact with De Santiago Martinez

outside of the lodge prior to firing the shotgun at the sign.

¶ 48 Third, Taylor had reason to believe that his pursuit and

apprehension were likely. While the prosecution didn’t present

direct evidence to support this, the evidence presented about

Taylor’s actions after the shooting indicates that he was aware he

was being pursued and that apprehension was likely. Following the

shooting, Taylor rejected all incoming calls, didn’t return home

before leaving Colorado, didn’t check on his children in Colorado

25
(even though they had also been threatened), didn’t call any of his

children, and immediately drove to Louisiana. Also, it was likely

that police would watch the surveillance video and would pursue

and apprehend him.

¶ 49 Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support that Taylor

fled to conceal himself or frustrate his apprehension. Although

Taylor said that he drove to Louisiana to check on his children, that

doesn’t explain why he stayed in Atlanta (alone) for two days or why

he drove to Florida. Taylor’s movement between multiple locations

shows an intent to conceal or frustrate apprehension.

¶ 50 Accordingly, sufficient evidence was presented to support a

flight instruction, and the court didn’t abuse it discretion by

providing the instruction.

D. Cumulative Error

¶ 51 Taylor contends that, cumulatively, the errors deprived him of

his right to a fair trial and require reversal. We reverse for

cumulative error where multiple errors collectively prejudice the

defendant’s substantial rights. Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO

69, ¶ 25. Therefore, for cumulative error to apply, the court must

have erred multiple times. People v. Daley, 2021 COA 85, ¶ 141.

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Because we don’t identify any errors, we need not engage in a

cumulative error analysis.

III. Disposition

¶ 52 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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