People v KB - Termination of Parental Rights Appeal

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of KB

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1670

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

25CA1670 Peo in Interest of KB 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1670
El Paso County District Court No. 23JV30740
Honorable Lin Billings Vela, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of K.J.B. and K.A.B., Children,

and Concerning A.D.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I
Opinion by JUDGE MEIRINK
J. Jones and Lum, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 26, 2026

Kenny Hodges, County Attorney, Melanie E. Gavisk, Senior County Attorney,
Sara B. Sonsalla, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for
Appellee

Josi McCauley, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Chelsea A. Carr,
Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant
¶1 In this dependency and neglect proceeding, A.D. (mother)

appeals the judgment terminating her parent-child legal

relationships with K.J.B. and K.A.B. (the children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 After receiving a referral because of a physical altercation

between mother and the children’s father, the El Paso County

Department of Human Services (the Department) filed a petition in

dependency or neglect alleging concerns of domestic violence and

substance abuse. The juvenile court granted the Department

temporary custody of the children, and the Department placed them

in foster care.

¶3 The juvenile court then adjudicated the children dependent or

neglected and adopted a treatment plan for mother. Mother’s

treatment plan required her to (1) cooperate with the Department;

(2) consistently engage in family time; (3) complete a substance

abuse assessment and follow all recommendations; (4) develop and

demonstrate protective parenting capacity; (5) maintain a stable

income and residence; (6) actively participate in life skills services;

and (7) complete a mental health evaluation and follow all

recommendations.

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¶4 Thirteen months later, the Department moved to terminate

mother’s parental rights. Two years after the Department filed the

petition, the juvenile court granted the motion and terminated

mother’s parental rights.

II. Fitness Within a Reasonable Time

¶5 Mother’s sole contention is that the juvenile court erred by

finding that she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We

disagree.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶6 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights if it finds, by

clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the child was adjudicated

dependent or neglected; (2) the parent has not complied with an

appropriate court-approved treatment plan or the plan has not been

successful; (3) the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or

condition is unlikely to change within a reasonable time. § 19-3-

604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶7 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of S.K., 2019 COA 36, ¶ 74. Reasonable parental

care requires, at a minimum, that the parent provide nurturing and

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safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet the child’s physical,

emotional, and mental health needs and conditions. Id. A parent’s

noncompliance with a treatment plan generally “demonstrates a

lack of commitment to meeting the child’s needs and, therefore,

may also be considered in determining unfitness.” People in Interest

of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 408 (Colo. App. 2008).

¶8 In deciding whether a parent’s conduct or condition is likely to

change within a reasonable time, the court may consider whether

any change has occurred during the proceeding, the parent’s social

history, and the chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct

or condition. S.K., ¶ 75. Where a parent has made little to no

progress on a treatment plan, the court need not give the parent

additional time to comply. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 24.

¶9 A reasonable time is not an indefinite time, and it must be

determined by considering the children’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. People in Interest of A.N-B., 2019

COA 46, ¶ 34. What constitutes a reasonable time is fact specific

and varies from case to case. Id. at ¶ 40. However, where, as here,

a child is under the age of six years old, the court must also

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consider the expedited permanency planning (EPP) provisions,

which require the court to place the child in a permanent home as

expeditiously as possible. §§ 19-1-102(1.6), 19-1-123, 19-3-

702(5)(c), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 10 Whether the juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

is a mixed question of fact and law. People in Interest of A.M. v.

T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the juvenile court’s findings of

evidentiary fact for clear error and accept them if they have record

support. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S., 2020 COA 12, ¶ 10. But

determining the proper legal standard to apply in a case and

applying that standard to the particular facts of the case are

questions of law that we review de novo. M.A.W. v. People in Interest

of A.L.W., 2020 CO 11, ¶ 31. The credibility of witnesses;

sufficiency, probative value, and weight of the evidence; and the

inferences and conclusions drawn therefrom are within the province

of the juvenile court. A.M., ¶ 15.

B. Analysis

¶ 11 The juvenile court found that, although mother was “very

engaged” early in the case, she didn’t reasonably comply with her

treatment plan and was unfit. See D.P., 181 P.3d at 408.

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Specifically, the court found that in the months leading up to the

termination hearing mother hadn’t regularly attended family time;

engaged in substance abuse, domestic violence, or mental health

treatment; or provided documentation of her sobriety. See People in

Interest of K.T., 129 P.3d 1080, 1082 (Colo. App. 2005) (unfitness

may be premised on a parent’s failure to document sobriety). The

court determined that mother’s conduct or condition was unlikely

to change within a reasonable time considering that the EPP case

had been open for two years and the initial concerns remained

unmitigated. See S.Z.S., ¶ 24. And giving primary consideration to

the children’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and

needs, including their special needs, the court determined that it

was not in their best interests to wait longer for permanency. See

A.N-B., ¶ 34.

¶ 12 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. The

caseworker — who was qualified as an expert in child protection

and child welfare — acknowledged that, early in the case, mother

made progress on her treatment plan, and the Department had

returned the children to her care. But three months later, mother

relapsed, and the Department placed the children in a kin-like

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placement where they remained for the remainder of the case. The

caseworker testified that, following the children’s removal, mother’s

substance abuse treatment provider discharged her multiple times

for noncompliance. And during the last nine months of the case

mother had not reengaged in substance abuse treatment, submitted

urinalysis test results, engaged in individual or group therapy, or

consistently engaged in family time. At the time of the termination

hearing mother hadn’t seen the children in person in four months

and was “very inconsistent” in attending video visits.

¶ 13 Above all, the placement provider and caseworker described

the children’s particular needs. The placement provider testified

that K.A.B. had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder,

global development delay, and speech delay. And the caseworker

testified that K.A.B. was in play therapy to address the trauma he

endured, speech therapy, and occupational therapy, and K.J.B. was

in occupational therapy for behavioral concerns. The caseworker

opined that given the length of the case, the children’s need for

permanency and stability, and mother’s lack of treatment plan

compliance, mother was unlikely to complete her treatment plan in

a reasonable amount of time.

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¶ 14 Nevertheless, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by

making these findings because she (1) was limited in her ability to

engage with her treatment plan in the months before the

termination hearing due to a complicated pregnancy; (2) cared for

her newborn with “no apparent safety concerns”; (3) had “previously

been very successful” in her treatment plan; and (4) demonstrated a

willingness to reengage in her treatment plan at the time of the

termination hearing.

¶ 15 First, the court considered mother’s argument that her

pregnancy impeded her ability to comply with her treatment plan

and found it to be incredible. Second, while the court

acknowledged that mother had custody of her newborn who

“[l]ook[ed] well cared for,” the court found that information was

insufficient to establish that mother was a safe and appropriate

parent. And it was within the juvenile court’s sole province, as the

fact finder, to determine the credibility of the witnesses as well as

the weight and probative effect of the evidence. See A.M., ¶ 15.

Moreover, the court recognized mother’s treatment plan progress

early in the case and acknowledged that she had recently expressed

willingness to reengage, but ultimately the court found there was

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not a substantial likelihood that mother would complete her

treatment plan within a reasonable time for these children.

Essentially, mother’s argument asks us to reweigh the evidence and

substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, which we

cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 16 Because the juvenile court’s findings are supported by the

record, we discern no error.

III. Disposition

¶ 17 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE LUM concur.

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