Peo v. Gonzalez - Criminal Conviction Affirmed

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Gonzalez

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23CA0395

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (75.9K)

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Combined Opinion

23CA0395 Peo v Gonzalez 03-26-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0395
Arapahoe County District Court No. 20CR1811
Honorable Ryan J. Stuart, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Julio Cesar Gonzalez,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V
Opinion by JUDGE YUN
Grove and Taubman*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 19, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Senior Counsel, Denver,
Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Kelly A. Corcoran, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Julio Cesar Gonzalez appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree assault,

second degree assault, and felony menacing. He argues that the

district court erred by (1) admitting sanity evidence during the

prosecution’s case-in-chief; (2) improperly instructing the jury on

his insanity defense; and (3) allowing the prosecutor to make

improper statements during closing argument. Additionally,

Gonzalez argues that the cumulative effect of these errors requires

reversal. We disagree with these contentions and affirm the

conviction.

I. Background

¶2 Gonzalez struggled with his mental health for years. He began

exhibiting symptoms of schizophrenia as a teenager and became

homeless at the age of eighteen. By 2019, his mental health had

worsened. He was hospitalized twice, and on both occasions, his

treating psychiatrists diagnosed him with schizophrenia.

¶3 In July 2020, Gonzalez committed two separate assaults

against women along a public trail near the campsite where he had

been living. In the first attack, at midday on July 8, Gonzalez

struck a woman on the arm with a piece of wood. The woman had

1
been biking behind her two daughters and, after the assault,

continued down the path to call the police.

¶4 In the second attack, early in the morning on July 11,

Gonzalez attacked a woman walking with her female friend. From a

distance, both women saw Gonzalez striking the ground with a

wooden board. As they approached, they greeted him. Gonzalez

asked why they were bothering him and demanded they leave him

alone. Then, without hesitating, he ran toward one woman and

struck her repeatedly with the board. The attack left the woman

with a split scalp, a bruised back, a brain bleed, temporary hearing

loss, and a broken finger with exposed bone.

¶5 The prosecution charged Gonzalez with (1) second degree

assault for the July 8 attack; and (2) attempted first degree murder,

first degree assault, and felony menacing for the July 11 attack. At

his arraignment, Gonzalez entered a plea of not guilty by reason of

insanity (NGRI) and formally notified both the district court and the

prosecution of his intention to present testimony regarding his

mental condition. After providing the required advisement and

receiving Gonzalez’s waiver of privilege, the court ordered the

2
required sanity examination. A state hospital forensic psychologist

completed the court-ordered examination.

¶6 At trial, during its case-in-chief, the prosecution called the

forensic psychologist, who testified that Gonzalez suffered from

schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations. She clarified that this

diagnosis does not automatically make someone “legally insane,” as

a person with schizophrenia and auditory hallucinations may still

distinguish right from wrong and form the required mental state to

commit a crime.

¶7 The psychologist testified that, during both assaults, Gonzalez

was experiencing symptoms of schizophrenia, including auditory

hallucinations where he heard voices saying insulting things about

him, which made him angry. However, she also agreed that anger

is not a “diagnostic symptom” of schizophrenia and that Gonzalez

told her he attacked the women because he was angry.

¶8 The psychologist ultimately concluded that Gonzalez was sane

when the assaults occurred. She opined that he was able to

distinguish right from wrong, he knew both before and after the

assaults that he could get into trouble for committing them, and he

3
refrained from attacking other individuals because he recognized

such behavior as wrong.

¶9 Gonzalez supported his insanity defense with (1) several video

recordings of his interactions with police officers on July 8 and

July 11; (2) testimony from his sister; and (3) testimony from three

psychiatrists. The psychiatrists provided the following testimony:

• Dr. Jacqueline Henschke, the psychiatrist who treated

Gonzalez during his first hospitalization in 2019, testified

that she would now diagnose him with paranoid

schizophrenia. She noted that research suggests people

with paranoid schizophrenia are more likely to display

violent behavior than those with other mental illnesses,

although violence itself is not a symptom of

schizophrenia. She did not determine Gonzalez’s mental

state at the time of the assaults.

• Dr. Roderick O’Brien, the neuropsychiatrist who treated

Gonzalez during his second hospitalization in 2019,

testified that he diagnosed Gonzalez with chronic

paranoid schizophrenia. He explained that people

experiencing psychotic symptoms from schizophrenia

4
often have difficulty distinguishing between what is real

and what is not and understanding the consequences of

their actions. He added that paranoid schizophrenia can

sometimes lead to violent behavior as a reaction to these

symptoms, although violence itself is not a diagnostic

criterion for schizophrenia. He did not offer an opinion

on Gonzalez’s mental state at the time of the assaults.

• Dr. Ahmad Adi, a forensic psychiatry expert who

evaluated Gonzalez in July 2021, diagnosed him with

schizophrenia and cannabis use disorder. He concluded

that Gonzalez suffered from a mental disease or defect at

the time of both assaults, identifying his psychotic

symptoms from schizophrenia as the decisive factor in

each incident; Dr. Adi opined that neither assault would

have occurred absent these symptoms. However, Dr. Adi

did not conduct a formal sanity evaluation to determine

Gonzalez’s legal insanity at the time of the offenses.

¶ 10 Ultimately, the jury rejected Gonzalez’s NGRI defense. It

acquitted him of attempted first degree murder but convicted him of

first degree assault, second degree assault, and felony menacing.

5
¶ 11 Gonzalez now appeals.

II. Prosecution’s Case-in-Chief Evidence

¶ 12 Gonzalez argues that the district court erred by admitting the

psychologist’s testimony about the court-ordered examination

during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Specifically, he argues that

the defense had to present insanity evidence before the prosecution

could introduce the psychologist’s testimony and that Gonzalez’s

plea of NGRI did not constitute such evidence. We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 13 In a pretrial motion, Gonzalez asked the court to prohibit the

introduction of evidence from his court-ordered examination during

the prosecution’s case-in-chief. He asserted the prosecution could

admit information from the court-ordered examination only as

“rebuttal evidence” under section 16-8-107(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.

¶ 14 At the outset of trial, the court stated that it would “grant the

motion preventing the [prosecution] from introducing any sanity

evidence until there’s been some evidence presented by the defense

related to mental condition or insanity,” but it later clarified that it

was “willing to reconsider” the ruling if the prosecution presented

6
contrary authority. Defense counsel subsequently reserved his

opening statement until after the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

¶ 15 During jury selection, the court — with the parties’

agreement — informed the jury that Gonzalez had pleaded NGRI

and that it would be tasked with “decid[ing] whether the

prosecution ha[d] proven beyond a reasonable doubt . . .

[Gonzalez’s] guilt and sanity.” Without objection, the court also

instructed the jury on the law governing the insanity defense. Both

the prosecutor and defense counsel thoroughly discussed the

insanity defense with prospective jurors during voir dire, addressing

the distinction between mental illness and insanity, the

prosecution’s burden of proof, and the jurors’ ability to follow the

court’s instruction on the insanity defense.

¶ 16 On the fourth day of trial, the court reconsidered its previous

ruling. The court noted that section 16-8-107(1.5)(a), unlike section

16-8-107(1)(a), does not limit the prosecution to presenting sanity

testimony solely as “rebuttal evidence.” Accordingly, “based upon

[Gonzalez’s] plea of [NGRI],” the court allowed the prosecution to

introduce the testimony of the psychologist who conducted

Gonzalez’s court-ordered examination during its case-in-chief.

7
¶ 17 Before the psychologist took the stand, the court instructed

the jury that it could consider her testimony only to determine

“whether the prosecution ha[d] proven beyond a reasonable doubt

that [Gonzalez] was sane at the time of the offenses” and “whether

the prosecution ha[d] proven beyond a reasonable doubt the

culpable mental state for each offense.” The court provided similar

guidance in its written jury instructions.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 18 Two standards of review govern our analysis. First, we review

questions of law involving statutory construction de novo. People v.

Moore, 2021 CO 26, ¶ 25. When interpreting a statute, we begin

with its language, giving words and phrases their plain and

ordinary meanings. Id. We also consider the statute as a whole,

construing each provision consistently and in harmony with the

overall statutory design. Id. If the statute is clear, we rely solely on

its plain language to determine its meaning. Id.

¶ 19 Second, we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of

discretion. Id. at ¶ 26. Under CRE 611(a), a district court has

broad discretion to control the order of interrogating witnesses and

presenting evidence. People v. Walden, 224 P.3d 369, 376 (Colo.

8
App. 2009) (“The order of proof at trial is a matter within the trial

court’s sound discretion, and courts are given wide latitude in

deciding these matters.”). A district court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair or

when it misapplies the law. People v. Johnson, 2021 CO 35, ¶ 16.

¶ 20 We review preserved evidentiary errors under the

nonconstitutional harmless error standard.1 Davis v. People, 2013

CO 57, ¶ 13. “Therefore, if we find an abuse of discretion, then

we . . . consider whether any error, in light of the entire record of

the trial, substantially influenced the verdict or impaired the

fairness of the trial.” Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 21 We disagree that the court erred by admitting evidence from

the court-ordered sanity examination during the prosecution’s

case-in-chief for several reasons.

1 Gonzalez contends this error is one of constitutional dimension

because it implicates his right to counsel. But he fails to develop
this argument. See People v. Cuellar, 2023 COA 20, ¶ 44 (noting
that we do not address undeveloped arguments). Moreover, we fail
to see how the order of proof at trial directly implicates the right to
counsel. See Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1097 (Colo. 2010)
(“[O]nly errors that specifically and directly offend a defendant’s
constitutional rights are ‘constitutional’ in nature.”).

9
1. Abuse of Discretion

¶ 22 Gonzalez argues that the court abused its discretion by

misapplying the law. Specifically, he asserts the court misapplied

both case law and statute by allowing the prosecution to present

the psychologist’s testimony during its case-in-chief.

¶ 23 First, Gonzalez relies on People v. Hill, 934 P.2d 821, 827

(Colo. 1997), to argue that his NGRI plea alone does not raise the

issue of insanity for the jury. He notes that “the evidence at trial,

not the defendant’s NGRI plea, determines whether sanity is an

issue for the jury.” Accordingly, Gonzalez argues that the court

erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce the psychologist’s

testimony before he introduced evidence of insanity.

¶ 24 Gonzalez’s interpretation stretches Hill beyond its holding. In

Hill, the supreme court addressed a narrow issue: “Whether a

defendant is entitled to have the question of his sanity determined

by a jury where he has presented no evidence of insanity sufficient

to overcome the presumption of sanity.” Id. at 824. The court held

that a defendant who pleaded NGRI was not entitled to a jury

instruction on insanity without presenting “some credible evidence”

to overcome the statutory presumption of sanity. Id. at 826-27.

10
The Hill decision did not address what evidence the prosecution

may introduce during its case-in-chief.

¶ 25 Second, Gonzalez argues that the court misapplied section

16-8-107, which governs the admissibility of evidence acquired,

directly or indirectly, for the first time during a court-ordered

examination. Section 16-8-107(1)(a) makes such evidence

inadmissible “against the defendant on the issues raised by a plea

of not guilty, . . . except to rebut evidence of the defendant’s mental

condition introduced by the defendant to show incapacity to form a

culpable mental state.” Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, section

16-8-107(1.5)(a) states that this type of evidence is “admissible only

as to the issues raised by the defendant’s plea of [NGRI], and the

jury, at the request of either party, must be so instructed.” Id.

Importantly, unlike subsection (1)(a), subsection (1.5)(a) does not

limit the evidence to rebuttal presentation only.

¶ 26 Gonzalez relies on subsection (1)(a) to argue that evidence

from a court-ordered examination is admissible by the prosecution

only as rebuttal evidence. Gonzalez’s reliance is misplaced.

Subsection (1)(a) prohibits the prosecution from introducing such

evidence “on the issues raised by a plea of not guilty” except to

11
rebut the defendant’s evidence regarding his mental condition. In

this case, however, the psychologist’s testimony was not introduced

to address issues raised by a not guilty plea; instead, it was offered

solely on the issues raised by the NGRI plea. The psychologist

testified only as to whether Gonzalez met the statutory criteria for

insanity. Thus, under subsection (1.5)(a), evidence from a

court-ordered examination is admissible without any requirement

that it be presented in rebuttal.

¶ 27 Gonzalez argues that the restriction found in subsection (1)(a)

should be incorporated into subsection (1.5)(a) because an “NGRI

plea includes a plea of not guilty.” However, “when the legislature

includes a provision in one statute, but omits that provision from

another similar statute, the omission is evidence of its intent.”

Deutsch v. Kalcevic, 140 P.3d 340, 342 (Colo. App. 2006).

Accordingly, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend

to limit the use of evidence from the court-ordered examination to

rebuttal evidence when a defendant pleads NGRI.

¶ 28 Finally, consistent with CRE 611(a), the district court properly

exercised its broad discretion by permitting the psychologist to

testify during the prosecution’s case-in-chief. Typically, the

12
prosecution does not offer sanity evidence until rebuttal. See

Castro v. People, 346 P.2d 1020, 1027 (Colo. 1959) (“Ordinarily the

issue of insanity is not present at the outset of the trial and is not

properly a part of the prosecution’s case.”); People v. Jones,

390 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (“Normally, [sanity]

evidence is presented by the prosecution in rebuttal since no proof

of sanity is presented in the case in chief due to the presumption.”).

¶ 29 In this case, however, the district court — with the parties’

agreement — instructed prospective jurors that Gonzalez had

pleaded NGRI, meaning that they would need to determine whether

his mental state relieved him of legal responsibility for the offenses

charged. And the parties’ discussion during jury selection

underscored that Gonzalez’s insanity defense was a central issue at

trial. Cf. Brown v. State, 686 So. 2d 385, 408 (Ala. Crim. App.

1995) (holding that “the State, in anticipation of the appellant’s

insanity defense, had a right to produce evidence rebutting the

appellant’s defense” in its case-in-chief when defense counsel told

the jury during opening statements that the appellant had pleaded

NGRI and intended to present expert testimony), aff’d sub nom., Ex

Parte Brown, 686 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1996); see also 14 Robert J.

13
Dieter, Colorado Practice Series, Criminal Practice and Procedure

§ 5.36, Westlaw (2d ed. database updated Oct. 2025) (“[A]s a

practical matter and in recognition of the slight proof required to

refute the presumption of sanity, the prosecution will present

evidence of sanity in its case in chief.”).

¶ 30 Because the jury selection discussions established that

Gonzalez’s insanity defense was a central issue — and the

prosecution ultimately bore the burden of proving sanity beyond a

reasonable doubt — the district court did not abuse its discretion

by allowing the psychologist’s testimony during the prosecution’s

case-in-chief. See Walden, 224 P.3d at 376; Martinez v. People,

493 P.2d 1350, 1352 (Colo. 1972) (“It is fundamental that the order

of proof and presentation of witnesses is within the sound

discretion of the trial court and error may not be predicated thereon

in the absence of a showing of prejudice.”).

1. Harmless Error

¶ 31 Even if the court abused its discretion by permitting the

prosecution to introduce sanity evidence during its case-in-chief,

any error was harmless. The jury would have heard the same

evidence regardless of the sequence in which it was presented.

14
¶ 32 Gonzalez argues that the ruling was not harmless because it

forced the defense to “deliver its opening statement after the sanity

evidence was admitted,” “respond as if its defense involved both

tests for insanity,” and “focus its presentation on insanity instead of

challenging the prosecution’s failure to prove [Gonzalez’s] mental

state.” We are not persuaded.

¶ 33 As for the timing of defense counsel’s opening statement, he

chose to reserve his statement even though he knew that the

prosecution disputed the court’s tentative ruling and that the court

had clarified it was “willing to reconsider” it. Further, we are

unclear, and Gonzalez does not explain, how defense counsel’s

decision to reserve his opening statement until after the

prosecution’s case-in-chief substantially affected the outcome of the

case.

¶ 34 We are likewise unpersuaded by Gonzalez’s contention that he

was forced to respond “as if [his] defense involved both tests for

insanity” — that is, whether he was so diseased or defective in mind

as to be unable to distinguish right from wrong and whether he

suffered from a condition of mind that prevented him from forming

the required mental state. See 16-8-101.5(1), C.R.S. 2025. At voir

15
dire, before opening statements, the court instructed the potential

jurors regarding both insanity standards. Gonzalez neither

objected to this instruction at trial nor raised it on appeal. Thus,

Gonzalez was on notice that both insanity tests would be at issue

before the prosecution’s case-in-chief.

¶ 35 As for the claim that the defense was forced to shift focus,

Gonzalez fails to explain how the introduction of the psychologist’s

testimony during the prosecution’s case-in-chief impaired his ability

to challenge the prosecution’s proof of his mental state. Rather,

defense counsel was able to present a robust defense on Gonzalez’s

behalf. The defense introduced testimony from three

psychiatrists — the two treating psychiatrists from Gonzalez’s 2019

hospitalizations and a psychiatrist retained for trial — as well as

video evidence of Gonzalez’s interactions with police officers and

testimony from Gonzalez’s sister to establish his insanity defense.

Regardless of whether the psychologist testified during the

prosecution’s case-in-chief or on rebuttal, the jury would have

heard the same evidence.

¶ 36 Accordingly, even if the district court erred in its ruling, the

error was harmless.

16
III. Jury Instructions

¶ 37 Gonzalez contends the district court improperly instructed the

jury on his insanity defense. He specifically argues that the court

erred by rejecting three of his proposed changes to the instructions.

We disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 38 At the conclusion of the evidence, the district court instructed

the jury on the insanity defense:

The defendant was insane at the time of the
commission of the acts if:

1. he was so diseased or defective in mind at
   the time of the commission of the act as to be
   incapable of distinguishing right from wrong
   with respect to that act; or

2. he suffered from a condition of mind caused
   by a mental disease or defect that prevented
   him from forming a culpable mental state that
   is an essential element of a crime charged.

But care should be taken not to confuse
mental disease or defect with moral obliquity,
mental depravity, or passion growing out of
anger, revenge, hatred, or other motives and
kindred evil conditions because, when an act
is induced by any of these causes, the person
is accountable to the law.

17
This instruction tracked the language in the model jury

instructions. See COLJI-Crim. F:183 (2025); COLJI-Crim. I:01

(2025).

¶ 39 Gonzalez objected to the instruction and proposed the

following changes: (1) removing the last sentence; (2) adding his

theory on temporary insanity; and (3) adding a clarification on

“anger that is the result of a mental disease or defect.” The court

denied his proposed changes.

B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 40 The district court has a duty to correctly instruct the jury on

all matters of law for which there is sufficient evidence to support

them. Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, ¶ 34. If there is sufficient

evidence to warrant an instruction, the resulting “jury instruction

should substantially track the language of the statute.” People v.

Schnorenberg, 2025 CO 43, ¶ 60 (citation omitted). As relevant

here, section 16-8-101.5(1) provides the “applicable test of

insanity”:

(a) A person who is so diseased or defective in
mind at the time of the commission of the act
as to be incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong with respect to that act is not
accountable; except that care should be taken

18
not to confuse such mental disease or defect
with moral obliquity, mental depravity, or
passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred,
or other motives and kindred evil conditions,
for, when the act is induced by any of these
causes, the person is accountable to the law;
or

(b) A person who suffered from a condition of
mind caused by mental disease or defect that
prevented the person from forming a culpable
mental state that is an essential element of a
crime charged, but care should be taken not to
confuse such mental disease or defect with
moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion
growing out of anger, revenge, hatred, or other
motives and kindred evil conditions because,
when the act is induced by any of these
causes, the person is accountable to the law.

¶ 41 We review de novo whether jury instructions accurately inform

the jury of the governing law and are supported by sufficient

evidence. Garcia v. People, 2022 CO 6, ¶ 15; Castillo, ¶ 32. If the

jury instructions accurately inform the jury of the law, “we review a

[district] court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for an

abuse of discretion.” McDonald v. People, 2021 CO 64, ¶ 54

(citation omitted). Under this standard, the court has broad

discretion in formulating the instructions and deciding whether

additional instructions are required. Id. We may not disturb the

19
district court’s ruling unless it is manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. Id.

C. Analysis

¶ 42 We conclude that the district court’s instruction adequately

informed the jury of the law on insanity and was supported by the

evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting

Gonzalez’s proposed changes.

1. Last Sentence of the Instruction

¶ 43 Gonzalez argues that the court should have removed the last

sentence — concerning “moral obliquity” — from the jury

instruction. He argues that its inclusion (1) obfuscated the law with

“superfluous” and “not definitional” language; (2) improperly limited

his insanity defense; and (3) was unsupported by the evidence. We

address each of these points in turn.

¶ 44 Gonzalez maintains that this sentence obscures the law on

insanity because the supreme court stated in People v. Serravo,

823 P.2d 128, 137 (Colo. 1992), that it was not “a definitional

20
component.”2 But in Serravo, the court explained that the

language’s “purpose” was to clarify the definition of legal insanity.

Id. It distinguishes between (1) “an act resulting from legal

insanity” — “an act committed by a person in a state of mental

illness that renders the person incapable of distinguishing right

from wrong with respect to the act” — and (2) “an act resulting from

moral obliquity” — “an act committed by a person capable of

distinguishing right from wrong but nonetheless acting out of a

perverse and culpable rejection of prevailing moral standards.” Id.

¶ 45 Further, removing the last sentence would contravene the

legislative intent to limit the insanity defense. The General

Assembly may constitutionally define criminal conduct, establish

the legal components of criminal liability, and delineate statutory

defenses. Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Colo. 2000). As

written, the court’s instruction “substantially track[ed]” the

language of section 16-8-101.5(1) — as it should. Schnorenberg,

¶ 60 (citation omitted); see also People v. Carey, 198 P.3d 1223,

2 The 1986 version of the insanity statute, discussed in People v.

Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 133 (Colo. 1992), contains almost identical
language on “moral obliquity” as the current version of the insanity
statute. See § 16-8-107(1), C.R.S. 2025.

21
1233 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[J]ury instructions phrased in the

language of the applicable statute are generally sufficient.”). The

only difference is that the court included the “moral obliquity”

sentence once at the end, while the statute includes it twice — after

each test for insanity under subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b).

§ 16-8-101.5(1)(a)-(b). This statutory language was intended to

limit the insanity defense by making it clear that acts caused by

legal insanity should not be conflated with acts resulting from

moral obliquity, mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger,

revenge, hatred, or other motives. Accepting Gonzalez’s proposed

deletion would erase this distinction and improperly render the

statute’s “words or phrases superfluous.” Garcia, ¶ 17 (citation

omitted); see also People v. Montgomery, 669 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Colo.

1983) (“[C]ourts cannot, under the pretense of deciding a case,

assume or usurp power vested in . . . the legislative” branch.).

¶ 46 Finally, the inclusion of this sentence was supported by the

record since the evidence at trial raised the issue of whether

Gonzalez’s actions stemmed from his schizophrenia or from a

generalized anger toward others. See Castillo, ¶ 34. The

psychologist testified that anger is not a symptom of schizophrenia

22
and that Gonzalez could distinguish right from wrong and form the

requisite mental state of the charged offenses when they occurred.

Gonzalez told the psychologist that he was angry when the assaults

occurred and that this anger was the reason he attacked the

victims. It was for the jury to decide whether his actions resulted

from anger or from a mental illness that rendered him incapable of

distinguishing right from wrong or forming the requisite mental

state of the charged offenses.

¶ 47 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court accurately

instructed the jury on the insanity defense.

1. Tendered Instruction on Temporary Insanity

¶ 48 Gonzalez argues the court should have included his proposed

instruction on temporary insanity:

[Gonzalez] need only be insane at the time of
the commission of the acts. The insanity may
be temporary in nature. A person who suffers
from insanity at the time of the alleged crime,
but later regains their sanity, is still insane
under Colorado law.

However, the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to add

this instruction.

23
¶ 49 In People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 38, the supreme court held

“that section 16-8-101.5 contemplates both temporary and

long-term insanity based on the statute’s plain language.”

Similarly, in this case, the district court found, and we agree, that

the substance of Gonzalez’s proposed instruction was already

included in the court’s instruction. Indeed, the district court’s

instruction repeated the statute’s phrase, “at the time of the

commission of the act[s],” five times. § 16-8-101.5. This

instruction made clear that the only relevant issue for the jury was

whether Gonzalez was insane at the time of the charged offenses.

1. Tendered Instruction on Anger

¶ 50 Gonzalez argues that the court should have added an

instruction explaining that

[a]nger as a result of a mental disease or defect
is not the same as anger that is not based [on
a] mental disease or defect. You should not
confuse the two when considering the
evidence. Anger that is the result of a mental
disease or defect does not preclude a finding of
insanity.

He contends that the “court had a duty to correct th[e]

misimpression” caused by the prosecution’s use of the “moral

obliquity” sentence in closing argument.

24
¶ 51 However, the district court did not abuse its discretion by

declining to give this additional instruction. As already explained,

the court accurately instructed the jury on the law of insanity and

highlighted the defense’s theory — that “legal sanity is the predicate

to legal accountability.” Because the jury was properly instructed,

the court retained “broad discretion” in deciding whether to

supplement the instructions with Gonzalez’s proposed instruction.

McDonald, ¶ 54 (citation omitted).

¶ 52 Gonzalez maintains that the court had a duty to correct the

misimpression he claims was created by the prosecutor’s closing

argument — specifically, the suggestion that an absence of emotion

or motivation is required for legal accountability. But the

prosecutor did not make such an assertion. Instead, the prosecutor

acknowledged Gonzalez’s mental illness but emphasized that

mental illness is distinct from legal insanity; Gonzalez could be both

mentally ill and angry, yet still legally sane. The court’s refusal to

give the requested instruction was not manifestly arbitrary,

unreasonable, or unfair. See id.

¶ 53 In conclusion, the district court’s instruction adequately

informed the jury of the law on insanity and was supported by the

25
evidence, and the court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting

Gonzalez’s proposed changes to the jury instructions.

IV. Prosecutorial Misconduct

¶ 54 Gonzalez contends the prosecutor committed misconduct

during closing argument by “misus[ing] the [moral obliquity]

sentence to generate confusion by focusing on anger and

accountability.” Specifically, he asserts that the prosecutor used

this sentence to “to suggest that persons who are legally insane

become accountable under the law in certain circumstances.” We

again disagree.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 55 In his initial closing argument, the prosecutor outlined the

“two parts” to the insanity test under Colorado law. See

§ 16-8-101.5(1)(a)-(b). He clarified that a person is not

“automatically” legally insane simply because that person has a

mental illness or suffers from symptoms of mental illness. He

explained, rather, that Gonzalez can be “mad at the voices” in his

head, “mad at the world,” and still be legally accountable because, if

he knows right from wrong and if he is able to act with intent, he is

still legally sane. The prosecutor then stated:

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All the doctors say he has schizophrenia, but
that is not where the law stops. That is not
where he is not accountable under the law.
You have to go to the next step, and we’ll talk
about what the evidence is there.

The instruction tells you to make sure you
take care not to confuse mental disease or
defect with things like moral obliquity, moral
depravity, passion growing out of anger, or
revenge, hatred, or other motives and kindred
evil condition, because a person is accountable
under the law when they are acting from that.

You will hear a lot about anger. He talks a lot
about anger, because he was angry that day.
He was angry because the voices made him
mad. The problem is he took that anger and
he applied it to [the mother riding a bicycle].
He took that anger and he attacked [the
woman walking]. That does not mean he is
insane. . . .

And it doesn’t mean he is not accountable for
the law. He could be angry for all of those
things and still be legally sane, because the
definition is here about what sanity is. Not
was it a factor. Not was it contributing. Those
are not the definitions. That is not what sanity
is in Colorado.

If you find [Gonzalez] not guilty on any of the
counts, you’re asked was it due solely to this
issue of sanity.

Defense counsel objected to these statements, and the court

overruled the objection.

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B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 56 We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing claims of

prosecutorial misconduct. Wend v. People, 235 P.3d 1089, 1096

(Colo. 2010). First, we determine whether the conduct was

improper based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. We

consider the context of the argument as a whole and view it in light

of the evidence before the jury. People v. Samson, 2012 COA 167,

¶ 30. Because arguments delivered in the heat of trial are not

always perfectly scripted, we give the prosecutor the benefit of the

doubt when his remarks are “ambiguous or simply inartful.” Id.

¶ 57 Second, if we identify misconduct, then we determine whether

it warrants reversal under the applicable standard of review. Wend,

235 P.3d at 1096. When, as here, the alleged misconduct is not of

constitutional magnitude, we review preserved claims of

prosecutorial misconduct for an abuse of discretion. People v.

Rhea, 2014 COA 60, ¶ 42. Under this standard, the district court’s

rulings on prosecutorial misconduct “will not be disturbed by an

appellate court in the absence of a gross abuse of discretion

resulting in prejudice and a denial of justice.” Id. (quoting People v.

Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 697 (Colo.1984)).

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C. Analysis

¶ 58 Considering the prosecutor’s argument as a whole, we

conclude that no misconduct occurred. While the prosecutor

conceded that Gonzalez struggled with mental illness, he ultimately

argued that a legally sane person — including someone who suffers

from mental illness but acts out of anger — is still accountable

under the law.

¶ 59 Gonzalez appears to equate the prosecutor’s acknowledgment

of mental illness with a concession of legal insanity. He asserts

that the prosecutor suggested “persons who are legally insane

become accountable under the law in certain circumstances.” If the

prosecutor had made such a statement, it would have constituted

misconduct because a prosecutor cannot misstate the law. See

Samson, ¶ 32. But the record does not support Gonzalez’s

assertion.

¶ 60 The prosecutor never conceded that Gonzalez was legally

insane. Rather, he explicitly distinguished mental illness from legal

insanity. Based on the evidence, the prosecutor argued that,

although Gonzalez suffered from a mental disease, it did not make

him incapable of distinguishing right from wrong and forming the

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requisite mental state. When Gonzalez attacked the victims, the

prosecutor maintained, he acted out of passion growing out of

anger. See People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148, 1153 (Colo. App. 2010)

(“A prosecutor has wide latitude to make arguments based on facts

in evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from those facts.”),

overruled in part on other grounds by, People v. Kennedy, 2025 CO

63.

¶ 61 Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district

court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defense counsel’s

objection to the prosecutor’s remarks in his closing argument.

V. Cumulative Error

¶ 62 Finally, Gonzalez contends that the cumulative effect of these

alleged errors requires reversal. We are not persuaded.

¶ 63 “The doctrine of cumulative error requires that numerous

errors be committed, not merely alleged.” People v. Conyac, 2014

COA 8M, ¶ 152. Under this doctrine, while an error may be

harmless in isolation, reversal is required when the cumulative

effect of multiple errors or defects substantially affects the fairness

of the trial or undermines the integrity of the factfinding process.

Howard-Walker v. People, 2019 CO 69, ¶ 24.

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¶ 64 Because we have not identified multiple errors, but merely

assumed one possible error, there can be no cumulative error. See

People v. Thames, 2019 COA 124, ¶ 69 (“Even assuming that the

trial court erred once, a single error is insufficient to reverse under

the cumulative error standard.”).

VI. Disposition

¶ 65 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.

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