Rahmanovic v. Keirton Inc. - Bankruptcy Adversary Proceeding
Summary
The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado issued an opinion in Rahmanovic v. Keirton Inc., denying a motion to dismiss an adversary complaint. The complaint alleges the debtor made false statements regarding property on his bankruptcy schedules and during the Meeting of Creditors.
What changed
This document is a U.S. Bankruptcy Court opinion for the District of Colorado in the adversary proceeding Rahmanovic v. Keirton Inc. (Docket No. 25-01338 MER). The court denied the debtor/defendant Mersad Rahmanovic's motion to dismiss Keirton Inc.'s complaint, which alleges violations of 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4). Keirton claims Rahmanovic made fraudulent false statements on his bankruptcy schedules and during the Meeting of Creditors concerning property known as the Oakland Property, which was subject to a state court judgment and levy.
This ruling means the adversary proceeding will continue, and Keirton Inc. will have the opportunity to prove its allegations of fraud against the debtor. Compliance officers should note the importance of accurate and complete disclosure of all assets and property interests in bankruptcy filings, as false statements can lead to denial of discharge or other penalties under § 727(a)(4). The specific allegations involve misrepresentations about the debtor's residence and ownership of the Oakland Property.
What to do next
- Review bankruptcy schedules for accuracy and completeness regarding all assets and property interests.
- Ensure all statements made during the Meeting of Creditors are truthful and consistent with filed schedules.
Penalties
Potential denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(4).
Source document (simplified)
Jump To
Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.
Support FLP
CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.
Please become a member today.
March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
In re: Mersad Rahmanovic v. Keirton Inc.
United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 25-01338
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
IN THEF OURN ITTHEED DSITSATTREICST B OAFN KCROULPOTRCAYD OCO URT
The Honorable Michael E. Romero
In re:
Case No. 25-12622 MER
Mersad Rahmanovic
Chapter 7
Debtor.
Keirton Inc. Adversary No. 25-01338 MER
Plaintiff,
v.
Mersad Rahmanovic
Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
§ 727(a)(4) Adversary Complaint (“Motion”) filed by Debtor/Defendant Mersad
Rahmanovic (“Rahmanovic”), Keirton Inc.’s (“Keirton”) response thereto, and
Rahmanovic’s reply.1
BACKGROUND
Keirton commenced the instant adversary proceeding on November 14, 2025.
Keirton asserts one claim for relief against Rahmanovic pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 727 (a)(4). In support of its claim, Keirton alleges that, prepetition, it obtained a
judgment (“State Court Judgment”) against Rahmanovic in the District Court for Crowley
County, Colorado (“State Court Case”), which Rahmanovic failed to pay. As a result,
Keirton filed a notice of levy against property owned by Rahmanovic known as 1607
South Oakland Street, Aurora, Colorado 80012 (“Oakland Property”). Prior to the
sheriff’s sale of the Oakland Property, Rahmanovic filed the underlying bankruptcy
case. Keirton alleges that Rahmanovic knowingly and fraudulently made false
statements on his schedules and during his Meeting of Creditors regarding the Oakland
Property. In particular, Rahmanovic stated he lives at the Oakland Property and claimed
a homestead exemption in the property. Keirton asserts these statements are
fraudulent because during the State Court Case, Rahmanovic testified that tenants
occupy the Oakland Property. Rahmanovic also referred to the Oakland Property as a
rental property and stated he lived at a different residence in Ordway, Colorado, in his
1 ECF Nos. 8, 9, & 10.
rReashpmonasneosv itco sKheoiurtlodn b’se pdoesnt-iejudd hgims eCnht ainptteerrr o7g daitsocrhieasr.g eA. s a result, Keirton contends
Rahmanovic filed the instant Motion on December 10, 2025, asserting that
Keirton’s complaint should be dismissed because it fails to demonstrate all elements
required to succeed under § 727(a)(4).2 Keirton disagrees and instead asserts that
Rahmanovic does not attack the sufficiency of the Complaint; only that the allegations
supporting Keirton’s claim are not accurate and that such arguments are inappropriate
to consider on a motion to dismiss.
ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Standard
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012), a
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts
as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff.3 A complaint will be dismissed unless it “contains sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”4
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”5 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”6 Along with the
other pleading requirements required to survive a motion to dismiss, a party alleging
fraud or mistake must also state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud
or mistake.7 To meet this standard, a plaintiff must describe the who, what, when,
where, and how of the alleged fraud.8
2 Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code unless
otherwise stated.
3 In re Matt Garton & Assoc., Adv. Pro. No. 21-1215-TBM, 2022 WL 711518, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Feb.
14, 2022) (citing Burnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013)).
Any use of the term “Rule” hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b) (incorporated by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7009).
8 In re Schamens, 666 B.R. at 533 (quoting U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Kellog Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d
370, 379 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted); In re Tesler, 647 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
2023) (when alleging fraud, a complaint must contain the identity of the person making the
representation, the time, place, and content of the misrepresentation, and the method by which the
misrepresentation was communicated to the plaintiff.).
B. Kei rton Properly Pled its § 727(a)(4) Claim
Pursuant to § 727(a)(4), a debtor may be denied his discharge if, among other
things, he knowingly and fraudulently, in or in connection with the case, made a false
oath or account.9 “A debtor’s petition, schedules, statement of financial affairs,
statements made at a 341 meeting, testimony given at a Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2004 examination, and answers to interrogatories all constitute statements
under oath for purposes of § 727(a)(4).”10 To prevail on a claim under § 727(a)(4), the
plaintiff must show: (1) the debtor made the statement under oath; (2) the statement
was false; (3) the debtor knew the statement was false; (4) the debtor made the
statement with intent to defraud; and (5) that the statement was related materially to the
debtor’s bankruptcy case.11
Rahmanovic does not dispute that Keirton pled sufficient facts to support its
claim. Rather, Rahmanovic argues that the facts Keirton pled do not support his claim
because he resided at the Oakland Property when he filed his bankruptcy case;
therefore, his statements regarding his residency at the Oakland Property are not false,
and he is entitled to claim a homestead exemption in the property. However, a motion
to dismiss is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving factual disputes. In deciding the
Motion, the Court must view the facts alleged in the Complaint in the light most
favorable to Keirton. In doing so, the Court finds Keirton’s claim is well pled. Keirton
alleges that Rahmanovic stated in his bankruptcy petition and schedules, and during his
Meeting of Creditors, that he lives at the Oakland Property and is thus entitled to a
homestead exemption in the property.12 Keirton contends these statements are false
and that Rahmanovic knows they are false because on April 20, 2024, Rahmanovic
submitted verified responses to Keirton’s post-judgment interrogatories in the State
Court Case, wherein he stated that he lives at 8228 Maverick Lane, Ordway, Colorado
81063.13 Keirton also alleges that Rahmanovic stated during a pre-petition deposition
that tenants occupy the Oakland Property, and that he referred to the property as a
“rented property” in an August 29, 2022, email sent to Keirton’s counsel.14 Further,
Keirton asserts that a private investigation conducted in May of 2025 revealed that
Rahmanovic was not living at the Oakland Property, and that Keirton received post-
petition mail from Rahmanovic that was sent from Ordway, Colorado, rather than from
Aurora, Colorado, where the Oakland Property is located.15 As such, Keirton contends
9 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4)(A).
10 In re Bushey, 568 B.R. 821, 828 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2017) (quoting Freelife Int’l, LLC v. Butler (In re Butler), 377 B.R. 895, 922 (Bankr. D. Utah 2006)).
11 In re Phouminh, 339 B.R. 231, 242 (D. Colo. 2005); In re Hickman, 616 B.R. 815, 822 (Bankr. D. Okla.
2020).
12 ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 24-25 & 27.
13 Id. at ¶18.
14 Id. at ¶¶ 19 & 20.
15 Id. at ¶¶ 21 & 22.
Rahmanovic made the statements regarding the Oakland Property on his schedules
and during his Meeting of Creditors knowingly and fraudulently.'® Given these
allegations, Keirton’s claim is well pled and meets Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading
requirements. Therefore, the Court will not dismiss Keirton’s § 727(a)(4)(A) claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court
ORDERS, the Motion is DENIED.
Dated March 19, 2026 BY THE COURT:
ALLE
Michael E. Ro , Judge
United Statés Bankruptcy Court
16 Id. at Jf] 26 & 27.
CFR references
Named provisions
Related changes
Source
Classification
Who this affects
Taxonomy
Browse Categories
Get Courts & Legal alerts
Weekly digest. AI-summarized, no noise.
Free. Unsubscribe anytime.
Get alerts for this source
We'll email you when CO Bankruptcy Court Opinions publishes new changes.