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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ivy Tran Pham Ngo

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-14867

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (1)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (395)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

The Honorable Michael E. Romero

In re:

Case No. 25-14867 MER

Ivy Tran Pham Ngo

Chapter 11

Debtor.

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTION TO CLAIM OF HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION

This matter comes before the Court on the Objection to Debtor’s Homestead
Exemption filed by Franklin D. Azar & Associates, P.C. (“Azar”) and the Debtor’s
response thereto.1

BACKGROUND

The Debtor commenced this case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on
August 1, 2025. Sometime in 2018, the Debtor acquired property known as 1020 S.
Clarkson Street, Denver, Colorado 80209 (the “Property”).2 On October 18, 2021, the
Debtor transferred the Property to her husband, Richard Rochelle (“Rochelle”), by
Special Warranty Deed. A year later, Azar initiated litigation against the Debtor in the
Denver County District Court (the “State Court”).3 The State Court entered a judgment
in favor of Azar on December 14, 2022 (the “State Court Judgment”). In an effort to
satisfy the State Court Judgment, Azar initiated another lawsuit in the State Court
against the Debtor, her parents, and Rochelle, seeking to avoid the Debtor’s 2021
transfer of the Property to Rochelle pursuant to the Colorado Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act (the “CUFTA Action”).4 On May 19, 2025, the State Court entered its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order in the CUFTA Action, wherein it
avoided the transfer of the Property and restored title to the Debtor. When she filed for
bankruptcy, the Debtor scheduled the Property as an asset of her bankruptcy estate
and claimed a homestead exemption in the Property.

1 ECF Nos. 46 & 63.

2 The following facts have been stipulated to by the parties per the Stipulation Regarding Objection to
Debtor’s Homestead Exemption and Request for Adjudication on Briefing filed at ECF No. 106.

3 Case No. 2020-cv-30785.

4 Case No. 2023-cv-32912.

Azar timely filed the instant Objection on October 2, 2025. In his Objection, Azar
argues that 11 U.S.C. § 522 (g) prohibits the Debtor from claiming a homestead
exemption in the Property since the State Court found the transfer of the Property to
Rochelle was fraudulent and avoided it for that reason. The Debtor disagrees. Instead,
the Debtor argues § 522(g) applies only to property recovered by the trustee and that
the Property was transferred back to the Debtor before she filed for bankruptcy.5 As
such, § 522(g) does not apply, and the Debtor is entitled to claim the homestead
exemption.

ANALYSIS

Section 522(g) states

Notwithstanding sections 550 and 551 of this title, the debtor may exempt under
subsection (b) of this section property that the trustee recovers under section
510(c)(2), 542, 543, 550, 551, or 553 of this title, to the extent that the debtor could
have exempted such property under subsection (b) of this section and if such
property had not been transferred if

(1)(A) such transfer was not a voluntary transfer of such property by the
debtor; and

(B) the debtor did not conceal such property; or

(2) the debtor could have avoided such transfer under subsection (f)(1)(B)
of this section.

“As a threshold matter, and by its terms, § 522(g) pertains to the debtor’s right to
exempt property that the trustee recovers using certain avoidance powers provided
under the Code . . . § 522(g), by its terms, applies only to property recovered by the
trustee, and not to property returned to the bankruptcy estate as a result of efforts by a
creditor.”6 Put another way, § 522(g) requires a recovery of property by the trustee
pursuant to powers delineated in particular sections of the Bankruptcy Code.7 “[A]
creditor who files a pre-petition suit under state law to annul a fraudulent conveyance
cannot conceivably be thought to have availed himself of any of these powers.”8

Indeed, § 522(g) is intended to prevent a situation in which the trustee, not a creditor,
expends estate resources to recover fraudulently transferred property only to have the

5 Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code
6 In re McDaniel, 2012 WL 174370, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Jan. 20, 2012) (citing Stornaway Fin. Corp. v.
Hill (In re Hill), 562 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009)).

7 In re Hill, 562 F.3d at 33.

8 Id. at 34.

debtor claim the property as exempt.’ As such, § 522(g) does not apply in cases where
the trustee did not expend estate resources to recover property pursuant to any of the
powers delineated in the Bankruptcy Code sections listed in § 522(g).'°
Here, the trustee did not expend any estate resources to recover the Property
under any of the aforementioned Bankruptcy Code sections. Rather, the Property was
already part of the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate as of the petition date because it was
reconveyed to the Debtor several months before she filed for bankruptcy. Therefore,
§ 522(g) does not prevent the Debtor from claiming a homestead exemption in the
Property. Accordingly,
THE COURT ORDERS Acar’s objection is OVERRULED.
Dated March 16, 2026 BY THE COURT:
MLE
Michael E. Ro , Judge
United és Bankruptcy Court

9 Id.
10 Id. at 35 (“We hold that § 522(g) does not authorize the bankruptcy court to deny a debtor's homestead
exemption with respect to property that had been fraudulently transferred and then voluntarily reconveyed
pre-petition, even though the retransfer came about through the efforts of a creditor.”)