R v Choudary & Anor - Terrorism Act Offences Appeal

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  Choudary & Anor, R. v [2026] EWCA Crim 395 (18 March 2026)

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[2026] EWCA Crim 395 | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Crim 395 |
| | | CASE NO: 202403036/202403104/202403097/B5 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT WOOLWICH
(WALL J) (T20247016)

| | | Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London
WC2A 2LL |
| | | 18 March 2026 |
B e f o r e :

VICE PRESIDENT OF THE COURT OF APPEAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION
(Lord Justice Edis)
MR JUSTICE GOOSE
HIS HONOUR JUDGE CONRAD KC

| | REX | |
| | - v - | |
| | ANJEM CHOUDARY
KHALED HUSSEIN | |

Computer Aided Transcript of Epiq Europe Ltd,
Lower Ground, 46 Chancery Lane, London WC2A 1JE
Tel No: 020 7404 1400; Email: rcj@epiqglobal.co.uk (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________ MR PAUL HYNES KC & MS KATE O'RAGHALLAIGH appeared on behalf of the Applicant Choudary
MR HOSSEIN ZAHIR KC & MS SHAHIDA BEGUM appeared on behalf of the Applicant Hussein
MR TOM LITTLE KC & MR KELLY BROCKLEHURST appeared on behalf of the Crown

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. THE VICE PRESIDENT, LORD JUSTICE EDIS:
5. Introduction
6. We have before us renewed applications for leave to appeal by Anjem Choudary and Khaled Hussein following refusal by the single judge. Anjem Choudary is now 59?years old. Khaled Hussein is now 31?years old.
8. On 23?July?2024 in the Crown Court at Woolwich before Wall?J, Anjem Choudary was convicted by the jury of directing a?terrorist organisation contrary to section?56 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which was count 1 on the indictment, and a?further offence of supporting a?proscribed organisation contrary to section?12 of the same Act, which was count 3 of the indictment. Khaled Hussein was convicted on the same date of membership of a?proscribed organisation contrary to section?11 of the 2000 Act. The offence alleged against him appeared as count 4 on the indictment. The organisation concerned in count 1 of the indictment was Al-Muhajiroun; the organisation concerned in counts 3 and 4 of the indictment was the Islamic Thinkers Society. This was said to be an?alter ego of Al-Muhajiroun, pursuing the same purposes under a?different name.
10. The trial had started on 4?June?2024. The nature of the prosecution case was reflected in evidence of various kinds, including evidence from undercover officers who had befriended Khaled Hussein in particular and recorded conversations of evidential significance. It also included covertly recorded conversations which took place in Anjem Choudary's home and a?good deal of other evidence, including, importantly to the present application, evidence concerning activities of other people other than these two applicants said to have been carried out in furtherance of the objectives of the organisation or organisations we have described. The nature of the prosecution case was that it was factually complex and required the jury to attend carefully to a?large number of individual pieces of evidence and to assess their significance not as isolated matters but in the overall context which they described. One word used in the submissions before us to describe the nature of a case of this kind was "nuanced". Essentially it was a?complex circumstantial case in which some of the utterances recorded amounted to rather more direct evidence of complicity.
12. We will have to set out the nature of the case in a?little more detail, but it will not be necessary, given the grounds of appeal which we have to consider, to identify everything which was placed before the jury.
14. Before we embark on that process, we should identify the terms of section?56 of the Terrorism Act 2000. This creates an?offence which is called "Directing terrorist organisation". The section itself says this:
16. > "(1) A person commits an offence if he directs, at any level, the activities of an organisation which is concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism.
17. > (2) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for life."
18. The other two offences with which we are concerned arise out of the proscription regime. It is an?offence to support a?proscribed organisation under section?12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and another different offence to be a?member of one under section?11 of the same Act. It is not necessary as an?element of the offence in those cases to prove what the relevant organisation has done or is preparing to do. It may be necessary evidentially to adduce evidence of that kind, but the element of the offence is proved once it is established that the relevant organisation is proscribed. This is different from the position so far as the section?56 offence is concerned. There, the proscription of the relevant organisation may well be highly relevant, but it will not be determinative of its necessary character. Evidence must be adduced in the context of an?offence contrary to section?56 which proves that the organisation is "concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism". We will return to that in a?little more detail when we come to the grounds of appeal against conviction which are advanced before us on behalf of Anjem Choudary.
20. On 30?July?2024 the same judge passed sentence in respect of those offences.
22. Anjem Choudary was sentenced to imprisonment for life, with a?minimum term of 26?years 358 days on count 1. That was a?minimum term assessed at 28?years, from which the judge made the necessary deduction to take account of time spent in custody before sentence. Count 3 resulted in a?special custodial sentence of 8?years, being a?custodial term of 7?years with the necessary statutory extension period of 1 year. That sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence on count 1. It is unnecessary to refer to certain further orders which were made at the same time.
24. Khaled Hussein was sentenced to a?special custodial sentence, with a?custodial term of 5?years and an?extension period of 1 year. That was in respect of the only count which he faced (count 4). Once again, other orders were made which it is unnecessary to recite.
26. Anjem Choudary seeks leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence. Khaled Hussein seeks leave to appeal against sentence only.
28. Both have been represented before us by both leading and junior counsel who represented them at the trial. They do that on a ?pro bono basis, in that they do it without any expectation of being paid any fee for the considerable amount of work involved in what they have done. It is not widely enough known that the Bar commonly provides this kind of service to applicants before this court in order to assist them and us. We are extremely grateful to all four of them for everything which they have done which has advanced their clients' position and assisted the court.
30. The Facts
31. With that introduction we turn to the facts of the case. The prosecution alleged that Anjem Choudary had been a?member of Al-Muhajiroun for many years. The conduct and leadership of that organisation is to some extent a?matter of public record. It was founded by Omar Bakri Mohammed. He had led it for a?number of years, during many of which Anjem Choudary had been a?member of the organisation and a?supporter of Omar Bakri Mohammed. Its aim is to seek to establish an?Islamic Caliphate ruled by sharia law. The establishment of what was proclaimed as a?Caliphate by Islamic State in 2014 was therefore a?matter of great significance to this organisation. The establishment of that caliphate, of course, did not take place in the United Kingdom where Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed had been and where Anjem Choudary at all material times was. Nevertheless the caliphate which they sought to establish is not one which is based on national borders. Accordingly the establishment of a?caliphate was something for which they had hoped and which they sought then to support.
33. Omar Bakri Mohammed left the United Kingdom for the Lebanon at about this time. He was later arrested and imprisoned, being released in about 2023. In his absence, Al-Muhajiroun needed a?leader ? perhaps accurately described as a?caretaker manager. The prosecution case was that Anjem Choudary stepped in in that role in order to lead the organisation and keep it together until its founder and true leader, Omar Bakri Mohammed, could return to continue his work.
35. The prosecution case was that during its life and following its proscription in the United Kingdom, Al-Muhajiroun had continued to exist using other names (Al Ghurabaa was one name, The Saved Sect another), but the prosecution said it was throughout the same organisation which owed allegiance to the same person, namely Omar Bakri Mohammed.
37. The indictment period in count 1 therefore ran from 1?April?2014 to 17?July?2023. These dates were supported by evidence within the case, in that, following Omar Bakri Mohammed's release from imprisonment, a?conversation between him and Choudary was recorded covertly on 27?April?2023. In it, Choudary sought to explain to his chief what he had done to promote the continuation and success of the organisation while Omar Bakri Mohammed was in custody. This conversation was a?very important part of the prosecution case. They said it contained a?series of admissions that during the relevant period, Anjem Choudary had directed the organisation Al-Muhajiroun in the absence of its true leader. As is conventional, this important piece of evidence was referred to at trial by its exhibit number AG/6. We will use the same term. The conversation was picked up by a?covert listening device and ranged widely over the objectives which Al-Muhajiroun shared with other important Islamist organisations. The conversation concerned the leadership of al-Qaeda and also the activities of Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, the man who had declared the Caliphate of Islamic State.
39. There was evidence in addition that from 2022 until he was arrested, Choudary sought to encourage support for Al-Muhajiroun by addressing online meetings of the Islamic Thinkers Society (which was the subject, as we have said, of counts 3 and 4). This is an organisation which exists in the United States of America and which, as the evidence in relation to Khaled Hussein was to show, has links in Canada. ITS (as it was called) had historical links with Al-Muhajiroun. The prosecution accepted that for a?period of time these two organisations had been separate, but they argued before the jury that during the relevant period to this trial (namely, 11?June?2022 and 17?July?2023) the two groups had united. They certainly shared the same ideology and aims, and there was evidence that ITS (the Islamic Thinkers Society) recognised both Omar Bakri Mohammed and Anjem Choudary as leadership figures. The prosecution case was that during that period (2022-2023) support for and membership of ITS was indistinguishable from support for and membership of Al-Muhajiroun. ITS was not proscribed; Al-Muhajiroun was.
41. A?great deal of evidence was placed before the jury to fill in a?lot more detail than we have included in this judgment about the activities of various people to whom we have already referred. One important piece of evidence was that Anjem Choudary had been convicted in 2016 for inviting support for a?proscribed organisation contrary to section?12 of the 2000 Terrorism Act. He was then convicted of inviting support for Islamic State. This allegation related to conduct which occurred at and very soon after Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi had declared the Caliphate in 2014. He was sentenced then to 5?years and 6 months' imprisonment and made the subject of a?Counter Terrorism Notification Order for 15 years. He was released from prison on 19?October?2018. That release was subject to licence conditions which expired on 19?July?2021. The prosecution case was that the activities which it sought to prove in this trial had been carried out by Anjem Choudary despite the constraints which those proceedings and that sentence had imposed upon him.
43. There was evidence that Khaled Hussein was a?determined supporter of Anjem Choudary. There was also evidence about the history of Omar Bakri Mohammed and the Islamic Thinkers Society. That society had been infiltrated by undercover officers in the United States of America. They had created recordings of many of its classes and lectures which they had attended. They also met and conversed with many members of the ITS. That evidence was supplied by the United States of America to counter terrorism officers of the Metropolitan Police and was deployed in this case.
45. There were a?lot of messages, videos and lectures which were relied upon to show the mindset of various actors in this series of events and also the connections between them. We will refer only to one message in any detail, for reasons which will become obvious. On 17?November?2021 Khaled Hussein sent a?voice note to one of the undercover officers which we will quote in full:
47. > "Wallah ahki, listen, I'm not sure how much that will be from me though because I'm working with Sheikh Anjem, a lot. Actually like I'm responsible for the blog that I'm posting, I'm also responsible for the magazine so there's a lot of things I'm responsible for, for Sheikh Anjem and I'm not supposed to be, well ITS isn't supposed to be associating with him right now so thus that's why I'm just I'm kind of trying stay clear for a bit right now. Even like even like I think all of my social media accounts I'm going to have to take ITS and I'm going to let Abu Mujadid know about this too and Allah knows best. What I will be doing though is I'll be starting a new organization you can say called the well right now it will just be media online thing with Dorus and it'll be Dar Al Arqam, Dar Al Arqam Media and Allah knows best. And we'll see you know what goes on with Sheikh Anjem from here till God knows when. But yeah, and you know how the relationship will be between us."
48. That voice note is the subject of Anjem Choudary's third ground of appeal. In it he criticises the direction that the judge gave to the jury about it. It was clearly evidence in the case of Khaled Hussein, who was standing trial alongside Anjem Choudary. The criticism made by Mr?Paul Hynes KC on behalf of Mr?Anjem Choudary is that its evidential status in the case of Anjem Choudary should have been treated differently. It was plainly capable of being very powerful evidence against both of these applicants.
49. The defence cases were conducted in different ways. Anjem Choudary gave evidence in his own defence and sought to deal with all the material that had been advanced against him. He said that he was not and never had been a?supporter of violent means of achieving political change; he was committed to change by peaceful methods. Khaled Hussein did not give evidence.
51. The Grounds of Appeal
52. We turn first then to the three grounds of appeal which are advanced by Mr?Anjem Choudary against conviction. These have been advanced before us in detailed documentation which we have carefully read and succinctly supported by oral submissions this morning advanced by Mr Hynes.
54. •    First, it is said that the judge was wrong to admit evidence of non-defendant bad character, namely, that particular people were members of Al-Muhajiroun during the indictment period, that they had committed terrorist acts as members of that organisation, and that the applicant had been a?director of it at the time when those third parties were committing those acts.
55. •    Secondly, it is contended that the judge was wrong to determine that all the convictions and misconduct relating to non-defendants and Mr?Choudary's own previous conviction (rehearsed above) constituted acts of terrorism for the purposes of proof of the elements of count 1.
56. •    Third, as we have mentioned in passing, it is submitted that the judge failed to direct the jury that the voice note (set out in full above) dating back to 17?November?2021 was not evidence against Mr?Choudary.
57. Ground 1: bad character evidence
58. So far as bad character is concerned, the prosecution made an?application at trial to adduce a?great deal of material about a?large number of people who had been, it was said, active one way or another in support of the aims of Al-Muhajiroun. They submitted that all this material was not in fact bad character evidence for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 at all. On the contrary, the Crown submitted that it was material which had to do with the facts of the offence charged in count 1 on the indictment and was therefore to be considered for admissibility under section?98 of that Act rather than section?100.
60. So far as Mr?Choudary's previous conviction is concerned, that also was said to be admissible under section?98; but if not, should be admitted under section?101 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which deals, as is well known, with evidence of the bad character of a?defendant in criminal proceedings. Gateways 101(1)(c) or in the alternative 101(1)(d) were relied upon.
62. Similar submissions were made by reference to section?101(1) of the 2003 Act in relation to evidence concerning Omar Bakri Mohammed.
64. So far as 'other people' beyond those that we have just named are concerned, the prosecution put the material that they wished to adduce into three categories:
66. •    Category 1 was material relating specifically to the timeframe of count 1, which began, as we have said, in?April?2014. This material was said to show the conduct of a?number of people carried out in the name of or on behalf of Al-Muhajiroun during the indictment period. This evidence included evidence of what was said to be the commission by these people of acts of terrorism. If so, that would satisfy the need under section?56 for evidence that at the time when Anjem Choudary was directing its activities Al-Muhajiroun was concerned in the commission of terrorist acts.
67. •    The second category was material relating to Al-Muhajiroun members prior to?April?2014.
68. •    The third category was 'mindset material', which was said to be relevant to the cases of both defendants at trial. This third category concerned people of whom an?example is Anwar al-Awlaki. He was a?famous Islamist leader who died in about 2006 as a?result of activity involving drones piloted by the United States of America. The reason for admitting material about him was because he was mentioned by defendants in lectures in other parts of the evidence. In order for the jury to know why they might be mentioning him, it was necessary to tell them who and what he was.
69. It is unnecessary to say any more about the second and third categories of non-defendant bad character evidence advanced by the prosecution. That is because the judge ruled that the second category should not be admitted at all. The third category was ultimately dealt with by agreement. The judge's ruling which is the subject of the complaint in Grounds 1 and 2 concerned the first category only; that is, conduct of non-defendants during the indictment period.
71. The judge described this category in his ruling as being "people whom the prosecution say the jury could infer were members of Al-Muhajiroun at the time when they could infer that it was being run by Choudary and who during that time engaged in acts of terrorism". The judge in his succinct but comprehensive ruling summarised the nature of the material and the submissions which had been advanced before him about it. He recorded the submission that it was all admissible by reason of section?98 and not within section?100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. He did not directly rule on it because he said that if he considered admissibility under the provisions of section?100 that would be to the benefit of Anjem Choudary, in that it could only then be admitted if it satisfied the enhanced relevance test set out in the statute. He said:
73. > "I?have no hesitation in finding that this evidence has substantial probative value to the issue I?have identified which is in issue as part of this trial. That issue is one which must be proved by the prosecution and is therefore of substantial importance in the context of the trial as a?whole."
74. The judge then went on to consider whether, notwithstanding it was admissible under the provisions of section?100 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, he should exclude it under section?78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. He declined to exercise his discretion in favour of exclusion and therefore admitted the evidence in this category. He recorded that it would be necessary to give the jury careful directions about how they should treat this material and the conviction of Choudary in particular, but held, "The potential probative value of the evidence to the prosecution is such that it would be unfair to exclude it". In consequence of that ruling, the material was largely placed before the jury by way of agreed facts.
76. The judge came at the conclusion of the evidence to give the jury legal directions. These legal directions are the subject only of focused criticism in this application. In general it is right to record that they are clear, accurate and expressed in language which the jury will readily have understood. They therefore fulfil the purpose of legal directions in a?case of this kind admirably. We will come to the criticised parts in a moment.
78. The direction that the judge gave to the jury about the elements of the offence set out in count 1 is not criticised. The judge directed the jury that they had to be sure that Al-Muhajiroun was concerned in acts of terrorism, and that the prosecution would succeed in doing that if they made the jury sure that members of Al-Muhajiroun engaged in acts of terrorism while they were members of that organisation and while Anjem Choudary was involved in directing it. He made the distinction between the section?56 offence and the sections 11 and 12 offences which we have recorded at the start of this judgment. He then summarised the evidence which he said was capable of showing that individual non-defendants were members of Al-Muhajiroun at the relevant time and that they had engaged in acts of terrorism. For the most part these acts of terrorism culminated in convictions of the people concerned for offences of supporting or promoting or in other ways advancing the objectives of proscribed organisations. In terms of actual violence during the indictment period perpetrated by suggested members of Al-Muhajiroun, the evidence was more limited. It was principally directed to the activities of a?British man, Siddhartha Dhar, who had travelled to the Middle East in order to join Islamic State and had there participated in Islamic State executions by beheading people. Videos of this activity are said to exist. The judge directed the jury that they had to decide whether this various conduct was one or more acts of terrorism by a?member of Al-Muhajiroun and defined "terrorism" for them.
80. The judge then gave a?direction under the heading "Non-defendants' convictions and/or conduct". Again he summarised shortly the evidence which was the subject of this direction and the rival parties' cases about it. The defence case, as there summarised, was that Al-Muhajiroun had ceased to exist long before the individuals concerned committed their acts of terrorism and therefore had no role in directing these activities. The judge directed the jury that they had to resolve that dispute on the totality of the evidence but then gave them this warning:
82. > "However you must not find Anjem Choudary guilty by reason of his knowing people who themselves committed criminal offences. We do not have guilt by association in this country. You should use this strand of evidence in the limited way in which I?have directed you and not allow it to prejudice in any way your consideration of the rest of the evidence."
83. He then gave them a?further direction about the evidence of speeches, lectures and demonstrations which had been placed before them. Almost all of that evidence related to lawful activity which was designed to show the ideological commitment of Anjem Choudary to the objects of the organisation, Al-Muhajiroun, and indeed the commitment of others too. The judge therefore directed the jury that it was irrelevant whether they agreed or disagreed with the views that were being advanced during these demonstrations or lectures and said:
85. > "Anjem Choudary's decision to participate in them does not go directly towards proving his guilt."
86. The purpose of this direction was to avoid the jury being prejudiced by any distaste they may feel for the world view which was promoted at these demonstrations and to treat the evidence only in the way for which it had properly been admitted.
88. There then followed a?further direction about how they should treat other parts of the non-defendant bad character evidence, and he concluded this part of the direction with these words:
90. > "I?warn you again that you must not think that Anjem Choudary is guilty simply because of any connection you might find that he had with any of these people. Beware the impermissibility of seeking to find guilt by association."
91. Those are the directions which it is necessary for us to refer to in this judgment in order to deal with Grounds 1 and 2 of this application.
93. In order to consider Ground 3 (the 'hearsay' ground) we should record this direction before leaving the summing-up:
95. > "Where what he [Khaled Hussein] says touches on the case of Anjem Choudary, you will want to be careful in deciding how much weight to attach to it when considering Anjem Choudary's case. Remember that Anjem Choudary was not there to dispute what was being said by Khaled Hussein when he said it, and that because Khaled Hussein has not given evidence at this trial, he did not have the opportunity to challenge him here about anything he said in the past."
96. Discussion and decision on grounds of appeal
98. Admission of non-defendant bad character evidence
99. In our judgment the judge was clearly right to admit the evidence in the disputed category. This was, we repeat, evidence of activity during the indictment period which the jury could infer was being carried out on behalf of Al-Muhajiroun at a?time when they could infer Anjem Choudary was directing its activities. An?offence under section?56 of the Terrorism Act 2000 does not depend on proof of proscription of the organisation concerned; it depends upon evidence of what that organisation was actually doing. Given that the defendant charged with such an?offence is charged as a?person directing others rather than necessarily carrying out such activities themselves, it is impossible to see how an?allegation of an?offence under section?56 could proceed without evidence of what those others were actually doing. It is the essence of the offence. For that reason we consider that the judge would have been right to admit the material, applying section?98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, and that he need not have gone to section?100. He did that, as we have recorded, in the interests of fairness because that meant that he applied a?test of enhanced relevance. We agree with the judge that whichever test of relevance is applied this evidence clearly surmounts it.
101. So far as his decision under section?78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is concerned, we agree with that as well. The evidence was highly probative. The judge carefully guarded against any risk of prejudice. in the directions we have referred to. In those circumstances it is impossible to say that his decision under section?78 was not one that it was properly open to him to reach. For those reasons we consider that Ground 1 is not arguably made out. This was a?strong case against Anjem Choudary, abundantly supported by AG/6 in particular. The evidence of non-defendant bad character in the first of the prosecution's three categories was necessary to describe the nature of the organisation concerned.
103. Moving to the second ground, which is a?different way of approaching the same subject matter, we need only add that in our judgment the conduct which was proved by the admission of the convictions of Anjem Choudary himself and the other named persons in the agreed facts did amount to proof that Al-Muhajiroun was concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism during the relevant period. That is so notwithstanding the narrow focus of the evidence of the perpetration of actual acts of violence revealed in that evidence. This is because of the terms of section?56 of the Terrorism Act 2000, section?20 of the Terrorism Act 2006 and section?1(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000.
105. Section?56 requires proof that the defendant directs at any level the activities of an?organisation which is concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism.
106. Section?20(2) of the Terrorism Act 2006 defines, for the purposes of that part of that Act and also for the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000, "terrorism" as including "anything constituting an?action taken for the purposes of terrorism within the meaning of the Terrorism Act 2000: see section?1(5) of that Act".
107. Section?1(5) of that Act says:
108. > "In this Act a reference to action taken for the purposes of terrorism includes a reference to action taken for the benefit of a proscribed organisation."
109. In our judgment those wide definitional sections clearly admit the evidence of the acts which we have described as evidence of activities concerned in the commission of acts of terrorism for the purposes of section?56. For those reasons and for the reasons that we have already given in dealing with the first ground, we consider that Ground 2 of the proposed appeal is similarly unarguable.
111. Ground 3 concerns the voice note from?November?2021, the text of which we have set out in full earlier in this judgment. We have also set out the judge's direction about it. We approach this ground on the basis that the evidence of what Khaled Hussein said to the undercover officer was hearsay so far as the case of Anjem Choudary was concerned. It was clearly not hearsay in his own case because it contained admissions of guilt.
113. So far as Anjem Choudary is concerned, the evidence could have been admitted under section?114(1) (d) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 on the grounds that it was in the interests of justice that it should be admitted. No such decision was ever made by the judge because the material was before the jury in the case of the co-defendant. It is inherent in the direction that the judge gave to the jury about it that he accepted that it was admissible evidence in the case of Choudary, albeit evidence which required the particular warning that he gave them. In our judgment that was a?proper approach for the judge to take. The principal questions in deciding whether to admit hearsay material in circumstances of this kind will concern its reliability and the extent to which the jury can safely assess it. Those principles were recently restated by this court in R?v BOB [2024] EWCA Crim 1494; [2025] 1 WLR 1101. It is important to record that the evidence sat within the case against Anjem Choudary; it did not comprise the whole of the case against him. There was therefore a?good deal of other material against which the jury could test the reliability and truthfulness of what Khaled Hussein said to the undercover officer. Moreover, it was on its face reliable material because there was no obvious reason why Khaled Hussein should lie to a?person whom he believed to be a?trusted associate about the conduct of Anjem Choudary, a?person whom he believed they both admired, respected and followed. In those circumstances the evidence was, in our judgment, clearly admissible as hearsay in the case of Anjem Choudary even if he had not been standing trial alongside Khaled Hussein. What was then required was an appropriate direction to the jury which warned them of reasons why they should treat it with caution. The judge gave them that direction as we have recorded above. For all of these reasons, we consider that Ground 3 of Anjem Choudary's appeal against conviction is also not arguable and we therefore refuse leave to appeal against conviction in its entirety.
115. The sentence applications
116. Anjem Choudary
117. The judge imposed a?sentence on count 1 which he described as the lead offence. He said that he would impose a?sentence on count 3 which would be concurrent with the sentence on count 1, but it followed that the sentence on count 1 would be increased to take count 3 into account. The judge correctly observed that there is no Sentencing Council Guideline for the offence of directing a?terrorist organisation. There is also very limited guidance to be derived from any previous decisions under that section from this court. It is an?offence which is very rarely prosecuted and therefore there is no body of material which the judge can consult when assessing sentence. It is also true that this is an offence which is particularly fact sensitive. The nature of the organisation, its activities, the acts of terrorism and the conduct of the person who is guilty of the offence, him or herself, will all vary widely and will require an?assessment by the sentencing judge. The judge correctly approached this exercise by assessing culpability and harm, having regard to the fact that Parliament has decided that the maximum sentence available for an offence under section?56 should be one of life imprisonment. The judge also reminded himself of the statutory aims of sentencing ? in this case that included the punishment, the protection of the public and the reduction of crime through deterrence. He derived that approach from the Sentencing Council general guideline on overarching principles.
119. The judge who had heard the trial and listened to Anjem Choudary giving evidence at some length arrived at some factual decisions which he said led to the conclusion that Choudary's conduct involved "the highest culpability". Choudary's involvement in Al-Muhajiroun had extended over many years and more than one decade. His conduct was planned, deliberate, committed and determined. He had been involved in the organisation from the start and took it over from Omar Bakri Mohammed knowing that it was a?proscribed organisation. He then played a?leading role in its activities over a?long period of time. His previous conviction was for conduct which was associated with this behaviour but distinct from it, and the resulting sentence had not deflected him from continued serious criminality after he had served it.
121. Having assessed the culpability as being at the highest level the judge turned to the harm caused, which he considered was of the most serious. Here he referred to the convictions which had been the subject of the first category of the bad character evidence which had been admitted. This was a?group of people who had committed numerous terrorist offences. Some of them had made plans to travel to the Middle East to join Islamic State. One of them, Siddhartha Dhar, had behaved in the way we have already described when he got there. The judge found that Choudary knew and intended that these people would behave in that way. He therefore concluded that his conduct directing Al-Muhajiroun ran the risk of causing or contributing to the deaths of very many people. It also contributed in a?significant way to the fear of terrorist attack by radical Islamist organisations in the United Kingdom and beyond.
123. The judge therefore assessed the proper sentence by way of a?starting point of 25?years' imprisonment. He checked that against Sentencing Council Definitive Guidelines for offences related to the offence with which he was dealing. There is a?Guideline for offences of Preparation of terrorist acts contrary to section?5 of the 2006 Act and another for membership of a?proscribed organisation contrary to section?11 of the Terrorism Act 2000. These did not dictate the sentencing level for the present offence of course but operated as a?useful check of the correctness of the conclusion to which the judge had come.
125. The judge then considered the aggravating features, in the context of which he referred to matters which had already been mentioned in dealing with culpability and harm but which were particularly egregious and required an?uplift in his judgment. He concluded that there was no mitigation and that the starting point of 25?years therefore required an increase to 28?years which would also factor in the separable conduct reflected in count 3 of promoting the activities of the Islamic Thinkers Society.
127. The judge then turned to an?assessment of the dangerousness. He was satisfied, for reasons which are probably obvious from what we have already said, that this applicant is a dangerous man for the purposes of the statutory regime. In those circumstances the judge decided that a?life sentence was unavoidable. That was so because of the persistence and determination through many decades of his ideologically motivated criminal conduct. There was no reason to suppose that this applicant will ever be deflected from behaving in the way which brought him to face this sentence. In those circumstances the judge decided that a?life sentence was required and that the sentence which he had assessed (of 28?years) should be imposed as a?minimum term against that life sentence. It required adjustment for the time spent on remand, which it received, and the eventual sentence was life with a?minimum term of 26?years and 358 days.
129. The grounds of appeal against that sentence contend that the life sentence was unnecessary and that the minimum term was based on a?sentence of 28?years which was manifestly excessive and wrong in principle. In essence these grounds of appeal rely on the fact that Mr?Choudary has not himself ever been shown to have participated in any terrorist acts of violence or any attack planning which directly resulted in such acts being committed by others. Al-Muhajiroun, as Mr?Hynes put it in his oral submissions to us this morning, was in substance mostly a?"talking shop". Most of its activity involved Dawah, which is proselytisation, for the purposes of this case at least of a?particular form of Islamist belief described as Salafism. This does not necessarily involve acts of violence or terrorism, and as Mr?Hynes put it to us this morning in this case, mostly did not involve any such things. Mr?Hynes invites us to step back and look at the impact of the sentence that was imposed and to ask ourselves anxiously whether it was necessary in the circumstances of this case.
131. The single judge refusing leave gave very succinct reasons which cover, in our judgment, all the relevant matters:
133. > "I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal which are confined to the sentence on Count 1 of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 28 years for the offence of directing a terrorist organisation of which you were convicted by the jury.
134. > The trial judge was entitled to conclude, for the reasons he gave, that your culpability was high; you were a founder member of ALM, took over its management from Omar Bakri Mohammed ('OBM') knowing it was a proscribed organisation and then played a leading role within it for an extended period. ALM was actively engaged in terrorism and the judge was entitled to infer that named individuals acted under direction and were inspired, supported, and encouraged by you in relation to acts of terrorism including beheading in the name of Islamic State. Your culpability was aggravated by your previous conviction for a terrorist offence and being subject to Counter Terrorism Notification Requirements and the encouragement of young men to engage in radical activity. A modest (unspecified) upward adjustment was made to the sentence for the offence charged as Count 3, for which a concurrent determinate sentence of 7 years' imprisonment was imposed.
135. > The judge acknowledged that no finding could be made that you planned any particular terrorist act but was entitled to find you dangerous for the reasons he articulated and that it was necessary to pass a sentence of life imprisonment given your role, mindset and determination. The minimum term of 28 years less the period already served on remand was an appropriate sentence by reference to other terrorism guidelines, the facts of your offence and the absence of any mitigating factors. There are no arguable grounds of appeal against your sentence."
136. We have asked ourselves with particular concern the question which Mr?Hynes puts to us. In the end we have concluded that this is a?case of exceptional gravity, persistence and duration, despite the conviction of himself and the convictions of others, and despite the deaths suffered by and caused by his associates. Although we accept the points made by Mr?Hynes, we are unable to say that the sentence imposed by the judge was arguably manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. We would make the point in reaching that conclusion that, although we have reached the conclusion that the application is not properly arguable, we have given it the same level of consideration that it would have received had it come to us as an?appeal with leave from the single judge.
138. Khaled Hussein
139. We turn then and finally to the sentence application advanced by Mr?Hossein Zahir KC on behalf of his client, Khaled Hussein. The judge placed this case as one falling within category B of the Sentencing Council Guideline for offences of membership of a?proscribed organisation. Khaled Hussein was involved in this activity for a?very much shorter period of time than Anjem Choudary, but he was involved for over 2?years. His activities in support of the organisation of which he was a?member were limited in scope, but the judge decided that he would reflect that by reducing the Guideline starting point of 7?years to one of 6?years. The judge identified no substantial aggravating factors except a?refusal to provide the police with a?PIN number to his electrical equipment at the time of his arrest. He did identify mitigation. Khaled Hussein has no previous convictions or police cautions either in the United Kingdom or Canada. There were strong and moving testimonials as to his character from his mother and other members of his family and a work colleague. It was also the case that Khaled Hussein was drawn into this activity because of the influence exercised over him by Anjem Choudary. The judge nevertheless found that he knew perfectly well what he was becoming involved in and was anxious to become ever more deeply involved in it. Mr?Zahir makes the point to us that the organisation, Islamic Thinkers Society, was not a proscribed organisation in the jurisdiction where Mr?Hussein lived, Canada. He was however fully aware that it was closely associated with Al-Muhajiroun which was proscribed in this jurisdiction. The voice note that we have set out above contains evidence which supports that.
141. Balancing all those matters, the judge arrived at a?sentence of 5?years' imprisonment. Section?278 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires that he be treated as an?offender of particular concern, which resulted in an?additional period of 1 year's licence.
143. Mr?Zahir on his behalf has made the points that are available to him and in substance has submitted that the judge's categorisation of this offence as falling squarely within category B was an?error; it should either have been within category C or, at worst, have been found to be on the cusp between categories B and C.
145. The single judge in refusing leave again gave succinct but comprehensive reasons:
147. > "I have considered the papers in your case and your grounds of appeal.
148. > Although your role was limited in time and the organisation of which you became a part was not proscribed in Canada where you lived, the trial judge was entitled to find that you were aware of its nature and its status in the U.K. (as a proscribed organisation) and place your culpability in Category B under the Guideline: you were actively providing support to Anjem Choudary intermittently in various ways over 2 years, with the intent of promoting a terrorist organisation that sought to achieve religious arms through violent means. The offence was aggravated by your refusal to provide the police with the PIN to your laptop tablet after your arrest. Your previous good character and other personal mitigating factors were reflected in the reduction in the custodial term to 5 years. It is not arguable that the judge erred in arriving at the sentence that he did or that there are grounds for arguing the sentence was manifestly excessive."
149. We respectfully agree with the single judge and with the sentencing judge that the sentence imposed on this young man was not manifestly excessive or wrong in principle. His activities were not extensive, but they were activities. He was not an?inert and inactive member of this organisation. He was doing what he could to further its aims, and as we have recorded and as the judge found, wanted to become ever more deeply involved in it. He was prevented from achieving that aim by the intervention of the police. In those circumstances, in our judgment, the sentence imposed upon him was a?moderate and proportionate sentence which takes into account all relevant factors. We therefore refuse him also leave to appeal against sentence.

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