Hoarean v Read - Funeral Arrangements Dispute

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  Hoarean v Read [2026] EWHC 763 (Ch) (23 March 2026)

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[2026] EWHC 763 (Ch) | | |
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If this Transcript is to be reported or published, there is a requirement to ensure that no reporting restriction will be breached. This is particularly important in relation to any case involving a sexual offence, where the victim is guaranteed lifetime anonymity (Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992), or where an order has been made in relation to a young person.
| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 763 (Ch) |
| | | Case No: CH-2024-000305 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
CHANCERY APPEALS (ChD)

| | | The Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London
EC4A 1NL |
| | | 23 March 2026 |
B e f o r e :

MR JUSTICE RAJAH

Between:
| | JULIE KAREN HOAREAN | Appellant |
| | - and - | |
| | PAUL ANTHONY READ | Respondent |

Digital Transcription by Marten Walsh Cherer Ltd.
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____________________ The Appellant did not attend and was not represented
The Respondent appeared in Person

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT APPROVED ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

2. MR JUSTICE RAJAH:
4. Theo Read died on 31 August 2024 aged 18. Julie Hoarean is his mother. Paul Read is his father. This claim is a dispute between them as to who should arrange his funeral and what should happen to his ashes. His father wants to scatter them on Dartmoor. His mother wants them divided so that she has half the ashes and can inter them in her family's grave.
6. On 3 December 2024, the final hearing of Mr?Read's Part 8 Claim came before Chief Master Shuman. The Chief Master granted letters of administration to Mr?Read limited to the making of the funeral arrangements and disposal of the ashes in accordance with the schedule to her order. The schedule provided for these arrangements: firstly, that Mr?Read would make all of the necessary funeral arrangements for the cremation of Theo which would take place at Henley Road Cemetery, All Hallows Road in Caversham; secondly, upon cremation Theo's ashes would be given to Mr?Read to dispose of by scattering in Dartmoor National Park, having regard to any considerations set out on the Dartmoor website; thirdly, Mr?Read would use his best efforts to notify in good time Ms?Hoarean and other family members who wished to attend the cremation and the scattering of the ashes; fourthly, Ms?Hoarean should be given an opportunity to spend time with Theo's body in advance of the time of the cremation, and Ms?Hoarean was permitted to have a memorial service in advance of the cremation and fifthly that Mr?Read would arrange via the Reading Borough Council cemetery office for a plaque to honour the life of Theo to be placed at Henley Road Cemetery for such period as he considered fit.
8. Ms?Hoarean issued an appeal notice on 19 December 2024 seeking permission to appeal that decision and applying for a stay of execution of the order. The application for a stay came before Trower J on 20 December 2024 and he stayed paragraph [2] of the Schedule to Chief Master Shuman's order in relation to the distribution of ashes and so the funeral and cremation has gone ahead but Theo's ashes remain undisposed of. That stay was a stay for the duration of this appeal.
10. On 12 February 2025 Marcus Smith J extended time for the filing of an appeal bundle to 31 May 2025. He had before him at that point a letter which had been submitted on behalf of Ms?Hoarean from her GP, Dr Back. I will come back to the letters from Dr?Back in a moment.
12. On 16 June 2025 Marcus Smith J granted a short, further extension to the end of July 2025 and directed that if the appeal bundle was not filed by the end of 2025 there needed to be a case management hearing. He had again before him another letter from Dr?Back dated 27 May 2025 but Marcus Smith J said that it was not simply a matter of whether the appellant was well enough to continue with this appeal, he had to balance the interests of Mr?Read, Theo and the public interest in relation to the disposal of these ashes.
14. On 11 July 2025 Marcus Smith J set aside his order of 16 June because he had before him another letter from Dr?Back dated 25 June 2025. On the basis of what he had seen in that letter, Marcus Smith J made a final extension of time to November 2025 for the filing of the appeal bundle and directed that unless that deadline was met, the appeal would be struck out. On 24 July he gave permission for the bundle to include new evidence without prejudice to what might happen to Ms?Hoarean's application to rely on fresh evidence. That appeal bundle was filed by the end of November 2025 and when the matter came back before Marcus Smith J, he directed that there should be one hearing to determine whether permission to appeal should be granted and if it was granted, then the appeal should follow immediately afterwards, what is sometimes referred to as a rolled up hearing.
16. This is that hearing. How this hearing came to be fixed is another matter which I must just briefly explain. On 29 December, so a week after Marcus Smith J ordering this rolled up hearing, Chancery Listing asked Ms?Hoarean for her dates to avoid between 14 April and 31 July 2026. The next day they adjusted that window to say that they needed dates of availability from 16?February to 31 July 2026. There was no response to that email, so they chased on 9 January. On 13 January Ms?Hoarean responded saying simply that she was unavailable until July 2026 with no further explanation of why.
18. On the same day Chancery listing responded saying that it was unsuitable to allow this hearing not to be listed until July 2026 and they said it would be listed in a three day window from 23 March 2026, which is today, with a time estimate of one day. Ms?Hoarean's response on the same day was that she had advised in good time that she was unavailable until July 2026 and therefore unable to attend any hearing listed in March 2026 and she referred to the fact that the court held her disability accommodations on file. "A listing on a date I have confirmed I cannot attend cannot proceed", she said.
20. She followed up that email to Listing with a further email about a month later on 9 February 2026 when she said:
22. > "On 13 January 2026 in response to your email of 9 January, I confirmed that I am unavailable to attend any hearing before July 2026. This arises from pre-existing proceedings, limitation periods and health complications and constraints, all of which were already engaged prior to the sealed order being emailed out on 22 December 2025."
23. She went on a little later to say:
24. > "A listing officer cannot override a party's stated availability as that function is outside administrative authority. The court is aware of the accommodation extended in this matter throughout and holds on file my disability related accommodations and safeguarding accommodations arising from domestic abuse and post separation control by the respondent. In that context repeated contact and the imposition of a deadline over the Christmas period, holiday period, were unnecessary and undermined the accommodations the court had put in place. My position on availability therefore remains unchanged. I am not available to attend any hearing before July 2026."
25. That was responded to by a listing officer from Chancery Listing saying:
27. > "Listing hearings is a judicial function which at the High Court is delegated to listing officers and July 2026 is an unacceptable delay to list a one day hearing, especially where reasons for unavailability have not been provided. You are welcome to apply to a judge to vacate and relist the hearing and if you wish to do this it would need to be made by way of formal application notice on form N244."
28. Nothing further was heard in February but on 2 March there was a letter sent by Dr?Back to Marcus Smith J. There was a response to Dr Back by the clerk to Marcus Smith J saying that as he was no longer dealing with this case, that letter would be placed on CE-file.
29. On Thursday 19 March, ie last week, my clerk, Ms?Galdem, sent emails to both parties saying that this hearing would be heard on 23 March before me. On the same day, Ms?Hoarean objected, referring to Dr?Back's letter of 2 March to Marcus Smith J. On Friday 20 March I directed that the hearing would go ahead but Ms?Hoarean could ask to attend remotely if she wished. No such request was received. Later that day Dr?Back sent to me via my clerk his letter of 2 March 2026 to Marcus Smith J and said in his email that the contents remained current.
31. I am going to look at Dr?Back's letters but I remind myself that the proper approach to the assessment of medical evidence relied on in support of an adjournment application was considered by Norris J in a case called Levy v Ellis-Carr [2012] EWHC 63 where he said this:
33. > "Such evidence should identify the medical attendant and give details of his familiarity with the party's medical condition (detailing all recent consultations), should identify with particularity what the patient's medical condition is and the features of that condition which (in the medical attendant's opinion) prevent participation in the trial process, should provide a reasoned prognosis and should give the court some confidence that what is being expressed is an independent opinion after a proper examination. It is being tendered as expert evidence. The court can then consider what weight to attach to that opinion, and what arrangements might be made (short of an adjournment) to accommodate a party's difficulties. No judge is bound to accept expert evidence: even a proper medical report falls to be considered simply as part of the material as a whole (including the previous conduct of the case)."
34. This guidance given by Norris J has been approved in a number of later decisions including by Lewison LJ in Forresters Ketley v Brent [2012] EWCA Civ 324 at [26] and again by the Court of Appeal in GMC v Hayat [2018] EWCA Civ 2796 at [48]. In the Forresters Ketley case Lewison LJ also said the following:
36. > "Judges are often faced with late applications for adjournment by litigants in person on medical grounds. An adjournment is not simply there for the asking. While the court must recognise that litigants in person are not as used to the stresses of appearing in court as professional advocates, nevertheless something more than stress occasioned by the litigation will be needed to support an application for an adjournment. In cases where the applicant complains of stress-related illness, an adjournment is unlikely to serve any useful purpose because the stress will simply recur on an adjourned hearing."
37. I have got to keep in mind in this case that there has already been considerable delay in dealing with the ashes of Theo. The interests which are engaged are not just those of the appellant but also those of Mr?Read, also those of Theo although he is deceased and the interests of his family and his friends and to no small measure the public interest in the proper disposal of a body promptly after death and with appropriate respect.
39. The first point to make, of course, is that this hearing has been listed for today. Ms?Hoarean was told that if she wanted to move this hearing, she should make an application. No application has been made. This morning a draft application was sent to the court but no fee was paid and it has not been issued. That application seeks an adjournment on the basis of the medical evidence of Dr?Back in his letter of 2 March and in the alternative it asks for a stay of any order which is made today. That is not, in fact, an issued application, it has not been served on Mr?Read. This morning he said to me he opposed an application and he became emotional in relation to the delay which this is causing and the extra stress which he is feeling while it continues to hang over him and I think that is an important consideration.
41. What has been provided to me is a letter of Dr?Back of 2 March. I have also read the letters of Dr?Back which I have already referred to of 31 October 2024, 9 January 2025, 27 May 2025, and 25 June 2025. Most of those letters state that they are confidential to the judge. They have not been seen by Mr?Read. That is not right. If a party wishes to rely on medical evidence, it needs to be put before the court in a form it can be shown to the opposing party so that the opposing party has an opportunity to address it.
43. In an appropriate case it may be appropriate to have redactions or some other steps which are taken to conceal truly confidential or private information but none of that has happened here. There has just been a blanket embargo imposed in the letter from Dr?Back saying:
45. > "This letter is confidential to the judge and there is no consent to share it with any other party given it contains medical information on my patient."
46. So there is no application to adjourn and no evidence in support of it which can be shared with the respondent. That is not fair. I am going to treat that evidence as before the court and I will, therefore, refer to it in this judgment. In summary, what these letters say is that Ms?Hoarean suffers from complex PTSD, that she has spiking blood pressure to dangerous levels and that she has dysphonia which means that she has difficulty being heard and she needs someone to speak on her behalf.
48. The first two conditions are all said to be linked to this litigation and in these letters Dr?Back says that it is in no small part down to a history of domestic abuse of Ms?Hoarean by Mr?Read. If I take the first letter, 31 October 2024, he says:
50. > "It is important that Ms?Hoarean is protected from any direct contact with or exposure to her ex-partner given she has been subjected to abuse at his hands."
51. In the letter of 9 January 2025 he says that what has caused her complex PTSD is as follows:
53. > "The abuse Ms?Hoarean has suffered coupled with the prolonged and adversarial court processes during her son's life has left her with significant psychological and physical scars. Reliving these experiences as part of the current proceedings has had a profoundly harmful effect on her health and wellbeing."
54. Later he says:
56. > "?her health issues have been significantly exacerbated by the inevitability of her ex-partner revisiting on her the traumatic harms inflicted in a court setting in addition to losing her son. The picture I see presented is one where her ex-partner has effectively weaponized the court process as a means to continue his abuse and to completely exclude her as Theo's mother."
57. In that same letter:
58. > "The court proceedings have allowed her ex-partner to perpetuate a narrative that Ms?Hoarean is uncaring and disinterested in her son's life. He has accused her of delaying the funeral for self-serving reasons. However, I strongly refute this characterisation. In the six years that I have served as Ms?Hoarean's GP she has consistently demonstrated a deep love and unwavering commitment to her son's wellbeing.
59. > Mr?Read has often acted contrary to their son's best interests. Despite this the professionals involved in her son's case have seemingly treated Mr?Read with undue favour leaving Ms?Hoarean feeling helpless. The fact this dynamic continues in the aftermath of her son's death and within the court has compounded her trauma."
60. Then on 27 May he returns to this theme:
62. > "The devastating loss of her son, the legal actions initiated by Mr?Read and his conduct in relation to her son's funeral arrangements have exacerbated her complex post traumatic stress disorder."
63. Then on 25 June, again:
64. > "The tragic death of her son compounded by the ongoing actions of her ex-partner in denying her access to his ashes- her sole remaining connection she has to him - has had a damaging impact on her complex post traumatic stress disorder. This situation is further compounded by years of controlling behaviour by her ex-partner who severed their relationship during their son's life and continues to exclude her posthumously through legal channels."
65. Then we finally arrive at the letter of 2 March 2026, which is the letter which is being relied upon in support of the adjournment:
67. > "In my professional opinion she is not fit at this time to participate in high stress or adversarial court proceedings?
68. > ?Her former partner is involved in both the inquest and the present proceedings within a documented history of abuse and controlling behaviour. He severed her relationship with their son during his life and continues to exclude her posthumously through these legal proceedings, denying her access to his ashes, her sole remaining connection to him. It is my clinical opinion that the continuing intense adversarial nature and the actions of her former partner in these processes has directly contributed to her clinical decline.
69. > Remote attendance remains necessary. In addition, due to the ongoing severity of her dysphonea she will require a third party or intermediary to speak on her behalf as a reasonable adjustment for her disabilities."
70. And later:
71. > "Ms?Hoarean cannot engage in these proceedings before July 2026."
72. As will have appeared from those excerpts, some of the language which has been used in these letters by Dr?Back, is most unusual to see in a letter from a GP. In many respects they read as if they were written by Ms?Hoarean rather than an independent doctor. I am, however, proceeding on the basis that they are letters from Dr?Back but I am not satisfied with that medical evidence. There is no reference in any of those letters to when he last examined Ms?Hoarean. The description of the medical condition as PTSD, spiking blood pressure and dysphonea is very high level and vague.
74. It is not at all clear to me what Dr?Back understands about these proceedings. His description of these proceedings as an attempt at continuing to exert controlling behaviour by the respondent is at odds with the fact that this is actually the appellant's appeal. Those letters in the terms in which they have been written do not convince me that they have the requisite quality of independence to be treated as expert evidence.
76. They make assertion of domestic abuse of Ms?Hoarean by Mr?Read as if it is fact and there is no explanation as to where Dr?Back has got this information that there was domestic abuse. That is something which does not seem to have featured in the evidence before the court below, or if it did it was not regarded as relevant by the chief master. It does not seem to sit well with the fact that what was recorded by the court below was the fact that Theo was removed from Ms?Hoarean's care at a young age and entrusted to his father because of Ms?Hoarean's emotional abuse of Theo. Now, it may be that there was domestic abuse of Ms?Hoarean by Mr?Read. I do not know. But there is clearly a much more complex picture than is being painted in Dr?Back's letters which seem to me to be one-sided.
78. In addition, there is no reasoned prognosis. The genesis of the suggestion that Ms?Hoarean is not able to deal with a hearing until July appears to have come from Ms?Hoarean, not Dr?Back. In her emails between her and listing no explanation was provided for the peremptory statement that she cannot deal with this until July. What is the significance of July except that it is at the end of the window which was offered by listing? In Dr?Back's letter of 2 March which I have just referred to and quoted, it is simply baldly stated that she cannot deal with the proceedings until July but no explanation of why and no explanation as to what will change in July and why she will be able to deal with it, if that is the position, in July. There is no explanation as to whether in July there will be yet another letter from Dr?Back asking for yet another adjournment.
80. It seems to me that there is a history of delay in relation to this appeal which cannot be allowed to continue. The interests of Theo, his father, his family, his friends and the public interest are in his body being disposed of with proper decency and respect and without further delay. This is not achieved by his ashes sitting indefinitely in a box while this appeal is repeatedly delayed and adjourned. So, this morning I indicated that I would refuse to vacate this hearing and I would deal with the application for permission to appeal and, if granted, the appeal thereafter, and give my reasons for refusing to adjourn when I gave judgment. I have now given my reasons.
82. I turn, therefore, to the judgment which is under appeal. At the trial before Chief Master Shuman the Chief Master heard oral evidence from both mother and father. Ms?Hoarean was represented by counsel who cross-examined Mr?Read. Mr?Read appeared in person and was not allowed to cross-examine Ms?Hoarean but was allowed to put questions which the Chief Master put to Ms?Hoarean. The Chief Master found that both mother and father loved Theo deeply but the historical breakdown of the mother's relationship with the father and Theo had impacted her evidence negatively. The Chief Master explained that she preferred Mr?Read's evidence to Ms?Hoarean's wherever it was disputed.
84. In her judgment, Chief Master Shuman reviewed the law and concluded, correctly, at [26]:
86. > "What these authorities effectively state is that each case will be very different, they will be highly fact-sensitive, but that in particular the court should consider the overarching principle, which is that there should be a decent and respectful disposal of the body without undue delay. That the court, in addition, should consider the deceased's wishes, the wishes of the deceased's family and friends and the location with which the deceased was mostly connected. Although the court is not constrained to consider only these factors but they are plainly of significance when the court has an issue such as this before it."
87. In relation to Ms?Hoarean's counsel's approach to the earlier Family Court proceedings, she said this at paragraphs [15] and [16]:
89. > "The mother has also exhibited extensive documents providing a selection or snapshots from the Family Court proceedings. In terms of the other documentation, some of the cross-examination by counsel of the father concerned a note in general practitioner records in August 2017. That referred to Theo being of a very low mood following the separation from his mother. That relates to events some seven years ago and, given the undoubted love of both of these parents for their son, it does not in any way surprise me that Theo would be affected so much by the separation from his mother. In fact, the mother has had no direct contact with Theo since 2016. He was then aged 10. Theo was removed from her care by an interim care order made by District Judge Henson on 11 July 2014, who was satisfied that Theo's safety demanded an immediate separation. Private law proceedings had already begun in December 2012 and as a result of concerns during those proceedings a section 37 report had been directed from the Local Authority.
90. > Theo was born on 21 April 2006 so he was aged eight when he was removed from his mother. On 9 March 2015, in a detailed judgment from his Honour Judge Simon Oliver, Theo was placed with his father permanently, with contact to take place with his mother. Unquestionably that contact broke down and that is why, since 6 August 2016, the mother very sadly has had no direct contact with her son Theo."
91. The Chief Master returned to this issue later in her judgment at [30] and [31] repeating that:
93. > "Contact finally broke down in 2016. The father applied for a non-molestation order against the mother and that order is in the papers before me, dated 29 August 2017. The order records that the last time the mother had contact with Theo was on 6?August 2016. It was suggested by counsel in cross-examination that this application and order was a device deployed by the father as an excuse to stop contact between mother and son resuming. But this is not the hearing of the Children Act proceedings; that time passed many years ago. The mother has had opportunity to challenge the decisions of the court which, from the limited material before me, she has done. None of her appeals were successful, so the decisions that previous courts made in the Family Court proceedings stand and the findings that the court made in relation to those proceedings stand.
94. > It certainly does appear that the father unilaterally stopped contact, albeit there is an order that I was shown during the course of the hearing which suspended direct contact for a period of time. But to an extent, for present purposes, this does not matter. The undisputed fact is that the last contact that the mother had with Theo was eight years ago on 6 August 2016 and at that stage he had been removed from her care some two years previously when he was aged only 8. The sad result in this case is that there has been no direct contact between Theo and his mother since 6 August 2016."
95. The Chief Master rejected Ms?Hoarean's contention that Theo was estranged from his father at the time of his death. She found that Theo enjoyed a close relationship with his father, although for one reason or another he was living elsewhere. She placed weight on a WhatsApp message sent by Theo to his father on 15 July, six weeks before his death. That WhatsApp message said this from Theo to his father:
97. > "You parented me way more than my mum did and you raised me and I wouldn't be who I am today without you. I honestly idolise you and I don't want our relationship to end because of a stupid convo. I hope this hasn't been a stupid convo but please all I ask is we keep in contact. I love you. Have a good day at work."
98. I should say perhaps at this point that in this judgment the Chief Master assumed, I am not sure for what reason or based on what evidence, that Theo had committed suicide and had taken his own life but I was told today by Mr?Read that the verdict of the coroner at the inquest is one of misadventure. Mr?Read tells me that the coroner has concluded that Theo walked onto railway tracks and was electrocuted. I do not consider that that misunderstanding on the part of the Chief Master as to the reason for Theo's death has any bearing on the issues as to what should happen to his ashes.
100. On the relevant issue, the Chief Master reviewed the evidence relating to Theo's wishes, the places with which he was most connected and the wishes of friends and family. In addition to Mr?Read's evidence she had witness statements from Theo's grandfather and grandmother, close friends and Theo's stepmother and she accepted that evidence that Theo had a deep connection with Dartmoor. She took into account the fact that the mother had had no real connection with Theo after 2016 and that he had chosen not to contact her when he was an older child and then an adult. The mother had no knowledge of Theo's wishes and no insight or appreciation of the wishes of Theo's father or his family. Her conclusion at [51] was as follows:
102. > "So in this case, having considered carefully the evidence of the parties, both in writing and the oral evidence they have given to the court, I am satisfied that it is not known what Theo's wishes were. Theo, whilst having close connections with Caversham, Reading, where he grew up, also had close connections and a feeling of peace when he was at Dartmoor. A cremation should take place at Caversham, as both parties agree. Thereafter his ashes should not be divided but be scattered on Dartmoor, ideally near Hound Tor. The father has indicated that the mother can attend this."
103. In this appeal, I have grounds of appeal which are largely related to the factual decision which was made by the judge. I will come to those but I also have an application to file new evidence and it seems to me I should deal with that application before determining whether to grant or refuse permission to appeal.
105. On 4 July 2025 Ms?Hoarean issued an application to file new evidence. It seems that the application was not served on the respondent. Indeed, according to Mr?Read, the appeal bundle was not served on him and he only received it last week when he asked my clerk to be provided with it and she sent it to him.
107. By the application to file new evidence, Ms?Hoarean seeks to adduce extracts from what she says are medical records, children's services records and police records that were produced during the course of the inquest last year. She says they show that Theo was estranged from his father and therefore contradict Mr?Read's evidence to the Chief Master. She also seeks to adduce two witness statements from a childhood friend called Yasmin Begg and a friend of Ms?Hoarean's, another mother called Karen Foote, to the effect that they had never heard him speak of Dartmoor.
109. The court has a discretion to adduce fresh evidence on an appeal but it is a discretion which is sparingly exercised. At a minimum, the court requires the Ladd v Marshall conditions to be satisfied. They come from the case of that name. They are that: firstly, the evidence could not with reasonable diligence have been obtained before the hearing below; secondly, the evidence would have had an important influence on the case if it had been available at that hearing; and thirdly the evidence must be credible even though it may not be incontrovertible.
111. In relation to Yasmin Begg and Karen Foote, there is in fact no explanation as to why this is evidence which could not have been obtained for the trial before the Chief Master. It is clear they can only give evidence of knowledge of Theo at a young age. In the case of Yasmin Begg, she speaks of her time with Theo at primary school and in his early years of secondary school. Karen Foote's connection is with Ms?Hoarean as a mother both with children and so it follows that her connection with Theo ended when Theo was removed from Ms?Hoarean's custody in 2014. It is therefore not surprising that they did not hear Theo speak of Dartmoor as the evidence was that this was a love for that place that he developed in his teenage years. So the first two limbs of Ladd v Marshall are not satisfied in relation to the evidence of Yasmin Begg and Karen Foote and so I will not allow that evidence to be adduced.
113. As for the extracts from the social services, children's services, medical and police records, I am willing to assume that this could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence before the hearing. The first point to make is that Ms?Hoarean has not produced the whole file or even the whole document but has prepared selective clips. There is therefore an issue as to whether the court is being given the whole picture from these excerpts and whether these excerpts are accurate.
115. I nevertheless have read them all. In it, there are statements, the ultimate source of which is sometimes difficult to attribute, that the relationship between father and son were at times difficult from one or other of their perspectives and that father was sometimes blamed by Theo or by Theo's grandmother for that. There are also statements, again the source of which is not always clear, to the effect that the father was responsible for domestic abuse of the mother and Theo.
117. I have some reservations as to whether this material is of sufficient cogency to be regarded as credible evidence of the truth of the statements in them such as to meet the Ladd v Marshall third condition. However, what I am firmly not satisfied of is that this is evidence which is relevant to the issues which the court had to decide. This is a continuation of the approach which the Chief Master deprecated which the mother took below to provide what the Chief Master described as a selection or snapshots of the Family Court proceedings and to re-litigate her dispute with Mr?Read.Theo was a a boy and a young man with mental health issues and that will have placed a great strain on his relationship with his family, including his father. That there are times at which he has said something to a health professional which reflects those strains is not in itself surprising.
119. What Chief Master Shuman found compelling in this case was Theo's deep connection with Dartmoor. Theo's grandmother, to whom many of the statements in these excerpts are attributed, filed a witness statement in support of the application for Theo's ashes to be scattered at Dartmoor and her evidence was accepted by the Chief Master. Nothing in this further evidence which it is sought to adduce casts any doubt on the evidence that Theo had a strong connection with Dartmoor. I do not consider it is evidence which would have had an important influence on the case.
121. I will not allow any of the further evidence or new evidence which it is sought to introduce to be allowed in on this appeal.
123. I turn then to the grounds of appeal. The first ground of appeal is that the judgment infringes the appellant's Article 8 rights under the ECHR by denying her the ability to have a meaningful memorial to her son. In the skeleton argument dated 16 December 2024 in support of this appeal, Ms?Hoarean referred to the case of Elsholz v Germany [2000] 34 EHRR 58 and she said it was authority for the proposition that parents have a right to maintain a relationship with their children even after death.
125. I have looked at Elsholz v Germany and it is not authority for that proposition. It is, if anything, authority for a proposition that a father may have a right to maintain a relationship with an illegitimate child during that child's lifetime even if that child does not want such a relationship but that is nowhere near the issues which we are concerned with in this case. It does not confirm that there is a right to a relationship with a deceased child. It is not possible to have a relationship with a deceased child.
127. I am prepared to assume that the right to family life includes a right for a mother, or a father, or a member of the family to participate in a dignified ceremony and process for disposing of the body and the remains. But it does not seem to me that there is any real prospect of successfully arguing that that is not what has happened here in circumstances where the Chief Master's careful judgment made provision in the schedule for Ms?Hoarean to have an opportunity to spend time with Theo's body in advance of the cremation, to have a memorial service in advance of the cremation, to be able to attend the cremation and the scattering of the ashes and in addition there will be a plaque to honour the life of Theo at Henley Road Cemetery at which Ms?Hoarean is able to go and pay her respects. So, in my judgment, there is no real prospect of success in relation to the ground of appeal relating to Article 8.
129. The remaining grounds of appeal all are basically disagreement with the Chief Master's decision, saying that she failed to place or consider evidence showing Mr?Read's deliberate actions in preventing contact, or his contribution to Ms Horean's estrangement from her son, or that she had placed undue weight on the resulting estrangement between mother and son, or that the decision was disproportionate and unjust because of the remote location chosen for the scattering of the ashes and she criticises Mr?Read for not coming to the court with clean hands and says his evidence was incorrect. She also says the judge wrongly found that Theo's death was a suicide and he killed himself and she says that the court judge was wrong to give the respondent sole authority over Theo's belongings.
131. If I can take these broadly together, there is one class of these grounds of appeal which are basically an attack on the findings of fact which the judge made and on the balancing exercise which she had to conduct to decide what was right to do with Theo's remains. However, I can detect no error of principle and no error of law in the exercise which the Chief Master conducted. It is well established that in those circumstances an appellate court will not interfere with the findings of fact which have been made by the trial judge unless they are findings which no reasonable judge could have made. There is no prospect of successfully arguing that.
133. One other class of the grounds of appeal is that the judge wrongly found Theo's death was a suicide. I am not sure that is properly described as a finding. That certainly is said by the judge but, as I have already indicated, I do not see that the manner in which Theo died has any bearing in the circumstances of this case on what should become of his ashes, so there is no real prospect of that ground of appeal being successful either.
135. So far as an error being made in granting the respondent sole authority over Theo's belongings and in so doing apparently disregarding the emotional needs of the appellant, that is not in fact reflected in the order which was eventually made. Although in the judgment there is a reference to directing the father to give some personal items to the mother and that these should be agreed between the parties so that the mother had some tangible memories of Theo. That seems to be a perfectly sensible and considerate suggestion by the Chief Master which was sympathetic to Ms?Hoarean's position but I cannot see that that has actually made its way into the order that was drawn up which simply grants letters of administration limited to the making of necessary funeral and cremation arrangements and the disposal of the ashes of the deceased. So for that reason, again I am not satisfied that there is any real prospect of appealing the Chief Master's order on that issue either. This appeal is in any event primarily concerned with the disposal of Theo's ashes and not what becomes of his other belongings.
137. So for these various reasons, I am not going to adjourn the hearing today for the reasons I have given. I am going to refuse the application for leave to adduce further evidence, refuse permission to appeal for the reasons I have given and dismiss the appeal. I am going to direct that a transcript of this judgment be produced at public expense and a copy will be sent to Ms?Hoarean.

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