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March 18, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In Re Dependency as to S.K.

Court of Appeals of Arizona

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1 CA-JV 25-0196

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (8K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by D. Steven Williams

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE
ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION ONE

IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.

No. 1 CA-JV 25-0196
FILED 03-18-2026

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. JD533241
The Honorable Marvin L. Davis, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Robert D. Rosanelli, Attorney at Law, Phoenix
By Robert D. Rosanelli
Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
By Laura J. Huff
Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.
Decision of the Court

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge D. Steven Williams delivered the Court’s decision, in
which Judge Andrew M. Jacobs and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

W I L L I A M S, Judge:

¶1 Erin K. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s dependency
order. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother is the sole adoptive parent of S.K. (“Child”), born in
2016. In 2020, the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) petitioned for a
dependency, but the juvenile court dismissed the petition for insufficient
evidence.

¶3 In September 2025, a neighbor requested a welfare check
while babysitting Child. The neighbor stated to police that Child mentioned
living with several animals in the apartment, including dogs, cats, guinea
pigs, and (possibly) chickens and a turkey. Police spoke to a second
neighbor who stated Mother kept animals in the apartment, including
aggressive dogs, and that the apartment emanated a foul odor. The second
neighbor also expressed concern for Child’s safety.

¶4 Standing outside of Mother’s apartment, police noted “a
strong foul odor of animal feces and urine.” Police knocked, and Mother
answered but refused to allow entrance into the apartment or to answer
questions about Child. Police left to contact the apartment complex’s
management office. Meanwhile, Mother went to the reporting neighbor’s
apartment “irate” and “banging on the door and window” to retrieve Child.
The neighbor phoned police, who promptly returned. Mother was “hostile
and uncooperative.” Police arrested Mother for disorderly conduct and
child neglect.

¶5 Mother’s boyfriend then gave permission for police to go
inside the apartment. Once inside, they observed “animal feces and animal
urine on the ground, [and] what appeared to be rotting food on the
ground.” DCS took custody of Child and petitioned for a dependency,
alleging Mother was “unwilling or unable to provide proper and effective

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.
Decision of the Court

parental care and control and neglected to provide a safe and stable home
environment and/or proper supervision.”

¶6 The juvenile court held a contested dependency adjudication
hearing over two nonconsecutive days. Mother testified she did not live in
the apartment, that it was her boyfriend’s, and that she owned a different
home, through a family trust, located in Williams. She admitted using the
apartment’s address to enroll Child in school, but claimed she was unaware
of the apartment’s condition. She stated she was living in a short-term
rental and had signed a new lease on a home in Pennsylvania.

¶7 A DCS caseworker testified that Mother refused to allow a
home visit at the short-term rental because of a water leak. The case worker
also relayed difficulty in scheduling a visit at the home in Williams, and
that she had not seen the Pennsylvania home lease documents. The
caseworker testified Mother faced “housing instability” and opined that
Mother may have “underlying mental health conditions.”

¶8 Mother offered her Pennsylvania home lease as an exhibit on
the second day of the hearing (held two weeks later). DCS objected, stating
the lease was not timely disclosed. Child’s counsel also objected,
emphasizing the Pennsylvania home had not been verified, nor had DCS
been able to assess whether the home was appropriate for Child. The
juvenile court admitted the lease into evidence because “housing is an
issue,” but noted that it “would be entitled to . . . little weight.”

¶9 At the close of evidence, the juvenile court found the
allegations in the petition proven by a preponderance of the evidence and
that Child was dependent. Over Mother’s objection, the court ordered
Mother to participate in the Nurturing Parent Program and submit to a
psychological evaluation.

¶10 Mother timely appealed. We stayed the appeal for the
juvenile court to supplement its dependency order with a “factual basis for
the dependency.” A.R.S. § 8-844(C)(1)(a)(ii); see Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 338(h)(4)
(explaining a finding of dependency must be supported by “specific facts”).
The juvenile court complied and we lifted the stay. We have jurisdiction
under Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235,
12-120.21 and -2101(A)(1), and now address Mother’s remaining
arguments.

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.
Decision of the Court

DISCUSSION

¶11 We review a dependency finding for an abuse of discretion.
Louis C. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 484, 488, ¶ 12 (App. 2015), viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s
findings, Willie G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 21 (App.
2005). The juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence,
observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and resolve disputed
facts,” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O., 209 Ariz. 332, 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004),
so we affirm its findings unless the record contains no reasonable evidence
to support them, Willie G., 211 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 21.

¶12 A dependent child is one adjudicated to be “[d]estitute or who
is not provided with the necessities of life, including adequate food,
clothing, shelter or medical care,” or one “whose home is unfit by reason of
. . . neglect.” A.R.S. § 8-201(15)(a)(ii)–(iii). Neglect is the “inability or
unwillingness of a parent . . . to provide [a] child with supervision, food,
clothing, shelter or medical care if that inability or unwillingness causes
substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.” A.R.S.
§ 8-201(25)(a).

¶13 Mother contends the juvenile court’s dependency finding was
contrary to substantial record evidence. She argues the dispositive issue is
not the apartment’s condition when DCS removed Child, but whether, at
the time of the dependency adjudication hearing, Mother had suitable
housing for Child. Referring to the Pennsylvania home, Mother claims she
secured a “presumably suitable residence for her and the child one month
prior to the conclusion of the dependency adjudication hearing.” But
Mother did not disclose a copy of the lease to DCS until the second day of
the hearing, which did not provide DCS with sufficient time to arrange a
home assessment to ensure it was fit for Child.

¶14 Moreover, record evidence supported the juvenile court’s
finding that Mother lacked “stable, safe and sanitary” housing as outlined
by A.R.S. § 8-201(15) and (25). The testimony at trial showed the apartment
was not fit or sanitary for Child, and yet was the address Mother used to
enroll Child in school. Mother later provided DCS with other housing
information, including a short-term rental, a motel, and the home in
Williams. The short-term rental agreement ended before the dependency
adjudication hearing date, so DCS told Mother a case worker would instead
need to conduct a “house check for her long-term residence.” Later, Mother
provided the address for the Williams home. DCS contacted someone living
in that home who confirmed it was not Mother’s permanent residence.

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.
Decision of the Court

¶15 The juvenile court had “concerns regarding the credibility of
[Mother’s] testimony” about her varied housing options. This court defers
to the juvenile court’s credibility determinations and will not disturb any
factual findings when reasonable evidence exists to support them. See Willie
G., 211 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 21; Oscar O., 209 Ariz. at 334, ¶ 4. Mother is correct
that the juvenile court must make its dependency determination “based
upon the circumstances existing at the time of the adjudication hearing.”
Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 239 Ariz. 47, 50, ¶ 12 (App. 2016). But based
on the evidence presented at the hearing, the juvenile court’s finding
Mother that lacked stable housing was justified.

¶16 Mother also contends that because the dependency
adjudication hearing was focused on housing, and no findings about
Mother’s mental state or parenting abilities were made, the juvenile court’s
order for her to complete a psychological examination and participate in
the Nurturing Parent Program was improper. Mother offers no Arizona
authority limiting the juvenile court’s authority to order necessary services
to achieve the goal of family reunification. To be sure, except in certain
aggravated circumstances, the juvenile court must order DCS “to make
reasonable efforts to provide services to the child and the child’s parent”
when a child has been removed from the home. A.R.S. § 8-846(A).

¶17 The DCS caseworker testified Mother may have “underlying
mental health conditions” that contributed to the condition of the
apartment. And DCS’s original petition for dependency in 2020 noted
similar home conditions as existed in 2025. DCS highlighted “Mother’s lack
of acknowledgement” of the unsanitary housing conditions to support why
a psychological evaluation and participation in the Nurturing Parent
Program were necessary.

¶18 Given evidence of Mother’s repeated inability to maintain a
sanitary home, and the court’s concerns about Mother’s credibility, Mother
has not shown how the juvenile court erred in ordering the psychological
examination and the Nurturing Parent Program. “The primary
consideration in a dependency case is always the best interest of the child.
Accordingly, the juvenile court is vested with a great deal of discretion.”
Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 236, 239 (App. 1994)
(citation modified).

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IN RE DEPENDENCY AS TO S.K.
Decision of the Court

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

MATTHEW J. MARTIN • Clerk of the Court
FILED: JR

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