Antiharassment Protection Order Affirmed, Docket 87843-3

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April 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Luke Distelhorst, V. Scott Francis Iceberg

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87843-3

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.8K)

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Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

LUKE DISTELHORST,
No. 87843-3-I
Respondent,

v. DIVISION ONE

SCOTT F. ICEBERG,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.

CHUNG, J. — Scott Iceberg appeals entry of an antiharassment protection order

restraining him and protecting Luke Distelhorst, arguing that the order violates his

constitutional rights. Because we conclude that the order does not violate Iceberg’s

constitutional rights, we affirm.

BACKGROUND 1

Luke Distelhorst served on the Board of Directors for the Housing Authority of

Snohomish County (HASCO). During the time of the actions at issue, Iceberg received

housing assistance through a Section 8 voucher program administered by HASCO.

Iceberg began sending communications to Distelhorst on January 21, 2025.

Though Distelhorst did not know Iceberg personally, he surmised the communications

were “apparently related to [Iceberg’s] application denial to live as a tenant in a property

owned by HASCO.” On the night of January 21, 2025, around 8 p.m., Iceberg called

1 The background facts are drawn from Distelhorst’s petition to the trial court for an

antiharassment order, which included the written communications from Iceberg. These facts are not
disputed on appeal.
No. 87843-3-I/2

and left a voicemail on Distelhorst’s work phone, which is unaffiliated with HASCO and

not listed on HASCO’s website. At 11:51 p.m., Iceberg wrote to Distelhorst’s personal

email address, “I’m going to be homeless soon due to HASCO’s policies. As such, I will

be living outside your house on the sidewalk. I’ll be taking every opportunity to talk to

neighbors about what a piece of shit you are...See you on the sidewalk rocking my first

amendment rights.” A few hours later, at 2:29 a.m., Iceberg texted the cell phone of one

of Distelhorst’s neighbors, pretending to be a fellow neighbor, and falsely accused

Distelhorst of touching children inappropriately.

Iceberg also sent emails to other HASCO officials. One stated “you are going to

have to evict my dead body from this apartment because I am going to commit suicide

in this apartment.” Another email stated, “if I blow my brains out here pretty quick due to

your insane psychopathic machinations, should I have my estate contact you, or should

I just summon you every night from the grave while you sleep? I’m not sure the

procedure if I go ahead an[d] blow my brains out.”

On January 24, 2025, Distelhorst filed a petition for an antiharassment protection

order against Iceberg in Snohomish County Superior Court. The court entered a

temporary antiharassment protection order on January 27, 2025. On February 10, a

court commissioner denied Distelhorst’s request for a full protection order, finding there

was insufficient evidence as “[t]he conduct complained of may be protected speech.”

Distelhorst moved for revision of the commissioner’s denial, which Iceberg opposed.

On March 5, 2025, the court held a hearing on the motion for revision. Iceberg

did not appear at the hearing and Distelhorst appeared through counsel. The court

granted the motion for revision and imposed an antiharassment protection order

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No. 87843-3-I/3

protecting Distelhorst and restraining Iceberg. On the pattern form for the protection

order, the court checked a box with a prewritten finding that stated

Based upon the petition, testimony, case record, and response, if any, the
court finds by a preponderance of evidence that the protected
person . . . has proved the required criteria for the following protection
order under chapter 7.105 RCW.
....

[X] Antiharassment Protection Order- The restrained person has
subjected the protected person to unlawful harassment.

In a separate written order issued after the hearing, the court specifically found

that Distelhorst’s petition “presented a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at

Petitioner that is not protected speech and is designed to harass, intimidate, instill fear,

and get Petitioner to take action that would be beneficial to Respondent.” The court also

concluded that the complained-of conduct met the definition of unlawful harassment and

stalking, and “would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress and did

cause such distress to the Petitioner per his testimony in the Petition.”

The order restrained Iceberg from harming, contacting, or stalking Distelhorst.

The order also restrained Iceberg from coming within 1,000 feet of Distelhorst or his

home, vehicle, workplace, and the HASCO office except as necessary for “voucher

administration.” Iceberg was ordered to get a mental health evaluation due to

“[r]eferences to suicidal ideation, psychosis, and other mental health issues at hearing.”

Iceberg appeals.

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, we note that Iceberg does not assign error to the trial court’s

findings that he subjected Distelhorst to unlawful harassment. Unchallenged findings of

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No. 87843-3-I/4

fact are accepted as true on appeal. In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386,

409 P.3d 1184 (2018).

Instead, Iceberg challenges the antiharassment protection order primarily on

constitutional grounds. Iceberg argues that the protection order is unconstitutionally

vague, unconstitutionally overbroad, and a prior restraint on his First Amendment rights.

He also contends that Distelhorst was untimely in noting his motion for revision.

We review a trial court’s decision to grant or deny an antiharassment protection

order for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391

P.3d 546 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion if its ruling is “manifestly

unreasonable or is based on untenable grounds or reasons.” State v. Rapozo, 114 Wn.

App. 321, 323, 58 P.3d 290 (2002). A ruling is based on untenable grounds “if it is

based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct

standard.” In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997). We

review issues of law, including constitutional challenges, de novo. Tyner v. State, 137

Wn. App. 545, 556, 154 P.3d 920 (2007).

I. Constitutional Claims

Iceberg argues that the antiharassment order restraining him and the underlying

statute authorizing the order, chapter RCW 7.105, are unconstitutional because they are

vague, overbroad, and a prior restraint on his speech.

To the extent that Iceberg raises a facial challenge to Washington’s

antiharassment protection order statute, we reject this challenge. 2 We presume a

2 The antiharassment protection order was effective for one year from the date it was issued on

March 5, 2025. Neither party has argued or provided briefing on whether this case is moot. “Generally, we
will dismiss an appeal where only moot or abstract questions remain or where the issues raised in the trial
court no longer exist.” Price v. Price, 174 Wn. App. 894, 902, 301 P.3d 486 (2013). As an exception to the

4
No. 87843-3-I/5

statute is constitutional. City of Seattle v. Abercrombie, 85 Wn. App. 393, 400, 945 P.2d

1132 (1997). “The party challenging an enactment bears the burden of proving its

unconstitutionality.” State v. Immelt, 173 Wn.2d 1, 6, 267 P.3d 305 (2011). “ ‘[A]

successful facial challenge is one where no set of circumstances exists in which the

statute, as currently written, can be constitutionally applied.’ ” State v. Gantt, 29 Wn.

App. 2d 427, 435, 540 P.3d 845 (2024) (emphasis in original) (quoting City of Redmond

v. Moore, 151 Wn.2d 664, 669, 91 P.3d 875 (2004)). Washington courts have upheld

antiharassment orders against First Amendment constitutional challenges. 3 See, e.g.,

State v. Noah, 103 Wn. App. 29, 33-34, 9 P.3d 858 (2000) (rejecting claim that

antiharassment order imposed unconstitutional prior restraint of speech). Thus,

Distelhorst’s facial challenge to the statute fails because there are circumstances in

which the statute can be constitutionally applied.

Regarding Iceberg’s as-applied challenges, we can discern from his briefing only

limited arguments specifically about the order entered against him. 4 These arguments

also are unavailing.

mootness doctrine, we may decide issues of continuing and substantial interest. Thomas v. Lehman, 138
Wn. App. 618, 622, 158 P.3d 86 (2007). “ ‘The continuing and substantial public interest exception has
been used in cases dealing with constitutional interpretation, the validity of statutes or regulations, and
matters that are sufficiently important to the appellate court.’ ” In re the Welfare of C.W.M., 27 Wn. App.
2d 747, 754, 533 P.3d 1199 (2023) (quoting State v. Beaver, 184 Wn.2d 321, 331, 358 P.3d 385
(2015)). Because Iceberg raises a constitutional challenge to the validity of Washington’s antiharassment
protection order statute, we exercise our discretion to address the merits of the appeal.
3 The antiharassment order in Noah was issued under the former antiharassment statute, the

former chapter 10.14 RCW. However, the definitions of “unlawful harassment” and “course of conduct” at
issue in this case are substantively unchanged in the current statute. Compare former RCW 10.14.020
(1999), repealed by LAWS OF 2021 ch. 215, § 170, with RCW 7.105.010(37)(a) and (7).
4 Distelhorst argues that we should not consider Iceberg’s “appeal brief as containing serious

arguments, as it is plagiarized from a law review article that was published before the statute at issue was
even enacted, and fails to actually address the record or applicable law in this case.” Iceberg’s brief in
large part copies text from a law review article by Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment
Orders, 64 Hastings L.J. 7811, 803-26 (2013). However, regardless of whether Distelhorst’s
characterization of Iceberg’s brief is accurate, his complaint that it is plagiarized is not helpful to our
analysis on the merits.

5
No. 87843-3-I/6

First, Iceberg argues that the order is unconstitutionally vague because it does

not “define[ ] what constitutes harassment, nor what Mr. Iceberg did specifically to

‘harass’ Mr. Distelhorst in the first place.” In the trial court’s written findings, to which

Iceberg did not assign error, it used the statutory definition of “unlawful harassment” in

concluding that Iceberg’s conduct was unlawful harassment. The statute defines

“unlawful harassment” as

A knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and
that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course of conduct must be
such as would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional
distress, and must actually cause substantial emotional distress to the
petitioner.

RCW 7.105.010(37)(a). Iceberg fails to acknowledge or challenge this statutory

definition. 5 Because the trial court’s findings track the statutory language, we analyze

whether that language is unconstitutionally vague.

A statute is void for vagueness if it is so vague that persons “ ‘of common

intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.’ ”

Abercrombie, 85 Wn. App. at 399 (quoting Haley v. Medical Disciplinary Bd., 117 Wn.2d

720, 730-40, 818 P.2d 1062 (1992) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co, 269 U.S.

385, 391 (1926)). But some measure of vagueness is inherent in the use of

language. Abercrombie, 85 Wn. App. at 399. Thus, impossible standards of specificity

are not required. Id. A statute is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person

cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would

5 Iceberg argues that the trial court relied on RCW 7.105.010(37)(b) of the “unlawful harassment”

definition “[a] single act of violence of threat of violence,” but it is clear from the antiharassment order and
the trial court’s accompanying written order, quoted in the previous section, that it found a “knowing and
willful course of conduct” under subsection (a) and issued the antiharassment order on that basis.
Iceberg’s argument regarding subsection (b) of the definition is thus unpersuasive.

6
No. 87843-3-I/7

be classified as prohibited conduct. Id. at 399-400.

The statutory definition, and, thus, the court’s order, is not so vague that persons

of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Id. at 399. Here, the trial

court’s written order found that Iceberg’s “complained-of conduct in the Petition meets

the definition of Unlawful Harassment by substantial evidence, i.e., more than a

preponderance of evidence.” Distelhorst’s petition, as described above, detailed

Iceberg’s exact communications that the trial court found constituted unlawful

harassment. The trial court clearly identified Iceberg’s conduct that constituted unlawful

harassment of Distelhorst.

Iceberg further argues that the order is unconstitutionally vague because it

forbids him “from engaging in any future stalking, harassment, threats, cyber-

harassment, etc. of a government official—without specifying what they are.” But the

antiharassment protection order itself describes the prohibited conduct in each

restrained category. Iceberg fails to acknowledge or challenge these descriptions.

Therefore, Iceberg fails to meet his burden to prove that that the order against him is

unconstitutionally vague.

Next, Iceberg argues that the order is overbroad because he “has a First

Amendment right to speak to Mr. Distelhorst’s neighbors, co-workers, and to post about

Mr. Distelhorst on the internet.” “A statute or ordinance is overbroad if it sweeps

constitutionally protected free speech activities within its prohibitions and there is no

way to sever its unconstitutional applications.” Abercrombie, 85 Wn. App. at 397. But

Iceberg fails to identify any restraint in the order that prohibits his protected speech to

Distelhorst’s neighbors or co-workers or online. The order properly prohibited Iceberg

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No. 87843-3-I/8

from engaging in unlawful harassment of Distelhorst via communications with his

neighbors, co-workers, or online. Iceberg does not meet his burden to show the

antiharassment order is overbroad.

Finally, Iceberg argues that the restraints imposed on him constitute a prior

restraint because he “wants to protest on the public right of way in front of HASCO. Mr.

Iceberg wants to protest on the public right of way in front of Mr. Distelhorst’s home. Mr.

Iceberg wants to freely associate with Mr. Distelhorst’s neighbors. Mr. Iceberg wants to

post about Mr. Distelhorst online.”

Prior restraints are “ ‘official restrictions imposed upon speech or other forms of

expression in advance of actual publication.’ ” State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 372, 679

P.2d 353 (1984) (quoting Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wn.2d 747, 756, 505 P.2d 126 (1973)).

The only Washington case Iceberg cites in support of his prior restraint argument is In

re Marriage of Suggs, 152 Wn.2d 74, 93 P.3d 161 (2004). There, the court held that an

antiharassment order’s provision restraining an individual from “knowingly and willfully

making invalid and unsubstantiated allegations or complaints to third parties which are

designed for the purpose of annoying, harassing, vexing, or otherwise harming

[petitioner] and for no lawful purpose” was an unconstitutional prior restraint. Id. at 81.

The court reasoned this provision was a prior restraint because it “lack[ed] the

specificity demanded by the United States Supreme Court for prior restraint on

unprotected speech. Indefinite wording . . . leaves us unable to ascertain what speech

the order actually prohibits.” Id. at 84.

By contrast, in Noah, we upheld no-contact provisions in an antiharassment

order, holding that the provisions were not an unconstitutional prior restraint, reasoning

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No. 87843-3-I/9

as follows:

Protecting citizens from harassment is a compelling state interest. The
legislature authorizes the court to order that the defendant have no contact
with his intended victim . . . . The statute is content neutral—no contact—
whether profession of love, screams of hate or anything in between. The
interest to be served is the safety, security, and peace of mind of the victim.
It is narrowly tailored by focus on the victim and a no contact zone around
the victim.

103 Wn. App. at 41-42.

In contrast to the order in Suggs, the order here does not restrain Iceberg’s future

protected speech. Rather, the order regulates Iceberg’s conduct. Iceberg remains free

to protest, freely associate, and post online as long as he does not contact (including

indirectly through third parties), harm, harass, or stalk Distelhorst, or violate the

mandated 1000-foot physical buffer around Distelhorst, his residence, or the HASCO

office, except as necessary for voucher administration. As in Noah, where we upheld

analogous no-contact provisions, here, the antiharassment order is content neutral and

narrowly tailored to focus on Distelhorst and a no contact zone around him. Iceberg has

not established an unconstitutional prior restraint.

We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in issuing the

antiharassment order against Iceberg. The statute is neither unconstitutional on its face

nor as applied to Iceberg.

II. Procedure for Noting a Hearing on Motion for Revision

Iceberg argues that the trial court “lacked jurisdiction” to hear the motion for

revision because Distelhorst failed to comply with Snohomish County Local Court Rule

(SCLCR) 7(b)(2)(d)(12) by not timely filing and serving a completed calendar note on

his motion for revision. SCLCR 7(b)(2)(d)(12)(a) states: “A party seeking revision of a

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No. 87843-3-I/10

commissioner's order shall, within the time specified by statute, file and serve on all

other parties a motion and completed calendar note.”

On February 20, 2025, Distelhorst filed a motion for revision and served it on

Iceberg that day, within the 10-day period specified by RCW 2.24.050. The record

reflects that a hearing date was already on the court’s calendar based on a separate

motion Iceberg had filed the same day as Distelhorst’s motion for revision. Upon

confirming that the already-scheduled hearing date reflected Iceberg’s separate motion,

on February 25, 2025, Distelhorst noted his motion for revision for a hearing for March

5, 2025, and served Iceberg with the calendar note. The trial court found that Iceberg

had notice of the March 5, 2025, hearing because he was properly and timely served,

with proof of service in the record.

Iceberg fails to identify any prejudice that resulted from Distelhorst’s delay in

noting the hearing on his motion for revision. Nor does he identify any legal authority

supporting his argument that a delay in noting a motion deprives the trial court of

jurisdiction; as Distelhorst argues, we have previously reasoned to the contrary. E.g.,

Buckner, Inc. v. Berkey Irrigation System, 89 Wn. App. 906, 915, 951 P.2d 338 (1998)

(“Noting the motion thus primarily serves to prompt the court to hear or consider the

motion. But the ultimate timing of the court's consideration of the motion is at the court's

discretion. Nowhere is there any suggestion that the failure to timely note the motion

deprives the trial court of the power to hear and decide it.” (footnote omitted)). The trial

court did not lack jurisdiction to hear the motion for revision.

III. Fees on Appeal

Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Iceberg represented himself and

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No. 87843-3-I/11

cites no applicable law granting him the right to recover attorney fees. Accordingly, we

decline his request.

Distelhorst requests attorney fees pursuant to RCW 7.105.310(j), which gives

“broad discretion to grant such relief as the [trial] court deems proper,” including

reimbursement to “the petitioner for costs incurred in bringing the [civil protection order]

action, including reasonable attorney[ ]fees.” Accordingly, “ ‘[i]f such fees are allowable

at trial, the prevailing party may recover fees on appeal as well.’ ” Sullivan v. Schuyler,

31 Wn. App. 2d 791, 814, 556 P.3d 157 (2024) (quoting Landberg v. Carlson, 108 Wn.

App. 749, 758, 33 P.3d 406 (2001)). We exercise our discretion to deny Distelhorst’s

request for fees on appeal.

CONCLUSION

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

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