Walberto Hernandez-Reyes v. Master Donuts, Inc. — ADA Accessibility Barriers

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Walberto Hernandez-Reyes v. Master Donuts, Inc.

District Court, D. Puerto Rico

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-01469

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.8K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

WALBERTO HERNANDEZ-REYES,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL NO. 25-1469 (RAM)
MASTER DONUTS, INC.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH, United States District Judge
Pending before the Court is Defendant Master Donuts, Inc.
(“Defendant” or “Master Donuts”)’s Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (“Motion”) and
Plaintiff Walberto Hernandez-Reyes (“Plaintiff” or “Hernandez-
Reyes”)’s opposition thereto. (Docket Nos. 26, 29). Having
considered the parties’ submissions, the Court rules that
Defendant’s mootness challenge requires consideration of matters
outside the pleadings and is intertwined with the merits. Hence,
the Motion at Docket No. 26 is HELD IN ABEYANCE and, pending
further development of the record, will be evaluated under the
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment standard. Defendant’s request
to declare Plaintiff and his counsel vexatious litigants is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties shall comply with the joint inspection and
supplemental briefing schedule set forth below.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initially filed an 11-page Complaint in the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s Court of First Instance on June 26,
2025. (Docket No. 1-3). The Complaint alleged that the height of

the counter at Master Donuts’ store (the “donut shop”), as well as
its aisle width, waiting area design, and lack of accessible-
entrance signage, violate Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
Title II, because they allegedly prevent wheelchair users from
enjoying safe and equal access. See id. On September 4, 2025,
Defendant invoked federal subject-matter jurisdiction and removed
the case to this Court. (Docket No. 1).
On October 1, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Docket No. 9). Therein, Defendant
alleged that the lawsuit should be deemed moot on account of prior

litigation brought by Plaintiff’s attorney and that the attorney
has a long track record of filing duplicative ADA lawsuits in order
to obtain attorneys’ fees. Id. at 19.
In response, on October 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a
voluminous, 117-page Amended Complaint composed of several hundred
paragraphs and subparagraphs. (Docket No. 17). The Amended
Complaint expanded the scope of litigation to dozens of newly
asserted architectural barriers, including ramp slope
measurements, parking lot gradients, restroom maneuvering space,
queue management stanchion placement, counter knee and toe
clearance, available clear floor space, among many more. See, e.g.,
id. at 9–91 (detailing dozens of alleged issues in the design of
the donut shop). On November 5, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion to
Strike/Dismiss Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 21). On November 26,

2025, the Court issued an Opinion and Order finding that
Plaintiff’s capacious Amended Complaint contained dozens of
superfluous pages, such as duplicated standing analyses recycling
assertions about Plaintiff’s desire to return to the shop and eat
donuts. (Docket No. 23 at 8). The Court held that the Amended
Complaint was “so riddled with redundancy, verbosity, and
prolixity that it would force the Court to ferret for the relevant
facts in a mass of verbiage.” Id. The Court struck the Amended
Complaint and ordered Plaintiff to file a streamlined version. Id.
at 8-9.

On November 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a much more succinct
10-page Second Amended Complaint. (Docket No. 24). Therein,
Plaintiff narrows his allegations. Id. His grievances center
around a handful of asserted architectural barriers at the donut
shop: (1) an allegedly noncompliant entrance ramp with an excessive
slope; (2) an allegedly noncompliant accessible parking space and
access aisle; (3) an allegedly inaccessible counter section with
inadequate clear floor space and clearance for knees and toes; and
(4) an allegedly inaccessible customer restroom, based on the
placement of a trash receptacle within the required clear floor
space alongside the toilet. Id. at 3-9.
On December 17, 2025, Defendant filed the instant Motion to
Dismiss Amended Complaint for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
(“Motion”). (Docket No. 26). Master Donuts avers that the Second
Amended Complaint is moot because the asserted architectural

barriers were allegedly remediated years earlier in connection
with prior ADA litigation involving the same premises and the same
plaintiff’s counsel. Id. at 9. Master Donuts says that changes in
the years since then, such as those brought on by the COVID-19
pandemic, have served only to make the donut shop more open and
accessible. Id. at 26. It claims that Plaintiff’s attorney is
recycling ADA claims identical to those litigated and settled by
him in late 2017 and early 2018. (Docket No. 26 at 2-9); Suarez-
Torres v. Masters Donuts, Inc. et al, Civil No. 16-2298-DRD,

(Docket Nos. 44, 58, 59, 61). It cites the Honorable Judge Daniel
R. Domínguez’s declaration in that case that Master Donuts “did
not have to make...[ADA-related] repairs for several reasons, to
wit: (a) the building structure was built before ADA; (b) the
defendant is not the owner of the building, and (c) the owner of
the building structure is not a party in the instant case.” (Docket
No. 26 at 8).
As a result, Master Donuts contends that no live controversy
exists for adjudication. Id. It avers that the insertion of a new
plaintiff into the dispute does not negate mootness, as the
relevant inquiry is into whether the barriers have been removed
and whether there has been any recurrence. Id. at 21. Lastly,

Master Donuts requests the Court to declare Plaintiff and his
counsel vexatious litigants on account of their immense and
duplicative ADA-based litigation history in numerous state and
federal courts. Id. at 23-24.
On December 19, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Opposition. (Docket
No. 29). He argues that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) dismissal would
be premature because the Motion relies on material from an
allegedly unrelated prior case; because the admission of
settlement agreements is barred by Fed. R. Evid. 408; on account
of the lack of privity between Plaintiff and the plaintiff in the
prior litigation; because a live controversy persists due to
Plaintiff’s personal and recent encounter with architectural

barriers at the donut shop; and because Defendant fails to carry
the formidable burden of demonstrating voluntary cessation. Id. at
5-18. Plaintiff also suggests that the donut shop may have merely
temporarily staged the placement of the furniture in the October
2025 photographs affixed to the Motion, and that more durable
evidence of routine operations is missing. Id. at 12-13. Lastly,
Plaintiff denies that he is vexatious, reasoning that Defendant
must offer more than evidence of case counts or settlement prior
to merits adjudication. Id. at 18-20.
II. APPLICABLE LAW
A. Motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) governs motions to dismiss brought
on subject matter jurisdiction and mootness grounds. See D.H.L.

Assocs., Inc. v. O’Gorman, 199 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1999);
Johansen v. United States, 506 F.3d 65, 68 (1st Cir. 2007).
The First Circuit and the Supreme Court have articulated one
definition of mootness as such: “when the issues presented are no
longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” O’Gorman, 199 F.3d at 54 (quoting Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Mootness doctrine “is grounded in the case or controversy
requirement and ensures that courts do not render advisory
opinions.” Massachusetts v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum.
Servs., 923 F.3d 209, 220 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Overseas

Military Sales Corp. v. Giralt-Armada, 503 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st
Cir. 2007)) (citation modified). A case can also be deemed moot
when “an intervening circumstance has deprived the plaintiff of a
personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit.” Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1, 14 (2023); see also Gulf of Maine Fisherman’s All. v.
Daley, 292 F.3d 84, 88 (1st Cir. 2002).
The burden of establishing federal court jurisdiction sits
with the plaintiff, but “the burden of establishing mootness rests
with the party invoking the doctrine.” In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt.
Bd. for Puerto Rico, 594 F. Supp. 3d 433, 442 (D.P.R. 2019)
(quoting Am. C.L. Union of Massachusetts v. U.S. Conf. of Cath.
Bishops, 705 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2013)) (citation modified). The

burden that the party asserting mootness must carry is “heavy.”
Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting
United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). It
must be “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior
could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Mangual, 317 F.3d at
60 (quoting United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968)). The First Circuit has likewise described
the burden of proving voluntary cessation--which renders a case
moot when “the defendant voluntary [sic] ceases the challenged
practice”--as “formidable.” Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 705 F.3d at
55.
B. Mootness, merits, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56

A party bringing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) challenge may
attempt to “controvert[] the accuracy (rather than the
sufficiency) of the jurisdictional facts asserted by the
plaintiff” and “proffer[] materials of evidentiary quality in
support of that position.” Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d
358, 363 (1st Cir. 2001).
Courts across the country routinely order the conversion of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motions into Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary
judgment motions when the resolution of the jurisdictional
challenge is “intertwined” with the merits. See, e.g., Holt v.
United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1995) abrogated on
other grounds by Cent. Green Co. v. United States, [531 U.S. 425,

437](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/118408/central-green-co-v-united-states/#437) (2001) (“a court is required to convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion
to dismiss into a Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a Rule 56 summary
judgment motion when resolution of the jurisdictional question is
intertwined with the merits of the case”); Safe Air for Everyone
v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling that
jurisdictional and merits issues were so intertwined that the
district court’s resolution amounted to “a grant of summary
judgment on the merits”); Torres-Negron v. J & N Recs., LLC, 504
F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2007); McLellan Highway Corp. v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5–6 (D. Mass. 2000) (“if jurisdictional
issues cannot be separated from the merits of the case, then
consideration of matters outside the pleadings transforms the

motion into one for summary judgment”) (citing Jones–Booker v.
United States, 16 F.Supp.2d 52, 58 n.9 (D. Mass. 1998)).
The First Circuit has recognized that “while such a conversion
is required in other Circuits, this Circuit provides more
flexibility.” Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 2d
123, 134 (D.P.R. 2007) (citation omitted). In cases involving
“factual challenges,” district courts are empowered with “broad
authority to order discovery, consider extrinsic evidence, and
hold evidentiary hearings in order to determine [their] own
jurisdiction.” Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363.
This Circuit has established a two-part inquiry for “when a

motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) involves factual questions.” Torres-Negron, 504 F.3d at 162. First, the court must discern whether the facts
impacting the court’s jurisdiction also implicate elements of the
plaintiff’s cause of action. Id. at 163. If they do, “the district
court should employ the standard applicable to a motion for summary
judgment.” Id. (quoting Autery v. United States, 424 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2005)). Second, if the jurisdictional facts are not
intertwined with the merits, the court may proceed to weigh the
evidence, find the facts, or otherwise “order discovery, consider
extrinsic evidence, and hold evidentiary hearings.” See Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363; Torres-Negron, 504 F.3d at 163.
III. DISCUSSION

Master Donuts styles its motion as a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
mootness-based attack on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
In reality, this is not a freestanding jurisdictional dispute.
Master Donuts’ mootness theory turns on the factual questions at
the heart of Plaintiff’s ADA claim: Is Plaintiff’s counsel
regurgitating a resolved lawsuit he brought many years ago? Or had
the architectural barriers recurred when Plaintiff stopped by the
donut shop in 2025? Have they since been durably remedied?
Hence, the Court concludes that the question of whether it
can hear this case is tightly intertwined with its merits.
Authority from across the country recommends the consequent

application of a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment standard.
See, e.g., Holt, 46 F.3d at 1002-03 (“a court is required to
convert a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss into a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion or a Rule 56 summary judgment motion when resolution of the
jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of the
case”); Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1040; Torres-Negron, 504 F.3d at 163; McLellan Highway Corp., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 5–6
(citing Jones–Booker, 16 F.Supp.2d at 58 n.9); see also Valentin, 254 F.3d at 363. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 itself permits the Court,
“[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond,” to
“consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the
parties material facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”

Unfortunately, the Court cannot resolve these contentions on
the scant paper record before it. Defendant relies in large part
on (a) an expert report it submitted in the case of Suarez-Torres
v. Masters Donuts, Inc. et al, Civil No. 16-2298-DRD, and (b) a
statement under penalty of perjury submitted for the present
litigation by its President. (Docket No. 26 at 9-16). While the
expert report from the previous case suggests Defendant complied
with its ADA obligations back then, and while the contemporary
averments about compliance are helpful, these submissions do not
eliminate every genuine dispute in the record. Plaintiff continues
to insist that there is a live controversy, that eight-year-old
measurements from the expert report are insufficient, that the

donut shop changed its layout in the last few years, and that the
post-complaint photographs may have been staged. (Docket No. 29 at
10-16). Similarly, while the Court does not disregard the history
of the Suarez-Torres case and is not oblivious of Plaintiff’s
counsel’s pattern of litigating very similar allegations against
the donut shop, prior remediation is not the same as present
compliance.
At this juncture, the Court deems it enough to say that the
existing paper record is too sparse to conclude that the donut
shop complies with the ADA as a matter of law. As a result, and
following the sensible practice of other Districts, the Court will
require a joint inspection of the donut shop. See, e.g., Garcia v.

Maciel, 2021 WL 4943063, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2021); Johnson v.
Montpelier One LLC, 2020 WL 3504458, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Myers
v. Myers Printing, Inc., 2012 WL 1532431, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
As the dispute has narrowed to four discernible categories of
barriers in the Second Amended Complaint, the joint inspection
should focus in particular on: (1) the allegedly noncompliant
entrance ramp and its slope; (2) the allegedly noncompliant
accessible parking space and access aisle; (3) the allegedly
inaccessible counter section, its floor space, and the clearance
for knees and toes; and (4) the allegedly inaccessible customer
restroom, in relation to the placement of trash receptacles within
the required clear floor space. (Docket No. 24 at 3-9). A targeted

inspection of these features of the donut shop is the most
effective means of developing a record capable of Fed. R. Civ. P.
56 adjudication.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion at Docket No.
26 is HELD IN ABEYANCE and, pending further development of the
record, will be evaluated under the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary
judgment standard. Defendant’s request to declare Plaintiff and
his counsel vexatious litigants is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The parties shall comply with the following joint inspection
and supplemental briefing schedule. By May 26, 2026, counsel for
both parties shall meet at the donut shop to conduct a joint

inspection considering the barriers outlined above. The parties
may confer and agree upon an expert to conduct the inspection, or
each bring an expert of their own. Defendant shall be permitted to
undertake requested corrective action during the inspection if it
is readily achievable. Within twenty-one days after the
inspection, Defendant shall file an informative motion to
supplement its Motion at Docket No. 26, addressing whether
Plaintiff’s claims are moot according to the joint inspection.
Within twenty-one days after Defendant’s informative motion,
Plaintiff may file an opposition and cross-move for summary
judgment if warranted. Defendant may file a reply within seven
days of Plaintiff’s opposition. Lastly, Plaintiff may file a

surreply within seven days of Defendant’s reply.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico, this 24th day of April 2026.
S/ RAÚL M. ARIAS-MARXUACH
United States District Judge