Hardware Plus, Inc. v. Omnimax International LLC - Ace Hardware Reconsideration Denied

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April 21, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Hardware Plus, Inc. v. Omnimax International, LLC, et al.

District Court, D. Puerto Rico

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:23-cv-01394

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.6K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

HARDWARE PLUS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil No. 23-1394 (MBA)

OMNIMAX INTERNATIONAL, LLC, et
al.,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
Pending before the Court is Codefendant Ace Hardware International’s (“Ace”) Motion for
Reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). (ECF No. 155). For the reasons outlined
below, Ace’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On May 15, 2025, this Court issued an Opinion and Order (ECF No. 149) denying Ace’s
Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 85). The Court ruled that plaintiff Hardware Plus, Inc.’s (“Plaintiff” or
“HP”) tortious interference claim against Ace is not time-barred because HP had sufficiently pled
allegations to support a continuing violation. (ECF No. 149 at 14-16). Specifically, the Court noted
that Plaintiff “does not merely allege continual ill effects or continuing damages from the original
tortious interference, but instead specifically alleges that Ace is continuing to tortiously interfere by
selling the Products in Puerto Rico.” (Id. at 16). On June 12, 2025, Ace timely filed a motion for
reconsideration. (ECF No. 155). HP opposed. (ECF No. 163).
LEGAL STANDARD
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not specifically recognize a ‘reconsideration’
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mechanism. Instead, parties usually resort to either Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).”
Tolbert v. Cooperative de Seguros Multiples de P.R., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131343, *2, 2025 WL 1891812 *1 (D.P.R. July 9, 2025). Such a motion may be granted when there has been “an error not of reasoning
but apprehension.” City of Miami Fire Fighters’ & Police Officers’ Ret. Tr. v. CVS Health Corp., 46 F.4th 22,
36 (1st Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). Moreover, the grounds for relief are extremely limited, essentially
encompassing only those situations where there has been an intervening change in the controlling law,
a clear legal error, or newly discovered evidence. Carrero-Ojeda v. Autoridad De Energía Eléctrica, 755 F.3d
711, 723-24 (1st Cir. 2014); Soto-Padró v. Public Bldgs. Auth., 675 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012); United States
v. Peña-Fernández, 394 F. Supp. 3d 205 (D.P.R. 2019). Because of that, these motions “should be used
sparingly,” Nat’l Metal Finishing Co. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir.

1990), and are “typically denied.” 8 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2810.1, at 128 (2d ed. 1995). See e.g., Palmer v. Champion Mortg., 465 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir.
2006) (holding that a rule 59(e) motion is “normally not a promising vehicle for revisiting a party’s
case and rearguing theories previously advanced and rejected.”). Courts enjoy considerable discretion
in deciding a Rule 59(e) motion. Carrero-Ojeda, 755 F.3d at 723; Soto-Padró, 675 F.3d at 9.
Additionally, and pertinent here, a party may not rely on Rule 59(e) “to raise arguments which
could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998); Trabal Hernandez v. Sealand Servs. Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 258, 259 (D.P.R. 2002). Nor may it use it “to repeat old arguments previously considered and rejected.” Nat'l
Metal Finishing Co., 899 F.2d at 123. Simply put, Rule 59(e) does not permit a party to turn back the
clock and try to reinvent its case with the benefit of hindsight after an adverse judgment has been
entered. See Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellants’ motion for reconsideration despite being led to a mistake

of fact when appellants’ withheld that information in their earlier filings); Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d
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27, 36 (1st Cir. 1994) (similarly rejecting a party’s attempt to introduce relevant, previously known
information after judgment had been entered).
DISCUSSION
Ace has failed to present any new argument in the motion for reconsideration or any argument
it could not have made before. Ace claims that the Court “failed to apply” two First Circuit cases,
Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 2016) and Quality Cleaning Prod. R.C., Inc. v. SCA Tissue
N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 200 (1st Cir. 2015). (ECF No. 155 at 2-4). Yet that is simply not the case.
While both cases were cited in Ace’s original motion to dismiss, they were not cases Ace identified as
controlling. In fact, Ace cited Flovac once for the one-year statute of limitations. (ECF No. 85 at 9). A
Rule 59(e) motion is not the time to debut new arguments. Moreover, while Flovac was a tortious

interference case, the injury emanated from a single instance. Flovac, 817 F.3d at 856. The First Circuit
determined Flovac could not rely on the allegation that damages (and not violations) continued to toll
the limitations clock, characterizing the argument as “nothing more than magical thinking.” Id. at 857.
Unlike in Flovac, here HP alleges not just continuing damages, but continuing violations. In its Opinion
and Order, the Court made this key distinction. (ECF No. 140 at 16) (“Plaintiff does not merely allege
continual ill effects or continuing damages from the original tortious interference, but instead
specifically alleges that Ace is continuing to tortiously interfere by selling the Products in Puerto
Rico.”). Therefore, the Court did not misapply Flovac.
While Ace did cite to Quality Cleaning Products a handful of times, it did so in regards to the
continuing violations doctrine in general and statements therein that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court
was “unlikely to apply the continuing violation doctrine to [Law] 75 claims.” (Id. at 15, 18). Ace thus
waived the arguments it now makes. If more were needed, Ace has failed to show the Court misapplied
the law. As explained by the First Circuit in Quality Cleaning Products, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s

“apparent resistance” to extend the continuing violations doctrine to breach of contract cases “makes
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sense,” after all, “[u]nlike a prolonged series of wrongful acts, a contract breach is a single, readily
ascertainable event.” 794 F.3d at 206. Unlike Quality Cleaning Products, this case involving a tortious
interference claim and allegations of continuous conduct. And Quality Cleaning Products recognized that
“application of the continuing violation doctrine is cabined to certain civil rights or tort actions.” (emphasis added). This is such a case.
In an effort to prove its point, Ace next cites to Puerto Rico’s Supreme Court’s decision in
B.W.A.C. Int’l v. Quasar Co., 38 PR Offic. Trans. 10 (1995) (ECF No. 155-1), a Law 75 case where the
plaintiff alleged the business relationship had been unilaterally terminated without just cause and
included a tortious interference claim. But again, as pointed out by HP, the interference came from a
single identifiable event. As stated in the Court’s Opinion, the defendant had taken away the dealership

from plaintiff and awarded exclusive dealership to a third party. (ECF No. 155-1 at 16). From then
on, all that continued was damage from that single event. (Id.). Nothing in B.W.A.C. stands for the
proposition that continuing violations cannot toll the statute of limitations.
Aces’s reliance on Padró fares no better. Padró v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. CV 10-2041 (JAG), 2012 WL 12995700 (D.P.R. Sept. 28, 2012). As discussed in the Court’s Opinion and Order, Padró
did not contradict V.W.F. (ECF No. 159 at 15). V.W.F. Corp. v. Capital Housing Partners CLXII, 2007
WL 1437503 (D.P.R. May 11, 2007). As such, the Court neither created nor contributed to a split.
And Ace cannot get around its failure to seek certification earlier. “Whatever may be the purpose of
rule[s] 59(e) [59(a), and 50(b),] it should not be supposed that it is intended to give an unhappy litigant
one additional chance to sway the judge.” Illinois central Gulf Railroad Co. v. Tabor Grain Co., 488 F. Supp.
110, 122 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The result would be that “some lawsuits really might never end, rather than
just seeming endless.” Frietsch v. Refco, Inc., 56 F.3d 825, 828 (7th Cir. 1995).
Finally, in the absence of binding Supreme Court case law, Ace directs the Court’s attention

to Puerto Rico Court of Appeals caselaw it believes to be on point. (ECF No. 155 at 8-9). Specifically,
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ACE points to Triple S Propiedad, Inc. v. Praxis Associate, Inc., 2013 WL 1741950 (2013) (ECF No. 162-
1). It is hard to see how this case alters the mix. As stated by the Court of Appeals, “the alleged
conduct of Triple S Property and its officers occurred on July 1, 2009, date in which the agency
contract was canceled and in that Praxis sold its business portfolio.” (Id. at 7). There simply were no
concrete allegations that the contractual breach involved continuing violations.
Puerto Rico Court of Appeals caselaw is instructive, however, and there is at least one case
that supports this Court’s earlier Opinion. In Healthy Air Masters, Inc. v. Motopac Corp., 2024 PR App.
LEXIS 2885, 2024 WL 5152889 (Nov. 21, 2024),1 a Puerto Rico Court of Appeals dealing with a Law
75 exclusive dealership scenario held that “a new statute of limitations would start running from the
moment in which the impairment actions of the subsisting relationship took place.” Id. at *37. The

Court went on to explain that “[f]ailing to consider the actions taken after notification of the
termination of the exclusive business relationship would undermine the purposes set forth in Law 75,
to the detriment of the local dealers who, through their business activities, have succeeded in
establishing a market, while allowing abusive practices by the principal.” Id. at *38. And it added that
“it would be improper to talk about start of the statute of limitations due to impairment of the
exclusivity until the definitive termination of the relationship or until any other impairment of that
relationship occurs, depending on the particular circumstances of each case.” Id. at *37 (emphasis in
original). This makes sense and serves to prevent injustice. A contrary ruling would grant immunity to
tortious interference simply because a first act was insufficient to trigger a lawsuit. As observed by the
First Circuit, the continuing violations “doctrine allows a lawsuit to be delayed in cases — such as
hostile work environment claims — in which a course of ‘repeated conduct’ is necessary before ‘a
series of wrongful acts blossoms into an injury on which suit can be brought.’” Quality Cleaning Prods.

1 A certified translation to the cited excerpt is attached to this Opinion.
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R.C., 794 F.3d at 205 (quoting Ayala v. Shinseki, 780 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2015)). This much was
recognized by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Cacho González v. Santarrosa, 203 D.P.R. 215, 225
(2019) (ECF No. 92-1). Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118 (9th
Cir. 2002), it stated “the continuing tort doctrine applies where there is no ‘single incident’ that can
fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm.” Id. (quoting Flowers, 310 F.3d at
1126). The doctrine’s application to Ace’s continued selling of the products—prices which range from
under a dollar to a little over $3— despite HP’s alleged exclusivity clause prevents rather than creates
injustice.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, Ace’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
In San Juan, Puerto Rico this April 21, 2026.

MARIANA E. BAUZÁ-ALMONTE
United States Magistrate Judge

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