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Feb. 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Robinson v. Hendricks

Oregon Supreme Court

• Citations: 374 Or. 866
• Docket Number: S072648
• Judges: Garrett

• Disposition: It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be discharged from his illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP 14.05(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment immediately.

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.2K)

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Disposition

It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be discharged from his illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to ORAP 1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP 14.05(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the appellate judgment immediately.

Combined Opinion

866 February 12, 2026 No. 12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

CRAIG ANTHONY ROBINSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Kimberly HENDRICKS,
Superintendent,
Santiam Correctional Institution,
Defendant.
(SC S072648)

En Banc
Original proceeding in habeas corpus.
Submitted on the record February 11, 2026.
Eric Deitrick, Oregon Justice Resource Center, Portland,
filed the petition, the memorandum in support of the peti-
tion, and the reply for plaintiff.
Kirsten M. Naito, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
filed the response to the petition for defendant. Also on the
response were Dan Rayfield, Attorney General, and Paul L.
Smith, Solicitor General.
GARRETT, J.
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be dis-
charged from his illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to ORAP
1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP 14.05
(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the appel-
late judgment immediately.
Cite as 374 Or 866 (2026) 867
868 Robinson v. Hendricks

GARRETT, J.
This is another in a series of petitions for writs of
habeas corpus concerning issues addressed by this court
in Arellano-Sanchez v. Thrasher, 374 Or 623, ___ P3d ___
(2025). As we explain below, we order that plaintiff be dis-
charged from custody. We also address more broadly the cir-
cumstances presently leading to the series of habeas peti-
tions raising the same underlying legal question.
In June 2025, plaintiff was sentenced to a total term
of incarceration of 60 months, the product of a 30-month
sentence on one count and a 30-month sentence on another
count, which were to be served consecutively. For each count,
the judgment provided, in part, “[Plaintiff] may receive
credit for time served. [Plaintiff] shall receive presentence
incarceration credits pursuant to ORS 137.370(4).”
In July, we issued a decision concerning the calcu-
lation of credit for time served under ORS 137.370(4). State
ex rel Torres-Lopez v. Fahrion, 373 Or 816, 572 P3d 1045
(Torres-Lopez I), adh’d to as modified on recons, 374 Or 423,
579 P3d 1056 (2025) (Torres-Lopez II). Following our decision
in Torres-Lopez I, the Oregon Department of Corrections
(DOC) recalculated plaintiff’s credit for time served and
determined that plaintiff’s projected release date was in the
past. In August, DOC released plaintiff.
In October, the district attorney’s office in Jackson
County filed a motion to correct the judgment of conviction
in plaintiff’s criminal case. See ORS 137.172(1) (“The trial
court retains authority after entry of judgment of conviction
* * * to modify the judgment, including the sentence, to cor-
rect any arithmetic or clerical errors or to delete or modify
any erroneous term in the judgment. The court may correct
the judgment either on the motion of one of the parties or on
the court’s own motion after written notice to all of the par-
ties.”). The state requested that the trial court amend the
judgment by “removing the language ‘pursuant to ORS 137.
370’ from [both counts].” (Emphasis in original.)
Thereafter, DOC changed its view of the relevant
law and again recalculated plaintiff’s credit for time served.
Under that new calculation, DOC determined that plaintiff
Cite as 374 Or 866 (2026) 869

had time left to serve on his term of incarceration. DOC then
issued an order for plaintiff’s arrest and detention pursuant
to ORS 144.350. On November 25, plaintiff was re-admitted
to DOC custody pursuant to DOC’s order.
On December 1, the state moved to withdraw its
motion to correct the judgment, explaining that the motion
was “moot” because DOC had corrected its “error in this
matter, the defendant is back in [its] custody, and the defen-
dant is now serving the remainder of his sentence originally
agreed upon by the parties and imposed by this court.” The
trial court granted that motion.
On December 24, this court issued Arellano-
Sanchez, in which the court concluded that, under similar
circumstances, DOC lacked authority to issue orders pur-
suant to ORS 144.350 and, for that reason, the plaintiff’s
detention in that case was unlawful. 374 Or at 637. The
court reached the same conclusion in Allen v. Thrasher, 374
Or 618, ___ P3d ___ (2025), and Hernandez v. Thrasher, 374
Or 643, ___ P3d ___ (2025), two other cases that presented
qualitatively indistinguishable circumstances.
Within a few hours of the issuance of the decisions
in Arellano-Sanchez, Allen, and Thrasher, the district attor-
ney’s office filed a motion to amend the judgment of convic-
tion in plaintiff’s criminal case by “delet[ing] the erroneous
references to ‘credit for time served’ or ‘presentence incar-
ceration credits pursuant to ORS 137.370(4)’ in the judgment
on the consecutive counts in this matter” in order “to ensure
[plaintiff’s] sentence continues to be calculated accurately,
consistent with the Court’s intent[.]” Following a hearing on
January 9, 2026, the trial court issued an order denying the
motion.
Thereafter, in Fletes v. Thrasher, 374 Or 735, 738,
___ P3d ___ (2026), this court ordered that the plaintiff be
discharged from custody. We again concluded that ORS
144.350 did not authorize DOC to issue the order for the
plaintiff’s arrest and return under circumstances that were
essentially indistinguishable from those in Arellano-Sanchez
and that no other putative source of authority existed for the
plaintiff’s imprisonment. See also McEwen v. Thrasher, 374
870 Robinson v. Hendricks

Or 744, ___ P3d ___ (2026) (same); Hatton v. Sundquist, 374
Or 739, ___ P3d ___ (2025) (same).
Plaintiff then petitioned for a writ of habeas cor-
pus, requesting that this court exercise its original juris-
diction and order his immediate release from prison. See
Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 2 (“[T]he supreme court
may, in its own discretion, take original jurisdiction in * * *
habeas corpus proceedings.”).1 Plaintiff contends that there
is “no legal or factual distinction between plaintiff’s case
and the individuals” whom this court ordered be immedi-
ately released in Arellano-Sanchez and other related cases
identified above. In response, the state has acknowledged
that “[a]ny factual or procedural differences between this
case and those are likely immaterial to the questions before
this court in this habeas proceeding.” The state has further
acknowledged that, “[p]ursuant to this court’s holding in
Arellano-Sanchez, * * * ORS 144.350 did not provide author-
ity for plaintiff’s re-arrest.” For that reason, the state notes
that “plaintiff is entitled to the same habeas relief as the
plaintiffs in Arellano-Sanchez, Allen, and Hernandez.”
In sum, as both parties observe, the circumstances
in this case are qualitatively indistinguishable from those in
Arellano-Sanchez. Thus, for the reasons stated in Arellano-
Sanchez, we again conclude that ORS 144.350 did not autho-
rize DOC to issue the order for plaintiff’s arrest and return.
Given the trial court’s denial of the state’s motion pursuant
to ORS 137.172, no other putative source of authority pres-
ently exists for plaintiff’s imprisonment.
Accordingly, we order that defendant discharge
plaintiff from custody immediately.2 See ORS 34.700(1)
(“If it appears that the party detained is imprisoned or
restrained illegally, judgment shall be given that the party
be discharged forthwith[.]”). We further waive otherwise
applicable appellate rules relating to reconsideration and
1
See also ORS 34.310 (providing that every person who is “imprisoned or
otherwise restrained of liberty,” with exceptions, “may prosecute a writ of habeas
corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint, and if illegal,
to be delivered therefrom”).
2
Also this day, the court has ordered that three other similarly situated
plaintiffs be discharged from custody: Golden v. Beaumont (S072646), Johnson v.
Hendricks (S072647), and Weber v. Randall (S072649).
Cite as 374 Or 866 (2026) 871

the issuance of the appellate judgment, and we direct the
State Court Administrator to issue the appellate judgment
immediately. See ORAP 1.20(5) (permitting the court, for
good cause and on its own motion, to waive any rule of appel-
late procedure); ORAP 9.25 (providing for reconsideration);
ORAP 14.05(3)(b) (providing for the timing of the issuance of
the appellate judgment).3
This court has now ordered the release of ten plain-
tiffs who were unlawfully arrested and imprisoned by DOC
under color of ORS 144.350. Based on the filings submitted
in this and other cases, we understand that other similarly
situated persons remain in custody—that is, that the state
continues to detain individuals like the plaintiff in Arellano-
Sanchez without demonstrating any putative source of
authority for their present imprisonment. The state has
requested further direction from this court, indicating that
DOC does not believe it has the legal authority to release
such individuals absent a ruling specifically directing their
release.
As to the described category of persons, we decline
to specifically order the release of any person who has not
filed a petition seeking such relief, because we must not
assume that an individual who has not demanded that relief
desires it. According to a filing by the state in a different
case, at least one affected person, similarly situated to the
plaintiff in Arellano-Sanchez, has indicated a desire not to
be released under the rationale set out in that case. See Bray
v. Sundquist (S072563). Nevertheless, to the extent that the
state believes that it lacks the authority to release such
persons in the absence of individualized relief ordered by
this court, that view is not well founded. This court’s recent
rulings have established that DOC’s orders did not provide
authority for plaintiffs’ rearrest and return to prison. The
state has authority to follow the law as we have stated it.
See Burke v. Children’s Services Division, 288 Or 533, 548,

3
ORS 34.700(2) provides that a court “shall include in the judgment an order
that the defendant pay the attorney fees incurred by the petition, not to exceed
$100,” if “[t]he court enters a judgment requiring that the plaintiff be discharged”
and “[t]he court finds that the allegations or defenses in the return were frivo-
lous.” Under the circumstances, we do not find that the state’s position was frivo-
lous. For that reason, plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees under the statute.
872 Robinson v. Hendricks

607 P2d 141 (1980) (“We will not assume that the defendant
agencies of the State of Oregon will, in the absence of an
injunction, refuse to follow the law as we have stated it.”).
We further observe that, at this point, the circuit
courts of this state are well equipped to address future
habeas proceedings to the extent that plaintiffs seek relief on
the grounds set out in Arellano-Sanchez. Moreover, because
such filings may well raise case-specific factual issues that
require resolution, the circuit courts are likely to be the pre-
ferred forum.
It is hereby ordered that plaintiff immediately be
discharged from his illegal imprisonment. Pursuant to
ORAP 1.20(5) and notwithstanding ORAP 9.25 and ORAP
14.05(3)(b), the State Court Administrator shall issue the
appellate judgment immediately.