State v. Lockman - Fentanyl Possession Conviction Affirmed

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL (Memorandum Web Opinion) S TATE V. L OCKMAN NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E). S TATE OF N EBRASKA, APPELLEE, V. S TEPHEN J. L OCKMAN, AP PELLANT. Filed February 24, 2026. No. A-25-240. Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: A NDREA D. M ILLER, Judge. Affirmed. Andrew W. Snyder, of Holyoke, Snyder, Longoria, Reichert & Rice, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Jordan Osborne for appellee. M OORE, B ISHOP, and W ELCH, Judges. M OORE, Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Stephen J. Lockman appeals his convictions for possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute; possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, more t han 140 grams; failure to a ffix drug tax stamp; and tampering with evidence, following a jury trial in Scotts Bluff County District Court. Lockman argues that the district court erred in preventing ad ditional impeachment evidence of a witness, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew his motion to suppress. We affirm. II. STATEMENT OF FACTS In June 2024, Loc kman enlisted a former girlfriend, Jennifer Radomski, to accompany him to Colorado to pick up 2 pounds of methamphetamine and over 1,000 fentanyl pills. Upon

returning to Scotts Bluff County, their vehicle was stopp ed by law enf orcement. Relying on information provided by Radomski, the methamphetamine and fentanyl pills were recovered and confirmed to be controlled substances through laboratory testing. On July 10, 2024, Lockman was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance (fentanyl) with intent to distribute, a Class II felony in violat ion of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024); possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with intent to distribute, more than 140 grams, a Cl ass IB felony in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(10)(a); f ailure to affix drug tax stamp, a Class IV felony in violation of in violation of Neb. R ev. Stat. § 77 -4309 (Reissue 2018); and ta mpering with evidence f or a Class II felony or higher, a Class II felony in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-922(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 2024). 1. M OTION TO S UPPRESS On October 11, 2024, Lockman filed a motion to suppress “ all fruits of the illegal search and arrest. ” Loc kman challenged law e nforcement ’ s ability to perf orm an investigatory stop of the vehicle and the subsequent search resulting from the stop. The dist rict court held a hearing on Lockman ’ s motion to suppress on Nove mber 13, 2024. Kristen Massie, an invest igator with the Gering Police Department, testified that she is a member of the Western Intelligence Narcotics Group (WING) Dr ug T ask Force. As part of Massie ’ s work with WING, she coordinates with cooperating individuals, who then participate in controlled buys, as well as surveillance an d interviews. Since April 2024, Radomski had been working with Massie as a coop erating individual to “ work o ff ” her own criminal charge. Prio r to the events at issue, Radomski had provided reliable information to M assie that led to an arrest for the distribution of narcotics. On June 18, 2024, Radomski informed Massie that Lockman had asked Radomski to accompany him to Colorado to “ help him bring stuff back. ” Massie attempted to meet with Radomski and, while she was on her way, Massie observed Lockman get into a black Toyota Corolla with Michigan license plates. Massie also observed the vehicle parked outside of Radomski ’ s home that s ame day. A contract demonstrating that the veh icle was a n Enterprise rental car was e ntered into evidenc e at the suppression hea ring. The contract stated that the vehicle had been rented to Josh Harshbarger on June 10 and reflected no additional authorized drivers. On June 23, following the events in this case, Harshbarger reported that a bla ck Toyota Corolla with Michigan license plates owned by Enterprise had been stolen by Lockman. When Massie later contacted Radomski on Jun e 1 8, 2024, she told Radomski that due to the short notice of Lockman ’ s trip, there was not enough ti me to arrange for the cooperation of other jurisdictions necessary for a controlled environment. Concerned for Radomski ’ s safety, Massie instructed R adomski that she should stay in the a rea. A series of text messages between Radomski and Massie from this ti me was entered int o evidence. In one of the messages M assie sent to Radomski on June 18, she stated, “ Do not g o!! I can ’ t keep u from getting charged even if it ’ s in NE. ” Radomski ultimately accompanied Lockman on his trip to Colorado over June 18 and 19, 2024. While Radomski was in Colorado, sh e stayed in communication with Massie and reported over a phone c all a nd text message that there were drugs in the vehicle, including roughly a pound of methamphetamine and 2,000 “ blues. ”

The following day, Radomski called Massie to report that she and Lockman would be driving through Kimball, Nebraska, on their return trip. Massie waited in the ar ea and observed a black Toyota Corolla with Michigan li cense plates drive into Kimball. Massie observed Radomski to be driving the vehicl e and Lockman to b e the passenger. The vehicle sto pped at a gas station, where R adomski went in side to call Massie. Over the phone, Radomski reported being scared and that there was a large qu antity of drugs in the vehicle. Massie encouraged Radomski to continue driving the vehicle. When the call concluded, Radomski got back into the driver ’ s seat and Lockman into the passenger ’ s seat, and the vehicle drove out of Kimball. Massie continued to surveil the vehicle until it turned onto a county roa d. Massie communicated the direction the vehicle was traveling as well as its identifying features to oth er WING officers in the area. Trooper Mar co Vera Chavez, with the Nebraska State Patrol, testifie d that on June 19, 2024, he was patrolling in Scotts Bluff C ounty. He was contacted by Investigator David Hunter, who advised Vera Chavez that a black Toyota Co rolla with Michigan lice nse plates was leaving Kimball and transporting methamphetamine and fentanyl pills. Vera Chavez soon identified the vehicle and began following it on the county road. At some point the vehicle signaled a turn into what appeared to be an abandoned house, and Ve ra C havez initiated an investigatory stop based on the information provided to him by Hunter. The vehicle had not committed a traffic violation. Vera Chavez activated his in -car camera and his body -worn c amera, and footage from both was entered into evidence. During the investigatory stop, Radomski exited the vehicle from the driver ’ s side. She gave Vera C havez consent to s earch her pu rse, which c o ntained a broken methamphetamine pipe. Vera Chavez also found 54 fentanyl pills on Radomski ’ s person. Radomski was then placed under arrest and taken to a patrol vehicle, where she expl ained to Vera Chavez that she was working with Massie. Radomski told Vera C havez that drugs were hidden inside the v ehicle ’ s dashboard. A search of the vehicle produced two b ags of a cr ystalline substance, approxim ately 900 grams in total, from the dashboard be hind the vehicle ’ s ra di o system. The subst ance field-tested positive fo r methamphetamine. Radomski also told Vera Chavez that Lockman had thrown a package containing fentanyl out of the window of the vehicle. Radomski provided an initial description of where Lockman had discarded the packa ge. After a 15-minute search, Vera Chavez asked Radomski for a more detailed description of the location where Lockman had discarded the package, and the package was recovered by law enforcement in a field to the side of the county road. The package contained 1,012 suspected fentanyl pills. In an order entered on December 12, 2024, the district court overruled Lockman ’ s motion to suppress. The court found that the information provided to Vera Chavez established reasona ble suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity existed. Radomski had provided credible statements to law enforcement detailing the steps taken by Lockman to transport the narcotics in the vehicle, as well as the type and quantity of narcotics. The vehicle used by Radomski and Lockman had been obs erved by o fficers to be d riven by Loc kman prior to the trip to Colorado. This information, along with officers seeing Radomski and Lo ckman together at the gas station in Kimball, provided the ne cessary reasonable suspi cion to briefly perform an investigatory stop. The court also found that because Lockman was not the owner, registered user,

or driver of the vehicle when it was stopped, Lockman had failed to establish a sufficient connection with the vehicle to have standing to challenge the searc h o f the vehicle itself. 2. T RIAL A jury trial was held on January 28 and 29, 2025. Though Lockman made several objections to exhibits to “ preserve our motion, ” Lockman did not make general objections to the testimony offered by law enforcement off i cers or seek a c ontinuing obj ection based upon the motion to suppress. Both Massie a nd Vera Ch avez testified consistentl y with their testimony at t he suppre ssi on hearing. The following evidence was also adduced. Radomski testified that on June 18, 2024, she and Lockman drove to a commercial area of Aurora, Colorado. Radomski went inside a store to purcha se some beverages, and when she returned, there was another man inside of the vehicle. Lockman and th e man had a conv ersation before the man left the vehicle, returning 5 minutes later to give Lockman “ the rest of the drugs. ” Though Lockman had told Radomski that they were in Colorado to retrieve “ rough ly 2 pounds and 2,000 fentanyl, ” Radomski did not see the drugs, as they were in a speaker box in the trunk of the vehicle. After this transaction, Lockman and Radomski left the are a in their vehicle. Radomski testified that Lockman then removed the disc player and radio from the dashboard of the v ehicle and hid two bags of methamphetamine behind the da shboard before remounting the disc play er and radio. Lockman also told Radomski to keep some of the f entanyl pills on her person because if the police were to find the small amount on her, they would not go on to search the vehicle. R adomski placed some of the fentanyl pills in a small envelope that she then tucked inside of h er bra. Radomski packaged the remainder of the f entanyl pills into a singular parcel that was kept within her and Lockman ’ s reach during their return trip. While Lockman was working to place th e methamphetamine behind the vehicle ’ s dashboard, Radomski used her cell phone to make a video of Lockman ’ s actions at 10:32 a.m. on June 19, 2024. The video briefly captures an individual from the waist down, but the face is not shown. Radomski ’ s video was entered int o e viden ce and shows a bag of methamphetamine sitting on an individual ’ s lap while in the drive r ’ s seat o f a vehicle. The v ehicle ’ s disc player had been removed and was hanging down from th e dashboard. In the video, a man ’ s voice is heard s aying, “ [Y]ou didn ’ t know there was that much in there? ” Then he s ays, “ [T]hat ’ s only one bag. ” Radomski later provided this video to Massie. Hunter testified that he was familiar with Lockman ’ s voice after having listened to seve ral of Lockman ’ s jail calls. Based on that familiarity with his voice, Hunter i dentified the voi ce in Radomski ’ s video as Lockman ’ s. Massie and Radomski testified consistently with Massie ’ s prior testimony at the suppression hea ring regarding Radomski ’ s c ontact with Massie while she was in Colorado and on the drive back to Nebraska. Radomski testified that after lea ving Kimball and d riving on the county road, she obse rved a state trooper turn around and follow their vehicle. She then tol d Lockman to throw the fentanyl pills out of the vehicle. R adomski saw Lockman th row the packa ge o f f entanyl out of the vehicle ’ s window. Vera Chavez testified that he did not see a package being thrown out of the vehicle. During cross-examination, Radomski acknowledged that she had been convicted of a crime of dishonesty. Lockman attempted to question her further about the details of that conviction, but

when the State objected ba sed on improper impeachment, the objection wa s sustained by the district court, and additional questioning of the underlying details of that offense was not permitted. Caitlyn Wensel, a forensic scientist with the Nebraska State Pa trol crime lab, testified that the suspected drugs r ecovered from the vehicle and the field were test ed. Wensel confirmed that the two bags found behind the vehicle ’ s dashboard contained 444.02 grams and 441.95 grams of methamphetamine, respectively. She also confirmed that the pills found inside the discarded package contained fentanyl. Trooper Juan Garfio of the Nebraska S tate Patrol, who arrived on the scene to assist Vera Chavez in the search o f the vehicle, testified that t he two bags of methamphetamine did not have a drug tax stamp. Massie testified that she proc essed the fentanyl e vidence, and there was likewise no drug tax stamp on the package of 1,012 fentanyl pills. Massie stated that based on her experience as a drug investigator with the WING drug task force, over 800 grams of methamphetamine and more than 1,000 fentanyl pills are distribution quantities of those controlled substances. 3. V ERDICT AND S ENTENCIN G After deliberating for an hour, the ju ry found Lockman guil ty of all four c ounts. The jury determined that Lockman was in possession of 885 grams of methamphetamine. The district court accepted the jury ’ s verdict and found Lockman guilty of the four counts. A sentencing hearing was held on March 28, 2025. The dist rict court sentenced Lockman to a term of 8 to 10 years ’ imprisonment for possession of fentanyl with intent to dist ribute; to 30 to 40 years ’ imprisonment for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, more than 140 grams; to 2 to 2 years ’ imprisonment for failure to affix a drug tax stamp; and 2 to 4 years ’ imprisonment for tampering with evidence. The court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently and awarded 283 days credit for time served as to Lockman ’ s conviction of possession of fentanyl with intent to distribute. Lockman appeals. III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Lockman assigns, restated and consolidated, that t he district cou rt erred in (1) preventing additional im peachment evidence of R adomski, (2) finding there was sufficient evidence to sustain each of Lockman ’ s c onvi ctions, and (3) de nying L ockman ’ s motion for directed ve rdict. Lockman also assigns (4) that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to renew his motion to suppress. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only whe n the rules make discretion a factor in determining admissibility. Where the Nebraska Evidence Rules commit the evidentiary question at issue to the discretion of the trial court, an appellate court reviews the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kruger, 320 Neb. 361, 27 N.W.3d 398 (2025). In r eviewing a criminal conviction for sufficiency of the evidence to susta in the conviction, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecut ion, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In an appellate cou rt ’ s consideration of a criminal defendant ’ s motion for a directed v erdict, the State is entitled to have all its releva nt evidence accepted as true, every controverted fact resolved in its fa vo r, a nd every beneficial inference reasonably deducible fr om the evidence. State v. Childs, 309 Neb. 427, 960 N.W.2d 585 (2021). An appellate court resolves claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on dir ect appeal only where the record is sufficient to conclusively determi ne whether trial counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or w as n ot pre judi ced by counsel ’ s alleged deficient performance as matters of law. State v. Kruger, supra. Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be determined on direct appeal is a que stion of law. Id. V. ANALYSIS 1. I MPEACHMENT E VIDEN CE Lockman first assigns that the district court er red in sustaining the State ’ s objection to impeachment questions directed to Radomski. Lockman cont ends that he should have been permitted to cross-examine Radomski regarding the details of her conviction of a c rime of dishonesty. Lockman asserts that thi s cross-examination would have elicited testim ony regarding Radomski ’ s “ previous efforts to get Lockman in trouble with the law. ” Bri ef for appellant at 21. Lockman argues that this impeachment of Radomski could have led a reasonable juror to conclude that Radomski was again lying about the cir cumstances of the offense to evade punishment while blaming Lockman. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-609(1) (Reissue 2016), provides for the impeachment o f a witness on cross-examination when the witness has commit ted a felony or a crime of dishonesty. After the conviction is e stablished, “ ‘ the inquiry must end there, and it is improper to inquire into the nature of the crime, the details of the offense, or the time spent in prison as a result thereof. ’ ” State v. Castillo-Zamora, 289 Neb. 382, 388, 855 N.W.2d 14, 22 (2014) (quoting State v. Johnson, 226 Neb. 618, 413 N.W.2d 897 (1987)). The inquiry is restricted, because a witness ’ conviction of a crime is meant to be used for whatever effect it has on only the c redibility of the witness, and it is not meant to otherwise impact the jury ’ s view of the character of the witness. See State v. Castillo-Zamora, supra. At trial, Lockman p roperly impeached Radomski by asking whether she had previously been convicted o f a fe lony or crime of disho nesty. Lockman then began to ask Ra doms ki whether the crime involved a false report on Lockman, to whic h the S tate objected. The district court sustained the objection on the grounds that § 27 -609(1) permits an inquiry only into whether the witness has a felony conviction or a crime of dishonesty, and that “ [d]iving into the convictions, the type of convictions, the nature of the convictions, has been disallowed in Nebraska[.] ” Once Lockman had established Radomski ’ s conviction, the inquiry should have ceased. It was improper for Lo ckman to continue the inq uiry and ask about the nature of R adomski ’ s conviction after she had been impeached. As such, the district court did not err when it sustained the State ’ s objection to the further questioning of Radomski regarding the nature o f her pr evious conviction.

1. S UFFICIENCY OF E VIDENC E Lockman argues that the evidence was insufficient to support any of his four convictions. We address each in turn. (a) Possession With Intent to Distribute Lockman asserts that the trial evidence was insufficient to support his two convictions for possession with intent to distribute fentanyl and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, over 140 grams, bec ause Radomski was a cooperating individu al under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1439.01 (Reissue 2016) and her testimony was not su fficiently corroborated as required by the statute. Nebraska law provides, “ No conviction for an o ffense punishable under any provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act shall be based solely upon the un corroborated testimony of a cooperating individual. ” § 28-1439.01. Under the Uniform C ontrolled Substance s Act, corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a conviction not be based solely upon uncorroborated testimony of an individual coope rating with the prosec uti on if the witness ’ testimony is corroborated a s to mate rial f acts and circumstances that tend to support the testimony as to the principal fact in issue. State v. Savage, 301 Neb. 873, 920 N.W.2d 692 (2018), modified on denial of rehearing 302 Neb. 492, 924 N.W.2d 64 (2019). Te sti mony of a cooperating individual need not be corroborated on every element of a crime. Id. For § 28-1439.01 to apply, the person testifying must be a “ cooperating individual. ” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-401(27) (Cum. Supp. 2024) provides, “ Cooperating individual means any person, other than a commissioned law enforce ment offi cer, who acts on behalf of, at the re quest of, or as agent for a law enforcement age ncy for the purpose of gathering or obtaining evidenc e of offense s punishable under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. ” As the district court note d at trial, there is a qu estion as to whether Radomski was acting as a coopera ting individu al in this case. R adomski wa s signed up to a ct as a confidential informant with Massie in April 2024 and was attempting to work off crimin al charges as part of thi s arrangement. However, in June, Radomski was explicitly instructed by Massie not to accompany Lockman on his trip to Colorado. Massie told Radomski that she was not ap proved to conduct this operation, a nd text messages where Massie urged Radomski not to go were entered into evidence. Despite these communications from Massie, Radomski decided to accompany Lockman on his trip to Colorado. Thus, Radomski was not explicitly acting at the request of law enforcement when she accompanied Lockman on his trip to Colorado. However, even assuming without deciding that Radomski was acting as a coop erating individual pursuant to § 28 -401(27), there was sufficient corroboration of her testimony at trial to support L ockman ’ s convictions for possession with int ent to distribute. Possession with intent to distribute is set out in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28 -4 16 (Cum. Supp. 2024). The relevant portion provides: “ [I]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally: (a) To manufac ture, distribute, deliver, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, deliver, or dispense a controlled substance. ” § 28-416(1). Thus, the State had to sh ow that Lockman knowingly or intentionally possessed both the fentanyl and methamphetamine with an intent to deliver or distribute it. For crimes under the criminal narcotics statutes, Nebraska common law recognizes both actual and constructive

possession. See State v. Warlick, 308 Neb. 656, 9 56 N.W.2d 269 (2021). Constructive possession may be proved by di rect or circumstantial eviden ce a nd may be shown by the accused ’ s proximity to the item at the time of the arrest or by a showing of dominion over it. Id. Mere presence at a place where a controlled substance is found is not sufficient to show constructive possession. State v. Sherrod, 27 Neb. App. 435, 932 N.W.2d 880 (2019). Instead, “ the evidence must show facts and circumstances which affirmatively link [the suspect] to the [narcotic] so as to suggest that he [or she] knew of it and exercised control over it. ” Id. at 442, 932 N.W.2d at 888. Radomski ’ s video, which was created on June 19, 2024, shows an individua l sitting in the driver ’ s seat of a vehi cle with a bag on his lap and the vehicle ’ s disc player disconnected and hanging from the dashboard. The indi vidual ’ s stat ement re fers to the amo unt as being only one bag, suggesting that there may have been more. Two bags of m ethamphetamine we re later recovered from b ehind the dashboard of the vehicle in which Lockm an was a passenger. Additionally, Hunter identified the voice in the video as belonging to Lockman. Possession of an illegal substance can be inferred from a vehicle passenger ’ s proximity to the substance or other circumstantial evidence that affirmatively links the passenger to the substance. Stat e v. Warlick, supra. Also, during the investigative stop, Radomski advised Vera Chav ez wh ere Lockman had discarded a package of fentanyl pil ls out of the veh icle ’ s window. After providing additional detail regarding the location, the fentanyl pills were found where Radomski had described. Lab testing con firmed the substance r emoved from behind the vehicle ’ s dashboard was over 885 grams of methamphetamine, and the over 1,000 pills recovered from the roadside were confirmed to be fentanyl. Massie testified that b ased on h er experience, the amounts constituted distribution quantities of those controlled substances. The facts presented at trial, viewed in the light most favora ble to the State, show that Lockman did possess with intent to distribute more than 140 grams of methamphetamine, and he did possess with intent to distribute fentanyl. The evidence that establishes Lockman ’ s knowledge of the presence and character of the controlled substances, as well a s his dominion over them, w as corroborated by evidence other than R adomski ’ s testimony, and it was sufficient to support the jury ’ s guilty verdicts on those count s. (b) Failure to Affix Drug Tax Stamp Lockman was also charged with failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of § 77-4309, which states in relevant part: “ A dealer distributi ng or possessing marijuana or a controlled substance without affixing the official stamp, label, or other indicium shall be guilty of a Class I V felony. ” Massie testified that there was no drug tax stamp on the fentanyl pil ls and Garfio testified that the two bags of methamphetamine also did not have a drug tax stamp. Evidence at trial did not provide a ny other indication that the required tax had be en paid. The forensic scientist testified that the substance in the two bags w as methamphetamine. She also confirmed that the pills were fentanyl. Both methamphetamine and fentanyl are controlled substance s. As found above, the evid ence established that Loc kman was in possession of the fentanyl and methamphetamine with an intent to distribute. Viewing this evide nce in the light most favorable to the State, a r ational trier of f act could find Lockman was a dea ler in possession of a controlled substance without an official tax stamp, label, or other indicium.

(c) Tampering With Evidence Lastly, we address Lock man ’ s challenge to the s ufficiency of the eviden ce to support his conviction of tampering with physical evidence, in violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28 -922(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024). Section 28-922 provides, in pertinent part: (1) A person commits the offense of tampering wit h physica l evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pe nding or about to be instituted and acting without legal right or authority, he ... (a) [d]estroys, mutilates, conceals, removes, or alters physical evidence with the intent to impair its verity or availability in the pending or prospective official proceeding[.] Lockman doe s not disput e that he threw the package of fentanyl pills out of the window of the moving vehicle and i nto a field. Instead, he asserts that his action in doing so was merely an “ abandonment ” of the property, whi ch a s a matter of law does not constitute tampering with evidence. Bri ef for appellant at 24-25. F or this assertion Lockman relies on S tate v. Lasu, 278 Neb. 180, 768 N.W.2d 447 (2009), which held th at the crime of tampering with physical evidence does not include mere abandonment of physical evidence in the presence of law enforcement. We find the facts in thi s case to be distinguishable from those in Lasu. In Lasu, the defendant removed a b ag of marijuana from his pocket in the presence of a police officer inside of a gas station. Id. at 181, 768 N.W.2d at 449 -450. The defendant then threw the bag into a large cardboard bin of sna ck foods, and the ba g landed on top. Id. The defendant did not attempt to conceal the bag of ma rijuana in the bin, and the o fficer immediately retrieved the bag and placed the defendant und er arrest. Id. In explaining its rationale, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that the defendant had placed the evidence where it was li kely to be discovered. Id. at 185, 768 N.W.2d at 452. S ee, also, State v. Vasquez-Arenivar, 18 N eb. App. 265, 779 N. W.2d 117 (2010) (defendant discarded Ziploc bag o f methamphetamine on ground with several police officers in close proximity; baggie of drugs was immediately rec o vered and defendant was arrested). In thi s c ase, Loc kman threw a bag of fentanyl pills out of the window of a moving vehicle, where it landed in a field next to a county road. Radomski gave Vera Chavez information regarding the location of the fentanyl pills during the traffic stop. Vera Chavez did not see the drugs being thrown out of the vehicle. Law enforcement was only able to recover the discarded fentanyl pil ls in the field based on Radomski ’ s detailed description of where Lockman had thrown them out the vehicle ’ s window. Based on these circumstances, we cannot say that Lockman discarded the fentanyl pills in the pre sence of law enforcement or where they were li kely to be discovered. Thus, when viewing the e vide nce in thi s case in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jur y could have found that Lockman ’ s act of throwing the fe ntanyl pills out of the window of a moving vehicle and into a fi eld was done to con ceal or remove the evidence, with the intent to impair it s availability in a prospective official proceeding. See § 28-922(1)(a). The district court did not err in acce pting the jury ’ s guilty verdicts. 3. D IRECTED V ERDICT Lockman also argues that his motion for a directed verdict should have been sustained as to the two charges of possession with intent to distribute.

Lockman moved for a dir ected verdict at the close of the State ’ s evidence, and he presented no evidence after the motion was overruled. He t herefore h as preserved for appellate review the district court ’ s denial of his motion for a directed verdict. See State v. Stack, 307 Neb. 773, 950 N.W.2d 611 (2020). In a criminal case, the court can direct a verdict o nly when (1) there is a compl ete failure of evidenc e to establish an essential element of the crime cha rged or (2) evidence is so doubtful in character and lacking in probative value that a finding of guilt based on such evidence cannot be sustained. State v. Childs, 309 Neb. 427, 960 N.W.2d 585 (2021). When a mot ion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is overruled by the trial court, appellate review is controlled by the rule that a directed verdict is proper only where reasonable minds cannot differ and can draw but one conclusion from the evidence, and the issues should be decided as a matter of law. Id. Because we found above that there was sufficient evidence to support Loc kman ’ s two convictions for possession with intent to dist ribute, Lockman ’ s claim for a directed verdict fails. If there is any evidence which will sustain a fin ding for the pa rty against whom a motion for directed verdict is made, the ca se may not be decided as a matter of law, and a verdict may not be directed. See State v. Wil liams, 306 Neb. 261, 945 N.W.2d 124 (2020). The district court did not err in overruling Lockman ’ s motion for a directed verdict. 4. I NEFFECTIVE A SSISTAN CE OF C OUNSEL Through different couns el, Lockman contends th at his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to renew his motion to suppress. When a defendant ’ s trial counsel is different from his or her counsel on direct appeal, the defendant must raise on direct a pp eal a ny issue of trial counsel ’ s ineffective performa n ce which is known to the defendant or is apparent from the record; otherwise, the issue will be procedurally barred in a subsequent postconviction proceeding. State v. German, 316 Neb. 841, 7 N.W.3d 206 (2024). Whether a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may b e determined on direct appeal is a question of law. Stat e v. Clark, 315 Neb. 736, 1 N.W.3d 487 (2024). In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of c ounsel on direct appeal, an appellate c ourt decides only whether the undisputed fac ts contained within the record are sufficient to conclusively determine whe ther counsel did or did not provide effective assistance and whether the defendant was or was not prejudiced by counsel ’ s alleged deficient performance. Id. An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal when th e claim allege s deficient performance with e nough particularity for (1) an appellate court to make a determination of whether the claim can be decided upon the trial record and (2) a district c ourt later reviewing a petition for postconviction relief to recognize wh ether the claim was broug ht before the appellate court. State v. German, supra. Whe n a claim of ineffective assistanc e of counse l is raised in a direct appeal, the appellant is not required to allege pr ejudice; however, an appellant must m ake specific allegations of th e conduct that he o r she claims constitutes deficient performance by trial counsel. Id. Once ra ised, an appellate court will determine whether the record on appeal is suff icient to review the merits of the ineffective performance claims. Id. The record is sufficient if it establishes either that tri al counsel ’ s perf ormance was not deficient, that the appellant will not be a ble to

establish prejudice as a matter of law, o r that tria l counsel ’ s actions could not be justified as a part of any plausible trial strategy. Id. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Stri ckland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), the defendant must show that counsel ’ s performance wa s deficient and that thi s deficient performance ac tu ally prejudiced the d efendant ’ s defense. State v. Miller, 315 Neb. 951, 2 N.W.3d 345 (2024). To show that counsel ’ s pe rfo rmance was deficient, the defendant must show counsel ’ s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary tr aining and skill in c riminal law. Id. To show prejudice fr o m counsel ’ s deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel ’ s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been diff erent. Id. Lockman argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to renew Lockman ’ s motion to suppress, claiming that the district court erred when it overruled the m otion. Lockman argues that the State lacke d any corroboration of Radomski ’ s claims rega rding the drugs and that Radomski “ was not a sufficiently reliable witness u pon which to base a stop of the vehicle in which Lockman was a passenger. ” Brief for appellant a t 19. To demonstrate pre judice from counsel ’ s failure to renew his motion to suppress, Lockman must allege facts sufficie nt to demonstrate the re was a reasonable probabilit y such a motion would have b een su ccessful. S ee, e.g., State v. Nolt, 298 Neb. 910, 906 N.W.2d 309 (2018) (unl ess motion to suppress would have been suc cessful, it cannot be said counsel was deficient in failing to file such motion). In reviewing a trial court ’ s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two -part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court ’ s findings for clear error, but whe the r those facts trigger o r violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court ’ s determination. State v. Lowman, 308 Neb. 482, 954 N.W.2d 905 (2021). As a general matter, the d ecision to stop an automobil e is re asonable where the poli ce have probable cause to b elieve that a traffic violation has occurred. See State v. Flodman, 33 Neb. App. 504, 18 N.W.3d 599 (2025). He r e, Vera Ch avez did not observe any tr affic violations before stopping the vehicle in which Lockman wa s a passenger. Police can c onstitutionally stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity exists, even if probable cause is lacking under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Reasonable suspicion entails some mi nimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion require d fo r probable cause. In determining whether there is reasonable suspicion for an officer to make an investi gatory stop, the totality of the circumstances must be taken into acc ount. Id. The question of reasona ble suspicion here turns on whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, Vera Chavez had reliable information that provided a particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the vehicle in which Lockman was a passeng er was traveling with narcotics. During the suppression hearing, M assie testified that Radomski had previo usly provided law en forcement with reliable information, whi ch had led to an arrest. In June 2024, Radomski had been working with Massie for over 3 months. Massie also found Radomski ’ s reports regarding Lockman to be re li able because Radomski implicated herself in the possession of distribution

quantities of controlled subst ances without ha ving the permission of law enforcement to accompany Lockman to Colorado. Evidence at the suppression hearing established that Radomski, a known and r eliable informant, reported to Massie that a blac k Toyota Corolla with Michigan license plates, which Radomski was driving, contained large quantities of drugs in cluding over a pou nd of methamphetamine and 2, 000 fentanyl pil ls. Based on Radomski ’ s description of where she was located, investigators found the vehicle and conducted surveillance, which enabled law enforcement to confirm that Radomski was driving and Lockm an was in the passenger ’ s seat of that vehicle. Massie com municated with other W ING officers in the area r egarding the direction the vehicle was traveling as well as its identifying features. Hunter advised Vera Chav ez that a black Toyota Corolla with Michigan license plates was tra nsporting methamphetamine and fentanyl pills. Thus, the detailed eyewitness report of a crime supplied by Radomski was reliable information that established re ason able suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity was ongoing. As a result, the investigatory stop by Vera Chav ez was reasonably justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Having found that the stop of ve hicle was lawful, the next issue concerns the sea rch of the vehicle, whic h produced two bags of methamphetamine from behind the v ehicle ’ s dashboard. We agree with the district court that Lockman does not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle because he had no privacy int erest in the rented vehicle. A driver of a rental vehicle may have standing to challenge a detention or search if he or she has demonstrated that he or she has received pe rmission to drive the vehicle from the individual authorized on the rental agreement. State v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 807 N.W.2d 769 (2011). Here, the vehicle w as rented by Harshbarger, Lockman was not listed as an authorized driver on the rent al agreement, and there was no evidence presented at the suppression hearing that Lockman had permission from Harshbarger to drive the vehicle. Because the investigatory stop of the vehicle was lawful, the re was no il legal seizu re of Lockman ’ s person. Lock man also la cks a separate privacy inte rest in the rental vehicle to challenge the search. We agree wit h the findings of th e district court in its denial of Lockman ’ s motion to suppress. Because the di strict court p roperly overruled Lockman ’ s motion to suppress, Lo ckman suffered no prejudice from trial counsel ’ s failure to renew it. This claim fails. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed by the district court. A FFIRMED.