Supreme Court of Georgia suspends lawyer Oksana Klymovych for one year

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Ma rch 3, 2026 S2 6Y 0042. IN THE MATTER OF OKSAN A KLYMOVYCH. P ER C URIAM. Thi s matte r is befo re th e C ourt on the r eport and recomm end ation of th e Sta te Di sci plin ary Rev iew B oard, revi ewin g the repo rt and recomm end ation of speci al ma ster M.J. B lakel y a n d recomm endin g th at resp onden t Ok sana K lym ovych (State B ar N o. 545028) be suspen ded fo r one year for vi ola tion s of s everal provis ions o f the Georgi a Ru les o f Prof essi onal C on duct (“GRPC”), in conne ction with he r repre senta tion of a single client. The special mast er ’ s determina tio n that Klymo vych v iolat ed the GRPC wa s base d on the finding t hat Kly movyc h was in de fault. However, after the special mast er en tere d hi s orde r, w e have cl arified that in attorn ey dis cipl in ary mat ters, t here i s a st ron g pref eren ce for “deci ding cases on th eir meri ts.” In the Matter of Alexander, 323 Ga. NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me C ourt Rule 27, the Co urt’s r econsider ation, and edit orial rev isions by the Rep orter of D ecisions. The ver sion of th e opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geo rgia Rep orts, d esignat ed as th e “Final C opy,” wi ll repl ace any prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of the Georgi a Reports will con tain the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 50, 54 (20 25) (quota tion m arks omi tted); In the M atter of B onnel l, 322 Ga. 585, 59 0 (2025). An d h ere, t he rec ord s hows th at Klymovych promp tly res pond ed t o the B ar wh en fi rst no tifi ed a bout th e cli ent’ s griev ance, p rovi ded s ubs tantiv e an swers to th e issu es rai sed, provide d do cumen ts reg arding th e clien t’s al leg ations, and part icipa ted in the e videntia ry hear ing. Therefo re, w e concl ude that the s pecia l maste r abuse d his d iscre tion in d enyi ng Klymovych’ s motio n to open de fault, and w e reve rs e in part and rem a nd f o r furthe r pro ceed in gs addr essi ng th e meri ts o f Klymovych’s argum ents. With res pec t to th e issu e of defa ul t, the re cord s how s tha t Kl y movy ch was retai ned by a cli ent i n the s ummer o f 2022 and dep osited c lient funds in a n IOLTA acco unt. I n Decem ber 2022, Kl y mov ych retu rned the f unds t o the client after the c lient file d a griev ance w ith th e Stat e B ar. In early 20 23, t he State Bar and Klymovych exchan ged emai ls reg ardi ng the matt er, and K ly movych provide d in form ation and do cum ents about the re pres entat ion. In April 2023, the Stat e Bar issu ed a Noti ce o f Inv estig ation rega rdin g

3 the cli ent ’s gri evan ce, an d Kl y mo vych provi ded a w ritten respon se i n May 2023. On October 24, 2023, a mem ber of the Boar d emai led Kly movych wi th questions about her re pres entati on of the cl ient, and Klymovy ch respon ded by emai l. O n Octobe r 27, 2 023, t he Sta te Bar issu ed a not ice of pro babl e cause finding prob able ca use to charge Klymovych with vio latio ns of multip le GRPC ar ising o ut of her rep resen tatio n of the cl ien t. On D ecembe r 15, 202 3, the State Bar filed a formal compl aint ag a inst Kly movych and so ught t he app ointme nt of a speci al m aster. This Court then ap pointe d a special mas ter, s ee C ase N o. S24B0 475 (D ec. 18, 202 3), an d Kly movych acknow ledg ed se rvic e of the formal complain t o n Decem ber 27, 202 3. Klymo vych did not f ile a timely answe r, and t he State Bar file d a mot ion for default. A hea ring o n the mo tio n for defau lt was set, an d Kly movy ch app eared at th e hea rin g. On th e day of th e hea rin g, Kl ymov ych fi led h er an swer to th e State Bar’s compl ain t, in whi ch she add ress ed at l eng th th e factu al asser tions a nd viola tions of the GRPC alleged in th e formal comp laint. At the heari ng before th e speci al m aster, Klymovyc h

4 apologi ze d fo r he r lack o f comm uni cation; sta ted that she int ended to enga ge fully wit h the St ate Bar reg ardi ng th e gr ievan ce, noting the co mmunica tions she ha d with the Stat e Bar in 2022 and 2 023; and sta ted that she misunde rstood the ap pr opriat e p rocedu res for disci pli nary mat ters. Klymovych exp lain ed that s he bel ieved sh e had provi ded ans wers and expl anati ons to the Stat e Ba r t hat she felt we re su ffici en t to ad dress the i ssu es rai sed by the client’s griev ance. Klymovych als o noted that she had rec eived her B ar licen se and op ene d her sol o pra ctic e in 2019, sh ortly befor e the on set of the Covi d - 19 pandemic, which limit ed he r ability t o meet a nd learn f rom o ther l awyers, an d that, as a na tive U krai ni an, sh e had become i nvol ved in v olun teer wor k wi th th e Ukrai ni an c ommunity in Geor gia fo llowing the R ussia n invasio n of Ukrai ne in 2022, includin g ta king o n hundre ds of immigr atio n case s on behalf of Ukra inian clie nts. Kly movych state d that she h ad be en surp ris ed whe n th e forma l complai nt i ssue d, and betw een her bu sy s che dul e as a sol o prac titio ner and single m othe r and he r misund erst anding s ab out

5 the di scipl inary pro cess, she f aile d to fil e a ti mely ans wer. At th e hear ing, Klymovy ch made an or al moti on to o pen defaul t under OCGA § 9- 11 - 55(b). Se e In the Mat ter of Tu rk, 2 67 Ga. 30, 30 (1985) (hold ing that OCGA § 9- 11 - 55(b), w hi ch gov erns t he proce ss for ope ning defa ults in c ivil ac tions, a pplie s in discip linary proce eding s). Klymovych argu ed that “proper cause ” exist ed to open the de fault; tha t she did not willf ully fail to f ile an answer but misinte rpr eted t he rule s; that the materia ls s he had pro vided to the State Bar provi ded a val id de fens e to th e cha rged v iol ations; a nd that sh e was read y to proc eed w ith the h eari ng. See general ly In the Matter of B oyd, 315 G a. 390, 394 (2022) (exp laining tha t “t he pro per - case ground fo r opening a defa ult should b e libera lly ap plied so a s to keep w ith the p oli cy of deci ding cases on th eir m eri ts”). Howeve r, the spe cial mast er g rant ed the Stat e Bar’s moti on for def ault an d denie d Klymovych’s motion to op en defaul t. A few we eks af ter the h ea ring, Klymovyc h filed a “Mo tion to Reconsi der th e Motion t o Va cate (Reopen) D efaul t and M oti on to Reopen Def ault. ” I n add ition t o reite rat ing her ass ertion s f rom t he

6 hear ing re gardi ng her requ est t o open def aul t, Klymovych de nied that she ha d willfully d isr ega rded her ob ligatio n to com ply with t he approp riat e proc ess and asser ted t hat her mishand ling of the disci pli nary pr ocess was the resul t o f an hones t mi stak e, p arti ally caus ed by the fact that she is repr esent ing her self in unfamilia r proc eedings, and was not d ue to any m alicio us or willful non - compli ance; and t hat h er dif ficul t pers onal cir cumst ances s hou ld be consi dered as al so havi ng given rise t o he r in adverten t n on - compli ance wi th t he appr opri ate di scipl in ary proce du re. In respon se to Kly movych ’s m otion to rec ons ider, th e State Bar n oted th at Kly movych had admi tted at the hearing tha t she had faile d to file a timel y, fo rmal, w ri tten an swer an d argu ed th at he r moti on sh oul d be den ied. In th e speci al mas ter’s repo rt and recomm en datio n, he f ou nd that th e all egat ions of the form al com pl aint were admi tted by Klymovych’s default a nd that a one - year sus pension was the approp riat e san cti on. On the sam e day, th e spe cial m aster ente red a brief order den yin g Kl ymov ych’s m otion for re consi derati on,

7 noting that Klym ovyc h had a dmitte d at the hearing t hat s he had failed to fil e a ti mely, form al, wr itten answ er and that sh e had presen ted n o new evid ence o r arg um ent as to th e de fault issu e. Klymovyc h f iled e xcept ions to the spe cial mas ter’s rep ort an d recomm end ation wi th the R eview Board to whic h the State Ba r respon ded. The Review Boa rd issued its repor t and recomm end ation, and wit h respect t o the is sue of defa ult, concl uded summar ily that a d efaul t w as w arran ted a nd that Klymovych failed to pres ent a meri toriou s de fense. Having c onsid ered the full r ecord and the par ties’ filings in t his Court, w e conclude tha t under these parti cul ar ci rcum stanc es, the spec ial mas ter abused his discr etion in re fusing t o open d efa ult. The record demon str ates that Kly movych acti vely parti cip ate d and coop erat e d wit h the St ate Bar betw een th e time th at th e gri evanc e was f iled and whe n the f ormal com plain t was fi l ed a yea r la ter; provided d etai led i nform ation a nd docu ment atio n rega rdin g her repres enta tion o f th e cl ient; and prov ided an expl anati on for he r failur e to time ly file an ans wer. Ad ditio nally, recen t cases issued

8 after th e entry o f th e speci al mas t er’s o rder h ere, mak e clear tha t, as to atto rney di sci pli nary m atte rs, th ere “is a str on g pr eferen ce f or ‘deci ding cases o n th eir meri ts’”; that “ the p rinci ple th at, w hen possibl e, di sci pli nary cases sh oul d be d ecid ed o n th e meri ts is parti cularl y true wh ere the recor d is clear th at t he att orney h as attemp ted to coop erat e and part icipate in the d isciplina ry proc eedings ”; that “def aults in disciplina ry c ases mos t oft en involve respon dents who comp letel y fa il to res pond to d isciplina ry proc eed ings”; that “th e pro per - cas e grou nd f or o peni ng a defau lt should b e liber ally ap plied so as to keep with t he policy of d eciding cases on th eir m erits”; and that “Sp ecial Mast ers have v ery am ple powers to op en d efault s. ” Bo nnell, 322 Ga. at 59 0 – 92 (clean ed up). We have furth er noted th at “ consi der ations for d ete rmin ing whether the pr oper - case ground s hould a pply include wheth er the failure to file a tim ely an sw er resu lted fro m ‘wi llfu l or gr oss negl igen ce’ an d wheth er the othe r party ‘w il l be harm ed or preju diced by op enin g the de fault.’” Id. a t 591. In thi s m atter, th e record wou ld supp ort a finding t hat Kly movych’s failure to time ly file an answer res ulted

9 from an h ones t mi sun derstan ding of the i nadequa cy of her comm unicat ions with the Ba r regardin g the griev an ce, rath er th an from an y “wi ll ful or g ross n egl igen ce.” Mor eover, t he State Bar has not es tabl ished t hat the re w ould be an y h arm or pr ejudi ce t o it res ulting fro m the ope ning of def ault. Finally, it is not clear t hat the Bar is co rrec t in its ass ertion that Kl ymovy ch has failed to establ ish the “ meritor ious de fense” co nditio n for op ening de fault. See general ly In the Matter of Mylee, Case N o. S25Y0888, slip op. at 21 (Janua ry 21, 202 6) (sta ting that in consid ering the req uireme nts to ope n defa ult, “ we see goo d reas o n in … libe ra lly app lying the … requir ement to s e t up a meri tori ous defen se ”). Howe ver, we ex press no op inion on whe the r Kly movych ’s d efens es to the charg ed Ru les violat ions will ult imat ely be meritori ous. The Ba r al so mak es n o attemp t to a rgue th at a “m erit oriou s def ense” has n ot bee n establ ish ed by refer ence to th e s tan dards establ ish ed i n th e relev an t case law, instea d simply sta ting so in a co nclusor y fashion. Accordi ng ly, w e di sagree w ith the Rev iew B oard and h old t hat the s p ecial m aster abused hi s dis creti on i n refusing t o ope n de fault

10 under t hes e pa rticu lar circu mstan ces. T heref ore, the Court reverses the s pecial m ast er ’ s ord er denying Klymovych ’s motion t o open defau lt and rema nd s this m atte r to the s pecial m aster wi th di recti on that he d ecid e th e me rits o f th e case i n acc ordan ce w ith th e app licable rules and la w. 1 Rev ersed in par t, vacate d in part, and c ase remand ed. All the Just ices c oncur. 1 We recogniz e that i t may be difficult t o proceed on t he meri ts of a ca se when the attorne y does n ot respond to the for mal compl aint according to the State B ar Rules. Ho wever, nothing in t his opinion precl udes a speci al master from setting a final hearing on the merits wit h the appropr iate n otice, even if the attorney does no t respond to the formal com plaint.

11 P ETERSON, Chie f J ustic e, co ncurring. I join f ully the dec ision o f the Court conclud ing that the special mast er abus ed his disc ret ion in re fusing t o ope n default. I writ e separa tely t o ex plai n that t he speci al mast er’ s decis ion w as neverth el ess r eason able at the ti me that i t wa s mad e, gi ven th e limited and co nflict ing guida nce t his Court had give n. As th e Court ’s o pin ion ex plai ns, w e have a stron g prefe rence for de cidi ng cases on th eir me rits. See O p. at 2 (ci ting In the Matter of Ale xand er, 323 Ga. 50 (202 5); In the M atte r of B onn ell, 3 22 G a. 585 (2025)). Thi s p referen ce i s ri ght an d g ood: Defaul t is a n ec essary pa rt o f t he dis cipli nary p rocess becaus e man y l awyers wh o com mi t seri ous vi ol ation s simply r efus e to pa rticipat e in the p roces s. The pub lic woul d be at con sidera ble ris k i f those law yers w er e allowe d to e vade dis cipline simply b y sta ying on t he sideline s. But that ’ s no t what hap pene d here, a nd enfor cing defa ult in t hese c ircumst ances (instea d of proce eding to th e meri ts) woul d no t prot ect th e pu bli c. Rul e 9.3 requ ire s law yers t o “re spond t o dis cipl inary autho ritie s in accor dance with Sta te Bar Rules.” The maximum p enalt y fo r vio lation o f that rule is merely a public repr imand.

12 In the Matt er of Sam mons, 316 Ga. 885, 893 (2023) (P ete rson, P. J., conc urring in jud gment only). And when de fault f ollows from a viol ation of Rul e 9.3 by som eone neverth el ess re spons ive to the proces s, it of ten conv erts vi olati on of a rule pu ni shabl e only by a publi c repri mand in to an aut omati c susp ens ion o r d isbarm ent. Se e id. But alt hough we have freq uently said that the re is a pr eferen ce for r eachi ng th e meri ts, se e, e. g., I n th e Matter of B oyd, 315 Ga. 390, 394 (202 2) (rema ndi ng for th e sp ecial mast er to h old a heari ng on openin g defau lt), i t is on ly m ore recentl y th at we ha ve act uall y been applying that pref ere nce. Al exander issued in Nove mber 202 5, and Bonnel l in Septe mber 20 25. Bu t th e speci al mas ter here is sued the last default - relat ed o rder in Fe bru ary 20 25. And befo re Fe bru ary 2025, our bi ndin g casel aw made clea r that we expe cte d speci al m aster s gener all y to ap ply pre ceden t regardi ng t he Ci vi l P ractice A ct, and th at p reced en t did n ot cl early include the he avy thumb we no w put on t he scale fo r reac hing the mer its. (Fo r the sam e reas on, I don ’t faul t the spe cial maste rs in

13 Alexa nder or Bon n ell.) B ut now we have m ade cl ear repea tedly that, absen t wil lfu l noncom plian ce, c om plete f ailu re to r espond, an attemp t to evad e th e di scipl inary pro cess, or somet hi ng el se of l ike kind, d isciplina ry ma tter s should g enera lly be reso lved on t he merits an d not by defau lt. In mos t othe r context s, this shif t in app roac h would likely be imprope r (o r a t l east requ ire s erio us con sid erati on of st are d ecisi s). But the regula tion of the pract ice of la w is differ ent. “ We have lo ng held t hat t his Cour t has the inhe rent a nd ex clusive a uthor ity t o regul ate th e p ract ice of law in Geo rgia. ” In the Matte r of Bro wn, 3 19 Ga. 465, 478 (20 24). T he en tire d is cipli nary proc ess i s our proc ess. When a stat ute like OCGA § 9 - 11 - 55 vests disc reti on i n tri al court s regardi ng d efaul t, t hat d isc retion is v ested by th e Gen eral Assem bly throug h it s exer ci se of th e legi slat iv e power. See OCG A § 9 - 11 - 55 (“ At any time before fina l judgme nt, t he court, in its disc retio n, upon paymen t of costs, may allow the defau lt to be op ened … . ”). A p roper respec t for the se parati on o f pow ers th us r equires u s to r espect the full sc ope o f that discre tio n. But what eve r discr etio n speci al m asters

14 enjo y regard ing defa ult in Ba r discip line ca ses is disc ret ion pure ly of our ow n cre ati on in the exerci se of our j udici al pow er, an d thu s we hav e mor e fre edom to sh ift a pproa ch than in an ord inary ap peal. Cf. Inquiry Concerni ng Judge Co omer, 316 Ga. 855, 860 n. 5 (202 3) (“ Although w e do gene rally def er to fact ual find ings by the Hearing Panel (and u lti mately do s o he re on t he criti cal poi nts), th e bro ad and d iscret ionar y nature of our review in j udicia l dis cipline mat ters means th at we need not alw ays d efe r e ven in situat ions wher e we woul d defer to a factfi nde r in an ordin ary a ppeal. ”). When w e see that the discip linary sys tem would f unctio n better wit h less discre tio n on a certain p oint, it is not only within o ur a uthorit y to adjust that d is cret ion, i t is ou r obligati on t o do so. One mo re word on def ault in d isciplinar y pro ceedings. Our prefe rence f or re achi ng th e merit s in dis cipli nary m atters m ean s that a speci al m aster’s di screti on to d eny ope nin g defau lt i s materi all y narr ower than a tri al cou rt judge’s sim ilar d isc retion under OCGA § 9 - 11 - 55. A nd yet ou r pre ceden t lo oks t o § 9 - 11 - 55 for gui dance. L awy ers, the Ba r, and sp ecial mast ers wou ld be mu ch

15 bette r off with a Bar - sp ecifi c rul e rega rding defaul t. To tha t end, I woul d encou rage the B ar to c onsi der cr afti ng s uch a rul e. I am au thori zed to s tate that Pres idin g Ju stice War ren an d Just ice Bet hel join in this conc urrenc e.