Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge - Public Trail Maintenance Authority

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. R eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: Reporter@vtcourts.gov o r by mail at: Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609 -0801, of any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 2026 VT 5 No. 25- AP -244 John Echeverria and Carin Pratt Supreme Court On Appeal from v. Superior Court, Orange Unit, Civil Division Town of Tunbridge October Term, 2025 H. Dickson Corbett, J. Geoffrey J. Vitt of Vitt & Nunan, PLC, Norwich, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. Stephen F. Coteus and Michael J. Tarrant II of Tarrant, Gillies & Shems, LLP, Montpelier, for Defendant-Appellee. John Kail Romanoff, Municipal Assistance Center, Montpelier, for Amic us C uriae Vermont League of Cities and Towns. Benjamin T. Brickner, Selectboar d Chair, North Pomfret, for Amicus Curiae Town of Pomfret. Charity R. Clark, Attorney General, and Jonathan Rose, Solicitor Gene ral, Montpelier, for Amicus Curiae State of Vermont. PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Eaton, Cohen and Waples, JJ., and Shafritz, Supr. J., Specially Assigned ¶ 1. COHEN, J. Landowners appeal a superior court decision concluding that the Town of Tunbridge h as authority to maintain and repair public trails that cross private p roperty. On appeal, landowners argue that the relevant statutes do not empower the Town with this authority. We conclude that because the Town trai ls are public rights-of-way under the controlling

2 statute, the Town has aut hority to maintain them to ensure the public’s access to the trails for the purpose intended. Therefore, we affirm. ¶ 2. The following facts were undisputed for purposes of summary jud gment. Landowners, John Echeverria and Carin Pratt, own a historic hill fa rm known as Dodge F arm that includes land in the towns of Tunbridge and Strafford. There are two public trails that cross the property within the Town of Tunbridge. The trails were created in 1987, and the Town has not historically actively maintained the trails. After pu rchasing the land over a decade ago, landowners maintained the trails for hiking. ¶ 3. Bicycle enthusiasts soug ht permission from the Town to use bicycles on the trails, and a Town discussion ensued over the appropriate use for the tr ails. Landowners opposed bicycle use and expressed disapproval by ceasing to maintain the trails and allowing them to become overgrown, so they were not suit able for biking. In 2022, the Town adopted procedures for private individuals to apply for and receive permission to maintain and rep air th e trails on the Town’s behalf. ¶ 4. Landowners filed suit, seeking a declaration that the Town lacked authority to perform maintenance or conduct repairs on th e public trails. The civil division initially granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the issue was not ripe because landowners had not alleged that anyone h ad applied for or received permission to perform maintenance on the trails. On appeal, this Court rev ersed, holding that landowners’ allegations demo nstrated “ a sufficiently concrete threat of physic al invasion a nd interference with [landowners’] asserted right to control who enter s or alters their property. ” Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge, 2024 VT 47, ¶ 19, 219 Vt. 585, 325 A.3d 98. ¶ 5. On remand, the parties cross-moved fo r summary judgment. The civil division examined the language and history of the statutory provisions in Title 19 related to the establishment and maintenance of town highways and trails. The court noted that historically trails

3 were subsumed in the definition of town highways, and under both the stat utes and the common law, these were public easement s that towns had authority to maintain to ensure public access. The court recounted that a recodification of the highway statutes in 1986 removed “ trail ” fr om the definition of “ highway ” and provided a separate definition of “ trail. ” The court rejected landowners’ a rgument that this change implicitly divested towns of the a uthority to maintain tra ils because “[t]he whole point of a p ubli c easement is to enable the public to travel over the easement, ” and if the towns were unable to maintain an easement, then access could be effectively vetoed by the landowner. The court therefore declined to make the n egative inference ass erted by landowners. The court concluded that towns ha ve authority to lay out and control their publi c trails through maintenan ce and re pair. Although thi s was not explicit in the statute, it was consistent with past practice throughout the state and the general law regard ing use of easements. Therefore, the court granted judgment in the Town’s favor. Landowners appeal. ¶ 6. On appeal, landowners argue that the c ivil division erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes. They contend that the 1986 amendments to Title 19 effec tively r emoved the authorization for towns to maintain and repair legal trails over private la nd. On appeal f rom a summary-judgment dec ision, this Court applies the same standard as the civil division. B artlett v. Roberts, 2020 VT 24, ¶ 9, 212 Vt. 50, 231 A.3d 171. “ Summary judgment is appropriate only when there are no g enuine iss ues of material f act and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of la w. ” Id.; se e V.R.C.P. 56(a) (providing standa rd for evaluating summary-judgment motion). ¶ 7. “ In cases of statutory interpretation, our obligation is to effectuate the intent of the Legislature. ” Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999). To do this, we look fir st to the language of the statute itself and “presume the Legislature intended the plain, ordinary meaning of the language.” Id. (quotation om itted).

4 ¶ 8. Landowners argue that towns lack the pow er to maintain and repair trails across private property because there is no explicit grant of authority in the relevant statutory provisions. See City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 2012 VT 32, ¶ 20, 191 Vt. 441, 49 A.3d 120 (noting that “ the power of the municipality is limited to what has been granted by the state ”). Landowners concede that towns previously had this authority but contend that when the Legislature recodified Titl e 19 in 1986, it removed towns’ authorit y over trail maintenance. ¶ 9. To understand this a rgument, some background on the development of the law surrounding roads and trails in Vermont is necessary. Vermont first introduced its system of highway classification in 1973 to better e xplain the funding for and obligations regarding maintenance of town roa ds. 1973, No. 63, § 17; s ee Town of Calais v. Cnty. Rd. Comm ’rs, 173 Vt. 620, 622, 795 A.2d 1267, 1269-70 (2002) (mem.) (explaining that prior to road-classification system introduced in 1973, “ the responsibility of towns to maintain and repair their local highways was broad and undifferentiated ”). That system req uired the town selectboard to ensure that Class 1, 2, and 3 roads were kept “ in good and sufficient repair at a ll seasons of the year.” 1973, No. 63, § 20 (amending 19 V.S.A. § 931, which was m oved to 19 V.S.A. § 310 in 1986); see also 19 V.S.A. § 302(a)(1)-(3) (defining class 1, 2, and 3 town highways). Unde r the 1973 scheme, trails were included in the definition of Class 4 town highways, and Class 4 highways were to “be maintained to the extent required by the necessity of the town, the public good, and the convenien ce of the inhabitants.” 1 1973, No. 63, § 1 (including “rights of way” in definition of highways); id. § 5 (defining Class 4 town highways to include “trails and pent roads”); id. § 20 (providing for town maintenance o f highways and bridges). This provision distinguished the permissive maintenance of trails and Class 4 road s from the required maintenance of other roads. 1 In 1921, the Legislature defined trails as highwa ys. 1921, No. 121, § 1. T his notion was carried forward in subsequent amendments.

5 A separate statutory provisi on predated the 1973 amendments and provided that towns were “not liable for the mainten ance of a tr ail. ” 2 See Perrin v. Town of Berlin, 138 Vt. 306, 307, 415 A.2d 221, 222 (1980) (recognizing that unde r statute in effect at that ti me, 19 V.S.A. § 293, town w as “ not liable for the mainte nance of a trail ”). Therefore, prior to 1986, trails, like Class 4 roads, were public rights-of-way that towns could, but were not required to, maintain. ¶ 10. In 1986, the Legislature rec odified all of Title 19, including the provisions on highways. That recodification added a definition of “ trail ” in new § 301. 1985, No. 269 (Adj. Sess.), § 1. Because of the new definition, trails were removed from the definition of Class 4 highways, and the statut e provided: “Trails shall not be conside red highways and the town shall not be responsible for any maintenance, including culverts and bridges.” 19 V.S.A. § 302(a)(5). ¶ 11. Landowners argu e that by removing trails from the definition of highways, the Legislature fundamentally precluded towns from exercising control over or maintaining trails. They point to the f act that the statutes confer “general sup ervision and control” and the responsibility for maintenance and management o ver town “highways, ” but not trails. Id. § 303; id. § 304(a)(1), (3) (delineating that town has duty and r esponsibility to maintain highways and purchase materia ls for such maintenance). Landowners describe this as a deliberate c hange in the scope of towns’ authority. ¶ 12. Because the statutory la nguage is central to our analysis, we begin with several provisions of the statutory chapter on “Town Hi ghways, ” which include the statutes related to town trails. The current 3 statutory definition of trail is: a public right-of-way that is not a highway and that: 2 This exception from liability was first enacted in 1921. 1921, No. 121, § 4. 3 The Legislature recently amended the statute to explicitly provide that towns “have the authority to exclusively or cooperatively maintain” trails. 2025, No. 66, § 45 (eff. April 1, 2026). Because thi s statute is not yet effective, the civil division concluded that there continued to be live controversy between the parties. Neither side has challenge d that conclusion on appeal.

6 (A) previously was a designated town highway having the same width as the designated town highway, or a lesser width if so designated; or (B) a new public right-of-way laid out as a trail by the selectmen for the purpose of provi ding access to abutting properties or for recreational use. Nothing in this section shal l be deemed to independently authorize the condemnation of land for recreational purposes or to affect the authority of selectmen to reasonably regulate the uses of recreational trails. Id. § 301(8). The statutes also confer on the town selectboard “the duty and responsibility” to “ make regulations gover ning the use of pent roads and trails.” Id. § 304(a), (a)(5). Finally, the statutes make clear that towns are not “liable for construction, maintenance, repair, o r safety of trails.” Id. § 310(c). ¶ 13. Considering these provisions together, we con clude that the Legislature has conferred on towns the authority to maintain and repair publi c trails across private land. This conclusion flows foremost from the use of the term “public right -of- way” in the definition of trail. See Town of Calais, 173 Vt. at 621, 795 A.2d at 1268 (“ We r ely on the plain meaning of the words in a statute because we presume they reflect the Legislature ’ s intent. ”). Under the common law, a “ right-of-way ” is a typ e of easement that provide s the benefitted party wi th “the right to use or control the land, or a n area above or below it, for a specific limited purpose (such as to cross it for access to a publi c road).” Easement, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The character and scope of an easement is drawn from “the circumstances existing at the time of execution, and the object and purpose to be accomplished by the easement.” Barrett v. Kunz, 158 Vt. 15, 18, 604 A.2d 1278, 1280 (1992). Under the common law, as reflected in the Restatement, 4 the holder of an easement “ is entitled to make any use of the servient estate that is reasonable for enjoyment of 4 This Court has looked t o the Restatement of Property: Servitudes in the p ast regarding the law on the maintenance of easements. S ee, e.g., Khan v. Alpine Haven Prop. Owners ’ Ass ’ n, 2020 VT 90, ¶ 40, 213 Vt. 453, 245 A.3d 1234 (c iting Restate ment § 4.13 regarding calculation of contribution due for maintenance of easement).

7 the servitude, including the right to construct, improve, repair, and m aintain improvements that are reasonably necessary.” Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.13 (2000) (explaining that principle is “consistent with generally accepted authority” and citing legal tre atises). ¶ 14. A public right-of- way fu nctions in much the sam e way, providing “[t]he right of passage held by the public in general to travel on roads, fr eeways, and other thoroughfares.” Right- of- Way, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). To ascerta in the scope of the public’s right, we look to the purpose of public trails, which is to provide “access to abutting properties or for recreational use.” 19 V. S.A. § 301(8)(B). Therefore, under the common law, towns can repair and maintain those trails to the extent ne c essary to ensure those us es. As the trial court noted, it would defeat the purpose of a public e asement if towns lacked authority to maintain or repair tr ails because a landowner could control the public’s use of the easement by refusing to conduct any repair or maintenance. This reading of th e statute would essentially make the syst em of public trails inef fective and superf luous. S ee Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 2006 VT 117, ¶ 5, 181 Vt. 26, 912 A.2d 984 (explaining that C ourt avoids statutory “ construction that would render the legislation ineffective or irrational ” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 15. Moreover, other statutory provisions concerning trails support the conclusion that towns retain authority to maintain their trails. The statute allows towns to regulate how trails are used. See 19 V.S.A. § 3 04(a)(5) (providing towns with authority to “make regulations gov erning the use of pent roads and tra ils”. It would not make se nse for a town to be able to regulate the use of a trail but not have the power to conduc t the m aintenance and repair required to support those uses. Moreove r, the statute continues to e xempt t owns from liability related to maintenance and repair. Id. § 310(c). If towns were precluded f rom maintaining or repairing trails, there would be no purpose in releasing towns from liability for failure to do so. ¶ 16. Landowners ’ assertion that the 1986 a mendments to the statute implicitly removed authority from the towns to maintain public trails is not supported by the language of those

8 amendments. As this Court has pre viously recognized, those amendments were intended to clean up Title 19 and not to alter the substance of its provisions. See Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 170 Vt. 167, 176, 744 A.2d 422, 429 (1999) (explaining that “ the purpose of Act 269 was not to ‘ attempt to change any of Titl e 19 ’ but rather to ‘ clean it up ’ and to ‘ recodify it ’ ” (quoting Hearings on Review of Title 19 before the Senate Highways and Traffic Committee, Sept. 19, 1985, at 3 (testimony of Robert Schwartz))). Although the amendments removed “ trail ” from the definition of “ highway, ” the statute continued to define trails as rights -of-way — a legal ly significant term. If the Legislature had intended to alter the common -law meaning of right-of-way and the existing long-standing authority to maintain trails to such a degree, it would have done so explicitly. See State v. R ichards, 2021 VT 40, ¶ 14, 215 Vt. 1, 256 A.3d 94 (explaining that statute overturns common law only in narr ow circumstances and must use “ clear and un ambiguous language ” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 17. Landowners sugg est that the purpose of removing trails from the definition of highways was to save money by e liminating t own authority over trail maintenance. This construction of the statutory amendment does not make logical sense given that towns had no financial obligations reg arding trail maintenance eve n before the 1986 amendments. Moreover, the exemption from liability for trail maintenance remained un changed in th e 1986 recodification. ¶ 18. W e are not persuaded by landowners’ argument reg arding Dillon’s Rule, which provides that “ a municipality has only those powers and functions specifically authorized by the legislature, and such additional functions as ma y be incident, subo rdinate or ne cessary to the exercise thereof. ” Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Hinesburg, 135 Vt. 484, 486, 380 A.2d 64, 66 (1977). This sit uation is distinguishable from the cases landowners cite where this Court recognized limits on the powers and functions of municipalities because the action was outside the statutor il y granted authority. See, e.g., In re Ball Mountain Dam Hydroelectric Project, 154 Vt. 189, 192-93, 576 A.2d 124, 126 (1990) (explaining that statute did not allow municipality

9 to generate and sell power to customers outsi de borders). In contrast, here, the statutes do not limit town authority over trail maintenanc e. In f act, Dillon’s Rule supports the conclusion that towns have authority to maintain trails because maintenance is incident to and implied by their statutory authority to define the us es for these publi c rights-of-way. See Vt. N. Props. v. Vill. of Derby Ctr., 2014 VT 73, ¶ 54, 197 Vt. 130, 102 A.3d 1084 (concluding that statutory au thorization for village to set rates for w ater usage and charge for unused reserved alloca tions implied right “to enforce the fees by revoking the reservation for nonpayment”). ¶ 19. The civil division also relied on the fact that real-life experience in V ermont demonstrates widespread consensus and long-standing practice of towns maintaining and repairing their public trails. On appeal, landowners challenge thi s observation and reliance. We do not reach th ese argum ents because our holding rests on the language of the statutes without the need to examine contemporaneous practice. Affirmed. FOR THE COURT: Associate Justice