State v. Michael Williams - Bail Decision Affirmation

NOTICE: This entry order is subj ect to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. R eaders are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions by email at: Reporte r@vtco urts.gov or by mail at: Vermont Supre me Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801, of any errors in order that correc ti ons may be made before this opinion goes to press. ENTRY ORDER 2026 VT 3 SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 25- AP -422 JANUARY TERM, 2026 State of Vermont } APPEALED FROM: } } v. } Superior Court, Caledonia Unit, } Criminal Division } Michael Williams } CASE NO. 25- CR -08766 } Trial Judge: Heather J. Gray In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter: ¶ 1. Defendant appeals a trial court’ s decision to hold him without bail. Although the trial court’s initial decision stated that the weight of the evidence against defendant was not great, while this a ppeal wa s pending, the trial court corrected one word o f its de cis ion. The court delet ed the word “not” to clarify that it had concluded that the weight of the evidence was great. Defendant argues that the correction was im permissible because the change was substantive and an appeal was pending b efore this Court. I n the alternative, defe ndant argues that the we ight of the evidence is not great. We conclude that the trial court permissibly corrected its o rder and that there w as substantial, admissible e vidence for a r easonable jury to find defendant guil ty beyond a re asonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm. ¶ 2. The law underlying a hold-without bail is well established. Both the Vermont Constitution and related statutes protect a defendant’s general right to pretrial release. Se e Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40 (“ All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. ”). This right, however, is not unlimited. We have explained that Chapter II, § 40(1) a uthorizes the co urt to hold a defendant without bail “ (1) if the of fense charged is punishable by life imprisonment and (2) the evidence of guilt is great. ” State v. Sartwell, 2025 VT 13, ¶ 4, __ Vt. __, 336 A.3d 313 (mem.) (citing corresponding language in 13 V.S.A. § 7553). If the State establishes both requirements listed in § 40(1), “a pr esumption against release arises.” Id. (quotation omitted). The defendant then “ bears the burden to c onvinc e the trial court to use its discretion to release the defendant or to set bail. ” Id.

2 ¶ 3. In the alternative, however, if the trial court finds that “ the evidence of guilt is not great, the person shall be bailable. ” 13 V.S.A. § 7553. In such circumstances, a “defendant shall be ordered released on personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond . . . unless the judicial officer determines that such a release will not reasonably mitigate the risk of flight from prosecution. ” 13 V.S.A. § 7554(a). Section 7554 lists multiple factors for a court to consider in making this determination. ¶ 4. Defendant was charged with second-degree murder in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 2301. At an arraignment on August 20, 2025, the court granted the State’s request to hold defendant without bail pending a weight -of-the-evidence h earing, which wa s held on November 18, 2025. The court subsequently issued a written order stating that the evidence of guilt wa s “not great” but nonetheless holding defendant without bail pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7553. S ee also Vt. Const. ch. II, § 40(1). Defendant timely appealed. ¶ 5. In its decision holding d efendant without bail, the trial court provided the legal standards set forth above. After reciting the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the decision read “[t]he Stat e has not met its bu rden of establishing that [def endant’s] guilt on the pending second-degree murder charge is great.” (Emphasis added). The decision explained that upon a finding that the evidence of guil t is great, a presumption against release arises. State v. Kirkland, 2022 VT 38, ¶ 9, 217 Vt. 653, 283 A.3d 974 (providing “ a pr esumption against release arises” wh ere p erson is “c harged with an offense punishable by life imprisonment” and “the evidence of guilt is grea t” (quotations omitted)). The court des cribed that it had examined the factors in § 7554, including that “[t]he weight of the evidence is considerable,” and determined that defendant had not met his burden of demonstrating that he could be released prior to trial. Therefore, the court granted the State’s motion to hold defendant without bail pursuant to 13 V.S.A. § 7553. ¶ 6. Defendant a ppe aled the hold -without-bail order to this Court. He argue d that the trial court erred when it held defendant without bail under 13 V.S.A. § 7553 because its conclusion that the evidence of guilt was not great precluded such a result. See State v. Memoli, 2008 VT 85, ¶ 5, 184 Vt. 563, 956 A.2d 575 (“[A] defendant may not be he ld wit hout bail under § 7553 unless the district court explicitly finds that the evidence of guilt is great. ”). In response, t he State conceded that because th e trial court found the evidence of guilt was not great, defendant could not be held without bail. At oral argument, the State indicated that it intended to withdraw its request to hold defendant without bail. I n light of th is repre s entation, on Dece mbe r 23, 2025, this Court issued an entry order placing the appeal on hold to allow the State to file such a motion with the trial court. ¶ 7. The next day, the trial c ourt issued a corrected decision indicating there was an error in the hold-without-bail order. The court struck the word “not” fro m one line of the order, so the decision r ead: “The State has met its burd en of establishing that [d efendant ’ s] guilt on the pending second- degree murder charge is great.” ¶ 8. The State respond ed by filing a statement with this Court that it would not withdraw its motion to hold defendant without bail. Th e Court accepted additional briefing and held oral argument.

3 ¶ 9. Defendant first argues that the trial court impermissibly issued a corrected decision. In the alternative, d efendant argues that even if the c orrection was permissib le, the trial court erred when it determined that the evidence of guilt was great. ¶ 10. We begin with addressing the corrected order. The pa rties dispute the applica bilit y of Vermont Rule of Cri minal Proc edure 36, whic h governs how and when a court may correct a clerical mistake. The rule states th at “[c] lerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the record and error therein arising from oversight or omission may be c orrected by the court at any time of its own initiative.” V.R.Cr.P. 36. The rule also requires that d uring the pendency of an appeal, cl erical mistakes may be “ corrected before the appeal is docketed in the Supreme Court.” Id. After a n appeal is docketed and pending, clerical err o rs may b e “ corrected with leave of the Supreme Court. ” Id. ¶ 11. According to defendant, Rule 36 do es not apply because the court made a substantive correction to its de cision, not a clerical one. “ In interpreting rules of proc edure and evidence, we employ tools similar to those we use in statutory construction. That is to say that when construing a rule, we conside r its plain language and the purpose it was designed to serve. ” State v. Amidon, 2008 VT 122, ¶ 16, 185 Vt. 1, 967 A.2d 1126. Mor eover, wh en our rule is identical to it s federal counterpart, we look to federal cases interpreting the federal rule for guidance. 1 Id. ¶ 12. We re cently e xpounded on the differe n ce be tw een a clerical mistake and an err or that could not be corrected under Ve rmont Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) in Warner v. Warner. 2025 VT 70, ¶ 18, __ Vt. _, _ A.3d __. We explained that “ the ‘ basic dist inction ’ between clerical mistakes and errors that c annot be co rrected. . . is that the former consist of blunders in execution, while the latter consist of instances where the court changes it s mind.” Id. ¶ 17 (quotation omitted). Consequently, “[t] he analysis of whether a judgment is subject to correction . . . thus focuses on what the court or iginally int ended to do. ” Id. ¶ 18 (quotation omitted). “ If this a n alysis reveals that th e flaw lies in the translation of the o riginal meaning to the judgment, then [the Rule] allows a correction. ” Id. (quotation omitted). ¶ 13. T o determine the court’s intent, w e look to the text of both the trial court’s corrected and original decisions. See id. ¶ 18 (describing focus of analysis is “ what the court originally intended to do ”). The corrected order reads: 1 The Reporter’s Notes to R ule 36 explain that th e “rule is identical to Civil Rule 60(a).” See V.R.C.P. 60(a) (“Clerical mistakes in judgme nts, orde rs or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omi ssion may be correc ted by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after suc h notice, if a ny, as the court orde rs. During the pendenc y of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the Supreme Court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with lea ve of the Supreme Court.”). Similarly, Rule 60(a) “is substantially identical to Federal Rule 60.” R eporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 60(a). C onsequently, unless a dist inction is material, we do not differentiate between precedent analyzing these three rules.

4 The court recognizes th ere was an e rror in the court’s December 1, 2025 Decision and Order on the State’s Motion to Hold Defendant without Bail. The first paragraph on page 7 of the D ecember 1st Order should read: The State has met it s burden of establishing that [defendant’s] guilt on the pending second-degree murder charge is great. The trial court appended a footnote to the corrected decision, explaining th at the State could rely on exclusively cir cumsta ntial evidence to meet its burden of proof. The footnote a lso appeared in the original decision. ¶ 14. The court’s original deci sion demonstrates that removing the word “not” from the decision was merely a c orrection of a clerical mistake. As indicated a bove, although the sentence originally included “not,” the legal reasoning indicated that the court had found the evidence of guilt great. For example, directly following the st atement that the weight of t he evidence wa s “not great” th e court appended a footnote explaining that the S tate ’s case was permissibly based on circumstantial evidence. Se e S tate v. Godfrey, 201 0 VT 29, ¶ 18, 187 Vt. 495, 996 A.2d 237 (“T he State is a ll owed to rely exclusively on circumstantial evidenc e in proving it s case.”). Nota bly, the court also used this identical footnote in its corre cted decision to support its conclusion that the evidence of guilt was great. ¶ 15. Moreover, the decision recited the correct leg al s tandards involved and analyzed the factors for release as if the evidence of guilt was great. It indicat ed that it was shifting the burden to defendant to “ demonstrate that there are conditions of release that can be imposed to protect the public a nd mi tigate risk of flight.” S ee Sartwell, 2025 VT 13, ¶ 4 (describing if State establishes both requirements listed in § 40(1), “a presumption against release arise s ” and defendant then “bears the burden to conv ince th e trial court to use its discretion to release the defendant or to s et bail”). After pl acing that bu rden on defendant, the court then turned to an analysis of relevant § 7554 factors. I n a section analyzing the “weight of the evidence against the accused,” the court described that th e weight of the evidence against defendant was “c onsiderable.” 2 Finally, following an analysis of the § 7554 factors, the court concluded that defendant had not met his burden to overcome the presumption against release — which, as described by the court itself, only emerges if the court finds that the evidence of gu ilt i s great. ¶ 16. In sum, the court’s correcti on— removing the word “not” from its decision — makes the original decision internally cohesive and consistent. S ee State v. Gree ne, 172 Vt. 610, 611, 782 A.2d 1163, 1165 (2001) (mem.) (“ The fact that the substance of the court ’ s order followed boilerplate language that was inconsistent, as well as at odds with defendant ’ s plea agreement, can 2 This Court recognizes that the weight-of-the-evidence considerations differ between analyses under § 7553 and § 7554. “I n the context of a § 7553 weight- of -the-evidence hearing, the phrase ‘w eight of the evidenc e’ generally refers to whether, under a Rule 12(d) standard, the State has put forward enough evidence of guilt to establish a presumption against release” whereas, “[i]n the context of a § 7554(b) analysis, the weight-of-the-evidence facto r can also r efer to the relative strength of the State’s case aga inst the d efendant.” State v. Auclair, 2020 VT 26, ¶¶ 16- 18, 211 Vt. 651, 229 A.3d 1019 (mem.).

5 be attributable only to a clerica l error.”). A conclusion that the State had met its burden that the evidence of guilt was great aligns with the appended footnote which just ifies the State’s use of circumstantial e vidence to meet its burden. I t conforms with the transition phra se “upon a finding that the weight of the evidence is great ” and the observation that the evidence against defendant was considerable. Finally, it supports the court ’s ultimate conclusion. ¶ 17. We are not persuaded by defendant’s assertion that the er ror cannot be a clerical error b ecause “it was not a mere a dminist rative correction of a subst antively unimportant point.” Defendant asserts that “ th e court changed the most significant finding in its orde r — that the weight of the evidence was not gre at, to a finding that the weight was great ” and argues that “[t] here is little that could be more substantive. ” (Emphasis in original). ¶ 18. This Court is aware o f the significant impact and shift in e xpected outcome t hat this clerical error has had on the parties in this case. However, “[t] he magnitude of the co rrection ’ s impact on the parties do es not determine the ava ilability of relief.” Warner, 2025 VT 70, ¶ 17. “ [W]here the record makes it clear that an issue was actually li tigated and decided but was incorrectly recorded, the trial court can correct the judgment. . . even if doing so materially changes the parties’ po sitions a nd leave s one party to the judgment in a less advantage ous position.” Id. ¶ 18 (quotations omitted). Here, as explained above, the conc l usion was incorrectly recorded. ¶ 19. Because this error was clerical, Rule 36 governs the trial court’s power to correct that error. As described above, generally, a trial court may correct a clerical error “ at any time of its own initiative.” V.R.Cr.P. 36. However, where an appeal is pending, the trial court may make a correction only “ with le ave of the Supr eme Court. ” Id. No such leave was requested in this case. ¶ 20. At the time the trial court corrected its decision, this Court had placed defendant’s bail appeal on hold with leave for the State to withdraw its request to hold defendant without bail. This Court had therefore transferred at least some of its jurisdiction over the bail matter back to the trial court. While under the circumstances, re questing leave to amend would have been the better prac ti ce, we need not decide whether this situation mea nt the appeal wa s no longer “pending” for purposes o f Rule 36 beca u se we grant the trial court “ leave” to make the corre ction. In addition, it would s erve only to further delay this proceeding if we were to remand back to the trial court with leave to p rovide the correction it has already made. See St ate v. P assino, 154 Vt. 377, 383, 577 A.2d 281, 285 (1990) (“ We emphasize that the bail hearing must be scheduled as soon as reasonably possible to protect defendant ’ s right to bail. ”). ¶ 21. Defendant next argues that the weight of the evidence was not great. “ Acknowledging that the threshold for g reat evidence of guilt lies between ‘ probable ca use ’ a nd ‘ beyond a r easonable doubt, ’ this Court has adopted the Vermont Rule of Crimi nal Procedure 12(d) standard for review under § 7553. ” S tate v. Theriault, 2014 VT 119, ¶ 2, 198 Vt. 625, 109 A.3d 448 (mem.). To establish a prima facie case that evidenc e meets the constitutional threshold set by Rule 12(d), the State has th e burden of sho wing: “(1) that substantia l, admissi ble evidence of guilt exists, and (2) the evidence can fairly and reasonably convince a fact -finder beyond a reasonable doubt that defenda nt is guilty.” Id. On appeal, this Court independently determines whether the standard h as be en met. State v. Hardy, 2008 VT 119, ¶ 11, 184 Vt. 618, 965 A.2d 478 (mem.).

6 ¶ 22. The record indicates that the State introduced the following fa cts. Defendant and the victim had been in an eight-year romantic relationship that had either ended or was in the process of e nding — as described by defenda nt, the relationship had “ soured. ” In the wee ks prior to the victim’s death, the victim had been involved in a relationship with another man. Defendant had rear-ended this other man in a recent car a c cident and had told him, if he was “messin’ with [the victim], just leave her alone.” The day before the victim was strangled to death, she told defendant that she was “done with him.” The night prior to her death, the vi ctim left the house she shared with defe nd ant to go to a party and told defendant not to joi n her. C orroborated by video evidence, she returned to the home in her car at around 3:30 a.m. ¶ 23. At this point in the night, defendant’s explanation of the events starkly diverges from other evidence. According to defendant in his first interview with a detective, the victim gave defenda nt all of her persona l effects — phone, wallet, and car keys — and immediately left the house again. De fendant first explained that the victim wa lked to a car waiting for her on the street. Available surveillance video footage covering the street does not support this account. 3 Later, defendant explaine d that he had been mistaken and that the victim left on foot. The video footage also does not show her leaving on foot. ¶ 24. When c onfront ed with th e inconsistency betwe en his stories and the video footage, defendant asserted, “I di dn’t put her in [her car]. I didn’t take her anywhere in [her car]. ” Video footage shows the victim ’s vehicle leaving the ho use forty minutes after she had arrived at home. According to def endant, after th e victim left the home, he started to wo rry and de cid ed to take her car out to go look for her. However, d efendant on ce again inconsistently explained the timi ng of this trip. According to defendant, while looking for the victim, he drove past the pull-off area where the victim’s body was later discovered. ¶ 25. When interviewing defendant on the day th e victim’s body was found, a detective observed a red mark on defendant’s arm and that defendant’s domi nant hand appeared swollen. Defendant offered two e xplanations for the swelling. A ccording to defend ant, he broke his hand twenty years prior and that it swell ed due to his medication. Defendant also e xplained that he had been sc ratched by his cat recently a nd, alternatively, that he had sustained some scratches while breaking apart some shutters. ¶ 26. Finally, according to the coroner’s report, the victim was strangled to death and suffered blunt trauma to her head. ¶ 27. As we have frequently explained, “ [t]his Court has upheld numerous convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence. ” Theriault, 2014 VT 119, ¶ 3. “ When reviewing a case based large ly on circumstantial evidence, the evidence must be considered together, not separately.” State v. Baird, 2006 VT 86, ¶ 13, 180 Vt. 243, 908 A.2d 475 (quotation omitted) (reviewing evidence for purpose of reviewing motion for acquittal but using identical standard required in inst ant case, namely that Court “ will review the evidence presented by the State viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution and excluding any modifying evidence, 3 The su rveillance video c overs the entirety of the intersection of the street leading to the residence.

7 and determine whether t hat evidence sufficie ntl y and fairly supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ” (quotation omitted)). ¶ 28. In the light most favorable to the State and considering the evidence in its e ntirety, the State met its burden t hat the eviden ce of guilt is great. As defendant concedes, the evidence presented by the State demonstrates a cl ear mot ive and opportunity. Defendant and the victim were in the process of en ding a long relationship. The victim had recently become involved with another man, and defendant was with the victim in the hours directly before her de ath. Based on the video footage of the surrounding a rea, a jury could also reach the concl usion that the only way the victim could have left the house th at night was in the car, which d efendant affirmatively indicated he drove past the pull- off area where the victim’s body was found. Furthermore, a jury could rea son ably conclude that the injuries observed on defendant align with a struggle consistent with the way in which the victim wa s killed. Together this constitutes substa ntial evidence of guilt which can fairly a nd reasonably convince a fac tfin der bey ond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty. See Theriault, 2014 VT 119, ¶ 2 (outlining requirements to determine evidence of guil t is great). ¶ 29. Finally, because defendant does not challenge the court’s § 7554 analysis, we do not address it here. Affirmed. BY THE COURT: Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice