Georgia Supreme Court Rules on Motor Vehicle Franchise Act

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: February 1 7, 2026 S25A113 9. LUCID GROUP US A, INC. v. S TATE OF GEORGIA et al. C O LVIN, Jus tice. Thi s case conce rns th e con stitu ti onali ty of two p rovi sion s of th e Georgi a Mot or Ve hi cle Fran chis e Pract ices Act, OCGA § 10 -1- 620 et seq. The fi rst of th ese provis ions, OCG A § 10 -1- 664.1 (c), g ene rally requir es man uf actur ers t o sel l th eir n ew mo tor ve hi cles th rough a new m otor veh icl e de aler (s peci fical ly, a deal er wi th a fr anchi se for such vehi cles). It provi des t hat “n o man ufactur er or fran chis or sh all offer to sel l or s ell, direc tly or ind irectl y, any n ew moto r vehi cle to a consu mer in this state, ex cep t thr ough a new m otor veh icl e d ealer holdi ng a fran chi se for th e lin e m ake cov erin g s uch n ew mo to r vehicle. ” OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(c). Th e secon d of t hese pr ovi sions, OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a), gene rally proh ibit s man ufac ture rs an d thei r NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me C ourt Rule 27, the Court ’s recons ideratio n, and edit orial rev isions by t he Report er of Decisi ons. The ver sion of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geor gia Report s, desig nated as th e “Final Co py,” will replace a ny prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of the Georgi a Reports will con tain the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 affili ated en titi es from own in g or operat ing a new motor v ehi cle deale r, pr ovidi ng that, as a gen eral matter, it i s “ unl awful for an y manu factur er … or an y … af fili ate … of a manuf actur er … to own, opera te, o r cont rol, d irectl y or in direc tly, more than a 45 p ercent interes t in a d eal er o r deal ersh ip i n th is st ate. ” As a res ult of th ese two p rovisi ons (c ollecti vely ref err ed to h ere as the “ Dir ect Sal es Prohib ition ”), n ew motor v ehi cle manu factur ers a nd th eir af fili ates gener ally cannot sell the ir vehicles in the s tate directly t o consu mers. If they wish to sell the ir new motor vehicle s in the state to consumers, they must instea d use an indepen den t fran chis ed deale r as an i nte rmed iary to facilit ate t he sale. The plaint iff in t his case, Lucid Group USA, Inc. (“Lucid”), opera tes r etail locati ons in other stat es wh ere it sell s dir ectly to consu mers n ew elect ric vehi cles manu factu red by an affi li ated entit y (Lucid USA, Inc.). Seeking to open a reta il location in Geo rgia, Lucid sub mitte d an applic ation for a de alership license t o the Geor gia Depar tment of R evenue, which is ta sked with lic ensing ne w motor v ehicl e deal ers. But the D epartm ent of Rev enue den ied

3 Lucid’ s app lication ba sed on the Direct Sale s Prohibitio n. Lucid t hen filed s uit ag ainst t he State, seeking de clarati ons that, as applied to Luc id, the Direc t Sales Prohib ition vio lates seve ral prov isions o f the Geor gia Const itution, including the Due Proces s Clau se, 1 the Eq ual Prote ction Clause, 2 and two p rovis ions of Arti cle III, Se ction VI, Parag raph IV of Geo rgi a’s C onsti tution (“Paragr aph IV ”). 3 Lucid also so ught a permanent injunctio n prohibi tin g the Stat e fr om en for cin g the D ire ct Sa les P rohibi tion agains t Lucid. T he tri al court, how ever, dismissed Lucid’s complaint. The court c oncl uded that Lucid’ s due p rocess and e qual prote ction claim s were ba rred by Arti cle II I, Se ction VI, Parag raph I I(c) o f the G eorgi a Const itution of 1983 (“Pa rag raph II(c)”), wh ich provi des in relev ant part that, “ [n]o twithsta nding the [Due Proce ss Claus e and the Equal 1 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person s hall be deprived of life, liberty, or prope rty except by d ue process of law.”). 2 Ga. Const. of 198 3, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (“No person shall be denied the equal protection of t he laws.”). 3 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a) (pr oviding in relevant part that “[l]a ws of a general natur e shall have uniform operation throughout this state”); Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(c) (“No special law relating to the rights or status of private persons shall be e nacted.”).

4 Prot ectio n Clause] of this Constitut ion, ” the Gene ral A ssem bly is authori zed to regu late s pecified m embers of the “n ew motor v eh icle” industr y “ in ord er to preven t fr auds, unfai r bu si ness pr acti ces, unfai r meth ods o f comp etition, im posi tion s, and oth er abu ses upon its c itizens. ” And the trial cour t concluded that Luc id had n ot s tated a claim und er Pa ragr aph IV. Luci d app eale d. As expl ain ed b elow, w e v acate th e tri al court’s d etermi nati on that Pa rag raph I I(c) b ars Lucid’ s due pr ocess and equal pro tecti on claim s and rem an d for fu rthe r con siderati on of that i ssue. As to the trial c ourt ’s di smi ssal of Lucid’s Parag raph IV cl ai ms, we affi rm in part, v acat e in part, and reman d fo r furt her c onsi derati on. 1. Understa nding the c laims a t issue in t his cas e requir es consi derati on of the history an d ope ration of the Mot or Vehi cle Franch ise P racti ces A ct. In 1974, th e Gener al As sem bly pass ed th e Motor V ehicl e F ranchi se P racti ces A ct, l egisl ati on desi gned to regul ate mot or vehi cle fr anch ise practi ces “in o rder to pr even t fra uds, unfa ir prac tices, discrimina tion, and undue contro l of the indep endent mot or veh icl e deal er by mot or v ehicl e m anufac turi ng

5 and di stri butin g organ izat ions. ” G a. L. 1974, pp. 134 – 35. See a ls o Gen. G MC Tru ck s, Inc. v. Gen. M otor s Co rp., G MC Tru ck & Coach Div., 239 G a. 37 3, 3 73 (1977). Two yea rs l ater, th at leg isl ation w as repeal ed and rep lace d by the 19 76 Fr anchise Practice s Act. See G en. GMC Truc ks, 239 Ga. at 373 – 74. The 197 6 Franchise Pract ices Act prom ptl y faced consti tution al ch all eng es. In 197 7, w e held that a provisi on of the Act that limi ted t he nu mber of f ran chi sed deal ers, ther eby limit ing the av ail able m arket f or out - of - stat e man ufactu rers seeki ng to marke t their p rod ucts i n Georg ia, violated th e Com merc e Clau se of the U nited S tates Const itutio n. See Ge n. GMC Trucks, 239 Ga. at 37 5– 76, 3 78. I n reaching this conclusio n, we no ted that the state general ly “m ay r egul ate un der th e poli ce powe r w here th e heal th, safety and w elf are o f its ci tize ns are at s take,” and that the legi slatu re th erefor e may “reg ulat e th e pu rchas e a nd sal e o f mot or vehi cles fo r the protec tion an d g eneral w elfa re of the pu blic, ” incl udi ng to pro tect t he pu bli c from “frau d.” Id. at 376, 379 (quot ation m arks omi tted). B ut w e not ed th at Ge orgi a cou rts h ad

6 “tradi tional ly lim ited th e p ower of th e st ate to regul ate p riv ate busi ness,” th at th e poli ce pow er do es not au thori ze “pu rel y antic ompet itive” legisla tion, w hich is “not affecte d with the public inter est,” and that “the leg islature … may no t indulge in a rb itrary price fixi ng, th e des truct ion of law ful competi ti on, or the creati on of trade rest rain ts t endi ng to establ is h a m onop oly.” Id. at 376 – 77, 379 (quot ation m arks omi tted). The G ener al Ass embl y “su bstan ti ve[ly ] re - en act[ed]” th e 1976 Franch ise P racti ces Act in 1 979. Georgi a Fra nchis e P racs. C omm’n v. Ma ssey - Fer guson, Inc., 244 Ga. 800, 80 1 (1979). T hat sam e year, we decla red th e 197 9 Fran chise Practi ces Act unconstit utional “ in its en tiret y.” I d. at 803. W e con clu ded th at p rovis ion s of th e Ac t, whi ch were not sev erable, vi ol ated s everal prov isi ons of Georg ia’s 1976 Co nstitut ion, including A rt icle I, Sec tion I, Par agraph I (the Due P rocess C lau se 4), Art icle I, Sec tio n I, Par agraph VII (c oncer ning 4 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. I (“No person s hall be deprived of life, liberty, or prope rty, except by d ue process of law.”).

7 laws t hat im pair con tract s 5), Art ic le III, Sec tion I, Pa r agraph I (conce rni ng l egis lative p owe r 6), Ar t icle I, Sec tion II, Par agraph III (conce rni ng i mparti al p rotec tion of p erson s and property 7), and Art ic le III, Sec tion VIII, Par a graph VIII (concerning anti - competi tiv e con tra cts 8). See id. at 801 – 03. And in reac hing this conclu sion, we n oted that the G en eral Ass embl y had improp erly “restri ct[ed] com petiti on” and sought “to re gulate an industr y not affec ted w ith a p ubl ic in teres t. ” Id. a t 80 1–0 2. In 199 2, following o ur rulings “ striking down previous statu tes 5 Ga. Const. of 1 976, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. V II (“No bill of at tainder, ex post facto law, retroacti ve law, or law impairing the o bligatio n of contracts, or making irrevocable grant of special priv ileges or immunitie s, shall be passed.”). 6 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. III, Sec. I, Par. I (“The legislative p ower of the State shall be veste d in a General Assembly ….”). 7 Ga. Const. of 197 6, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. III (“Protectio n to person and property is the paramount dut y of government, an d shall be impartial and complete.”). This pr ovision in the 1976 Constitu tion did no t yet include what we commonly refer to as the Equal Pr otection Claus e of the 1983 Constitution. See Ga. Const. of 1 983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II (“Pro tection to person an d property is the paramou nt du ty of governmen t and shal l be imparti al and complet e. No person shall be de nied the equal prote ction of the laws.” (emphasis added)). 8 Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. III, Sec. VIII, Par. VIII (“All contracts and agreements, which may have t he effect, or be intended to have the effect, to defeat or lessen co mpetition, or to e ncourage monopoly, shall be illegal and void. The Gener al Assembly of this Sta te shall ha ve no pow er to auth orize any such contract or agreement. T he Genera l Assembly shall enf orce the provisions of this Paragraph b y appropriate legisl ation.”).

8 regul ating mot or veh icle f ranch is e pra ctic es” as u n consti tuti onal, the pe ople o f Geo rgia ra tifi ed a consti tuti onal a men dment th at “expres sly auth ori ze[d] the G ener al A ssembl y t o reg ulat e new m otor vehi cle man ufactu rers, dist ribu tors, d eale rs, and th eir rep resentat ives doing bus iness in Geo rgia” notwit hsta nding certa in “co nstitut ional prov isions tha t litigant s had re lied on to challenge previou s m otor v ehi cle f ranchi se l aws.” WMW, In c. v. Am. H onda Motor Co., 291 G a. 68 3, 6 86 & n.3 (2012) (cl ean ed up). S ee G a. L. 1992, p. 33 42, § 1, r atifi ed Nov. 3, 199 2. As relev ant here, the 1 992 cons titutio nal amend ment — whic h is now c odifie d as Paragrap h II(c) of Georg ia’s Constit ution — provides: The dist ribut ion of … new moto r vehicle s … in the State of Georg ia vi tall y affec ts th e gene ral ec onom y of th e stat e and t he public inte rest and pub lic welfa re. Not withsta nding the pro visions of Article I, Sectio n I, Paragr aphs I [t he D ue Pro ces s Cl ause], I I [th e Equ al Protect ion Claus e], and II I [the Freed om of Con sci ence Clause 9 ] or Articl e II I, Secti on V I, Parag raph V(c) [th e 9 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. III (“Each perso n has the natural and inalienable rig ht to worship G od, each according t o the dictates of t hat person’s own conscience; and no h uman authority should, i n any case, control or interfere with suc h right of conscie nce.”).

9 Anti - Competiti ve Con tracts Cl ause 10 ] o f this Const itution, the Gene ral Asse mbly in the exerc ise of its police p ower shal l be au thori zed t o regu late … n ew motor vehi cle man ufac turers, di stri buto rs, deal ers, and thei r repr esentat ives doing bus iness in Georg ia, including agreem ents amon g such parti es, i n ord er t o p reven t fra uds, unfa ir business p ractices, unfair methods of compe titio n, impositio ns, and othe r abuses upon it s citize ns. Ga. Con st. of 1 983, A rt. III, Sec. VI, Pa r. I I(c). Fol lo win g ratifi cati on of Parag ra ph I I(c), “th e Gen eral Assembl y i nv oked it s new cons titutio nal author ity when it sub stantive ly reena cted the Franch ise P racti ces A ct.” WMW, 291 G a. at 6 86 (clean ed up). See Ga. L. 1993, p. 1586, § 1 (“It is the inte nt of t he General As semb ly to subs tanti vely re enact c ertai n l egisl ation relati ng to dist ribu tion of tr acto rs, f arm equi pment, heav y equ ipm ent, and moto r v ehicl es subsequ ent to th e ratifi cation at th e 199 2 gene ral electio n of a 10 Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. V(c)(1) (“The Gener al Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contract or agree ment which may have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect of encouraging a mon opoly, which is hereby decla red to be unlawful and void. Except as otherwise provided in su bparagrap h (c)(2) of this Paragraph, the General Assembly shall not have the power to authorize any contrac t or agreement which m ay have the effect of or which is intended to have the effect o f defeating or lessening compe tition, which is hereby decla red to be unlawful and void.”).

10 cons titutio nal amend ment d eclaring tha t suc h distr ibution v itally affec ts th e gen eral econom y o f th e st ate and th e pu bl ic in terest an d publi c wel fare a nd auth oriz ing the Gen eral As se mbly to regu late such dis trib ution.”). Thi s case c oncern s seve ral p rovis ion s of the M ot or Veh icl e Fair Practi ces A ct, O CGA § 10 -1- 660 et s eq., a subdi vis ion of th e Georgia Motor V ehi cle F ranch ise P rac tices Act, OCG A § 10 -1- 620 et se q. By way of backg rou nd, Ge orgi a law proh ibit s anyon e f rom op erati ng as a n ew m otor v ehi cle dealer in the st ate without first obt aining a deale r licen se fr om the Geo rgia D epar tment of Rev enu e. See OC GA § 40 -2- 39(b)(1) (“It s hall be un lawfu l for an y pers on to en gag e in any activi ty as a new moto r vehi cle d ealer u nl ess a nd until suc h pers on has regi ster ed w ith the comm issi oner an d ob tain ed a deal er’s num ber licens e plat e …. ”); OCGA § 40 -2- 1(2) (“ ‘Comm issio ner’ means the s tate rev enue com miss ioner.”). And th e M otor V ehi cle Fair P racti ces A ct restri cts w ho m ay obtai n a d eal er lic ense by

11 restri cti ng who m ay own or oper ate a “de aler ” 11 or “deal ershi p” 12 in the st ate. As releva nt here, OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a) — the first compone nt of t he Direct Sa les Prohib ition — gener ally prohi bits manu factu rers and a ffili ated en titi es from ow ni ng or o perati ng a deal er or deale rship, pr ovidi ng that, subj ect t o ce rtai n exc epti ons, “[i] t sha ll be unla wful for any manufa cturer … or any par ent, aff iliate, w holly or pa rtiall y ow ned s ubsid iary, of fice r, o r re pres entati ve of a manu factur er … to own, oper ate, or c ontr ol, di re ctl y or i ndi rectly, more th an a 4 5 per cent in teres t i n a deal er o r deal ers hip in this state.” As not ed above, th e othe r comp onent of th e D irect Sales Prohib ition is O CGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(c), w hich prov ides th at, as a general matt er, “ no m anufac ture r or fran chis or sh all offer t o sel l or 11 See OCGA § 10 -1 - 622(1) (“‘D ealer ’ means any person engaged in the business of selling, offering to sell, soli citing, or advertisin g the sale of ne w motor vehicles an d who is lice nsed or otherwise authorized to uti lize trademarks or serv ice marks ass ociated with one or more makes of m otor vehicles in connecti on with such sa les.”). 12 See OCGA § 10 -1- 622(2)(A) (defining “[d]ealersh ip” as inclu ding “[t]he dealer, if the dea ler is a corpo ration, partnershi p, or other busine ss organization.”).

12 sell, dire ctly o r in directly, an y new motor v ehi cle to a consu mer i n this st ate, except through a new mo tor vehicle de aler hold ing a fra nchise for the line m ake cover ing such new motor ve hicle.” By its plain t erms, t his provis ion only regula tes t he sale to consu mers of “new motor vehicle[s].” OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(c). An d, as exp lain ed below, becau se t he sta tuto ry d efi niti on of th at t erm h as chan ged over th e yea rs, so to o has the effec t of O CGA § 10 -1- 664.1 (c). Prior t o a 20 15 amen dmen t, th e Motor V eh icle Fran chis e Practi ces Ac t defi ned “[n ]ew m otor v ehi cle” as “a motor v ehicl e which has been sold to a dealer and o n which the or iginal motor vehicle title has not be en issue d.” OCGA § 10 -1- 622(11) (2010). Bu t in 2 015, the G eneral Ass embl y am ended th is d efi niti on, rem ovin g the p hrase “which ha s been sold to a dealer,” and defining “[n]e w motor vehicle” sim ply as “a mot or vehicle on which the origina l motor v ehi cle ti tl e has not b een i ssu ed.” OCG A § 10 -1- 622 (11). S ee Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, § 1. The cha nge to the stat utory def inition of “ne w motor vehic le” had a significa nt impac t on the ope ration of OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(c).

13 Prior to th e 2015 amen dment, wh en “new m oto r veh i cle” w as def ined as inc luding on ly new ve hicles that ha d been s old to a d ealer, the plain la nguage o f OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1 (c) di d n ot requ ire manu factur ers to s ell new motor vehicles through indep endent franch ised dealer s. It on ly p rohibi ted a m anufa ctur er fr om sel lin g a new motor vehicl e to cons umers th rough a n on - fra nch ised d eale r, providi ng that a m anu facturer cou ld n ot “offe r to sel l or sell, dire ctly or indi rectl y, an y n ew moto r vehi cl e [i.e., any moto r veh icle w hic h has be en sold to a deale r and on whic h the o rigina l motor vehicle title has not been issue d] to a consumer in t his state, exc ept through a new m otor v ehi cle de aler hol di ng a fran ch ise fo r the li ne m ake coveri ng s uch n ew m otor v ehi cle.” OCG A § 10 -1- 664.1(c). After t he 2015 am endm ent red efin ed “new moto r veh icle” m or e broad ly as an y motor vehicle wit hout an is sued title, however, the plain langua ge of OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(c) app lied dif ferently, prohibit ing manufa cture rs from se lling new motor vehicle s direct ly to consu mers an d re qui ring that man ufactu re rs in stead sel l n ew motor vehicle s thro ugh indepe ndent fra nchised de aler s. S pecifica lly,

14 OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(c) now prov id es th at man ufactu re rs can not “offe r to sel l or sel l, directl y or i ndi rectly, an y new mot or veh icle [i.e., a motor v ehi cle o n wh ich the orig inal motor vehi cle title h as not been issu ed] to a con su mer in thi s state, ex cept throu gh a n ew mot or vehicle dealer holding a fra nchise for the line ma ke covering s uch new m otor veh icl e.” As alle ged in the amend ed complaint, pri or to the 20 15 amendm ent, Tesl a Motors, In c. (“ Tesl a”) — a manufactu re r of new electri c m otor veh icles tha t (like Lucid and its manuf acturing aff iliate) s ells its electri c veh icl es in other stat es direc tly to cons umers witho ut using ind epend ent franc hised de alers as interm edia ries — obtain ed a d ealer l icen se to sell new m otor vehi cles dir ectl y to cust omers in G eorgia. As f urther alle ged in the amend ed complaint, once th e Ge neral Ass embly red efin ed “n ew motor v ehi cle” i n 2015, OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(c) woul d h ave proh ibi ted Tesl a from selling ne w vehic les in the state di rec tly to cu stom ers without utilizing a fra nchised dea ler as an inter medi ary. But t he same amendm ent that re defin ed “ new motor veh icl e” al so ad ded a

15 new provisio n to OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1 that creat ed an excep tion to th e Direct Sal es P roh ibiti on fo r a lim ited class of ele ctric motor v ehicle manu factur ers w ho w ere oper ating deal ershi ps in th e stat e as of January 1, 2015 — a class that (as appea rs undisputed on a ppeal) incl udes, and cou ld on ly ev er incl ude, T esla. Speci fical ly, the 20 15 amendm ent adde d a new s ubs ecti on — OCGA § 10 -1- 6 64.1(a)(8) — which pro vides that OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a) “s hall not be c onstru ed to pro hibit”: The ow nersh ip, o perati on, o r cont rol by a manu factu rer of not mo re th an f ive l ocat ions l icen sed as n ew mo tor v ehi cle deale rship s for t he sal e of new moto r vehi cles a nd an y number of locat ions that engage exclusiv ely in the repair of s uch manuf acturer’ s lin e mak e of mot or v ehi cles, provide d that su ch m anufact urer was sel li ng or oth erw ise distri buti ng i ts m otor veh icles a t an es ta blish ed p lace of busi ness i n thi s stat e as o f Jan uar y 1, 20 15, an d: (A) Th e manu fac ture r manu factu res or ass embl es zero em issi ons m otor veh icles excl usi vely and has never sold its line make of motor vehicle s in this state throu gh a fr anchi sed new m otor v ehi cle de ale r; and (B) Th e manu fact urer h as n ot a cqui red a c ontr olli ng interes t in a fra nch isor o r a su bsidi ary or othe r entity cont rolled by su ch fran c hisor, or sol d or tra nsferred a controlling int erest in such

16 manu factur er t o a fran chi sor o r su bsidi ary or othe r entit y contro lled by suc h franchis or. OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a)(8); Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, § 2. 2. As not ed abov e, Lucid sued t he State, challengin g the Direct Sale s Prohibit ion u nder th e D ue Proc ess Cl au se, the Equ al Protect ion C laus e, and Par agr aph IV of Geo rgi a’s C onstitut ion (which pla ces certa in limitat ions on the pas sag e of g ene ral and special laws). As to the Paragr aph IV c laim, Lucid alleg ed that the Direct Sal es P roh ibiti on “arbitra rily distingu ishes betwee n classes that a re simi larl y situ ated in all materi al respec ts, ” and that it ther efor e violates Paragr aph IV (a), “be cause it is not a law of a general natu re th at has a u ni form ope rati on th roug hou t this state.” And Lucid allege d that t he Direct S ales Prohibit ion viola tes Paragr aph IV(c) “bec ause it i s a sp ecial l aw rela tin g to the rig hts or status of p riva te person s.” Over L ucid’s obj ection, th e trial cour t perm itte d th e Georgi a Autom obile D ea lers A ssoci ati on (“GA DA”) to i nterv ene as a defen dant. And t he St ate and G AD A each move d to dism iss t he

17 comp laint. The def endants argu ed that L uci d’s du e proce ss an d equal p rote ction cl aims w ere barred by Paragraph II (c), whic h authori zes th e Gen eral Assem bly to r egul ate the n ew motor v ehicl e industr y notwit hsta nding the Due Proce ss and Eq ual Pro tection Clause s. GADA ar gued that t he same constit utiona l provision also preemp ted Luci d’s cl aim un der P aragr aph I V. And the defend ants argued that Lu cid’s P arag raph IV cla im failed be cause the challe nged la ws operate d uniformly upo n all peop le within t heir ambit. Foll owin g a h earing, the tri al cou rt iss ued an o rde r gran ting the defend ants’ m otions to dismiss. Fir st, the t rial c ourt c onclud ed that the “plain, unambiguo us langua ge of Para graph I I(c) mandate [d] the dismi ssal ” of Luci d’s due pr ocess and equ al prote ction cl aim s bec ause the Di rect S ales P roh ibiti on w as ena cted pursu ant to P arag raph II (c), and b ecaus e Paragrap h I I(c) gr ants th e General As sem bly the autho rity to reg ul ate n ew motor veh icle manufa cture rs “notwit hstand ing” the Due Proces s and Equa l Protect ion Clauses. In r eachi ng t his con clu sion, the cou rt rej ected

18 Lucid’ s argume nt that the langua ge in Para graph II(c) s tating tha t the Ge neral As sembly could issue s uch regula tions “in o rder to preven t frau ds, unfai r busi ness p ractic es, u nfair m ethod s of competi tion, i mposi tions, an d other abuse s u pon [G eo rgia’s ] citiz ens” limi ted the G ener al Ass embl y’s au thority to r egul ate new motor v ehicl e ma nufactu rers pursuant to Pa ragrap h II (c). A ccord ing to th e trial co urt, thi s lang uage w as m erely an i nopera tiv e “statem ent of pu rpose,” n ot a “ li mitati on,” be cau se the fr amers wou ld have u sed “more pr ecis e lan guag e” if th ey ha d meant for t he languag e “to f unctio n as a limita tion”; re ading t he language “as a limitat ion is no t a natura l reading of t he text”; and r ead ing the lang uage as a l i mitati on “w ould force the c ourt s to ev alu ate th e exerci se of the G eneral Assem bl y’s p olice p owe r,” wh ich i s “pre cisel y not the rol e of th e cour ts … where th e G enera l A ssembl y can regul ate wi thou t reg ard t o th e E qual P rotec tion Clau se or D ue Proces s Clau se. ” Secon d, th e tri al cou rt conclu ded that Lu cid c ould not s how that the Di rec t Sal es P rohibi tion vi olate d Pa ragr aph IV be cause

19 Paragr aph IV on ly requires that a general la w operat e alike wit h respec t to al l wh o com e with in i ts scop e, “it is beyond d ispute that the Di rect Sal es P rohibi tion ” i s a “g ener al l aw,” and “ the Di rect Sale s Prohibit ion ap plies wit h equal fo rce to all who f all within its terms throu ghou t th e Sta te.” The t rial court con cl uded that it w as irrelev ant that th e Di rect S ales Pr ohi bition prov ide d for excep tion s becaus e gen eral laws can have exce ption s. The tr ial cour t also reject ed Lu cid ’s a rgum ent tha t the exc eption tail ore d to T esla w as an unco nstitut ional spe cial la w, not ing that even a law that appl ies in only one ins tance can be a g eneral law. A nd the co urt note d that a chal len ge to t he ex cepti on to th e Di rect S ales Proh ibi tion th at app lied only to Tesl a cou ld n ot r edres s L ucid’s gri evan ce b ecau se, i f the c ourt conc luded that the exceptio n was unc onstitut ional, “ the proper remed y w ould be t o d eclar e it [u ncons titu tion al] an d en join [its] enfo rcemen t,” n ot t o decl are “the remai nder of th e sta tute” pro hibit ing direct s ales unco nstitutio nal. 3. In it s fi rst of tw o en umera tions of e rror o n appeal, Luc id argues tha t th e tr ial cou rt mis inter preted Pa ragr aph II(c), and, as a

20 res ult, applie d an incor rect standa rd in conclud ing tha t Paragra ph II(c) b arred L uci d’s du e pr ocess and equal prote cti on clai ms. W e agree. When int erpret ing the Cons titution, we genera lly “affor d the cons titutio nal text it s plain a nd ordina ry mea ning, view the te xt in the con tex t i n wh ich i t app ears, an d r ead the tex t i n i ts mos t na tural and r eason able w ay, as an o rdinar y speak er of th e En gli sh langua ge would. ” Hollis v. Cit y of L aGran ge, 320 Ga. 45 1, 453 – 54 (2024) (quotati on m ark s omitt ed). Accordingly, our const ructio n of Para graph II(c) begins with t he text its elf, which, as no ted abov e, states in relevant pa rt: The dist ribut ion of … new moto r vehicle s … in the State of Georg ia vi tall y affec ts th e gene ral ec onom y of th e stat e and t he public inte rest and pub lic welfa re. Not withsta nding the pro visions of Article I, Sectio n I, Paragr aphs I [t he D ue Pro ces s Cl ause], I I [th e Equ al Protect ion Claus e], and II I [the Freed om of Con sci ence Clau se] or Ar ticle I II, Sect ion VI, P aragr aph V (c) [th e Anti - Co mpetit ive Contr acts C lause] of t his Const itution, the Gen eral Asse mbly in th e exerci se of its poli ce pow er shal l be auth ori zed t o reg ulate … new m otor v ehi cle manu factur ers, distri bu tors, deal ers, an d thei r repr esentat ives doing bus iness in Georg ia, including agreem ents amo ng s uch p arti es, in o rder to prev ent

21 fra uds, unfa ir business p ractices, unfair methods of compe titio n, impositio ns, and othe r abuses upon it s citize ns. Ga. Con st. of 198 3, Ar t. III, S ec. VI, Par. II(c). The pla in langua ge of Paragrap h II(c) es tablishe s that, pursu ant to its “police pow er,” th e Gene ral Asse mbl y may pass certain st atutes th at “regu late … n ew mot or v ehicl e man ufactu rer s, distri buto rs, deal ers, and t heir r epres enta tiv es doi ng bu sin ess in Geor gia,” and that it may pa ss such sta tutes “[n]o twithsta nding” — that is, despi te — any limitatio n that the enumerated constit utiona l provis ions, such as th e Due P rocess Cl ause an d the Equ al P rotecti on Clau se, mi ght ot herw ise i mpos e on th e Gen eral A ssembl y’s police power. See Notwithsta nding, Merriam Webst er’s C oll egiate Dictio nary 79 5 (10th e d. 19 97) (de fining “not withst anding” a s meaning “despit e”); No twithstanding, Webs ter’s Ninth New Coll egiate D icti onary 808 (1988) (same). Becau se P aragr aph II(c) authori zes cert ain reg ulat ions d es pite an y li mitat ion s imp osed by the enu mer ated consti tution al p rov ision s, th e tria l cou rt co rrec tly determi ned that clai ms bas ed o n the e numerated constit utional

22 provis ions t hat c hal leng e regul ation s auth orize d by Paragr aph II(c) are barred by the Const itution. That muc h is undis puted on appeal. 13 The di spu te here con cern s which regulati ons Par ag raph II(c) authori zes. Th e trial cou rt c oncl uded t hat P arag raph I I(c) authori zes any regul ation of “n ew m otor veh icl e man ufac turers, distri buto rs, deal ers, and t heir r epres enta tiv es doi ng bu sin ess in Georgi a.” In rea chin g thi s con clu sion, howev er, th e trial c ourt disreg ard ed Para graph II(c)’s “in o rder t o” cl ause, w hi ch stat es tha t the Gen eral Ass embly is au thori z ed to regul ate the new mo tor vehicle industr y “in or der t o preve nt frauds, unfair b usiness 13 While unclear, GADA appears to claim that Paragraph I I(c) bars n ot only claims arisin g under th e constitutio nal provisions it expressly enumer ates but also claims ari sing under other constitutional provisions if the claims resemble claims ar ising under the e numerated constitu tional provisions. Specifically, GA DA argues that, becau se Lucid’s Paragrap h IV claim resembles an equal protection claim, a nd because Paragraph II(c) enumerates the Eq ual Protection Clause, Paragraph II (c) bars Lucid’s Paragra ph IV claim. This argument, however, is misguided. It is a well-establish ed canon of cons truction that “[t] he express mention of one thing implies the exclusio n of another.” A llen v. Wright, 282 Ga. 9, 13 – 14 (200 7) (quotation marks omitte d). A nd Paragr aph II(c) expressly enumerates several constitution al provisio ns, while excluding Paragraph IV from the list. Accor dingly, even assumin g the legislation at issue here is the type of regulatio n authorized by Par agraph II(c), Paragraph II(c) would not bar a Par agraph IV- bas ed challenge to tha t legislation.

23 practi ces, un fair m etho ds of com peti tion, im positi on s, an d oth er abuses upon [Ge org ia ’s ] citize ns.” As expla ined below, t he trial court erre d in disre garding this la nguag e. A cons titutio nal pro vision “s hould be co nstrued t o make all it s parts h armon iz e and t o gi ve a sen sibl e and int elli gent effec t to each part.” Camden County v. Sweatt, 315 Ga. 498, 509 (202 3) (quo tati on marks omitt ed). And becaus e it is presu med t hat n o par t of th e tex t is “wit hout meaning,” a co urt “genera lly should avoid a cons tructio n that makes som e lan guag e mer e s urpl usag e.” Id. (quot ation ma rks omitted). Here, th e trial cou rt reli ed on t he con verse of th ese wel l - est ablished canons of cons truction in co ncluding tha t Para graph II(c)’s “in o rder to” cl ause w as n ot a li mitati on o n the G eneral Assem bly’s au th ority under Paragr aph I I(c). The trial court w as correct in sofar a s it con clud ed t hat, wh en Para graph II(c) w as ratifie d, the p hra se “ in o rder to” w as g ener all y un derstoo d to me an “for the pu rpos e of.” Order, Merriam Webster ’s Col le giate D icti onary 818 (10th ed. 1997) (d efin ing “in order to” as “f or the purp ose of”);

24 Order, W ebs ter’s Nin th New Collegi ate Di ctiona ry 83 0 (198 8) (same). But rath er than pre suming tha t the “in order to ” clause had oper ative ef fect and r eading the provision in t he most natural way based on th at pre sump tion, the tri al cou rt p resum ed th at the cla use was mer e surpl u sage an d concl u ded that, absent “mor e preci se languag e,” that p resu mption coul d not be rebutted. This re asoning was e rroneou s. Prop erly applying the surp lusage cano n, Paragraph I I(c)’ s “in order to” cl ause is nat urall y read as a l imi tation on th e poli ce pow er authori zed by th e prov ision. Presuming that the “in order to” claus e has mean in g and ef fect, as we should, the p lain langua ge of Paragr aph II (c) authori zes the G ener al A ssem bly t o exe rcise its “poli ce p ower” to p ass regu lati ons on th e “ n ew m otor vehi cle ” industr y that are for the purp ose o f “prevent [ing] fra uds, unfa ir busi ness pr acti ces, u nfai r meth ods of comp etiti on, i mpos ition s, an d other abu ses upo n [Georg ia ’s ] c itizens.” And s o long as a reg ul ation of t he “new mot or vehic le” indus try is for th e pu rpose o f prev entin g the type s of “abuses upon [Georgia ’s ] citize ns” spec ified in the

25 provis ion, Parag raph II (c) ren de rs the regulat ion immune fr om challe nge unde r the cons titutiona l pro visions enume rate d in Paragr aph II (c). 14 This te xtual inte rpret ation of Pa ragraph I I(c) is als o suppo rted by the l egal an d historica l context in which th e pro vision wa s ratifie d. As exp lai ned ab ove, P arag raph II(c) was ra tifi ed in respon se to our de cisio ns striking d own por tions o f the pr ior Franch ise P rac tices Act. In tho se dec isions, we had indica ted that “the pow er of t he s tate t o regu la te priva te bu sin ess” is “lim ited,” Gen. GMC Tr ucks, 239 Ga. at 376, and th at i t was im proper for the 14 In conclud ing that the “in or der to” cla use was not a limita tion on the General Assembly’s authority under Paragraph II(c), th e trial court also reasoned that, because Paragra ph II(c) exempts regulatio ns of the n ew motor vehicle industry from scrutiny un der the enumera ted constitutional provisions, and beca use reading the “in order to” clause as a limitatio n “would force the courts to evaluate t he exercise of the Ge neral Assembly’s poli ce power,” it would not make sen se to read “in order t o” clause as a limi tation on the General Asse mbly’s authority. Th is reasoning, however, con fuses the nature of the limitation impose d by Paragraph II(c)’s “i n order to” clause. That clause is not a limitation on th e Genera l Assembly’s police power, but it limits the ways the police power may be exe rcised that are im mune from challenge under the enumer ated con stitutional p rovisions. Paragrap h II(c) requires a n assessment of whether the regulat ion in question fits with in the category of regulations immun e from such challeng es. That said, a determinati on that a given regulation is not within that ca tegory does not mea n that it is invalid, only that it is not immune from challenge s under the enumer ated constitutional provisions.

26 General Assem bly to seek “to re gul ate [the n ew m otor v ehicl e] industr y,” which is “not affect ed with a pub lic int erest,” Mass ey - Fergus on, I nc., 244 G a. at 802. W e h ad st ruck d own a prior v ersi on of th e Fran chi se Practi ces A ct a s v iolati ve o f sev eral prov isi ons o f the Ge orgia Co nstitut ion, inc luding p rovisio ns tha t addres sed due proces s, equ al prote ction, and anti - com peti tiv e con tracts. See Massey - Fergu son, 244 Ga. at 80 1 – 03. And we had noted th e wel l - est ablished principle t hat the pol i ce powe r perm i ts the G ene ral Assembly to p ass regula tions “whe re th e he alth, s af ety and wel fare of its ci tizen s are at s take,” includ ing where “fraud” in “the pu rch ase and s ale of mot or v ehicl es” puts the “g ener al w elf are of the publ ic ” at stake. Gen. G MC Truc ks, 239 Ga. at 376, 379. The tex t o f Pa ragraph II (c) address es e ach of th ese points. First, c ontr ary to our d ecisi ons i ndi cating that the ne w moto r veh icl e industr y was not a ffected w ith the pub lic interes t and co uld not be regul ated, Pa rag raph II (c) cl ari fies that the “new moto r veh icl e” industr y “vit ally affec ts the g ener al ec onomy of th e st ate an d th e public interes t and public welfare, ” a nd that the “p olice p ower ”

27 authori zes th e General Assem bl y to “regulate ” the “n ew moto r vehicle ” indust ry. Second, in re sponse to our dec isions str iking down the Fr anchise Pract ices Act und er speci fic p rovisi ons of G eorgi a’s Const itution (including the Du e Pro cess C laus e, th e Equal Prot ectio n Clause, a nd the Ant i -C ompeti tiv e Con tracts C lau se), Paragr aph II (c) speci fie s tha t th e Gene ral As sembl y may pas s certain regu lati ons of the new motor vehic le indust ry “[n] otwit hstand ing” those cons titutiona l provisio ns. Finally, Paragr aph I I(c) cla rifi es th at the s cope of th e p olice pow er autho rized in t he pro vision is co nsistent with the tra ditiona l police power (which a uthorize s legisla tion des igned to prote ct the hea lth, safety, and wel far e of Ge orgi a citi ze ns) in t hat t he General A ssembly can pass regula tions of the new mo tor vehicle industry tha t are for the pu rpos e o f “ preven t [ing] … abuse s upon [Georgia ’s ] citize ns,” such a s “fra uds, unfair busine ss prac tices, unfair method s of competi tion, [and ] imposit ions.” Because the tri al court d ismi ssed Luci d’s du e p rocess and equa l prote ction cl aim s u nder Parag rap h II(c) without first consider ing

28 whethe r the Direc t Sales Prohib ition wa s en act ed f or th e pur pose of preven tin g the t ypes of abu ses specif ied in Paragr aph II (c), t he court’s di smis sal was prem atur e. 15 W e theref ore va cate t he trial court ’s dismiss al of L ucid ’s du e pr ocess and equ al p rotec tion clai ms and r emand f or f urth er cons id erati on of th ose claims c onsistent with this o pinion. 4. In its sec ond a nd fin al en umerati on of e rror on app eal, Lucid challe nges t he trial co urt’s d ismissal o f its cla ims challeng ing the Direc t Sales Prohib ition under P arag raph I V(a) an d (c), which, as relevan t h ere, pr ovide: (a) La ws of a general na ture shall ha ve unifor m opera tion th rou ghou t thi s stat e an d no l ocal or s peci al law shal l be en act ed i n any cas e fo r wh ich provi sion has been made by an existi ng g eneral law …. (c) No sp ecial law relatin g to th e rig hts or st atus of privat e pers ons sh all be en act ed. Ga. Con st. of 198 3, Art. III, Se c. VI, Par. IV (a), (c). 16 As exp lained 15 On remand, the tri al court should cons ider in the first inst ance which party has the burde n to establish the challenged legisla tion’s purpose and wh at showing is required to establish th at purpose under Par agraph II(c). 16 Although Paragrap h IV(c) was included for the first time i n Georgia’s

29 below, we affi rm in part and vac ate i n part the trial co urt’s d ismissa l of Luci d’s Parag raph IV clai ms. (a) At the outse t, w e note that th e porti ons of Parag raph IV(a) and (c) quoted ab ove con tai n a t otal of th ree s epar ate p rovi sion s that are relev ant here, each of whi ch con cerns “gen eral” or “special ” l aws, and ea ch of which re quires a different analysis. As a gen eral matter, wheth er a l aw i s a “gen eral law ” or a “spec ial law” und er Parag raph IV turns on the le gislat ive 1983 Constitution, the port ion of Para graph IV(a) r elevant here has been included in Georg ia’s Constitutio n in ma terially similar f orm since the Georgia Constitution of 1877. Compare Ga. Co nst. of 1877, Art. I, Sec. IV, Par. I (“Laws of a general nature shall have un iform operation through out the State, and no special law shall be enacted in any case for which provision has been made by existing general l aw. No genera l law aff ecting private righ ts shall be varied in any particular case by special legislati on, except with the free consent, in writing of all persons to be affe cted thereby; a nd no person under legal disability to con tract is c apable of suc h consent.”), G a. Const. of 1945, Art. I., Sec. IV (“Laws of a general nature shal l have unif orm operation throughout the State, and no special law sh all be en acted in an y case for which provision has been mad e by an ex isting gen eral law. No general la w affecting priv ate rights, shall be varied in any particular case, by spe cial legislation, except with the free consent, in writing, of all persons to be affected the reby; and no person under legal disabilit y to contract, is capable of such cons ent.”), and Ga. Const. of 1976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. VII (same), with Ga. Cons t. of 1868, Art. I, Se c. 26 (“Laws shall have a general oper ation, and no general law, affecting private rights, shall be varie d, in any particular c ase, by special legisl ation, except with the free consent, in writing, of all persons to be affecte d thereby; and no person under legal disabilit y to contract is c apable of such free c onsent.”).

30 classi fic ation d raw n by th e law. A “ speci al law ” is a law that d raws a “le gislat ive class ificat ion” tha t is “ arbitr ary or u nreas onable ” in relati on to the “ purpos e” of t he l egis lation, Dev. Aut h. of DeKa l b County v. State, 286 Ga. 36, 39 – 40 (2009) (quota tion m arks omi tted). See Walke r v. Cr omarti e, 28 7 Ga. 511, 5 13 (20 10) (noti ng th at “[a] special law is a l aw th at on ly affec ts a li mited area or class ” and thus doe s not “appl[y] unifor mly to t he subject wit h which it p urport s to deal”); Gliem mo v. Cou sineau, 28 7 Ga. 7, 8 (2010) (“This Cour t has found a statu te t o be a sp ecial law where i t deal s w ith a lim ited act ivity in a s pecific industr y during a limit ed t ime fra me.” (quot ation m arks omi tted)); Las seter v. Ge orgi a Pub. Serv. Com m’n, 253 Ga. 2 27, 2 29 (19 84) (n oti ng th at “sp ecial l aws affec t[] spe ci al classes”); Sasser v. Martin, 101 Ga. 447, 4 53 – 54 (18 97) (exp laining that not all “public law[s]” ar e “ge neral l aw [s], ” a nd that “ [a] public sta tute is sp ecial, not only when it is lo cal, b ut also w hen it is confin ed in its su bjec t to les s than a clas s of p erson s or t hin gs ”). B y contras t, a “gene ral l aw” is a law th at is “ fram ed in gen eral term s ” and applies to a “[non] arbi trar y” class of “ob ject s” that “are

31 disti ngu ished by charact eris tics su fficien tly mark ed an d import ant to make th em a cl ass by them sel ves” with re spect to t he le gislat ion’s “subje ct - mat ter” and “pu rpos e.” Sasser, 101 Ga. at 45 5– 57 (quot ation m ark s omi tted) (no tin g that a gen eral law d raws “a substan tial disti n ction, h avi ng re feren ce to t he su bje ct - matt er of the propos ed l egis lation, betw een th e obj ects or plac es e mbrace d in suc h legi slati on and the o bje cts o r pla ces excl uded ”). In ot her wo rds, a law is “ge ne ral” i f “t he clas ses i ncl uded o r excl uded from its g ener al effec t are reason able an d not arbi trary ” with r espect to the subject matter of t he legislat ion. McAlli ster v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 24 8–4 9 (1977). See Zarate - Mart inez v. Ech emen dia, 29 9 Ga. 301, 3 11 (2 016) (n otin g that a “gen eral law” m akes “ cl assi fication [s] ” that are “no t arbi tra ry or u nr eason able” (clean ed u p)). 17 The fir st provis ion of Par agrap h IV that is re levant here 17 See also Walter McElreath, A Treatise on the Constitu tion of Georgia § 123 (“One of the most important limitations plac ed upon legis lative action was the provision that ‘no special l aw should be enacted in any case where provision had been made by gener al law.’ This has gi ven prominence to t he theory of the classification of su bjects [sic] matter of le gislation and the enactment of what a re known as ‘Genera l laws of local applic ation,’ based upon a classification, in many cases, so ne arly arbitrary tha t it amounts to little more than a subterf uge.”).

32 appear s in subsec tion (a). I t prov id es that “[l]aw s of a gener al n ature shall ha ve unifo rm operat ion througho ut this st ate.” Ga. Const. o f 1983, Ar t. III, Se c. VI, P ar. IV(a). “[T] o viol ate th is cons titu tional pro vision, the statute in questio n must … be [1] a ge neral la w which [2] l acks u ni form ope rati on throughout t he state. ” Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 8 (cl ean ed up). As to the uni formi ty com pon ent o f Pa ragrap h IV(a), we have ex pl ained that a general law h as un iform o pera tion for pu rposes of P arag raph I V(a) s o long as it “ oper ates alik e on all who co me within t he sc ope of it s provis ions,” meaning tha t it “ap pl[ies] to all per sons, matt ers, or things whic h it is int ended to affect.” Zara te - Martinez, 299 Ga. at 311 (quo tati on m arks omi tted). See Sass er, 101 G a. at 45 2 (ex plaining tha t a gener al law s atisfi es the unif ormit y requir ement if it is “unifor m in its o peratio n or capabl e of bein g m ade u niform in its oper ation upo n th e su bject or class of s ubje cts wi th whi ch it purport ed to deal ”). See also Wa lt er McElr eath, A Trea tise on t he Constitut ion of Geor gia § 1 13 6 (19 12) (not ing that the “ [t]err itoria l test of whethe r a l aw is gener al law is that it sh all oper ate i n ev ery p art of t he St ate u pon ev ery pe rson o r

33 trans acti on emb race d with in its terms ”). “Wh en a [gen eral law ] purp orts to do this, b ut in applica tion lacks unif orm oper ation, it runs afoul of [P aragra ph I V(a)].” Lasset er, 2 53 Ga. at 229. The s econd p rov isi on of P arag raph IV r elevan t here also appear s in subs ecti on (a). Speci fical ly, P aragr aph IV(a) prov id es that “n o loc al o r speci al l aw sh all be enac ted in an y cas e for wh ich provis ion h as be en made by an exi stin g gen eral law.” G a. C onst. of 1983, Ar t. III, Sec. V I, Pa r. IV(a). We hav e exp lained tha t this provis ion “w as i n tended to ensu re th at on ce th e leg i slatu re ent ered a field by en acti ng a gen eral l aw, that fiel d mu st th erea fter be reserv ed ex clu sivel y to g ener al leg i slati on and c oul d no t be op en to special o r local l aws.” City of Atl anta v. Mays, 301 Ga. 367, 376 (2017) (pu nctua tion and quot ation marks omi tted). Se e al so Gliemmo, 28 7 G a. at 8 (“[T] o vio late [thi s provi si on of Pa ragr aph IV(a)], th e statu te i n ques ti on mu st … [be] a s pe cial l aw f or wh ich provis ion h as bee n mad e by exis tin g gen eral l aw.” (quot ation m arks omitted)). The th ird prov isi on of P arag raph IV r elev ant h ere is Paragr aph

34 IV(c), w hich prov id es that “[n] o speci al l aw rel atin g to th e righ ts or status of pri vat e pers ons s hall be enacted.” G a. Co nst. of 1 983, Ar t. III, Sec. VI, Pa r. IV(c). An d our pre ceden t clari fie s that the term “speci al l aw” car ri es the sam e mea ni ng in Paragrap h IV (c) as it d oes in P aragrap h IV(a). See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10 (co ncludi ng that a statut e di d no t vi olate Pa ragraph I V(c) bec ause it w as a g en eral l aw for purpo ses of Parag ra ph IV(a)); State v. Martin, 266 G a. 2 44, 24 6 (1996) (s ame). Thi s descri ption of Pa ragr aph IV mak es cl ear that Parag raph IV “doe s not p roh ibit special laws per s e.” Lasseter, 253 Ga. at 22 9 (addres sin g Paragra ph IV ’s pr edeces sor in G eorgi a’s 19 76 Const itution). Th e fi rst provi sion of P aragr aph I V(a) has n o beari ng on spec ial laws, req uiring only that “gene ral law[s]” have “unifo rm opera tion th rou ghou t the s tate. ” Zarate - Mar tin ez, 29 9 Ga. at 3 10 – 11 (quo tati on m arks om it ted). T he se cond prov isio n of P arag raph IV(a) prohibit s only “spec ial law[s] fo r which provisio n ha[s] been made by exis ting general law. ” Id. (quot ation mark s omit ted). A nd Paragr aph IV (c) proh ibits onl y “s pecial law [s]” tha t “rela t[e] to t he

35 righ ts or st atus of pri vate p ers ons. ” Ga. Con st. of 1 983, A rt. III, S ec. VI, Pa r. IV(c). (b) Here, th e tri al court did not ful ly an alyz e Lu cid’s P aragr aph IV cla im under any of thes e three prov isions. The trial cou rt perfo rmed only a par tial a nalysis under the f irst provisio n of Paragr aph IV (a), w hich requi res th at law s of a g eneral natu re ap ply unifor mly thro ughout t he state. Specifica lly, t he tria l cou rt anal yzed wheth er t he Direct S ales Proh ibiti on app lied unifo rmly, co ncluding that it “applies with e qual f orce to a ll who fall wit hin its t erms throug hout the S tate.” But the trial co urt d id not analyz e whethe r the Di rect Sales P rohibi tion was a gen eral or sp eci al l aw, asserting without any exp lanat ion or a nalysis tha t it was “ beyon d disp ute” that th e Direct Sales Prohib ition wa s a “ genera l law. ” While t he trial co urt’s foc us on Parag raph IV (a) is under standa ble, give n Lucid’ s characteri zati on of its o wn claims, that f ocus may have b een mi sgu ided. Lucid p urport s to cl aim th at the Di rect S ales Proh ibiti on vi olat es Par agrap h IV(a) “ becaus e [the Direct Sal es Proh i bition ] is not a l aw of a gen eral natu re th at h as a

36 unifor m oper ation thro ughout t his sta te. ” But it is clear from Luci d’s complai nt an d its arg umen ts on appeal th at Lucid ’s p rimary c halle nge to the Direc t Sale s Prohibit ion does n ot actua lly arise under this provision. This is beca use Lucid ’s theory of why the Direc t Sales Prohib ition vio lates t his provis ion is tha t the law “ creates … arbitr ary cl assi ficati on s ” — a t heor y tha t, if suc cessf ul, would s how only t hat the Dir ect Sale s Prohib ition is a specia l law. And as expl ain ed a bove, the first prov isi on of Parag raph IV (a) does not ad dress s pe cial l aws: i t places limitat ions o nly on gene ral la ws. Attemptin g to fit its ch all enge t o th e Dire ct S ales Proh ibit ion with in the scope of the fi rst p rov isi on of Parag r aph IV (a), Lucid argues that a l aw that dra ws u nreas onabl e cla ssi ficat ions necess aril y violates Paragraph IV(a)’s pr ohibi tion on gen eral law s that lack uni form appl ication. To support this ar gument, Lucid cites our de cisions in Lasset er, 253 G a. at 227, Celot ex C orp ora tion v. St. Joseph Ho sp ital, 259 Ga. 108 (1989), and Hix v. Ramey, 214 Ga. 464 (195 8). But as our d escri pti on of t he l aw set out above show s, Lucid’ s interp retat ion of Paragr aph IV(a) i s in correc t. And none of the cas es

37 cite d by Lucid su pport that i nte rpret ation. First, in La sseter, which ad dressed Parag raph IV’s pred eces sor in the 1976 Cons titu tion, 18 we conclu ded th at, be caus e the challe nged la w “deal[t] with a limited ac tivity in a spe cific ind ustry during a limited time frame,” it w as a “spe cial law.” Lasset er, 253 Ga. at 22 9. But we did not ho ld that the “ special class [ificatio n]” drawn by the s tatu te rendere d it unc onstit utional und er Paragrap h IV ’s pre deces sor. Id. Instead, w e noted that P aragrap h IV ’s predec essor “d [id] not proh ibit s pecial law s per se ” and con clu ded that the speci al law did n ot viol at e Par agraph IV b ecaus e it w as n ot “preemp ted ” by a g ener al law. Id. at 229 – 30. Fu rther, a lthough Lasset er acknowl edged th at the G en eral A ssembl y lack s author ity to pass a law “if t he clas sifi cati on of th ose af fect ed is un reason able, ” we explai ned tha t the E qual Pro tection Cl ause, not Paragr aph IV ’ s predec essor, pr ohi bited such legislatio n. Id. 18 Ga. Const. of 1 976, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. VII (providing, as relevant h ere, that “[l] aws of a general nature sh all have uniform op eration throughout t he State, and no s pecial law shall be enacted in any case for w hich provision ha s been made by an ex isting gen eral law”).

38 Second, in C elote x, we e xplaine d th at th e law at issue wa s a “speci al l aw” b ecau se i t unr eas onabl y “si ngl e[d] out f or sp eci al treatm ent p rope rty clai ms ag ain st m anu factur ers an d sup pliers o f asbest os.” Celotex, 259 Ga. at 110. But we did not ho ld that the law viol ated Pa ragra ph IV (a) simply because it w as a speci al law th at drew an un reas onable class ifi cati on. In ste ad, we hel d th at the special law v iola ted Pa rag raph I V (a) bec ause th e specia l la w w as “preempt [ed]” by a gener al l aw app licabl e to “ all oth er claim s that mig ht be bas ed u pon othe r haz ardou s or t oxic s ubst ances.” Id. (quot ation m arks omi tted). Third, our decisio n in Hi x did no t hold, as Luc id argue s, that legi slati on aff ordi ng speci al tr eatm ent to s cho ol bu s driv ers wh o had contra cts during certain ye ars viol ated P aragr aph I V’s pred ecesso r becaus e the law rest ed on a “ pur ely ar bitr ary” cl a ssifi cation. Hix, 214 Ga. at 46 6. It is tru e tha t Hix conclud ed that t he law was a “speci al l aw” b eca use i t emp loyed an arbitr ary classi fi cation. Id. But the reas on Hix conclude d that the law wa s uncons titutiona l was no t becaus e it dr ew an arbi tra ry clas sif icati on but inste ad because i t

39 confli cted w ith a general law r ega rdin g sch ool bus drivers. Se e id. a t 46 4– 66 (holding that the cha llenged law was a spe cial l aw “ limited by its expr ess term s to th e bu s dri vers w ho h ad 19 51 – 52 con tra cts,” and th at the l aw was “i nval id for the r eason s urge d,” nam ely th at the la w was “ a s pecial law made i n der ogati on o f exist ing gener al law” p rovid ing that th e “sal ary s chedul e shal l be u niform f or al l bus drivers tran spo rtin g tw elve or more s chool chi ldren ”). Even if Lu cid’s amen ded c ompla in t coul d be cons trued as claiming that t he Dire ct Sale s Pro hibition violates P aragra ph I V(a)’s pro hibitio n on general la ws tha t lack unif ormit y, the cla im fails becaus e, a s a mat ter o f law, th e Direct Sale s Prohibitio n is a gener al law with unif orm operation throu gh out the s tat e. 19 First, the Direct Sales P rohi biti on is a general l aw becau se the clas sificat ions it draws are reas onable an d relev ant to the pu rpose of the legislation 19 As noted above, the portions of OCG A § 10 -1- 664.1(a) a nd (c) that constitute the Direct Sales Prohib ition and that Luci d challenges in this case generally prohibit manufac turers and franchis ors from selling n ew motor vehicles directly to consumer s in the state and prohibit m anufacturers and franchisors from owning, opera ting, or controlling a dealer or dealership. We express no opinion a bout other porti ons of OCGA § 10 - 1-664.1(a) and (c).

40 at issu e. Sp ecifi call y, the cl assif icati ons th at ar e the s ubjec t of OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a) and (c) are “m anufa cturer[s]” a nd “fra nchisor[s].” 20 The Direct Sal es P rohibi tion there fore appl ies to broad cat egori es of entit ies that “are disting uished by charact eris tics su fficien tly mark ed and impo rtan t to m ake them a class by thems elv es,” Sasser, 101 Ga. at 4 56 – 57 (quotati on mark s omitted), in that man ufactu rer s and f ranch iso rs are re adily ident ifiable ent ities tha t play i mportan t r oles i n Georg ia’s new motor vehicle industry. And it is not arbit rary or unreas onabl e to ident ify broa d classes of i mpo rta nt pl ayers in Georgia’s new motor vehicle industr y as the sub ject of legis lation co ncerning who may own a n ew mo tor vehi cle de aler or d ealers hip an d w ho may sell new motor v ehicl es in the sta te to custom ers. Thus, the Dir ect S ales Prohib ition is a “ g eneral ” law, not a “ speci al ” one. Second, as the tri al cou rt corr ectl y concl uded, the Dire ct Sales 20 OCGA § 10 - 1- 664.1(a) also includes a c atchall phrase tha t applies to certain entities or persons aff iliated w ith a manufacturer or franchisor. See OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a) (providing t hat it applies to “any manufacturer or franchisor or a ny parent, affiliate, wholly or partially owned subsidiary, officer, or representative of a manufacturer o r franchisor ” (emph asis added)).

41 Prohib ition operat es u niform ly f or pu rposes of Parag raph IV(a) becaus e it “op erates ali ke on all w ho com e with in the s cope of i ts pro visions. ” Zarate -Martinez, 299 Ga. at 311 (q uotati on mark s omitted). The plain langua ge o f the Direct Sale s Prohibitio n applies to any “ma nufacturer or franchis or” in the state. Specifi cal ly, the challe nged p ortion of OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a) applies equall y to “ any manu factur er or fran chi sor” in the state, prohib iting suc h entities from “o wn[ing], operat [ing], o r cont rol[ling] … more than a 45 percen t in terest i n a de ale r or d ealers hip i n th is state. ” And the challe nged po rtion of OCGA § 10 -1- 66 4.1(c) li kewi se appl ies equally to a ny “manuf actu rer” or “franc hisor” in the s tate, pr ohibit ing such entit ies fro m “ se ll [ing] … any new motor ve hicle to a consume r in this st ate, except through a new mo tor vehicle de aler hold ing a franch ise fo r the li ne mak e coveri ng su ch n ew motor v ehicl e.” A nd Lucid d oes not claim tha t, alt hough the pla in language of t he se pro visions “purport [ ] to” appl y unifor mly to all man ufactu re rs and franch isors, the y fail t o apply to a ll manufa cturer s or franc hisors “in app lication. ” Las seter, 253 Ga. at 229.

42 Because th e Di rect S ales Proh ibi tion is a g eneral l aw wi th unifor m operatio n, Lucid ’s c laim tha t the Dir ect Sale s Pro hibitio n viol ates Parag raph IV(a) ’s requ ir ement th at “[l] aw s of a gene ral nature … have unifor m opera tion thro ughout this state” fails as a matter of law. Ga. C onst. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, P ar. IV (a). Furth er, b ecau se th e Di rect Sal es P rohi bition i s a g ener al l aw, rather than a speci al law, Lucid’s claim that th e Dire ct S ales prohibi tion viol ates P arag raph I V(c) ’s prohib ition on e nact ing any “ specia l law relati ng to th e ri ght s or s tatu s of p rivate pers ons ” lik ewis e fails as a matt er of law. 21 Ga. Const. of 19 83, Art. III, Se c. VI, Par. IV(c) (em phasis added). See Gliemmo, 287 Ga. at 10 (hol din g that, bec ause the chal leng ed l aw was “a g en eral law, it does no t violat e [Para graph IV(c)], which pro hibits specia l laws r elating to the rig hts or sta tu s of p rivat e pers ons” (quot ation mark s om itte d)). 21 To the exte nt that Lucid claims that the Direct Sales Prohibiti on violates Paragrap h IV(a)’s prohi bition o n enacting any “ special law … in any case for which provi sion has been made by an e xisting general law,” that claim fails as a matter of law for the sa me reason: th e Direct Sales Prohi bition is a general law, not a special law. Ga. Con st. of 1983, Art. III, Sec. VI, Par. IV(a) (emphasis added).

43 (c) Lucid argue s that it has stat ed a cl aim u nde r Parag raph IV based on OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1(a) (8), which, as desc ribed above, permits a limi ted cl ass of el ect ric vehi cle man ufac turers who w er e opera ting deale rsh ips i n th e state as of Jan uary 1, 2 015, to s ell t heir vehi cles di rectl y to con sum ers i n Geo rgia without using a fra nchised deale r as an i nterm edia ry. Lucid conte nds that OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a)(8) can o nly ever app ly t o T esla and is theref ore a sp ecial law tha t “arbitr arily distingu ishes betwee n manufact urers a nd their aff iliates (like Lucid) t hat ca nnot se ll cars in Geo rgia and manufa cture rs and their aff iliate s (like Tes la) that ca n.” And Lucid also contend s th at th e 2015 a mendment (Ga. L. 2015, A ct 159), which simult aneo usly cre ated the Dir ect Sale s Prohibitio n and the excepti on fo r Tesl a, w as invalid “spe cial legis latio n.” As expla ined below, the tri al co urt co rrec tly d ismi ssed L ucid’s chal len ge to OCGA § 10 -1- 66 4.1(a)(8) but fai led to ad equat ely cons ide r whet her Lucid had st ated a Par agraph IV cl aim chal leng ing the 2015 amen dmen t. To the exte nt that Luc id cla ims that OCG A § 10 -1- 664.1(a) (8) is a spe cial law that v iolat es P arag raph IV, Lucid lacks

44 cons titutio nal stand ing to raise the cla im. “S tanding is a juri sdicti onal p rer equi site n ec essary to inv oke a cou rt’s j udici al powe r under the Georgia Co nstitut ion.” Co bb Cou nty v. Fl oam, 319 Ga. 89, 91 (2 024) (citin g Ga. C onst. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. I, Par. I). As th e part y seek ing to invo ke a co urt’s juris diction, the plaint iff bear s the b urden of establishing i ts co nstitut ional sta nding as to each cl aim of r eli ef sou ght. See Republi can N ation al C ommit tee v. Etern al Vig ilan ce Act ion, Inc., 321 G a. 771, 77 5 (20 25). To d o so, th e plaint iff must show tha t it has “a cog niz able in jury that c an be redres sed by a j udi cial decisi on. ” Son s of C onf ederat e Vet eran s v. Henry C nty. B d. of Comm ’rs, 315 G a. 39, 39 (2022). And a p laintiff has a “co gnizable injury ” at sta ke in the litiga tion only if the plaint iff “assert [s ] a violation o f [the p laintiff’ s] lega l rights — a lega l injury.” Wasser man v. Frank lin County, 320 Ga. 62 4, 624, 63 8 – 39 & n.8 (202 5) (quotation marks omi tted) (“[W]ith out a righ t at stake, ther e is n o actu al c ontr oversy betw een th e parti es fo r a co urt to resolv e.”). Finally, in the cont ext of a con sti tuti onal ch all enge t o a stat e statu te, lik e the one at i ss ue her e, “ it is gener ally not suff icient to a ssert only

45 the gen eral ized v iolati on of a public right, which is b y de finition no t individ ualized, at least absent a right o f action gr anted b y the legisla ture for vindica ting the public rig ht at issue. ” Id. at 64 3 n.1 0. Here, Lucid ha s not ass erted that enforcem en t of OCGA § 10 - 1- 664.1(a)(8) in parti cular (as op posed to t he D irect S ale s Prohib ition) causes any part icular injury t o its legal r ights by itself. Lucid ge nera lly claims that its right t o engage in t he lawful b usiness of selling new motor ve hicles directl y to c onsu mers has be en viol ated, but it is enfo rcemen t of the Direct Sa les Prohib ition (which pro hibits manuf acture rs and their affilia tes fro m selling new motor vehi cles di rectl y to c onsu mers in the stat e) th at is the sour ce of tha t assert ed legal inj ury. OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a)(8), w hich is an excepti on t o the Direct Sales Pr ohi bition that does n ot apply to Lucid, ha s no imp act on Luc id ’s asser ted righ t to sell new ve hicles direc tly to c onsu mers in the stat e. And Lucid has no t ide ntified any other infringe ment of a n assert ed lega l right o f Lucid’ s that results from enf orcem ent of OCGA § 10 - 1- 664.1 (a)(8) ’s alleg ed uncons titutio nal fea ture. See Wasserman, 320 Ga. at 64 2 – 43

46 (exp laining tha t a pla intiff cannot “ challeng e a st atut e on cons titutio nal ground s unless he c [a n] show th at i ts enfo rcem ent is an infr ingement upon his r ight of pers on or p rop erty, an d that such infringe ment re sults fro m the uncons titutio nal featur e of the stat ute upon whic h he bases his at tack ” (quotati on marks omitted)). Accor dingly, Luc id la cks sta nding to c halleng e the cons titutio nality of OCGA § 10 -1- 6 64.1(a)(8) by itself. 22 Cf. Republi can Nat ’l Comm., 321 Ga. at 7 87 – 88 (hold ing that individua l voters la cked st andin g to challe nge rule s concer ning po ll watc hers and daily report ing of votes, wher e the individual vo ters ha d not shown tha t the “ rules would ever infring e on the right to vote” and “ ident if [ied] no other privat e rig ht th at th ose tw o ru les v iol ate ”). B y contr ast, Lucid ha s const itutional s tanding t o challe nge the enforc emen t of the 2015 amendment to the Motor Vehic le Franc hise Practi ces A ct, Ga. L. 201 5, Act 159. As expl ain ed abov e, that 22 We express no opinion about whether OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a)(8) may be relevant to Lucid’s claims that the Dir ect Sales Prohibi tion violates Lucid’s rights under the Eq ual Protection and Due Process Cl auses, should the tr ial court reach that q uestion after further considering whether Paragraph II(c) bars Lucid’s equal p rotection and due pr ocess claims.

47 amend ment simult aneo usly create d the Direct Sales Prohibit ion (whi ch is t he sou rce o f Lu cid’s ass erted l egal inj ury) b y re defining “[n] ew mot or v ehi cle” and created a carveou t f rom the D ire ct Sal es Prohib ition for T esla. S ee Ga. L. 2015, Act 159, §§ 1 & 2. But t he tria l cou rt did not conside r whet her it was poss ible for Lucid to prove within the framewo rk of the comp laint that the 201 5 amendm ent a s a whol e, or a non - sever able co mponent of it, i s a “s pecial law … f or which pr ovisio n ha [d] been m ade by an exi stin g gen eral law ” (namely by t he th en - existing, unamend ed version of OCGA § 10 -1- 664.1), in violat ion of Para graph IV(a), or a “ special la w rela ting to the rig hts or s tatu s of pri vate p ers ons,” in violat ion of Pa ragrap h IV(c). Accor dingly, alt hough we af firm the tr ial court’s dismissal of Lucid’ s Paragrap h I V clai m to the exten t tha t Lucid d irectly a nd separa tely c hallenged enforc emen t of the Direct S ales Proh ibit ion cod ified in OCGA § 10 -1- 66 4.1 (a) an d (c) an d the ex c eption for Tes la cod ified in OCGA § 10 -1- 664. 1(a) (8), we vac ate t he tri al cou rt’s dism issal of L ucid’s Par agra ph IV clai m to the ex ten t that Lucid

48 challe nged t he enfor cement of th e 2015 amen dme nt (Ga. L. 2015, Act 159). An d we rem and the case for furthe r con side rati on o f Lucid’ s Paragra ph IV challe nge to the enf orcem e nt of t he 20 15 amendm ent. * * * As expl ain ed abo ve, we a ffirm in par t and v acat e in p art the trial cour t’s di sm issal of L uci d’s P arag raph IV clai m. We v acate t he trial c ourt ’s di smi ssal of Lu cid’s d ue pr ocess and equ al pr otec tion claims. And we rem and th e case for fu rther p roce edi ng s consi stent with this opinion. Judgment affirmed in part an d vacated in part, and case remand ed with dire ction. All th e Ju stices concu r, ex cept War ren, P. J., not pa rticipati ng.