Bryan Matthew Pritchett Disbarred by Georgia Supreme Court

In th e Supr eme C ourt o f Georg ia Decided: Febru ary 17, 2026 S2 6Y 0106. IN THE MATTER OF BRYAN MATTH EW PRITCHE TT. P ER C URIAM. Thi s dis ciplin ary matt er is be fore t he C ourt on t he repo rt an d recomm end ation of Spe cial M aster L aRae D ixon Moore, who recomm ends that respon dent B rya n Matth ew Prit chett (State B ar No. 58 8325), wh o was ad mitt ed to th e St ate B ar in 200 1 and is curren tly suspe nded f rom th e pra ctic e of law i n Georg ia, b e disbarred. Because Pritch ett defa ulted in the discip linary proce eding s, he is deem ed t o hav e adm itt ed the fa ctu al alleg ation s and d isciplina ry viola tio ns char ged. He ha s filed no excep tions t o the Speci al Mas ter’s rep ort, and the ti m e has run f or hi m to do s o. S ee Bar Ru le 4 - 2 18. The matter i s no w ri pe fo r our consi derati on. The re cord bef ore us sh ows tha t th e Bar fil ed the first Formal NOTICE: T his opini on is subje ct to mo dificat ion res ultin g from motion s for re consi derat ion unde r Supre me C ourt Rule 27, the Co urt’s r econsid eratio n, and ed itorial revisio ns by th e Report er of Decis ions. Th e versi on of the opinion publis hed in the Advance Sheets fo r the Geo rgia Rep orts, desig nated as the “Final Copy, ” will r eplace a ny prior version on the Court’s websi te and docket. A bound volu me of the Georgi a Reports will con tain the final a nd officia l text of t he opinio n.

2 Compla int on Jun e 28, 20 24, and th e second Formal Co mplaint o n July 25, 2024. Th e Bar cer tifie d tha t it serv ed a c opy of ea ch complai nt on Pr itch ett by em ail, by fi rst - class ma il, and, when Pritc hett d id not resp ond to t he emails, b y publica tion. 1 The Bar then f iled t wo unopp osed motions for d efault, which the Spec ial Master g ran ted, reason in g that P ritch ett di d not file an swers t o either f orm al com plai nt or r eques t exten sion s of time to do s o. See Bar Ru le 4 - 2 12(a). Th e Speci al Master ’s re port foll ow ed. The facts, as a dm itted by Pritch ett, are as f ollow s. Pri tchet t primari ly repres ented in jured w orkers in wo rker’s comp ensa tion cases. In three d iff erent cas es — repre sente d in the d isciplina ry proce eding s by SD B Dock et Nos. 7861, 7 862, and 7863 — Pritc hett receiv ed ch ecks made out t o cli ents, forged cli ent s’ sig natu res i n order to nego tiat e the ch ecks, dep osited th e procee d s of the che ck s into his perso nal or business accounts, use d the proc eeds for his own ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 1 T he physical addre ss that Pritchett pro vided to the Ba r is the address of a UPS st ore, the commercial equiva lent of a P.O. box. See Bar Rul e 4 - 203.1(a) (“The ch oice of a lawyer t o prov ide only a post office box or commerci al equivalent address t o the Membershi p Departme nt of the St ate Bar of Georgi a shall constitute an e lection to waiv e personal ser vice.”).

3 purpos es, and lied or failed to resp ond to (1) client s ’ inq uiries regardi ng the sta tus of th eir recov eri es a nd (2) the Bar’ s requests for infor mat ion and notice s of inve stigat ion. Based on this conduc t, Pritc hett violat ed Rule s 1.1, 2 1.2(a), 3 1.3, 4 1.4(a)(1), 5 1.4(a) (2), 6 ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 2 Rule 1.1 prov ides, in r elevant p art, that “[a] lawyer shall provide competent represen tation to a clie nt.” 3 Rule 1.2(a) prov ides that, ge nerally, “a lawyer shall ab ide by a client’s decisions concernin g the scope an d objectives of repres entation and, as required by Rul e 1.4, sha ll consult with the client a s to th e means by which they are to be purs ued. A lawyer may take such actio n on behalf o f the client as is impliedly auth orized to carry o ut the repres entation.” 4 Rule 1.3 provides that “[a] lawyer shal l act with re asonabl e diligence and promptness in r epresenting a cl ient.” 5 Rule 1.4(a)(1) provides that a lawy er must “promptly infor m the client of any decision or c ircumstance with r espect to which the client’s i nformed consent … is requir ed by these rul es.” 6 Rule 1.4(a)(2) provi des that a lawy er must “reas onably consult with t he client about the m eans by which the cli ent’s obje ctives are to be accomplis hed.”

4 1.4(a)(3), 7 1.4(a)(4), 8 1.4(b), 9 1.5(a), 10 1.15(I)(a), 11 1.1 5(I)(c), 12 ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 7 Rule 1.4(a)(3) provi des that a lawyer m ust “keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the m atter.” 8 Rule 1.4(a)(4) pro vides that a lawye r must “ promptly c omply with reasonable requests for information. ” 9 Rule 1.4(b) pro vides that “[a] lawye r shall expl ain a ma tter t o the extent reasonably necessa ry to permit the client to make i nformed decisions regarding the repre sentation.” 10 Rule 1.5(a) provides that “[a] l awyer sh all not make an a greement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable f ee or an unreasonable amo unt for expenses.” 11 Rule 1.15(I)(a) pro vides that, in relevant p art, that “[a] l awyer shall hold funds or other property of cl ients or third perso ns that are in a lawyer ’ s possession in connec tion with a represen tation separa te from the lawyer ’ s own funds or other property. … Complete records of such accou nt funds and other property shall be k ept by t he lawyer an d shall be pr eserved for a period of six years after terminat ion of the repres entation.” 12 Rule 1.15(I)(c) provides that, “[u]p on receiving fu nds or othe r property in which a client or t hird person h as an i nterest, a lawyer shall pro mptly notif y the client or third person. E xcept as st ated in this rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the cli ent, a lawyer shall prom ptly deliver to the client or third pe rson any funds or other property that the cli ent or third person is entitled to receiv e and, upon req uest by the c lient or t hird person, sha ll promptly render a f ull accounting re garding such property.”

5 1.15(I)(d), 13 1.1 5(II)(a), 14 1.15(II)(b), 15 4.1(a), 16 8.1(a), 17 8.1(b), 18 8.4(a)(4), 19 and 9.3 20 of the Georgia Rules of Prof essiona l Cond uc t found in Bar R ule 4 - 102(d). The Sp ecial M aste r con side red th e appr opria te l evel o f ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 13 Rule 1.15(I)(d) pro vides, in relevant p art, that, “[w]hen in the course of representation a l awyer is in possess ion of funds or other property in which both the lawyer an d a client or a third person clai m interest, the property s hall be kept separate by the lawyer unti l there is an account ing and severanc e of their interests.” 14 Rule 1.15(II)(a) provides that a law yer “who receives money or property on behalf of a client or in any ot her fiduciary capacity[] shall main tain or have availabl e one or more trust accounts as required by the se rules. All funds held by a lawyer for a clien t and all funds he ld by a lawyer in a ny other fiduciary capacity sh all be deposited in a nd administered fro m a trust account.” 15 Rule 1.15(II)(b) provides, in relev ant part, that “[r]ecords on such [] accounts shall be so kept and ma intained as to reflect at a ll times the exact balance held for each client or third person. No funds s hall b e withdrawn from such trust accounts for the person al use of the lawyer maint aining the ac count except earned lawye r’s fees debited agai nst the account of a specific clien t and recorded as such.” 16 Rule 4.1(a) p rovides that, “[i] n the co urse of representin g a client, a lawyer shall not knowingly … make a f alse statem ent of m aterial fact or law to a third person.” 17 Rule 8.1(a) pro vides that “a lawye r … in connection with a di sciplinary matter [] shall not … knowingly make a false s tatement of material fact.” 18 Rule 8.1(b) pro vides that “a lawye r … in connection with a di sciplinary matter [] shall not … knowingly fa il to respon d to a lawful demand f or information from an admissions or disciplinary authority.” 19 Rule 8.4(a)(4) prov ides that “[i]t shall be a vi olation of the Georgia Rules of Professiona l Conduct for a law yer to … eng age in professiona l conduct involving dishonest y, fraud, deceit, or misrepres entation.” 20 Rule 9.3 provides th at, “[d]uring the i nvestigati on of a matte r pursuant to these Rules, the lawyer co mplained against shall res pond to discip linary authorities in accor dance with St ate Bar Rules.”

6 discip line f or these ad mitted fac ts. In doing so, t he Sp ecial Mas ter looked t o the A merican Bar A ssoci ati on Stan dar ds for I mposi ng Lawy er San ction s (“AB A S tanda rds”). In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652 (19 96). See also A BA Stand ard 3.0 (when imp osing a sancti on, a cou rt sh oul d con sider the du ty v iolat ed, the lawy er’s mental stat e, th e po tenti al or ac tual in jury c aused by the lawy er’s miscon duct, and the ex ist ence of ag gravati ng o r mit ig ating factor s). Under th ose s tan dards, the Speci al Master n oted th at disbarm ent is general ly ap prop riate wh en: (1) a law yer know ing ly con verts a client ’ s proper ty an d cause s in jury or poten tial i nju ry to a cl ient, s ee ABA Standard 4.11; (2) a l awy er k nowi ngl y fai ls to per form s ervi ces for a cli ent an d causes seri ous or poten tial ly ser ious injur y to a clien t, se e ABA Standa rd 4. 41; (3) a law yer kno win gly decei ves a clien t wi th the i ntent t o bene fit th e law yer or an ot her, an d cau ses ser ious injur y or po tentia lly ser ious injur y to a client, see AB A Standa rd 4. 61, or en gages in crim inal or o ther cond uct t hat h as an elemen t of, or i nvol ves, di shon esty, f rau d, d eceit, or misrep resen tatio n th at adv ersel y refl ects on th e law yer’s fitn ess to

7 practi ce, s ee A BA Stan dard 5.1 1; o r (4) a l awye r kn owi ngl y vi olates a duty ow ed as a profess ion al w ith th e i nten t t o obt ain a b enefit for the law yer or a noth er, an d c aus es seri ous or poten tiall y seri ou s inj ury to a cli ent, the publ ic, or th e l egal sy stem, see ABA Standar d 7.1. Applying t hose stand ards to the fa cts here, the S pecial Ma ster firs t note d that Prit che tt’s most serio us viola tions inv olved hi s secr etly rece iving a nd convert ing to his own us e tens of thousa nds of dol lars by f orgi ng clien ts’ si gnatu res on ch eck s mad e out s olely to them. S econd, the S peci al Ma ster ex plain ed that P ritch ett disreg ard ed his du ty to p ass al ong to cl ients thei r rec overi es, conver ted t he funds to his o wn use, and hid the t ruth fr om the m in his re sponse s to their inq uirie s. Third, the Spe cial Maste r n oted that Pritch ett r epeat edl y dec eiv ed his clients about t he status of their recove ries to con ceal h is m iscon duc t and that he engag ed in c onduct that am oun ted to c rimi nal conversi on an d forge ry. F ourth, t he Speci al Mast er s tat ed th at Prit chett disreg ard ed h is du ty not to collec t an unrea s onable fee from cl ien ts for h is own ben efi t an d his

8 duty t o coop erate a nd comm unicate trut hfully a nd comp letely with the Bar. The Sp ecial M aster then turne d to the aggrav ati ng an d mitiga ting fa ctors in Pritc hett’ s case. The S pecia l Master identif ied ten agg ravati ng f actors: (1) dish on est or s elfi sh m otive; (2) a pat tern of misc onduc t; (3) multiple offe nses; (4) ba d fait h obstructio n of the discip linar y proce eding 21; (5) subm is sion o f fal se s tat ements duri n g the di scipl inary pro cess; (6) refus al to ack nowl edg e the w rong ful natur e of his conduc t; (7) vulnerab ility of victims; (8) sub stant ial experi ence in t he pr acti ce o f l aw; (9) indiff erence to making restitu ti on; and (10) il legal condu ct. S ee A BA Stan dard s 9. 22(b) - (k). In con trast, th e Special Mas ter d et ermin ed that the so le mitiga ting fact or wa s Pritch ett ’s la ck of a pri or dis cipl in ary reco rd. S ee ABA Standa rd 9.32(a). T he Speci al Mas ter concl ude d that the ten aggrav atin g fac tors overwhe lmingly o utweig hed the single mitiga ting fa ctor. ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 21 We do not consider this cond uct as a factor in aggrava tion, as Pritche tt was also charged wi th a violation of R ule 9.3 for similar co nduct. See, e.g., In the Matter of Har dy, 316 Ga. 845, 852 n.16 (20 23).

9 Accordi ng ly, th e Sp ecial Mas ter conclude d that disbarm ent was th e only approp riat e penal ty. S ee In the M atter of Faga n, 3 1 4 Ga. 208, 21 3 (2022) (dis barrin g law yer wh o admi tted vi olati ons of Rul es 1.7, 1. 8(b), 1.1 5(I), 8.4(a)(4) an d 9. 3 bas ed on us e of p osi tion a s in - house cou nsel to defrau d an d swi ndl e clien t out of subs tant ial sum of mone y); In the Matter of Cheatham, 30 4 Ga. 645, 646 (2 018) (disba rrin g law yer wh o admi tted v iolat ions of R ul es 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(I)(a) and (c), 1.15 (II) (a) an d (b), 5. 5(a), and 8. 4(a)(4) based on conve rsion of clien t fun ds t o ow n us e and fail ure t o r espond t o discip linar y autho rit ies); In the Matt er of Sni pes, 303 Ga. 800, 801 (2018) (disb arri ng l awyer w ho ad mitted v iolat ions of Ru les 1.2, 1.3, 1.5, 1.15(I), 8.4(a)(4), and 9.3 bas ed on sett lemen t of case w ithou t clien t’s kn owledg e, c onvers ion o f fu nds to ow n u se, and fai lu re to respon d to di s ciplinary a uthorit ies); In the Matter of Mathis, 297 Ga. 867, 868 (2015) (d isbar ring lawy er wh o a dmitt ed vi ol ations of Rul es 1.3, 1. 4, 1.1 5(I), 1.1 5(II)(a) an d (b), 8.4(a)(4), an d 9. 3 based on conve rsion of clien t fun ds t o ow n us e and fail ure t o r espond t o discip linar y author itie s); In the Matte r of Jo nes, 296 Ga. 151, 152

10 (2014) (disb arri ng l awyer w ho ad mitted v iolat ions of Ru les 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(I), 1. 15(II), 8.4 (a)(4), and 9.3 bas ed on h is abs condi ng w ith client funds and failur e to re spond to disciplina ry a uthorit ies). Havi ng revi ewed the re cord, w e a gree th at dis bar ment i s the approp riat e san cti on, and that dis barm ent i s con si stent w ith p rio r cases i n wh ich a n atto rney admi tted t o violat ing simila r pro visions of the G e orgia R ules of Profes si onal Con duct that carry disb armen t as a sanct ion and f ailed to pa rticip ate f ully in the discip linar y proces s. 22 If Pritche tt ever seek s re admi ssion, he mu st mak e restituti on in the tot al amou nt of $159, 615, cons ist ing of $25,0 00 to the cli ent in S DB D ocket N o. 7861, $29, 715 to th e cli ent i n SD B Docke t No. 7 862, and $1 04,9 00 to t he cl ient i n D ocket N o. 786 3, and Pritc hett must off er to the Cou rt pro of of that resti tut ion. See In the ————————— ——————— —————— ————— ——————— —— 22 We have some reservations about w hether the facts of this case amount to a violation of Rule 1.1, which states that “[a] law yer shall provide competent represent ation to a clien t.” But we need not reach t hat issue because Pritchett clearly vio lated Rules 1. 2(a), 1.3, 1.1 5(I) – (II), 4. 1(a), 8.1(a) – (b), and 8.4(a)(4), all of whi ch carry the same maximum pen alty of disbar ment. See generally In the Matter of Morris, 3 02 Ga. 862, 86 4 n.3 (2018) (declining t o reach question of whether attor ney violated Rule 8. 4(a)(3) because he cle arly violated several other Rules for which disbar ment was an appro priate sanction).

11 Matter of Herbe rt, 31 9 Ga. 881, 88 4 (202 4) (di sbar rin g atto rney and impos ing the manda tory require ment that he “ pay restit utio n to the griev ants i n the amoun ts of their loss es as s et out i n the Notic es of Discip line” s hould he see k reinst atem ent). Accordi ngly, i t is h ereby order ed tha t the name of B ryan Matth ew P ritch ett be remov ed from the rol ls of pe rs ons aut hori zed to p racti ce l aw i n th e Sta te o f Georgi a. Pritchett is remi nded of h is duties purs uant to Ba r Rule 4 - 219(b). Disba rred. Al l th e Ju stic es con cur.