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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Adoption of: T.R.S., Appeal of: S.L.N.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1022 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

J-S01005-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF: T.R.S., A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: S.L.N., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1022 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 30, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Orphans' Court at No(s):
41 in Adoption 2025

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 13, 2026

S.L.N. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree terminating involuntarily her

parental rights to T.R.S., born in February 2025. Mother’s counsel, Patrick W.

Kelley, Esquire, has filed an application to withdraw and brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), and In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 1992)

(extending Anders procedures to parental termination cases). We affirm the

decree and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

The orphans’ court detailed in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion Mother’s

extensive history with the Erie County Office of Children and Youth (“OCY”),

which eventually led to the termination sub judice. Briefly, T.R.S. is the

youngest of Mother’s nine children. OCY first became involved with Mother in

---

• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01005-26

1. At that time, only the two oldest children had been born. OCY secured

their removal and they were adjudicated dependent “due to concerns of

physical abuse, substance [abuse], inadequate health care needs, inadequate

basic needs and lack of supervision.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/3/25, at 1.

Their dependency matters closed in 2014, with the court granting a permanent

legal custodianship arrangement for each child.

Between 2016 and 2023, before T.R.S. was born, Mother gave birth to

six more children. OCY reopened services with Mother in 2023 after the

umbilical cord for the youngest child tested positive for amphetamines,

methamphetamines, and cocaine. That child subsequently died at Mother’s

home. The other five children were removed by emergency protective order

in February 2024. As part of that process, they were examined and the two

surviving youngest, ages one and two, tested positive for cocaine metabolites.

As a result, Mother was criminally charged. Meanwhile, she became pregnant

with T.R.S. In December 2024, Mother’s parental rights as to all five children

were terminated involuntarily,1 and in January 2025, she pled nolo contendere

to one count of endangering the welfare of children and was sentenced to a

term of eleven to twenty-three months of incarceration.

The orphans’ court explained T.R.S.’s particular history in the following

manner:

---

1 This Court affirmed the decrees terminating Mother’s parental rights as to

those children. See Matter of Adoption of S.E.N., ___ A.3d ___, 2025 WL
2964310 (Pa.Super. 2025) (non-precedential decision).

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J-S01005-26

T.R.S. was removed from Mother’s care by [emergency protective
order] shortly after his birth, due to Mother’s incarceration;[2]
significant safety concerns with Mother’s ability to care for T.R.S.
due to Mother being an indicated perpetrator of abuse for failure
to supervise the children; lack of progress with her treatment
plan; and involuntary termination of [five of her] children in
December of 2024.

On March 3, 2025, [OCY] filed a dependency petition alleging
T.R.S. was without proper parental care or control in the care of
Mother. The petition included a motion for a finding of aggravated
circumstances relating to Mother due to the involuntar[]y
termination of her parental rights to T.R.S.’s siblings.

The adjudication hearing was held in front of the hearing officer
on March 11, 2025. Mother was not present[.] However,
[Attorney Kelley] was present and proceeded on her behalf, [OCY]
was represented by Attorney Amy Jones (“Attorney Jones”)[,] and
Attorney Michelle Alaskey (“Attorney Alaskey”) was guardian ad
litem (“GAL”) for T.R.S. T.R.S. was adjudicated dependent and
[OCY’s] motion for aggravated circumstances was granted.

The dispositional hearing was held on March 25, 2025. Mother
was present and represented by Attorney Kelley. [OCY] was
represented by Attorney Jones[,] and Attorney Alaskey was
present on behalf of T.R.S. At the conclusion of the dispositional
hearing the Juvenile Court held that [OCY] was not obligated to
make reasonable efforts to provide Mother with services and a
permanency goal of adoption was in T.R.S.’s best interest.

On April 23, 2025, [OCY] filed an [involuntary termination of
parental rights petition] pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and
(b). The trial on the [termination] petition was held on June 20,
2025. Mother was present and represented by Attorney Kelley.
[OCY] was represented by Attorney Jones, and Attorney Alaskey
was present as legal counsel for T.R.S. [because the court
determined that T.R.S.’s legal and best interests merged due to
his age]. . . . At the trial [OCY] presented testimony of ongoing
caseworker, Carrie Bielak (“Ms. Bielak”). Attorney Kelley

---

2 J.S. (“Father”) was also incarcerated at that time. Although the court
terminated Father’s rights involuntarily at the same time as Mother’s, his case
is not part of the instant appeal.

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J-S01005-26

presented the testimony of Colleen Flatley (“Ms. Flatley”) . . . and
Mother.

Ms. Bielak testified that she is the ongoing caseworker for T.R.S.
and his siblings. Ms. Bielak testified to Mother’s history with the
agency regarding her eight other children as set forth above . . . .
Ms. Bielak further testified that despite [OCY]’s assistance on
multiple occasions and involvement with numerous service
providers over the last sixteen years, Mother has never been able
to demonstrate that she can safely parent. Additionally, Ms.
Bielak testified that throughout the dependency proceedings for
the T.R.S.’s siblings, Mother blamed everyone else for the removal
of the children from her home and never took accountability for
anything; including her substance use. In fact, the day before her
July 6, 2024 arrest, while pregnant with T.R.S., Mother tested
positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine[,] and suboxone.

Finally, Ms. Bielak testified that T.R.S. has been placed in a pre-
adoptive foster home with his siblings since his removal. Ms.
Bielak opined that since T.R.S. is in the only home he has ever
know[n] with his siblings, and does not know Mother, the
termination of her parental rights would be in his best interest.

Ms. Flatley testified that she is employed as a case manager at
the Mercy Center for Women (“Mercy Center”). She described the
Mercy Center as a structured residential facility for women
experiencing homelessness. Ms. Flatley testified Mother came to
reside at the Mercy Center on May 28, 2025, [upon being released
on parole,] and has been compliant with the program so far.
When asked about Mother’s past substance use, Ms. Flatley
testified that she believed Mother had disclosed prior substance
abuse on her application, but was unfamiliar with her day[-]to[-
]day treatment goals, such as obtaining housing.

Mother testified that after she was released from incarceration she
began residing at the Mercy Center. Mother stated she will
remain on parole for the next three years and is participating in
programing at the Mercy Center. Mother described participating
in programs . . . for her mental health; however, due to her recent
arrival at the Mercy Center . . ., her participation in any
programming was limited.

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J-S01005-26

Id. at 3-6 (citations, quotation marks, and parenthetical numbers omitted,

some capitalization and citations altered). Attorney Alaskey echoed Ms.

Bielak’s opinion that termination was in T.R.S.’s best interests.3 The orphans’

court found that OCY had met its burden and therefore granted the petition to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights.

Mother timely filed pro se a notice of appeal to this Court. In response

to this Court’s directive to file a concise statement of issues raised on appeal,

Attorney Kelley indicated his intent to submit an Anders brief. As noted, the

orphans’ court authored a Rule 1925(a) opinion in support of affirmance.

Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we must first address

counsel’s request to withdraw, which we review using the following legal

principles:

To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must comply with the
following requirements:

1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that,
after making a conscientious examination of the
record, counsel has determined that the appeal would
be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy of the Anders brief to
the appellant; and 3) advise the appellant that he or
she has the right to retain private counsel or raise
additional arguments that the appellant deems worthy
of the court’s attention.

---

3 Attorney Alaskey maintains this opinion on appeal. Although she chose not
to submit a brief, she sent a letter agreeing with both Attorney Kelley that the
appeal is frivolous and with the reasoning of the orphans’ court in terminating
Mother’s parental rights. See Letter, 12/5/25. OCY likewise concurred with
Attorney Kelley and relied upon the orphans’ court opinion in lieu of filing its
own brief. See Letter, 12/4/25.

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J-S01005-26

Counsel must provide this Court with a copy of the letter advising
the appellant of his or her rights.

Additionally, our Supreme Court has set forth the following
requirements for Anders briefs:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and
facts, with citations to the record;

(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel
believes arguably supports the appeal;

(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
frivolous; and

(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the
relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or
statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that
the appeal is frivolous.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d 658, 661 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

Mother has not responded to counsel’s application to withdraw or

Anders brief. Upon review of counsel’s filings, we are satisfied that counsel

has substantially complied with the aforementioned requirements.4 Thus, we

now turn to the merits of the claims outlined in the brief, and then “we must

conduct an independent review of the record to discern if there are any

additional, non-frivolous issues overlooked by counsel.” Id. at 662 (cleaned

up). In the Anders brief, counsel has identified two potential questions for

our consideration:

---

4 We note that Attorney Kelley incorrectly advised Mother that, in addition to

hiring new counsel or proceeding pro se, she also had the option to ask for
new court-appointed counsel. Since Mother has not detrimentally relied upon
that incorrect advice, we decline to send the matter back to counsel simply to
remove that statement.

-6-
J-S01005-26

1. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
   of law when it concluded that the agency established sufficient
   grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511?

2. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
   of law when it concluded that termination of [Mother]’s
   parental rights was in [T.R.S.’s] best interests under
   [§] 2511(b)?

Anders brief at 8 (cleaned up).

As these issues attack the termination petition, we consider them

mindful of the following:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re Adoption of B.G.S., 240 A.3d at 662 (cleaned up).

Involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511, which sets forth the requisite two-part analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs
and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the
child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between

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J-S01005-26

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.

Id. at 663 (cleaned up).

Here, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide for termination where:

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.

....

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

We have elaborated upon § 2511(a)(2) in this way:

The grounds for termination of parental rights under
[§] 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct.

Unlike §(1), §(2) does not emphasize a parent’s refusal
or failure to perform parental duties, but instead emphasizes the
child’s present and future need for essential parental care, control
or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.
Therefore, the language in §(2) should not be read to compel
courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong,

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J-S01005-26

continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint in state
intervention is intended to protect. This is particularly so
where disruption of the family has already occurred and
there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting it.

Thus, while sincere efforts to perform parental duties . . . can
preserve parental rights under §(1), those same efforts may
be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under §(2).
Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. A
parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of
uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of
services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117–18 (Pa.Super. 2010) (cleaned up, emphasis

in original).

In the matter sub judice, the orphans’ court determined that OCY had

demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that termination was

warranted, explaining its findings thusly:

Mother’s contact with [OCY] began in 2010[,] when her two oldest
children were removed from her care and adjudicated dependent
due to concerns of physical abuse, substance [abuse], inadequate
health care needs, inadequate basic needs and lack of supervision.
That case was closed in 2014 with [permanent legal
custodianship]. T.R.S.’s other five siblings came into care in
February 2024, for similar reasons. Mother was set up with
service providers and given a treatment plan, however, just as in
the 2010 case, she was unable to alleviate the circumstances that
led to the children’s dependency. The record repeatedly reflects
that Mother has historically been unable to alleviate the
circumstances that led [to] the removal of T.R.S.’s seven siblings
from her care because she refused to acknowledge them.

Despite having the siblings removed from her care with a
permanency goal of reunification and agency assistance, Mother
continued to use controlled substances while pregnant with T.R.S.
Fortunately, due to Mother’s arrest and incarceration, T.R.S. was
not born drug dependent. However, he was born while his Mother
was incarcerated for endangering the welfare of his siblings.

-9-
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Ultimately T.R.S.’s permanency cannot be put on hold in the hopes
that now that Mother is back in the community she will somehow
be able to recognize and remedy circumstances that have
repeatedly placed her children’s safety, mental health, and well-
being at risk.

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/3/25, at 8-9 (cleaned up).

Attorney Kelley determined that any challenge to the court’s decision

regarding § 2511(a)(2) or (b) would be wholly frivolous. Specifically:

[T]here was no opportunity for Mother to participate in court-
ordered services, and there is no record of her obtaining
reunification services on her own other than finding housing. As
the [orphans’] court noted in its opinion, . . . Mother’s child welfare
history is extensive. Since there was no real mechanism by which
Mother could demonstrate the likelihood that she could overcome
the conditions that led to [T.R.S.’s] placement, she was left with
the unenviable and legally unsupportable argument that she was
entitled to more time to prove herself. Based upon these facts,
termination was legally appropriate and this appeal is without
merit.

....

[Furthermore,] as a practical matter, based upon these facts, any
party would be hard pressed to determine that a bond existed
between Mother and [T.R.S]. However[,] the child is [with] a
permanent resource, and no evidence was presented to indicate
that severance of a parental bond would negatively affect the
child.

Anders brief at 17-18, 20 (cleaned up).

Our review mirrors that of counsel and the record bears out the

conclusions of the orphans’ court. It is plain that OCY adduced sufficient

evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights as to T.R.S.

pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b). Satisfied that the issues identified in the

Anders brief are devoid of merit, we note that our independent review of the

• 10 - J-S01005-26

record has revealed nothing else potentially worthy of appellate review that

counsel failed to detect. Accordingly, we affirm the decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights as to T.R.S. and grant counsel’s application to

withdraw.

Decree affirmed. Application of Patrick W. Kelley, Esquire, to withdraw

as counsel granted.

DATE: 3/13/2026

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