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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Int. of: K.B., Appeal of: R.B.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1976 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Stabile

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.6K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Victor P. Stabile](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8247/victor-p-stabile/)

J-S39014-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: R.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1976 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered June 25, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Civil Division at No: CP-64-DP-0000004-2024

IN THE INTEREST OF: K.B., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: R.B., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1977 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered June 25, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County
Civil Division at No: 2025-00012

BEFORE: STABILE, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2026

R.B. (Father) appeals from the June 25, 2025, decree involuntarily

terminating his parental rights to his biological son, K.B., born April 2018

(“Child”). Father also appeals from the order entered the same day, changing

K.B.’s permanency goal to adoption. Upon review, we affirm the termination

decree and dismiss Father’s appeal from the goal change order as moot.
J-S39014-25

We glean the factual and procedural history of the above-captioned

matters from the certified record. Wayne County Children and Youth Services

(“CYS”) has history with this family dating back to 2017. On December 14,

2023, a warrant was executed on T.D. (Mother) and Father’s home based on

suspected drug trafficking. See Petition for Dependency, 3/8/24. Father was

arrested and charged with possession with intent to deliver. Id. Mother

admitted to using drugs and tested positive for methamphetamines, fentanyl,

and THC. Id. An in-home safety plan was established by CYS and removed

shortly thereafter because Mother started to cooperate with CYS and had a

negative drug screen. Id. Father was then released from jail. Id.

Approximately one month later, Mother and Father were charged with

harboring a fugitive and possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. Father was

again arrested.1 Id. At that time, a second in-home safety plan was

established by CYS. Id. On February 21, 2024, CYS determined that the in-

home safety plan was no longer feasible as Mother tested positive for

methamphetamines and amphetamines. Id. As a result, Mother signed a 30-

day voluntary placement agreement. Id. On March 8, 2024, CYS filed a

petition for dependency noting that Father was incarcerated and that it was

not safe for K.B. to return to Mother’s care as CYS had concerns with Mother’s

lack of cooperation, substance abuse, mental health, parenting skills, and

---

1 Father pleaded guilty to harboring a fugitive and possession with intent to

deliver and was sentenced on May 9, 2024, to an aggregate 12 to 36 months
imprisonment and 18 months concurrent probation. See CP-64-CR-33-2024
and CP-64-CR-387-2023.

-2-
J-S39014-25

housing stability. Id. On March 12, 2024, CYS was awarded protective

custody of K.B., and, at a shelter care hearing, the court determined K.B.

should remain in the care and custody of the agency.

K.B. was adjudicated dependent on March 26, 2024, and placed in foster

care, where he remained during the pendency of these proceedings. On May

16, 2025, CYS filed a petition to involuntarily terminate Father’s parental

rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) and (b). 2 The court held a

termination hearing on June 17, 2025, wherein CYS presented the testimony

of CYS caseworker Michael Murolo.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under

advisement and ultimately entered a decree involuntarily terminating Father’s

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). This

timely appeal followed.3 Both Father and the court have complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Father raises the following issues for our review, renumbered

for ease of disposition:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an error of law when it found that sufficient grounds existed for [the] termination of [Father’s] parental rights in this child, and when the trial court failed to primarily consider the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare, thus

---

2 John J. Martin, II, Esquire, was appointed as both legal counsel and guardian

ad litem for K.D. See Order, 5/20/25. The trial court determined that there
was no conflict between the child’s best interests and the child’s legal
interests. Id.

3 Mother also appealed the termination of her parental rights. Her appeals are
separately pending before this Court.

-3-
J-S39014-25

contravening sections 2511(a) and 2511(b) of the Adoption
Act[.]

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law in determining
   that the termination of parental rights of [Father] would serve
   the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
   of the minor child.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
   error of law when it found that the child’s permanent placement
   goal of reunification was neither appropriate, nor feasible and
   ordered goal changes to adoption, thus contravening sections
   6351(f) of the Juvenile Act . . . when the parent had exhibited
   compliance with the permanency plan having attended nearly
   all visits and participated in or completed nearly all
   recommended services that were available to him and the trial
   court failed to fully consider the bond between the parent and
   child.

Father’s Brief, at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions

-4-
J-S39014-25

concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
support. Termination of parental rights has significant and
permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated

analysis:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interest
of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

“We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to

determine whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent

evidence.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 383 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc),

appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004) (citing In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197,

1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)).

-5-
J-S39014-25

Here, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to

Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the trial

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b),

to affirm. Id. at 384. We begin our analysis with Section 2511(a)(8), which

states:

The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or
under a voluntary agreement with the agency, 12 months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led
to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8). Stated another way, to satisfy Section 2511(a)(8),

the petitioner must prove that: (1) the child has been removed from the

parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the conditions which led to the

removal or placement still exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would

best serve the needs and welfare of the child. In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177

A.3d 937, 943 (Pa. Super. 2018).

“Termination under subsection 2511(a)(8) does not require an

evaluation of a parent’s willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led

to placement of his or her children.” Id. Rather, the relevant inquiry is

focused upon whether the at-issue conditions have been “remedied” such that

“reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of the hearing.”

In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009) (emphasis added). Additionally,

the Adoption Act prohibits the court from considering, as part of the §

-6-
J-S39014-25

2511(a)(8) analysis, any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions that

began after the filing of the termination petition. M.E., 283 A.3d at 832.

Although Section 2511(a) generally focuses on the behavior of the

parent, the third prong of Subsection 2511(a)(8) specifically “accounts for the

needs of the child.” Id. “This Court has recognized that application of §

2511(a)(8) may seem harsh when the parent has begun to make progress

toward resolving the problems that had led to the removal of her children.”

Id. (citing In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006))

(quotation marks and brackets omitted). However,

by allowing for termination when the conditions that led to
removal of a child continue to exist after a year, the statute
implicitly recognizes that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will
not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence
and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for
the future. Indeed, we work under statutory and case law that
contemplates only a short period of time, to wit [eighteen]
months, in which to complete the process of either reunification
or adoption for a child who has been placed in foster care.

Id. (emphasis added).

Father contends that CYS failed to prove by clear and convincing

evidence that his conduct warranted termination under Subsection

2511(a)(8). Although he concedes that Child has been in placement for 12

months, he argues that the remaining two prongs were not met:

[Father] would posit that he has resolved the major issues which
led to the separation while making great strides toward removing
the factors [which led to Child’s placement]. As for the bond issue
he has maintained that bond with [Child]. Over the past months

-7-
J-S39014-25

the priority of that relationship [has] become a motivating force
for [Father] to toe the line.

---

The court also failed to properly weigh the evidence of [Father’s]
progress toward alleviating the circumstances underlying the
child’s dependency.

Father’s Brief, at 27-28.

The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that the conditions

which led to K.B.’s removal continue to exist. The child was removed because

(1) the police raided Mother and Father’s home as part of a drug investigation;

(2) Mother’s admission to drug use and positive drug screens; (3) Mother and

Father’s lack of cooperation with CYS; (4) Father’s incarceration; and (5) lack

of stable housing.

Father was incarcerated for most of the dependency proceedings and

was released from incarceration on February 23, 2025. Id. at 23. While

incarcerated, Father completed a drug and alcohol program, as well as a

parenting class. Id. at 41. Upon his release, Father successfully completed

a 30-day in-patient rehabilitation program at Endless Mountain In-Patient

Rehabilitation Center. Id. at 24. Father attended Pennsylvania Treatment

and Health (“PATH”) weekly in Honesdale and was compliant with drug

screens. Id. He only tested positive for his prescription medication

(buprenorphine). Id. As of June 16, 2025, Father obtained full-time

employment with Sunoco gas station and provided his work schedule to his

caseworker. Id. at 25.

-8-
J-S39014-25

At the time of the termination hearing, Father resided in a trailer park

with Mother and a friend of theirs.4 Id. Prior to Father’s release, CYS informed

Mother that for their current residence to be considered a home for K.B., the

friend with whom they resided would have to be present for home visits,

undergo a background check, complete drug screens, and they would need to

purchase a bed for K.B. Id. at 20. None of those occurred because the friend

was unwilling to cooperate with CYS. Id. Additionally, there were structural

concerns with the home, and CYS was aware of frequent drug use within the

home. Id. As a result, CYS had additional concerns with Father maintaining

his sobriety while living there with Mother, who continued to test positive for

substances. Id.

Moreover, CYS was concerned about K.B.’s safety if Father continued to

live with Mother because there was prior abuse allegations made against

Father.5 Id. On more than one occasion, during a Zoom visit while Father

was incarcerated, K.B. pleaded with Father not to hit Mother when he

mentioned coming home from prison. Id. The last such statement was in

November of 2024. Id.

---

4 Father did not ask CYS for housing assistance because of his prior eviction.

N.T., 6/17/25, at 44.

5 There was no further information on these past allegations in the certified

record.

-9-
J-S39014-25

While we acknowledge that Father has taken steps to resolve the issues

that led to K.B.’s placement, we are prohibited from considering any

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions which led to placement. See

J.N.M., 177 A.3d at 943. Nor are we permitted to consider any efforts by the

parent to remedy the conditions that began after the filing of the termination

petition. See M.E., 283 A.3d at 832. Father did not remedy the issues which

led to Child’s placement such that reunification of Father and K.B. was

imminent at the time of the termination hearing. See I.J., supra. Therefore,

we find that the conditions which led to K.B.’s removal continue to exist.

Father resided in a friend’s home with Mother, who continued to test positive

for substances, where other drug users were known to frequent, and would

challenge his sobriety. The home was not safe for K.B. to return to.

Accordingly, we find the second prong of subsection 2511(a)(8) is satisfied.

We next consider whether the record supports the court’s conclusion

that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father’s rights

pursuant to the third prong of § 2511(a)(8) and § 2511(b). See In re

Adoption of G.W., 342 A.3d 68, 89 n.20 (Pa. Super. 2025) (en banc)

(explaining that courts regularly conduct the needs and welfare analyses

required by both the third prong of § 2511(a)(8) and § 2511(b) together using

the same evidence).

Father argues that the court abused its discretion by determining that

termination of his rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

• 10 - J-S39014-25

emotional needs and welfare of K.B. See Father’s Brief, at 30. He contends

that CYS “has shown that there is a healthy bond between [Father and K.B.

and] the record is devoid of evidence of how terminating this child’s link to his

birth parents would benefit the child.” Id. at 32.

Section 2511(b) provides:

The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and

welfare’ requires consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent

and child. The ‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on

the child of permanently severing the parental bond.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d

251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).

Our Supreme Court has explained, however, that “the parental bond is

but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a

determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,

i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical

and emotional needs and welfare.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113

(Pa. 2023). The needs and welfare analysis must also include the

consideration of factors such as: “the child’s need for permanency and length

of time in foster care . . .; whether the child is in a preadoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

• 11 - J-S39014-25

developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of

love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (citations omitted).

Importantly, “courts have the discretion to place appropriate weight on each

factor present in the record before making a decision regarding termination

that best serves the child’s specific needs.” Id.

With respect to its needs and welfare analysis in the instant case, the

court explained:

While Father has been more successful in maintaining his sobriety,
Father has struggled to obtain employment and, as of the time of
the termination hearing, was living with Mother in a residence
where there is suspected drug use. There are past domestic
violence allegations between Father and Mother. The minor child
even ordered Father not to hit Mother during a Zoom visit. Such
instability can only negatively impact the minor child’s
developmental needs, which are currently being met by the minor
child’s permanency resource, [W.J.] Additionally, Mother and
Father have demonstrated an inability to meet the child’s physical
needs, as they continue to live in a residence which is unsafe for
the minor and poses a threat to their own sobriety. The minor
child’s physical needs are met by residing with his placement
resource.

Termination of parental rights best serves the minor child’s
emotional needs and welfare. The minor child is cared for, loved,
and supported by [W.J.], who also promises the minor child
continued safety and security. The minor child and [W.J.] are
bonded. The minor child is the only child in [W.J.]’s home. The
minor child calls [W.J.] “Grandma.” [W.J.] has expressed that,
out of all the children she has cared for, [K.B.] is her favorite, and
even her family loves [him]. [W.J.] has expressed a desire to
serve as a permanent resource for the minor child.

Mother and Father cannot offer the minor child this same degree
of love, support, security, and safety. This is illustrated by the
minor child’s needs to express concerns that Father would
potentially assault Mother. Mother’s lack of concern in and
responsibility toward becoming sober, and Father’s lack of concern

• 12 - J-S39014-25

in defending his sobriety against potential triggers also bode ill in
their capacity for providing the minor child with emotional care
and support the minor child needs.

While the court finds that there is a bond between [K.B.] and
Mother and Father, the court finds that these bonds are not
beneficial to the minor child. The bond between the minor child
and [W.J.] is suited to meet the minor child’s developmental,
physical and emotional needs. Ultimately, the potential trauma
caused by breaking these bonds is outweighed by the benefit of
moving the minor child toward a permanent home.

Supplemental Trial Court Opinion, 1/21/26 at 2-3.

The record supports the court’s determination. While incarcerated,

Father attended 46 of 57 visits offered. N.T. Hearing, 6/17/25, at 10. Most

of the visits he missed were due to technical or scheduling difficulties with the

prison. Initially, Father did not contact CYS upon his release from in-patient

rehabilitation to set up visits. Once the visits were scheduled, Father attended

12 of 15 visits. The ones he missed were due to illness or failure to respond

to the agency. Id. at 10-11. Father was always attentive during the visits

and communicated with K.B. about age-appropriate topics.

Although Father and K.B. have a bond, Father cannot provide K.B. with

the safety and security that he deserves. Father refused to put Child’s needs

ahead of Mother’s and his own needs by choosing to reside with Mother, while

Mother showed minimal efforts to address her substance abuse and mental

health issues. At the time of the termination hearing, Father was not

independent enough to care for Child and reunification was not imminent. The

court was unable to return Child to Father after terminating Mother’s parental

• 13 - J-S39014-25

rights because Father resided with Mother, and Mother conceded that the

trailer was not safe for Child.

Prior to K.B.’s placement, he had not yet attended school despite being

old enough to do so. After K.B. was placed in foster care, he attended

kindergarten for a few months; thereafter, he was not promoted to first grade

and it was recommended that he attend a full year of kindergarten to build a

strong foundation with letters, sounds, numbers, etc. N.T. Permanency

Review Hearing, 6/11/24, at 9. It was further recommended that K.B. be

evaluated to see if he was eligible for an individualized education program

(IEP). Id. There were also incidents where K.B. was physically aggressive

toward other students and misbehaved on the school bus. N.T. Permanency

Review Hearing, 12/17/24, at 8. Those behaviors subsided over time while

K.B. was in placement. Id.

At the termination hearing, K.B.’s grades improved significantly and

there were no longer any disciplinary concerns. N.T. Hearing, 6/17/25, at 12.

His vocabulary grew exponentially, he can hold full conversations, and he

verbalizes his feelings and needs. Id. at 7. K.B. was diagnosed with an

intellectual disability. Id. at 12. Overall, K.B. is healthy and was prescribed

Ensure to help him gain weight. Id. W.J. reported that K.B. eats and sleeps

well and expanded his palette by trying different foods. Id. at 7.

Based on the record before us and the standard of review we must

employ, we discern no abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that K.B.

• 14 - J-S39014-25

is bonded with his foster parent, his foster parent meets his needs and welfare,

and that K.B. will not be irreparably harmed by terminating Father’s parental

rights. Accordingly, we conclude that the court did not err in determining

K.B.’s developmental, emotional and physical needs and welfare are best met

by terminating Father’s parental rights under the third prong of subsections

2511(a)(8) and 2511(b).

As the court’s determination pursuant to subsections 2511(a)(8) and

2511(b) is supported by the record, we must affirm the decree terminating

Father’s parental rights. See M.E., supra.

We now turn to Father’s separate challenge of the court’s order changing

K.B.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption. Under Pennsylvania

law, our decision above affirming the court’s termination decree renders any

challenge to the goal change order moot. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247

A.3d 439, 446 (Pa. Super. 2021); see also In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 616

(Pa. Super. 2002) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon the issue

the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).

Accordingly, we dismiss Father’s goal change appeal as moot.

Decree affirmed. Appeal from goal change order dismissed as moot.

• 15 - J-S39014-25

Date: 3/13/2026

• 16 -