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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Herrmann, K. v. Herrmann, J.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 334 MDA 2025

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2.5K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

J-A28005-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

KELLY N. HERRMANN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JEREMY J. HERRMANN :
:
Appellant : No. 334 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered February 12, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Civil Division at No(s):
24-2421

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM PER CURIAM: FILED MARCH 13, 2026

Jeremy J. Herrmann (Father) appeals pro se from the custody order

entered by the Berks County Court of Common Pleas, which granted Kelly N.

Herrmann (Mother) sole legal and primary physical custody of Father’s and

Mother’s ten-year-old son, J.H., and five-year-old daughter, K.H. (collectively,

the Children). Father argues that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction

under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)

to enter the order. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5401-5482. After review, we affirm.

The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history in

its Appellate Rule 1925(a) opinion:

Mother and Father were married on December 29, 2007.
They are the natural parents of [the Children]. The parties
separated on November 14, 2021 and were divorced on
April 13, 2022.
J-A28005-25

This case has a complicated procedural history: Father
and Mother first resided in Pennsylvania and then moved to
California and then to Reno, Nevada. Mother and the
Children moved to Susanville, California to be closer to a
hospital that could provide care for their oldest daughter.
After this child passed away, Mother and the Children moved
back to Father in Nevada. A Temporary Protection Order
was entered against Father on November 13, 2021. The
parties separated on November 14, 2021. Mother moved
with the minor Children back to Susanville, California, where
she filed for divorce.

The divorce and custody cases were heard in Washoe
County, Nevada. An Order deciding these matters was
entered on April 13, 2022. Pursuant to this Order, Mother
was awarded sole legal and primary physical custody of the
Children and she was permitted to relocate back to
Susanville, California with the Children because it was in
their best interests and because they only moved to Nevada
out of medical necessity to obtain care for their daughter.
Father did not appeal this decision. Father was awarded two
video calls per week, provided he was sober.

In July of 2022, Father filed a notice of change of address
with the Nevada court indicating he had changed his address
from Reno, Nevada to Montana.[FN 3]

FN 3. Apparently, according to a footnote to the
Nevada court’s Order of April 30, 2024, a hearing had
been held in this case in Nevada on February 15,
2024. Father attended the hearing remotely from
Arizona via Zoom, but his mailing address was in
Montana at that time.

Mother moved to the home of her parents in Berks
County, Pennsylvania on July 1, 2023. Through counsel,
she registered the foreign Custody Order from the Washoe
County Court in Nevada with the Court of Common Pleas of
Berks County. She also filed a notice of change of address
with the Court in Nevada [in July 2023] indicating that she
had relocated from California to Pennsylvania. [In August
2023, Father filed a motion in Nevada for an order to enforce
the divorce decree and/or for an order to show cause

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J-A28005-25

regarding contempt. The Nevada court held a hearing on
the matter in February 2024.]

On March 15, 2024, Mother filed a Petition to Modify
Custody in Berks County. Ten days later, on March 25,
2024, Father filed a Motion for Change of Custody or
Visitation with the Nevada trial court. On April 17, 2024,
Father filed a Request for Conference between Judges to
Establish Jurisdiction in the Nevada Court, asking that the
Nevada Judge contact the undersigned to establish
jurisdiction and asserting that the only [c]ourt that could
assume jurisdiction other than Nevada is the Lassen
Superior Court in California.

On April 30, 2024, after an informal judicial conference
with this [c]ourt, the Nevada court, sua sponte, found
Father’s Motion to be moot because neither party nor the
Children resided in the state of Nevada. Those facts were
of record so, under the law, there was no other possible
determination, whether argued or not. There was no
“swap.”

Father filed an appeal of Nevada’s April 30, 2024 Order
in the Court of Appeals of the state of Nevada. On June 14,
2024, Father filed a Change of Address to Verdi, Nevada in
the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County. On September
20, 2024, a three-judge panel in the state of Nevada
affirmed the district court order on the basis that Nevada no
longer had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction.

A Custody Trial was held [in Pennsylvania] on December
4, 2024 and, after obtaining the transcript and reviewing the
evidence, our Decision and Order were entered on the
docket on February 12, 2025. [. . .]

Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 4/9/25, at 1-3 (internal citations and some

footnotes omitted) (parties’ names adjusted to “Father” and “Mother”).

Father timely filed this appeal. He raises the following twelve issues for

our review, which we reorder for ease of disposition:

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J-A28005-25

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and violate due
   process by improperly limiting Father’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
   Statement to one page under threat of waiver, thereby
   hindering his ability to adequately preserve issues for
   appeal?

2. Did the Trial Court err in its February 11, 2025, Order by
   finding Nevada lost Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction
   (CEJ) under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5422(a)(2), based on an
   erroneous factual finding that Father did not reside in
   Nevada and by misconstruing Father’s ability to preserve
   Nevada’s jurisdiction, when Father was, in fact, residing
   in Nevada (as noted in the court’s own Findings of Fact

   2 and #18) and maintained significant connections with

   Nevada through, inter alia, court-ordered monthly
   supervised child visitations in Reno, thereby preserving
   Nevada’s CEJ under § 5422(a)(1)?

3. Did the Trial Court err by asserting “initial home state
   jurisdiction” for Pennsylvania under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421
   when Nevada, the decree-issuing state, retained CEJ at
   the time Mother commenced the Pennsylvania action,
   thereby precluding Pennsylvania from exercising initial
   jurisdiction?

4. Did the Trial Court violate 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5426
   (Simultaneous Proceedings) by exercising its jurisdiction
   after being informed that Father had commenced a
   custody proceeding in Nevada (the state with CEJ)—
   specifically Father’s Motion for Change of Custody filed
   March 25, 2024, in direct response to Mother’s March 15,
   2024, Pennsylvania filing and her illegal relocation—
   without first staying its own proceeding and properly
   communicating with the Nevada court as mandated, and
   before Nevada had validly terminated or stayed its
   proceeding or determined Pennsylvania was a more
   appropriate forum?

5. Did the Trial Court err by relying on a UCCJEA conference
   call whose very necessity is questionable given the
   court’s primary stated jurisdictional grounds (PA as home
   state, NV lost CEJ as all parties supposedly left), and
   which was, in any event, fatally flawed by being
   unrecorded, held with conflicting dates, and by denying

-4-
J-A28005-25

Father his statutory right (NRS 125A.275; J.C. v. K.C.)
to participate or present facts and legal arguments
regarding jurisdiction before the transfer determination,
thereby violating due process?

1. Did the Trial Court err by failing to conduct the
   mandatory significant connection or inconvenient forum
   analyses under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5422 and 5427 before
   assuming jurisdiction, relying instead on a flawed “home
   state” determination?

2. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in its February
   11, 2025, Order by exercising jurisdiction when such
   jurisdiction was predicated upon Mother’s acknowledged
   violation of the specific, limited relocation authorization
   in the April 13, 2022, Nevada Divorce Decree
   (authorizing relocation to Susanville, California only),
   constituting unjustifiable conduct under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
   5428, thereby mandating that the Pennsylvania court
   decline jurisdiction, particularly in light of cases like
   Beese v. Calehuff?

3. Did the Trial Court err in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
   Memorandum by improperly introducing, for the first
   time, an argument that Mother’s illegal relocation might
   be excused by alleged domestic violence under 23
   Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(k), thereby attempting a post-hoc
   justification for its flawed jurisdictional ruling and
   prejudicing Father who had no opportunity to rebut this
   complex factual and legal excuse at Trial?

4. Did the trial court err by failing to properly apply the
   “clean hands” doctrine to preclude Mother from
   benefiting from her illegal relocation?

5. Was Father denied due process by the trial court’s refusal
   to permit virtual participation in the custody trial under
   Pa.R.C.P. 1930.3 despite documented good cause
   (financial and physical hardship) and the court’s
   subsequent imposition of unaffordable and physically
   burdensome travel for visitation?

6. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and deny due
   process by making numerous findings of fact that were

-5-
J-A28005-25

unsupported by, or contradictory to, the evidence of
record, including but not limited to mischaracterizations
of Father’s parental guidance, risk assessment, self-care
ability, housing, mental health, criminal record, and the
circumstances of a deceased child’s death, while ignoring
evidence adverse to Mother?

1. Did the trial court exhibit judicial bias, denying Father a fair hearing, through a pattern of erroneous rulings, unsupported findings, mischaracterization of facts and law, disparate treatment of parties, use of biased language (“her children”), an inconsistent approach to jurisdictional determinations including the UCCJEA call, and improper post-hoc introduction of legal authorities?

Father’s Brief at 19-23 (parties’ names adjusted to “Father” and “Mother”).

We begin by noting the difficulty this Court has had in discerning which

issues Father has properly preserved for our review and adequately argued in

his brief. Father filed two concise statements of errors complained of on

appeal with the trial court. Father’s first statement was three pages, single-

spaced, and raised sixteen issues, along with a list of case law. Upon receiving

that statement, the trial court ordered Father to file a “Concise Statement.”

See Order, 3/14/25 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The trial court

included a footnote that specified, a “statement that is over one page long,

verbose and redundant violates the relevant mandatory Rules of Appellate

Procedure 1925(b)(4)(i), (iv) and 2135.” Id. (citation omitted). Father then

filed a second concise statement, which was one page, hand-written, and

raised approximately nine issues, along with harm suffered, relief sought, and

conclusion sections. Now, on appeal, Father raises twelve issues in the

-6-
J-A28005-25

statement of the questions involved section in his brief. These issues do not

fully match either concise statement.

Moreover, Father’s brief is one hundred pages, and the argument

section begins on page thirty-nine. In contravention of our Appellate Rules,

his argument is not clearly divided into sections for the twelve issues he listed

in his statement of the questions involved. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Instead,

this section has numerous headings labeled “A” through “L,” and ending with

“VIII.” These headings do not clearly align with Father’s twelve issues, and

some raise new arguments not included in his statement of the questions

involved in his brief. See generally Father’s Brief at 39-95. Most headings

also contain multiple subsections. For example, Section D has twenty-two

numbered paragraphs, each purporting to raise an additional sub-issue.

Additionally, many sections throughout his argument are repetitive, with

Father making the same or similar arguments multiple times.

Most troubling is the fact that throughout the majority of Father’s

argument, he fails to provide citations to the record and to tell us when or

where he raised his claimed error to the trial court. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(c),

(e). For many of his issues, Father also fails to meaningfully cite legal

authority or cogently explain how his cited authority supports his argument.

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a)-(b). We recognize that Father included an appendix

to his brief with purported relevant case law which he claims supports his

arguments. However, he admits that this case law was removed from his brief

“due to word limitations.” See Father’s Brief at 13. To the extent that this

-7-
J-A28005-25

appendix takes Father’s brief over the 14,000-word count limit, he fails to

explain why we should consider it. More importantly, a list of over twenty

cases with a few sentences summarizing the cases and purporting to explain

why they are relevant does not cogently support Father’s argument, as

contemplated by our Appellate Rules and case law.

We are cognizant of Father’s pro se status. Nevertheless, it is well-

settled that this status affords him no special benefit, and he must comply

with our Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Vurimindi,

200 A.3d 1031, 1037-38 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations omitted). Moreover,

“any person choosing to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a

reasonable extent, assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be

his undoing.” Id. (citation omitted). Equally well-settled is the fact that this

Court will not act as an advocate or develop arguments on behalf of an

appellant. See Interest of R.H., 320 A.3d 706, 716 (Pa. Super. 2024)

(citations omitted). If an issue is not properly developed with citation to legal

authority; it is waived. See B.S.G. v. D.M.C., 255 A.3d 528, 535 (Pa. Super.

2021) (citations omitted). Nor will we scour a record to find evidence to

support an appellant’s argument. See Milby v. Pote, 189 A.3d 1065, 1079

(Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We will only address the issues that

Father has properly raised and argued in this appeal.

Related to the above discussion, Father’s first issue alleges that the trial

court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights by improperly

limiting his concise statement “to a mere one page, under threat of waiver.”

-8-
J-A28005-25

Father’s Brief at 92. Father claims this severely prejudiced him in his ability

to adequately preserve all meritorious issues for appellate review. Id. at 93.

Father asserts that this Court should not strictly waive issues reasonably

discernible from the record and argued in his brief. Id. (citations omitted).

Father’s characterization of the trial court’s order is inaccurate. The trial

court did not specifically limit his concise statement “to a mere one page.”

Instead, as noted above, the court ordered Father to file a concise statement.

The court reminded Father that a statement that is “over one page long,

verbose and redundant” violates the Appellate Rules. Order, 3/14/25

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). The court did not accept Father’s

original three-page concise statement that was also verbose and redundant,

and it reminded him of the rules for a concise statement.

We agree with the trial court that Father’s first concise statement was

redundant. For example, Father raised at least nine issues dealing with the

trial court’s jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Moreover, as will be explained

below, Father has waived some of his issues due to a lack of proper

development in his brief or because he raised new issues in the argument

section of his brief that were not included in his statement of the questions

involved. These issues are not waived strictly because of his one-page concise

statement. Father’s first issue merits no relief.

Father’s next eight appellate issues relate to his argument that

Pennsylvania does not have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the

UCCJEA. As these issues are related, we address them together.

-9-
J-A28005-25

Because Father challenges whether the trial court had subject matter

jurisdiction, his claim presents a pure question of law. See J.S. v. R.S.S.,

231 A.3d 942, 947 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted). Our standard of

review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Id. (citation omitted).

The “purpose of the UCCJEA is to avoid jurisdictional competition,

promote cooperation between courts, deter the abduction of children, avoid

relitigating custody decisions of other states, and facilitate the enforcement of

custody orders of other states.” Boback v. Pershing, 311 A.3d 1126, 1129

(Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). The UCCJEA was also enacted to

conform state law with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28

U.S.C. § 1738A, which is a federal law requiring “that states give full faith and

credit to another jurisdiction’s child custody determination made in compliance

with the provisions of the PKPA.” R.M. v. J.S., 20 A.3d 496, 502-03 (Pa.

Super. 2011) (citation omitted); see also U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 1.

On appeal, the crux of Father’s argument is that Nevada, as the state

that issued the original custody order, retained exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction over the custody matter. Father claims Nevada retained

jurisdiction because Father resided in Nevada and Father and the Children

maintained significant connections there. Thus, Pennsylvania could not invoke

initial home state jurisdiction. Further, Mother’s relocation to Pennsylvania

was illegal, and Pennsylvania should have declined jurisdiction.

Father’s argument is misplaced and fails to appreciate the procedural

posture of this case. In April 2024, the Nevada district court found that it no

• 10 - J-A28005-25

longer had jurisdiction over this matter because neither party was located in

Nevada. See Order Finding Motion Moot; Sua Sponte Order Regarding

Jurisdiction, 4/30/24, at 2. Father appealed the district court’s order. The

Nevada appeals court affirmed, agreeing with the district court’s decision to

relinquish jurisdiction because Nevada had lost exclusive, continuing

jurisdiction as the parties and Children no longer resided in Nevada. Order of

Affirmance, 9/20/24, at 5-7.

Thus, the Nevada courts have relinquished jurisdiction and any of

Father’s arguments related to Nevada having exclusive, continuing jurisdiction

are unavailing. This includes Father’s arguments related to significant

connections. The appropriate time and place for Father to make those

arguments was to the Nevada courts. This Court does not have the authority

to tell Nevada that it has jurisdiction over a case, when that state has

determined it does not. We are bound by Nevada’s decision.1 See U.S. Const.

---

1 Put another way, even if we agreed with Father (which we do not) that
Nevada should not have relinquished jurisdiction, there is nothing we can do
about that. Father’s available remedy was to appeal the Nevada order, which
he did, albeit unsuccessfully. This Court has no authority to overturn another
court’s decision. As the learned trial judge asked Father, “[W]hen it comes to
foreign orders, you’d agree with me there is a thing that’s full faith and credit
with regard to orders and decisions of other states. So here’s my question to
you. Even if I decided that Nevada got it wrong, as [Mother’s counsel]
mentioned, they relinquished jurisdiction, so what ability do I have, at this
point, to send this case back to Nevada even if I thought -- even if I did, and
I said if, if I thought it was the appropriate forum?” N.T., 12/4/24, at 155.
We agree with the trial court’s astute assessment of the case. In response,
Father cited a case “J.C. versus J.C” to support his position, which we discern
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 11 - J-A28005-25

Art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public

Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”); R.M., 20 A.3d

at 502-03 (explaining that the “PKPA requires that states give full faith and

credit to another jurisdiction’s child custody determination made in compliance

with the provisions of the PKPA” (citation omitted)).

Because Nevada determined it no longer has jurisdiction in this matter,

we now analyze whether Pennsylvania has jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Here, the trial court found that it had authority to modify the Nevada

custody order because neither the Children nor the parents resided in Nevada,

Nevada had divested itself of jurisdiction, and Pennsylvania had jurisdiction to

---

to be referring to J.C. v. K.C., 179 A.3d 1124 (Pa. Super. 2018). We take
this opportunity to distinguish J.C. and other similar cases.

In J.C., this Court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by
relinquishing jurisdiction to New York under the UCCJEA without permitting
Father to submit information relevant to the inconvenient forum determination
or present facts and legal arguments pursuant to Section 5410, in conjunction
with the telephone conference between the Pennsylvania and New York courts.
This Court found that the trial court’s contravention of its statutory obligations
denied Father a full and fair ability to litigate his case and reversed the trial
court’s jurisdictional orders.

Father fails to appreciate the different procedural posture of J.C. In J.C., it
was the Pennsylvania court that relinquished jurisdiction and entered orders
to that effect. The father in J.C. then appealed the Pennsylvania
jurisdictional orders to this Court. However, here, Nevada relinquished
jurisdiction and entered an order to that effect, not Pennsylvania. And the
order Father is appealing here is a custody order, not an order relinquishing
jurisdiction. Even if we agreed with Father, we simply could not grant him the
same relief granted in J.C. because we have no authority to reverse a Nevada
order. Again, Father should have raised his arguments to the Nevada appeals
court when he appealed the Nevada jurisdictional order.

• 12 - J-A28005-25

make an initial custody determination under the UCCJEA. See Decision and

Order, 2/12/25, at 16.

UCCJEA Section 5423 explains when a Pennsylvania court has

jurisdiction to modify a child custody determination made by another state.

Except as otherwise provided in section 5424 (relating to
temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court of this
Commonwealth may not modify a child custody
determination made by a court of another state unless a
court of this Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an
initial determination under section 5421 (a)(1) or (2)
(relating to initial child custody jurisdiction) and:

(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer
has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under section 5422
(relating to exclusive, continuing jurisdiction) or that a
court of this Commonwealth would be a more convenient
forum under section 5427 (relating to inconvenient
forum); or

(2) a court of this Commonwealth or a court of the other
state determines that the child, the child’s parents and
any person acting as a parent do not presently reside in
the other state.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5423.

To make a custody modification under Section 5423, the trial court must

first have jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under Section

1. Section 5421 provides, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section
5424 (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction), a court
of this Commonwealth has jurisdiction to make an initial
child custody determination only if:

(1) this Commonwealth is the home state of the child on
the date of the commencement of the proceeding or was
the home state of the child within six months before the

• 13 - J-A28005-25

commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this Commonwealth but a parent or person acting
as a parent continues to live in this Commonwealth[.]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421. The UCCJEA defines “home state” as the “state in which

a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six

consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody

proceeding.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5402.

Here, although Father contests the legality of Mother’s relocation, he

does not dispute that she relocated with the Children to Pennsylvania in July

2023, where they have remained since. At the time Mother filed her petition

to modify custody in March 2024, the Children had lived with a parent, Mother,

in Pennsylvania for at least six consecutive months. See id. Thus,

Pennsylvania was the home state of the Children. Accordingly, the trial court

had jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination under Section

1. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5421(a)(1).

Because the trial court had jurisdiction to make an initial custody

determination as the Children’s home state, it met the first element needed

to modify Nevada’s child custody determination under Section 5423. It also

met the second element because Nevada determined that it no longer had

exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under Section 5422 as Father, Mother, and

the Children no longer resided in Nevada. Therefore, the trial court had

jurisdiction to modify Nevada’s child custody determination under Section

1. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5423(1), (2).

• 14 - J-A28005-25

The circumstances of Mother’s relocation do not change our

determination that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. Father

cites UCCJEA Section 5428 to support his proposition that Pennsylvania was

required to decline jurisdiction because of Mother’s unjustifiable conduct of

illegally relocating to Pennsylvania. Father also claims that Mother’s wrongful

relocation made her hands “unclean” such that, as a matter of equity, the trial

court should not have granted her relief.

Section 5428 provides:

(a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in section
5424 (relating to temporary emergency jurisdiction) or by
other laws of this Commonwealth, if a court of this
Commonwealth has jurisdiction under this chapter because
a person seeking to invoke its jurisdiction has engaged in
unjustifiable conduct, the court shall decline to exercise its
jurisdiction unless:

(1) the parents and all persons acting as parents have
acquiesced in the exercise of jurisdiction;

(2) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction
under sections 5421 (relating to initial child custody
jurisdiction) through 5423 (relating to jurisdiction to
modify determination) determines that this
Commonwealth is a more appropriate forum under
section 5427 (relating to inconvenient forum); or

(3) no court of any other state would have
jurisdiction under the criteria specified in sections 5421
through 5423.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5428.

Father’s argument fails for two reasons. First, Father already attempted

to argue, in his Nevada case, that Mother’s relocation was illegal, and Nevada

• 15 - J-A28005-25

was required to retain jurisdiction. This was a proper argument to make in

Nevada because Mother’s relocation purportedly violated a Nevada custody

order, not a Pennsylvania order. However, Father failed to file a fact-specific

affidavit or declaration in support of his motion as required by Nevada law, so

the Nevada district court lacked jurisdiction to find contempt. See Order After

Hearing on Enforcement, 4/30/24, at 3. On appeal, the Nevada court noted

that Father failed to explain how the allegedly improper relocation impacted

the district court’s jurisdictional analysis or otherwise provided the district

court with jurisdiction. Order of Affirmance, 9/20/24, at 6.

Second, even if Father gets another bite at the apple to raise this issue

again to this Court, the trial court did not determine that Mother’s relocation

was unjustifiable conduct. The trial court explained:

Father does not deny that he has PTSD from his years in
the military serving in Iraq. He also had a problem with
alcohol abuse, though he claims to be sober now. We found
Mother’s testimony credible that, when she tried to leave
Father with her Children, he assaulted her. In fact, the
youngest child was bruised when he grabbed the baby from
Mother and carried it under his arm as he fled. Mother gave
notice to the court in Nevada when she filed a Change of
Address. We find that the fact that she did not notify Father
she was relocating to Pennsylvania, was mitigated by the
history of abuse at the hands of Father, both physical and
emotional. The Nevada court gave her permission to
relocate to California in the first instance, and gave Father
the right to telephone contact with his Children only if he
was sober. He was later given professionally supervised
visitation. We find that Mother can provide a safer
environment for her Children in Pennsylvania.

• 16 - J-A28005-25

T.C.O. at 8-9 (internal citation omitted) (parties’ names adjusted to “Father”

and “Mother”).

Section 5428’s Uniform Law Comment and Pennsylvania’s relocation

statute support the trial court’s decision. The Uniform Law Comment states:

The focus in this section is on the unjustified conduct of the
person who invokes the jurisdiction of the court. A technical
illegality or wrong is insufficient to trigger the applicability
of this section. This is particularly important in cases
involving domestic violence and child abuse. Domestic
violence victims should not be charged with unjustifiable
conduct for conduct that occurred in the process of fleeing
domestic violence, even if their conduct is technically illegal.
Thus, if a parent flees with a child to escape domestic
violence and in the process violates a joint custody decree,
the case should not be automatically dismissed under this
section. An inquiry must be made into whether the flight
was justified under the circumstances of the case. [. . .]

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5428, Uniform Law Comment. The relocation statute provides

that any “consideration of a failure to provide reasonable notice [of a

relocation] under subsection (i) shall be subject to mitigation if the court

determines that such failure was caused in whole, or in part, by abuse.” 23

Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(k).

At the custody trial, Mother testified to past incidents of abuse

committed by Father including: pushing her once before they had children;

losing his temper and punching holes in walls; punching and breaking a

window of her vehicle while the parties’ son was in the backseat; verbally

abusing her; and sending her vulgar, threatening, and harassing text

messages and emails, which were admitted into evidence. See N.T., 12/4/24,

• 17 - J-A28005-25

at 35-36, 56-57. She also testified about the November 2021 incident,

described above by the trial court, which culminated in Father pleading guilty

to battery. See id. at 24-31. Mother obtained protection orders against

Father in Nevada and California. See id. at 31, 35. The trial court referenced

this conduct several times throughout its custody decision. See Decision and

Order, 2/12/25, at 4, 7-10, 14. The court stated that there “is a history of

violent behavior by Father toward Mother.” Id. at 9. In its opinion, the court

noted that testimony and exhibits submitted by Mother “at the custody trial

established she was a battered wife.” T.C.O. at 7 (citation omitted).

Thus, the trial court’s conclusion that Mother relocating in violation of

the Nevada custody order was mitigated by past abuse was supported by the

record and relevant law. Moreover, as the trial court noted, Mother filed a

change of address in Nevada, which indicates that she did not hide her

relocation. Mother flew the Children back to Nevada for supervised monthly

visits with Father, even after she relocated. See Decision and Order, 2/12/15,

at 10; N.T. at 39; Order After Hearing on Enforcement, 4/30/24, at 3.

Father alleges that the trial court’s reliance on domestic violence as a

justification for Mother’s relocation was improper because it was a “post-hoc”

justification that was not litigated at trial. Again, we disagree.

At trial, Father’s and Mother’s history, including the past abusive

conduct, was extensively litigated. Father had the opportunity to testify and

cross-examine Mother and could have used either opportunity to rebut her

testimony. The trial court was permitted to consider any past abuse in making

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its jurisdiction and custody determinations. Father was not precluded from

arguing to the trial court that Mother’s relocation was illegal, which he did. He

was also not precluded from attempting to rebut the trial court’s reasoning on

appeal to this Court, after receiving the trial court’s opinion.2

Father also argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an

inconvenient forum analysis pursuant to the UCCJEA. Father devoted two

paragraphs of his argument to discussing inconvenient forum. See Father’s

Brief at 54-55, 70-71. He generically cites UCCJEA Section 5427, but he cites

---

2 Father repeatedly cites Beese v. Calehuff, 514 A.2d 182 (Pa. Super. 1986)

to support his argument that the trial court should have declined to exercise
jurisdiction. Beese was decided under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act (UCCJA), the predecessor statute to the UCCJEA and is factually
distinguishable from this case. In Beese, mother and father had one child
while married. They divorced in Florida. The Florida court forbade either
parent from removing the child from Florida without the other parent’s or the
court’s permission. Mother subsequently tried to modify the restriction on
removing the child from Florida but was denied. Nevertheless, mother
brought the child to Pennsylvania, without father’s or the court’s permission.
Mother and the child moved in with mother’s new husband. Mother and her
new husband, who claimed to be the child’s biological father, filed a petition
in Pennsylvania seeking custody of the child. The trial court determined that
under the UCCJA, it could not properly assume jurisdiction over the matter
because mother violated the Florida custody order. This Court affirmed,
concluding that mother’s removal of the child without proper permission
precluded her and her current husband from litigating custody in
Pennsylvania.

Here, however, as noted, Father should have, and attempted to, raise issues
with Mother’s relocation in Nevada, but was unsuccessful. The trial court
found that Mother’s relocation was mitigated by past abuse. Mother relocated
first to California, with permission, and then went to Pennsylvania. Nevada
has already relinquished jurisdiction, so even if the trial court had declined to
exercise jurisdiction, this matter could not have gone back to Nevada, and
Pennsylvania has been established as the Children’s home state. See 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 5428(a)(3). Thus, Beese is inapposite here.

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no other authority nor any evidence in the record to support his assertions.

See id. This issue is waived. See B.S.G., supra; R.H., supra; Milby, supra.

Even if not waived, Section 5427 states a “court of this Commonwealth

which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a child custody

determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time if it

determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and that

a court of another state is a more appropriate forum.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5427(a)

(emphasis added). Therefore, contrary to Father’s claims, the trial court was

not mandated to decline jurisdiction under this section, and Pennsylvania was

the Children’s home state.

Lastly, Father raises various arguments related to alleged procedural

errors the Pennsylvania and Nevada courts made under the UCCJEA. He

claims that the trial court violated Section 5426 by failing to stay its

proceeding and properly communicate with the Nevada court. See Father’s

Brief at 49. Father takes issue with the conference call that occurred between

the Pennsylvania and Nevada courts, claiming that it violated the UCCJEA

because it was unrecorded, and he was not given the opportunity to present

facts and arguments before the jurisdiction decision was made.

We again reiterate that, after the conference call between the courts,

Nevada issued an order relinquishing its jurisdiction. Father then appealed

that order in Nevada. The appropriate time and place for Father to raise any

procedural irregularities with the conference call that resulted in Nevada’s

order relinquishing jurisdiction was in the Nevada proceedings. See Father’s

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Brief at 68, 71 (citing Nevada law). When asked by the trial court at the

custody trial if Father had raised those issues in the Nevada matters, Father

admitted that he had not raised those issues and had failed to state the

applicable law or appropriate arguments in Nevada. See N.T. at 104, 135.

Father specifically admitted that he “didn’t know about the UCCJEA.” Id. at

1. Because Father failed to appropriately raise these issues and arguments

in Nevada, they are waived. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the

trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”)

Further, the Nevada appeals court specifically stated, “the district court

properly held a conference with the Court of Common Pleas of Berks

County, Pennsylvania—at [Father’s] request—at which it was agreed that

Pennsylvania had assumed jurisdiction . . . .” Order of Affirmance, 9/20/24,

at 6-7 (emphasis added). Thus, the Nevada court indicated that the

conference was proper.

Moreover, although Father claims that he was not given an opportunity

to present facts and legal arguments before the courts decided on jurisdiction,

this is unclear from the record. The Nevada court orders reference filings from

Father and Mother related to jurisdiction and a hearing the district court held

on February 15, 2024, wherein Father and Mother testified to their respective

residences. See Order Finding Motion Moot; Sua Sponte Order Regarding

Jurisdiction, 4/30/24; Order of Affirmance, 9/20/24.

We are not privy to what Father included in his filings to Nevada.

However, the references to these filings and hearing appear to belie Father’s

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assertion that he had no opportunity to present facts and arguments regarding

jurisdiction before the Nevada court made its decision. See id. Even if this

opportunity was insufficient under the UCCJEA, as explained above, Father

should have raised the propriety of the courts’ communication in his appeal of

the Nevada court order regarding jurisdiction. And then it was for Nevada to

decide if Father was provided an adequate opportunity to present facts and

arguments before it relinquished its jurisdiction.

As for Father’s other arguments, even assuming there was an error, he

fails to allege, let alone persuade us, how he suffered any prejudice from

Pennsylvania not staying its proceeding until a jurisdiction determination was

made. See J.C. v. K.C., 179 A.3d 1124, 1129-1130 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citing Harman ex rel. Harman v. Borah, 756 A.2d 1116, 1122 (Pa. 2000)

for the proposition that relief is not warranted merely because some

irregularity occurred during the trial; the moving party must demonstrate that

he has suffered prejudice from the mistake.)

It appears from the record that Father filed a request for a conference

call between the courts in Nevada on April 17, 2024, which occurred on or

about April 26 or April 30, 2024. Father cites no authority to support the idea

that this call, which occurred less than two weeks after Father’s request, was

untimely under the UCCJEA, and he again fails to allege how he was prejudiced

by any delay. Further, Father’s claim that the trial court exercised its

jurisdiction prematurely is inaccurate. After Mother and Father filed

exceptions to the custody hearing officer’s recommended order, the court held

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its custody trial in December 2024, which was after the Nevada appeals court

affirmed the district court’s decision. And the court did not enter its custody

order until February 2025, well after Nevada had relinquished jurisdiction. We

fail to see how Father suffered any prejudice from the lack of an official stay.

For the reasons explained above, Father’s second through ninth issues

related to jurisdiction merit no relief.

Turning to Father’s remaining issues, we note our well-settled standard

of review for custody matters:

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest
type and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must
accept findings of the trial court that are supported by
competent evidence of record, as our role does not include
making independent factual determinations. In addition,
with regard to issues of credibility and weight of the
evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial judge who
viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand. However, we
are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences
from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether the
trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the
trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial
court.

Wilson v. Smyers, 284 A.3d 509, 515 (Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting S.T. v.

R.W., 192 A.3d 1155, 1160 (Pa. Super. 2018)). Importantly, it is not this

Court’s role to “re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.”

Id. at 520 (citation omitted).

In a custody-related matter, the court’s “paramount concern is the best

interests of the children involved.” A.L.B. v. M.D.L., 239 A.3d 142, 148 (Pa.

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Super. 2020) (citation omitted). When ordering any form of custody, a court

must determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant

factors, giving substantial weighted consideration to specific factors that affect

the safety of the child.3 See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

In his tenth issue, Father claims that he was denied due process because

the trial court refused to permit him to virtually participate in the custody trial

despite documented good cause. He also claims that he was denied due

process because the court imposed unaffordable and physically burdensome

travel for visitation on him.

This argument is waived due to lack of development. See B.S.G.,

supra; R.H., supra; Milby, supra. Father devoted one paragraph in the

argument section of his brief to this issue. See Father’s Brief at 73-74. He

cites no legal authority besides Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1930.3

to support his argument, and he cites nothing in the record. Father also fails

to mention due process in this paragraph.

---

3 In 2024, the General Assembly enacted significant amendments to the
custody factors “pursuant to Act of April 15, 2024, P.L. 24, No. 8 (known as
‘Kayden’s Law’).” Velasquez v. Miranda, 321 A.3d 876, 886 n.6 (Pa. 2024).
Kayden’s Law expanded the factors to be considered in the court’s best
interest analysis and required the court to give “substantial weighted
consideration” to, inter alia, the “safety of the child.” Id. (citation omitted).
These statutory amendments took legal effect on August 13, 2024. As the
trial court entered the instant order in February 2025, Kayden’s Law applies
to this appeal.

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Even if not waived, Rule 1930.3 provides that a party may testify

electronically with “the approval of the court upon good cause shown.”

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1930.3. This right is not automatic. Although Father takes issue

with not being permitted to attend virtually, he does not claim he was denied

notice or an opportunity to be heard, as he participated in the custody trial in

person. See S.T., 192 A.3d at 1161 (“Formal notice and an opportunity to be

heard are fundamental components of due process when a person may be

deprived in a legal proceeding of a liberty interest, such as physical freedom,

or a parent’s custody of her child.” (citation and emphasis omitted)).

As for the costs of visitation, Father simply makes a bald allegation that

the final custody order “imposed an unaffordable and physically burdensome

travel schedule for minimal supervised visitation, effectively taking [Father]

out of the [C]hildren’s lives without following the proper legal avenue to do

so.” Father’s Brief at 74. He fails to give any explanation as to why this travel

schedule is unaffordable or physically burdensome, and he cites nothing in the

record nor any legal authority to support his claim. This issue is waived. See

B.S.G., supra; R.H., supra; Milby, supra.

Even if not waived, we would rely upon the trial court’s explanation for

its decision and the discretion it is afforded in custody matters. See Wilson,

supra. The trial court explained as follows:

[Father], under the current Custody Order, has more of
an opportunity to see the Children in person if he comes to
Pennsylvania than he had under the original Nevada court
order. He previously lived in Pennsylvania, he is
unemployed, very mobile, and has lived in his camper

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before. [Father] could travel to Pennsylvania once a month,
and he could see his Children through supervised visitation,
which he could pay for through part-time work. Mother
showed her cooperation with supervised visits when she
flew the Children to Nevada in the past, without complaint
about the costs.

T.C.O. at 9.

In his eleventh issue, Father claims that the trial court abused its

discretion and denied him due process by making numerous factual findings

that were unsupported by, or contradictory to, the evidence. In his statement

of the questions involved, he alleges mischaracterizations of his parental

guidance, risk assessment, self-care ability, housing, mental health, criminal

record, and the circumstances of a deceased child’s death. Father also claims

the court ignored evidence adverse to Mother.

As noted above, in the due process section of his brief, Father includes

twenty-two numbered paragraphs, each purporting to raise a separate error

by the trial court. Some of these paragraphs have already been addressed in

our analysis above. None of the other paragraphs properly develop arguments

for our review. Father simply makes bald allegations about the court, without

sufficient citations to the record or legal authority to support the allegations.

This issue is waived.4 See B.S.G., supra; R.H., supra; Milby, supra.

---

4 Even if not waived, it appears that Father is seeking that this Court re-weigh

the evidence in his favor and find him to be more credible than Mother. This
is not our role. See Wilson, 284 A.3d at 520 (noting that it is not this Court’s
role to “re-find facts, re-weigh evidence, and re-assess credibility.” (citation
omitted)).

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In his final issue, Father argues that the trial court exhibited judicial bias

through numerous actions, many of which have already been addressed

above. Within his argument, Father’s allegations of bias mainly stem from

factual findings or statements made by the trial court that Father disagrees

with. We have reviewed the record and see no evidence that the court was

biased against Father. That the court disagreed with Father or found Mother

more credible does not demonstrate bias. Father’s final issue merits no relief.

To the extent that Father attempts to raise other issues in his argument that

were not included in his statement of the questions involved, Father has failed

to adequately develop those issues for our review, so he has waived them.

See B.S.G., supra; R.H., supra; Milby, supra.

In sum, the trial court had jurisdiction under Section 5423 of the UCCJEA

to enter the custody order on appeal. This Court is bound by Nevada’s decision

to relinquish jurisdiction, and many of Father’s arguments related to the

UCCJEA should have been made to the Nevada courts. Most of Father’s other

claims have been waived because he failed to cogently develop them in his

brief. For any claims that Father properly raised and developed, we discern

no error of law or abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.

Order affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/13/2026

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