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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Int. of: L.H., Appeal of: K.H.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1230 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (24.6K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: K.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1230 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000043-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: K.H., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1231 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000042-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: G.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: E.H., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 1232 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000042-2025
J-S01002-26
J-S01003-26

IN RE: L.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: E.H., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 1233 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000043-2025

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 13, 2026

In these consolidated cases, K.H. (“Mother”) and E.H. (“Father”)

(collectively, “Parents”) have each appealed the September 3, 2025 orders

that granted petitions filed by the Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth

and Families (“CYF” or “the Agency”) and involuntarily terminated their

parental rights to their biological daughters: G.H., born in March 2019, and

L.H., born in October 2020 (collectively, “the Children”).1 We affirm.

We glean the relevant factual and procedural history of these matters

from the certified record. CYF first became involved with this family in May

2023 due to concerns regarding “substance abuse, homelessness, and neglect

---

• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We have consolidated these cases sua sponte as Parents raise similar claims
concerning the same factual and procedural events. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.

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of the [C]hildren.”2 Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/28/25, at 2. Parents each

have a history of opiate abuse and reported being in medication-assisted

treatment. Id. at 3. The referral also indicated that Parents were not ensuring

that G.H. received prompt medical care for an ophthalmological issue that

required surgical intervention.3 See N.T., 8/28/25, at 23-24. CYF caseworker

Mallory Conti was assigned to the matter beginning in May 2023. Between

May 2023 and July 2023, the Agency unsuccessfully sought to engage Parents

with services and conduct unannounced home visits at the family’s residence.

On July 28, 2023, the court placed the Children in the emergency

custody of CYF. At the time of removal, G.H., was four years old and L.H. was

two years old. The Children were initially placed into kinship care with their

paternal grandparents (“Paternal Grandparents”). On September 6, 2023, the

juvenile court adjudicated the Children dependent and established their

permanency goal as reunification with Parents. In furtherance thereof,

Parents were each ordered to, inter alia, continue with substance abuse

treatment, complete evaluations through the Pennsylvania Organization for

Women in Early Recovery (“POWER”), obtain and maintain appropriate

housing, comply with random drug screens, and attend the Children’s medical

---

2 The certified record indicates that Mother has another, older child who was
placed into a subsidized permanent legal custodianship for “similar issues” to
those presented in these proceedings. See N.T., 8/28/25, at 38.

3 While in the Agency’s custody, G.H. underwent surgery and recovered
without incident. See CYF Exhibit 9 at 21.

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appointments. See id. at 11, 14-15. Parents were afforded liberal visits with

the Children, which were informally arranged and supervised by Paternal

Grandparents. See CYF Exhibit 1 at 23 (unpaginated); N.T., 8/28/25, at 31.

Between December 2023 and March 2025, the juvenile court found that

Parents’ compliance with these objectives and progress towards reunification

was largely minimal. See generally CYF Exhibit 1 (records of the Children’s

dependency proceedings). Despite fourteen referrals across twenty months,

Parents never completed their court-ordered POWER assessments. See N.T.,

8/28/25, at 12, 14. They each appeared for one random drug screen in

September 2023, wherein they each tested positive for opiates. See CYF

Exhibit 4 at 5; CYF Exhibit 5 at 5. Thereafter, Parents did not complete any

screens, which yielded a total of approximately ninety-three “no show” or

“refused” incidents between September 2023 and August 2025. See

generally CYF Exhibits 4-5. Parents’ housing also remained unstable. As of

April 2025, they were reportedly “doubled up with a friend” in a living situation

that “would not be safe” for the Children. N.T., 8/28/25, at 15. Parents

remained in substance abuse treatment through, inter alia, Progressive

Medical Treatment (“Progressive”). Mother’s overall prognosis was identified

as “poor.” See CYF Exhibit 1 at 53. We are unable to assess Father’s

prognosis since he revoked his consent for Progressive to share his medical

information with the Agency. See id. During this time period, Parents were

also identified as being intermittently incarcerated in connection with criminal

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charges and otherwise out of contact with the Agency for extended periods of

time. See generally id.

Contemporaneously, the Children were removed from Paternal

Grandparents’ custody in November 2024. This removal occurred after the

Agency learned that Parents had moved into Paternal Grandparents’ home in

February 2024 and had been seeing the Children “almost daily” and

“unsupervised” for approximately nine months. N.T., 8/28/25, at 31-32.

Following a number of temporary placements, the Children were transferred

to the pre-adoptive custody of A.K. (“Foster Mother”) and P.B. (collectively,

“Foster Parents”) in January 2025, where they have remained.

Upon the Children’s removal from Paternal Grandparents’ home,

Parents’ visits with the Children were reduced in frequency to twice per week

and were supervised at the CYF offices from December 2024 until February

1. See id. at 13, 34. During this time period, Parents’ visits with the

Children were “inconsistent” due to transportation issues. Id. at 29.

Beginning in February 2025, however, Parent’s visits were transferred to the

foster care agency, Every Child, which was already overseeing Foster Parents’

custody of the Children. Thereafter, Parents’ visits “became very consistent.”

Id. at 29. We also note that Every Child assigned Kristi Breighner to serve as

the Children’s foster care caseworker. See id. at 41.

In March 2025, the Children underwent individual psychological

assessments performed by psychologist Gregory Lobb, Ph.D. Parents failed

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to appear for individual assessments with Dr. Lobb on three separate

occasions. Nonetheless, he was able to conduct separate interactional

evaluations of the Children with Parents and Foster Parents, respectively. See

N.T., 9/2/25, at 69-72. Ultimately, Dr. Lobb authored two reports concerning

his observations and conclusions, which were dated March 28 and July 18,

2025, respectively.

On April 15, 2025, the Agency filed petitions seeking to involuntarily

terminate Parents’ parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5),

(8), and (b).4 On July 30, 2025, the juvenile court changed the Children’s

permanency goal to adoption. See N.T., 8/28/25, at 19. It is unclear from

the available documentation whether Parents appealed the goal change. In

connection with the entry of that order, Parents’ visits with the Children were

further reduced to once per week. See id. at 19-20.

The orphans’ court held hearings on the involuntary termination

petitions on August 28 and September 2, 2025, at which time G.H. was six

---

4 Our Supreme Court has instructed this Court to engage in “limited sua
sponte review” to ensure that children are “afforded their statutory right to
legal counsel when facing the potential termination of their parent’s parental
rights.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1218, 1238 (Pa. 2020) (citing
23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a)). In separate orders filed on May 30, 2025, the orphans’
court appointed Andrea Spurr, Esquire, to represent the Children’s “legal
interests” in these proceedings. Orders Appointing Legal Counsel, 5/30/25,
at 1 (unpaginated). Thus, the orphans’ court complied with § 2313(a), as
interpreted by our Supreme Court. See K.M.G., 240 A.3d 1238.

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years old and L.H. was nearly five years old.5 During the hearings, the Agency

adduced testimony from Ms. Conti, Ms. Breighner, and Dr. Lobb. CYF also

introduced a several documentary exhibits into evidence, including the court

records from the Children’s dependency proceedings and copies of Dr. Lobb’s

reports. Parents were each represented by separate attorneys and appeared

in court for the second hearing day, wherein Father testified. Mother did not

testify on her own behalf.

On September 3, 2025, the orphans’ court filed orders that granted the

Agency’s petitions and involuntarily terminated Parents’ parental rights to the

Children pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). On September 29, 2025,

Father timely filed separate notices of appeal along with concise statements

of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On October 3, 2025, Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal and Rule

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) concise statements. In their respective concise

statements, Parents asserted allegations of error that only challenged the

orphans’ court’s conclusions pursuant to § 2511(b). On October 28, 2025,

the orphans’ court filed a thorough Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion that collectively

addressed Parents’ arguments.

---

5 Mother gave birth to a son in August 2025. See N.T., 8/28/25, at 39-40.
Testimony adduced during the termination proceedings indicated that Mother
attempted, unsuccessfully, to hide the pregnancy from CYF. See id. at 27.

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In this Court, Parents have each presented a single issue for our

consideration, which jointly challenge the evidentiary support underlying the

orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(b) of the Adoption Act (“the

Act”).6 See Mother’s brief at 8 (“Did the [orphans’] court abuse its discretion

and/or err as a matter of law in finding [that] termination of Mother’s parental

rights would best serve the needs and welfare of [the Children] pursuant to

[§] 2511(b) . . . ?”); Father’s brief at 8 (same).

Our basic standard of review in this context is well-established:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights,
appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the
decree of the termination court is supported by competent
evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must
accept the trial court’s findings of fact and credibility
determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the
trial court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an
appellate court may not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless it
has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the
reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the
facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court
may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration
of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-
will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple
hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, a trial court
must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with
the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and
support. Termination of parental rights has significant and

---

6 Attorney Spurr has filed briefs in this Court on behalf of the Children
advocating for reversal. We address the Children’s position further infra.

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permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such,
the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to
establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence,
which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing
as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of

the Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon the “eleven

enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant termination. Id.

at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the orphans’ court

determines the petitioner has established grounds for termination under one

of these subsections by “clear and convincing evidence,” the court then

assesses the petition pursuant to § 2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71

A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court need only agree with the orphans’

court’s determination as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to

§ 2511(b), in order to affirm in this particular context. See In re B.L.W.,

843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).

As noted above, Parents have declined to challenge the orphans’ court’s

conclusion that involuntary termination of Parents’ rights was warranted

pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). Accordingly, we will proceed to

consider their arguments pursuant to § 2511(b), which provides, as follows:

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

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of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Our Supreme Court has explained that the “plain

language” of § 2511(b) “clearly mandates” that the orphans’ court “focus on

the child and consider all three categories of needs and welfare.” Interest of

K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023). In undertaking this inquiry, “courts

should consider the matter from the child’s perspective,” placing the child’s

needs and welfare above concerns for the parent. Id. Furthermore, the

orphans’ court’s determination pursuant to § 2511(b) must be rendered on a

case-by-case basis and in the individual light of each child’s specific needs and

particular circumstances. See id. at 1105-06 (citing In re Adoption of

L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 593 (Pa. 2021)).

To that end, our Supreme Court has identified several specific aspects

of the child’s welfare that the orphans’ court must always consider in this

context. See id. at 1106. Specifically, the court must consider: (1) the

nature and extent of the child’s “bond with the biological parent;” (2) whether

the child is “in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their

foster parents;” and (3) intangibles such as love, comfort, security, stability,

and permanency. Id. at 1106, 1109. These factors are each of “primary

importance” in the context of § 2511(b). Id. at 1109. In addition to these

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mandatory factors, a court may also “properly consider the effect of the

parent’s conduct upon the child and consider ‘whether a parent is capable of

providing for a child’s safety and security or whether such needs can be better

met by terminating a parent’s parental rights.’” M.E., 283 A.3d at 837

(quoting Interest of L.W., 267 A.3d 517, 524 (Pa.Super. 2021)).

Where a parental bond is found to exist, the orphans’ court “must

examine whether termination of parental rights will destroy a ‘necessary and

beneficial relationship,’ thereby causing a child to suffer ‘extreme emotional

consequences.’” M.E., 283 A.3d at 837 (quoting In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481,

484-85 (Pa. 1993)). A “necessary and beneficial bond” is one that “serves

the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” K.T.,

296 A.3d at 1109. “Extreme emotional consequences” means “irreparable

harm,” which exceeds an “adverse or detrimental impact[.]” Id. at 1110-11.

Our Supreme Court has summarized these considerations as follows:

[A]n emotional bond with a parent is legally insufficient to
preclude termination of parental rights without determining
whether such bond is necessary and beneficial to the child and
weighing the other factors present in the record. Likewise, an
adverse effect or detrimental impact of severance alone cannot
demonstrate a necessary and beneficial bond.

Id. at 1114 (cleaned up). Moreover, “although the parental bond is a major

aspect of the [§] 2511(b) analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many

factors to be considered by the court[.]” Id. at 1109 (emphasis added).

With these legal principles in mind, we turn to Parents’ arguments.

Father avers that “[t]he record affirmatively demonstrates that Father shares

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a meaningful, beneficial bond with [the Children.]” Father’s brief at 15.

Mother similarly asserts: “There was substantial evidence to demonstrate the

[Children] have a beneficial and necessary relationship with Mother.” Mother’s

brief at 15. Thus, Parents submit that the orphans’ court’s § 2511(b) analysis

failed to appropriately consider Parents’ bond with the Children and the

potential for harm if that bond was severed. See id. at 21 (“The record clearly

established that [the Children] will suffer if Mother’s rights are terminated.”);

see also Father’s brief at 21 (“Here, the uncontroverted record demonstrates

that the [C]hildren have a meaningful and secure attachment to [Parents],

consistently express a desire to live with or maintain a relationship with them,

and that termination would likely cause emotional harm.”). For the following

reasons, we disagree.

In its Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion, the orphans’ court concluded that CYF

“clearly and convincingly” proved that “terminating [P]arents’ rights was in

the best interests of [the Children], that neither [G.H. or L.H.] would suffer

extreme, unrepairable harm from termination nor did the [C]hildren have a

necessary and beneficial relationship with [Parents], and that termination best

served the [C]hildren’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs.”

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 10/28/25, at 18. While acknowledging that a bond

exists between Parents and the Children, the court found this bond was not

necessary or beneficial, based largely upon Parents’ ongoing struggles with

narcotics. See id. at 38 (“[Parents’] actions, largely dictated and impacted

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by the disease of addiction, rendered themselves no longer necessary or

beneficial to [G.H. or L.H.]”). The court emphasized that Parents had failed

to make any substantive progress with respect to their permanency goals,

explaining: “These were critically important goals that would allow [Parents]

to be in a position where they could meet the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs of [the Children.]” Id. at 19. Overall, the orphans’ court’s

concluded, as follows:

[Parents] expressed feelings of love and affection towards [the
Children], and the court did find their sentiments credible.
However, the totality of the evidence and testimony presented,
along with [the orphans’ court’s] first[-]hand observations and
credibility determinations, overwhelming[ly] supported the
conclusions that the [C]hildren would not suffer serious emotional
harm if parental rights were terminat[ed], the [C]hildren were
bonded and securely attached to their current caregivers, the
foster home was best meeting their developmental, physical, and
emotional needs in a way that [Parents] did not or could not
provide, and that the [C]hildren’s relationship with their parents
was no longer necessary and beneficial.

Id. at 37. The court also “emphasized the safety needs and intangibles of

[the Children] in this analysis,” including “love, comfort, and stability.” Id. at

1. In rendering these findings, the court specifically found the testimony of

Dr. Lobb, Ms. Breighner, and Ms. Conti to be credible. Id. at 38.

Contrary to Parent’s arguments, our review indicates that the orphans’

court’s conclusions pursuant to § 2511(b) are amply supported by the certified

record. In their respective testimonies, Dr. Lobb, Ms. Breighner, and Ms. Conti

each acknowledged that a bond exists between Parents and the Children. See

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N.T., 8/28/25, at 23, 30, 50; N.T., 9/2/25, at 70. They were also unanimous,

however, in noting that this bond was not necessary or beneficial.

Based upon her observations during approximately thirty supervised

visits, Ms. Breighner averred that the bond between Parents and the Children

was “not a secure bond or attachment,” but one which produced “a lot of

anxious behavior from the [C]hildren[.]” N.T., 8/28/25, at 50. When

interacting with Parents, Ms. Breighner observed that the Children “appear

very dysregulated and escalated.” Id. at 51. These behaviors, however, were

not present when the Children interacted with Foster Parents. See id. Dr.

Lobb further explained that while there was “the possibility of some detriment”

due to the termination of Parents’ rights, he believed any negative

consequences would “be overcome by the relationship that [the Children]

have with [Foster Parents] and the stability that they have there.” N.T.,

9/2/25, at 74. He determined the Children were “securely attached” to Foster

Parents, who he also identified as “an appropriate adoptive resource.” Id. at

1. Ms. Breighner further confirmed the existence of a bond between the

Children and Foster Parents, testifying that the Children were particularly

closely bonded with Foster Mother. She explained,

[t]hey seek out affection from [her]. When I’m there for home
visits, they repeatedly come into the room and ask for hugs. Often
times it is hard to have a conversation, because they are coming
in seeking out affection. [Foster Mother] reciprocates that
affection. The girls appear very comfortable with her.

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N.T., 8/28/25, at 51. Finally, Ms. Conti averred that the Agency believed that

Foster Parents were “very much” meeting the Children’s “educational,

psychological and developmental needs.” Id. at 19.

The witness’s conclusions were also largely predicated upon Parents’

lack of progress with respect to their dependency objectives, which had

significant and negative impacts upon the Children’s permanency and the

critical “intangibles” of security, stability, and permanency that were

emphasized by the orphans’ court. Ms. Conti explained that “the Agency

believes the Children deserve permanency,” which Parents could not offer

since “the issues that brought the family to the attention [of the Agency] have

not been rectified.” N.T., 8/28/25, at 38. Dr. Lobb similarly opined that the

Children’s “need of permanency” outweighed any potential detriment that

might result from the severing of Parents’ parental rights. N.T., 9/2/25, at

1. Finally, Ms. Breighner expressed her concern that Parents were continuing

to struggle with substance abuse by detailing several incidents that occurred

between June 2025 and August 2025, wherein Parents appeared to be under

the influence of narcotics during visits with the Children. See id. at 47-49.

Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the orphans’ court’s conclusions pursuant to § 2511(b). Contrary to

Parents’ arguments, the certified record fully supports these findings.

We acknowledge that the Children in this case are opposed to

termination and have argued in favor of reversing the orders involuntarily

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terminating Parent’s parental rights. Their arguments, however, are

essentially the same as Parents’ arguments, i.e., that the orphans’ court’s

findings were not supported by competent evidence. See Children’s brief

(Father’s cases) at 8 (contesting that CYF “presented proof at trial of grounds

for the termination of [Father’s] parental rights by clear and convincing

evidence”); Children’s brief (Mother’s cases) at 9 (same).

There is no dispute that the Children have expressed their desire to be

reunited with Parents. We emphasize, however, that “courts correctly refine

their focus on the child’s development and mental and emotional health rather

than considering only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’ for the parent, which

even badly abused and neglected children will retain.” K.T., 296 A.3d at 1111

(cleaned up). We previously expounded upon this point thusly:

[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent. . . .
Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between
[the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to
establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and its mental and emotional health than
the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (cleaned up).

The Children’s preference is not dispositive. Instantly, the orphans’ court

considered the pertinent need-and-welfare factors to be assessed pursuant to

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Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d at 1105, and the certified record supports its

conclusion that the benefits of moving the Children toward a permanent home

with Foster Mother offsets their desire to maintain their connection with

Parents. Thus, mindful of our deferential standard of review, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that terminating parental rights

serves the Children's needs and welfare by allowing them to achieve

permanency with Foster Mother. Accordingly, we affirm the orders

terminating Parents’ parental rights.

Orders affirmed.

DATE: 3/13/2026

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