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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Bryte, C.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 573 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Bowes

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (96)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

                        by [Mary Janes Bowes](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8225/mary-janes-bowes/)

J-S01009-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CHANZE STEPHEN BRYTE :
:
Appellant : No. 573 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0000627-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MARCH 13, 2026

Chanze Stephen Bryte appeals from the judgment of sentence of six to

twelve years of incarceration, followed by twelve months of reentry

supervision, imposed after a jury convicted him of possession of a firearm

prohibited. We affirm.

We glean the following underlying facts from the evidence offered at

Appellant’s trial. On the afternoon of January 25, 2024, Officer Terry Robatin

of the Uniontown City Police Department responded to reports of a

neighborhood dispute. Immediately upon turning onto Askren Street, he

observed Appellant, with whom he was familiar, standing in the street with a

firearm and arguing with a neighbor. Officer Robatin pulled over, exited his

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• Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-S01009-26

vehicle, drew his weapon, and ordered Appellant to drop the gun. He ignored

the officer and walked into an apartment building. He remained inside the

building for “half a minute or less” while Officer Robatin radioed for backup.

Appellant then returned outside holding a cell phone instead of the firearm,

raised his hands in the air while yelling “it’s a cell phone,” and proceeded to

drop the phone before lowering himself to the ground. See N.T. Trial, 4/7/25,

at 9.

After taking Appellant into custody, police on the scene searched in and

around the structure to locate the weapon. Officer Robatin went into the foyer

of the apartment building and made contact with individuals on the first floor

who did not know Appellant but indicated that someone had hurriedly come

into the building and gone to an upstairs apartment. The officer proceeded to

the second and obtained consent to search one of the apartments, and

ultimately recovered a loaded pistol from a bag of dirty clothes in the

bathroom. The gun’s appearance was consistent with the weapon he had

observed in Appellant’s possession. Officer Robatin’s vehicle and body

cameras recorded these events, and the jury viewed the videos.1

Appellant did not object to the officer’s testimony that an occupant of

the apartment had given consent for the search or the video footage

memorializing the interactions. In fact, he elicited additional testimony about

---

1 It is unclear from the certified record whether the jury viewed the entirety

of this footage or only select portions.

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J-S01009-26

Officer Robatin’s communications with the people he encountered in the

residence on cross-examination:

Q. Now, someone else lets you search the apartment. Correct?
The person who occupied it. Correct?

A. Yeah. The resident of the apartment.

Q. They consented to that search?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they lead you to the weapon?

A. No.

Q. But they did give you consent to search it?

A. Yes.

Q. But they just sat back and let you search the place?

A. Yes.

Q. This is a yes or no question. Were you ever informed from
anybody in that apartment that [it] was my client’s gun?

A. No.

Id. at 14.

Pollice Chief Delbert DeWitt testified that he conducted a videotaped

interview of Appellant at the police station after he waived his rights in

accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). During the

course of the interrogation, Appellant admitted not only to possessing the

firearm, but to having fired it into the air earlier on the date of the incident.

Id. at 27. The jury viewed the pertinent portions of this video footage.

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J-S01009-26

The Commonwealth’s final witness established that Appellant had a

2014 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to

deliver (“PWID”). Thereafter, the Commonwealth moved to admit its exhibits

into evidence, including the recovered firearm. Appellant objected on the

basis that his Confrontation Clause rights would be violated by allowing its

admission because the person who purportedly consented to the search of the

apartment from which it was recovered did not appear at trial to be cross-

examined. After confirming that Appellant had not pursued a pre-trial

suppression motion, the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the

weapon into evidence. Id. at 37.

The jury convicted Appellant of violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1), which

prohibits, inter alia, persons who have been convicted of PWID from using,

possessing, or controlling a firearm. The trial court sentenced him as indicated

above. Appellant filed no valid post-sentence motion,2 but timely appealed to

this Court. Appellant and the trial court subsequently complied with their

respective Pa.R.A.P. 1925 obligations.3

---

2 Appellant submitted a pro se motion that was forwarded to counsel, but
which the court properly disregarded. See Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928
A.2d 349, 355 (Pa.Super. 2007) (holding pro se post-sentence motion filed by
a defendant who was represented by counsel was “a nullity, having no legal
effect”).

3 Appellant filed a pro se document purporting to amend counsel’s Rule
1925(b) statement, but that filing was likewise inoperative. See
Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 293 (Pa. 2010).

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J-S01009-26

Appellant presents the following question for our determination:

Did the court abuse its discretion by admitting the firearm into
evidence when the firearm was found by police only because of
the hearsay of another witness who accused [Appellant], which is
in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I, [§] 9 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (capitalization altered).4

We begin with the applicable legal principles. “The admission of

evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court[.]”

Commonwealth v. Bernarsky, 348 A.3d 304, 325 (Pa.Super. 2025)

(cleaned up). This Court will not disturb the trial court’s decision “unless that

ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-

will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.” Id. at 325-26 (cleaned

up).

Both the federal and Pennsylvania constitutions guarantee “all criminal

defendants the right to confront their accusers in a public trial. Thus, absent

a defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine a witness, that witness’s out of

court statements are not admissible at trial.” Commonwealth v. Walker,

___ A.3d ___, 2026 WL 247429, at *18 (Pa. 2026). However, this right

applies only to evidence that is testimonial in nature. See Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). “Testimonial statements are statements

---

4 We note with displeasure that the Commonwealth neither filed an appellate

brief nor advised this Court of its intent to refrain from doing so.

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J-S01009-26

made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact. To determine

whether a statement is testimonial or nontestimonial, courts consider whether

the statements were made for the primary purpose of establishing or proving

past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”

Commonwealth v. Nabried, 327 A.3d 315, 326 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned

up). Critically, “the Confrontation Clause’s requirements apply only when the

prosecution uses out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter asserted.”

Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783 (2024).

Here, the trial court explained its decision to admit the firearm over

Appellant’s objection thusly:

Officer [Robatin] requested to search one of the apartments and
he located the firearm in the bathroom in the bottom of a bag of
clothing. No testimony was presented that the residents directed
the officers to the laundry bag or even admitted that the firearm
was in the laundry bag. Officer Robatin testified that the residents
in the apartment never informed him that the gun belonged to the
Appellant. Nor did the residents lead the officer to the location of
the weapon. Officer Robatin testified that the residents sat back
and let him search.

There was no objection to the questioning about the search of the
apartment nor was there any abuse of discretion by the trial court
[in] permitting the weapon to be admitted into evidence. Officer
Robatin identified the weapon, located it without assistance, and
the residents did not make any statements about the ownership
of the firearm.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/25/25, at 3 (pagination supplied).

Appellant’s argument that the trial court’s ruling constitutes an abuse of

discretion is, at bottom, as follows:

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J-S01009-26

The Commonwealth used testimonial hearsay, i.e. the consenting
occupant’s out-of-court assertions, to justify admission of the
firearm. The firearm was recovered solely because police
conducted a search of a private, independent apartment at 62
Askren based on the occupant’s purported consent. The occupant
did not testify; the Commonwealth elicited from Officer Robatin
that “the resident of that apartment” gave consent. The defense
objected that admitting the firearm based on that absent witness’s
consent violated the Confrontation Clause.

The Commonwealth thus relied on the occupant’s out-of-court
statements, which were communicated to law enforcement in
direct response to an active investigation, to establish the
foundation to admit the recovered firearm. Those statements are
testimonial: they were made to police officers during an
investigation to facilitate a search and possible prosecution, and
they were presented at trial through an officer to establish a
crucial foundational fact necessary for admissibility of the seized
evidence.

Appellant’s brief at 10 (cleaned up).

Appellant is not entitled to relief. Significantly, he does not contend that

the Commonwealth proffered hearsay statements suggesting that Appellant

had possessed the firearm that was uncovered by the search. Indeed, it was

Appellant, not the Commonwealth, who queried Officer Robatin about whether

the non-testifying defendants implicated Appellant, and elicited from Chief

Dewitt that the occupant of the apartment denied that Appellant had ever

been there. See N.T. Trial, 4/7/25, at 14, 30.

Rather, evidence that Appellant claims was admitted in violation of his

right to confront witnesses against him was the loaded pistol found in a bag

of dirty laundry. That object contained no declarations “made for the primary

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J-S01009-26

purpose of establishing or proving past events potentially relevant to later

criminal prosecution.” Nabried, 327 A.3d at 326 (cleaned up).

The statement that Appellant challenges, i.e., that the occupant of the

apartment from which the firearm was recovered consented to the search,

likewise was not made to prove past events for use in a later prosecution.5

Further, that statement did not provide the foundation for relevance of the

evidence. The foundation was established by Officer Robatin’s testimony that

he found the weapon in the building into which he watched Appellant walk

with a firearm, and it was consistent in appearance with what he saw in

Appellant’s hand. See Pa.R.E. 901(b) (indicating that an item of evidence

may be identified by, inter alia, “[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed

to be,” and “[t]he appearance . . . of the item, taken together with all the

circumstances”).

Moreover, it was not offered by the Commonwealth to prove the truth

of the matter asserted. Appellant was not pursuing a motion to suppress the

fruits of the search by asserting that it was invalid because he had an

expectation of privacy in the area that was searched. At Appellant’s trial,

whether the occupants actually consented was not relevant to any issue the

Commonwealth was seeking to prove. Hence, the admission of the firearm

---

5 As noted above, Appellant raised no objection, hearsay or otherwise, to the

testimony about the occupant’s consent.

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J-S01009-26

obtained in the search did not violate Appellant’s Sixth Amendment

confrontation rights. See Smith, 602 U.S. at 783.

Stated plainly, Appellant’s claim that the admission of the firearm

violated his Confrontation Clause rights has no basis in law or fact. As such,

the trial court properly admitted it over Appellant’s objection. We accordingly

have no cause to disturb his conviction or the resultant judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 3/13/2026

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