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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Austin Moore, Adam Day, and A&A Investment Property, LLC v. Woodrow Alan Carter

Supreme Court of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC-2025-0452

• Judges: McCool, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.4K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 13, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

SC-2025-0452

---

Ex parte Woodrow Alan Carter

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

(In re: Austin Moore, Adam Day, and A&A Investment Property,
LLC

v.

Woodrow Alan Carter et al.)

(Dallas Circuit Court: CV-24-900347)

McCOOL, Justice.
SC-2025-0452

Woodrow Alan Carter is a defendant in an action currently pending

in the Dallas Circuit Court ("the circuit court"), and he has petitioned this

Court for a writ of mandamus, asking us to direct the circuit court to

grant his motion for a change of venue. For the reasons set forth herein,

we grant the petition and issue the writ.

Facts and Procedural History

Austin Moore, Adam Day, and A&A Investment Property, LLC

("the plaintiffs"), are the owners of real property -- specifically, a

commercial building ("the building") -- that is located in Dallas County.

At the time of the events giving rise to this case, the plaintiffs had an

insurance policy ("the policy") that had been sold and issued to them in

Dallas County by Auto-Owners Insurance Company ("Auto-Owners"),

and the policy generally provided insurance coverage for "direct physical

loss of or damage to" the building. According to the plaintiffs, in June

2024 the building was damaged "as a result of trespass, vandalism and

theft," so they submitted an insurance claim to Auto-Owners, which

employs Carter as a claims representative. Carter "work[s] out of [his]

home office in Mobile County," and, although his duties require him to

travel to other Alabama counties, Dallas County is not among them.

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SC-2025-0452

However, Carter was tasked with reviewing the plaintiffs' insurance

claim "due to overflow."

Following an inspection of the building, which was conducted by "a

third-party independent investigator," Carter sent the plaintiffs a letter

explaining that their insurance claim had been denied. In that letter,

Carter purported to quote a provision of the policy that, he said,

prohibited insurance coverage for any damage that occurred to the

building if the building was "vacant" at the time it was damaged.

According to Carter, that provision stated, in relevant part:

"6. Vacancy

"a. Description of Terms

"(1) As used in this Vacancy Condition, the term …
vacant ha[s] the meaning[] set forth in (1)(a) and
(1)(b) below:

"(a) … [The] building is vacant when it
does not contain enough business
personal property to conduct
customary operations.

"(b) … [The] building is vacant unless
at least 31% of its total square footage
is:

"….

3
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"2) Used by the building
owner to conduct customary
operations.
"….

"b. Vacancy Provisions

"If the building where loss or damage occurs has been vacant
for more than 60 consecutive days before that loss or damage
occurs:

"(1) We will not pay for any loss or damage caused
by any of the following ….

"(a) Vandalism;

"….

"(e) Theft."

Relying on the foregoing, Carter's denial letter stated:

"We completed an inspection of your property on June 14,
2024. During the inspection it was determined that the
structure was the support branch for People's Choice Bank.
Per the field adjuster the building was vacant at time of loss.
Per the insured the building is used as a storage facility for
their plumbing business but was emptied out for possible sale
of the property.

"….

"During the inspection, we observed damage to the electrical
wiring in the building as well as the generators. We did not
see any signs of a customary business. Our inspection
concluded that there was significant theft/vandalism damage
to the electrical wiring as well as some ceiling tiles to the
interior of the rooms. The building is at the end of a secluded
4
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road not visible by traffic. The adjuster stated that the
cameras were all pointed up and no recording of the
theft/vandalism was available. We received an estimate for
the damages to the electrical in the amount of $485,000; this
did not include repairing the generators. Per the photos and
statements from the field adjuster the building appears to be
a vacant building. Your policy specifies that such building is
vacant when it does not contain enough business personal
property to conduct customary operations. You have stated
there has never been an active business and have never had
a tenant in the building.

"Based on the facts as they have been presented and the …
policy language, we have no alternative but to respectfully
deny your claim."

After receiving the denial letter, the plaintiffs filed a complaint

against Carter in the circuit court, asserting claims of slander, the tort of

outrage, and fraud and deceit. In support of their claims, the plaintiffs

alleged, in short, that Carter had fraudulently denied their insurance

claim by "alter[ing] the terms and/or conditions of the … policy in the

denial in order to manipulate the … claim into a pre-determined position

that would allegedly support the denial" and by "deliberately and

intentionally ignor[ing] evidence that supported payment of the claim

and/or wrongfully categoriz[ing] evidence in a manner that would

support the wrongful and fraudulent denial." The plaintiffs also alleged

that Carter had "defame[d] and slander[ed]" them by misrepresenting to

5
SC-2025-0452

third parties that they had committed "felonious criminal conduct" --

namely, "filing and/or pursuing a false and/or fraudulent insurance

claim." As relief for their claims, the plaintiffs seek damages for the

"value of the unpaid [insurance] claim," "mental anguish" and "damage

to reputation"; they also seek punitive damages.

Following the filing of the complaint, Carter filed a motion to

change the venue to Mobile County. Carter supported his motion with

his affidavit, in which he attested that he had "never resided in Dallas

County"; that, "at all times material to this case," he had been "a

permanent resident of Mobile County" and had "work[ed] … within

Mobile County"; that he had not traveled to Dallas County in conjunction

with his review of the plaintiffs' insurance claim and that, instead, "[t]he

on-site inspection … was … conducted by a third-party independent

investigator"; and that all of the actions he had taken in reviewing the

plaintiffs' insurance claim, including his telephone and email

communications and his issuance of the denial letter, had "originated

from Mobile County." Thus, according to Carter, venue for the plaintiffs'

action is proper in Mobile County. Carter also filed an answer to the

complaint, in which he defended his denial of the plaintiffs' insurance

6
SC-2025-0452

claim on the basis that the claim "was barred under the policy terms

because the [building] was 'vacant' as defined by the … policy, and

damages arising from vandalism or theft are not covered for a 'vacant'

building."

After Carter moved to change the venue, the plaintiffs filed an

amended complaint in which they "adopt[ed] and re-alleg[ed] all claims,

demands and averments … in the original complaint." The plaintiffs

then set forth in further detail the factual allegations that, they said,

supported their claims against Carter.1 In addition to the allegations in

the original complaint, the amended complaint alleged:

1The plaintiffs' amended complaint also added other defendants,

including Auto-Owners, and asserted other claims against those
defendants. However, "[t]he question of proper venue for an action is
determined at the commencement of the action," Ex parte Pratt, 815 So.
2d 532, 534 (Ala. 2001), so the addition of new defendants and new claims
in the plaintiffs' amended complaint has no bearing on the venue issue.
See Ex parte Lugo de Vega, 65 So. 3d 886, 892 (Ala. 2010) ("Later
amendments to the complaint to add parties or claims, with the exception
of substituting the true name of a fictitiously named party, are not
considered in determining whether venue is improper at the
commencement of the action."). On the other hand, with respect to
Carter, the additional factual allegations in the amended complaint may
be considered in resolving the venue issue. See Ex parte Maynard,
Cooper & Gale, P.C., 280 So. 3d 391, 396 (Ala. 2018) (taking into
consideration the "additional allegations of fact" in the plaintiffs'
amended complaint, which was filed after the defendant moved to change
7
SC-2025-0452

On or about … June 11, 2024, [the plaintiffs] suffered a
covered and compensable loss to [the building] as a result of
trespass, vandalism and theft. … [Carter's] written denial
[of the plaintiffs' insurance claim] acknowledged that the loss
was caused by a trespass -- '[o]ur inspection concluded that
there was significant theft/vandalism ... in the amount of
$485,000.' The basis for the denial related specifically to the
manner, method and extent to which the plaintiffs were using
the [building] at the time of the loss. More particularly, the
denial alleged 'the building was vacant at the time of the loss';
the building 'was the support branch for People's Choice
Bank'; the building was 'used as a storage facility for their
plumbing business but was emptied out for possible sale'; and
the building had no 'signs of customary business.'
Furthermore, the denial relied upon provisions of the policy
that defined and/or addressed whether the property was
vacant, the percentage of square footage of occupancy, the
purpose of said occupancy and whether the property was
being used for a 'customary business.' In so doing, the denial
raised issues regarding the ownership, nature, character and
use of the insured real estate as it existed at the time of the
trespass and theft.

"[The plaintiffs] allege and aver as follows:

"that the denial of the [insurance]
claim was contrary to the terms and
conditions of the … policy, and was
premised entirely upon the property's
ownership/tenancy; history; use and
occupancy;

"that the denial was without
reasonable and/or arguable basis;

the venue, when considering whether the denial of the defendant's
motion was proper).
8
SC-2025-0452

"that the denial was the result of an
intentional and/or deliberate failure to
properly investigate the [insurance]
claim and/or an intentional failure to
submit the results of any investigation
to an objective, cognitive analysis that
was premised upon principles of good
faith and fair dealing;

"that during the course of the
adjustment of the [insurance] claim,
Carter … did intentionally employ
heavy handed, threatening,
manipulative, fraudulent and/or
intimidating techniques to falsely
and/or fraudulently create a debatable
reason to deny the [insurance] claim;

"that Carter … did intentionally,
deliberately and fraudulently alter,
ignore and/or categorize evidence as to
the true use, occupancy,
ownership/tenancy, etc. of the subject
real property in order to falsely
manipulate the [insurance] claim into a
pre-determined position of denial;

"that Carter did intentionally
misrepresent to third parties that the
[insurance] claim was criminal and/or
fraudulent. Said misrepresentations
were made with the specific intent of
affecting said third party's ability
and/or willingness to supply evidence
that would support payment of the
[insurance] claim;

9
SC-2025-0452

"that Carter … did deliberately and
intentionally ignore evidence as to the
use and/or occupancy of the real estate
that supported payment of the
[insurance] claim; did intentionally
categorize evidence as to use,
occupancy and/or ownership/tenancy of
the real estate at the time of the loss in
such a manner as to create a
fraudulent/bad faith denial; did
deliberately and intentionally
categorize and/or attribute evidence to
create a false basis for denial; and did
intentionally fail to disclose efforts to
intimidate a factual witness and that
material evidence was being ignored
and/or mis-characterized so as to
allegedly support a bad faith denial;

"that during the claim
adjustment/investigation process,
Carter did intentionally defame and
slander [the plaintiffs] by knowingly,
intentionally, maliciously, and/or
deliberately publishing false
statements about [the] plaintiffs to
third parties. More particularly, [the
plaintiffs] aver that Carter did accuse
the plaintiffs of a felonious act
involving moral turpitude, to wit: filing
and/or pursuing a false and/or
fraudulent insurance claim. In so
doing, Carter did slander the
[plaintiffs] with regard to their
representations as to the ownership,
tenancy, intended and/or actual use,
and use capacity of the subject
property. [The plaintiffs] aver that the
10
SC-2025-0452

defamatory and/or slanderous
statements were made with personal
contempt, to aid Carter's
employer/principal in denying the
subject claim, and/or to benefit Carter
in his work and/or association with
Auto-Owners;

"that as a result of the damage to the
insured real estate caused by the
subject trespass, … Carter … had a
duty and obligation of good faith and
fair dealing to fully and properly
investigate the [insurance] claim. Said
investigation would have included a
good faith assessment of the property's
ownership/tenancy; condition; current
use; past use and damage;

"that the real estate remains in a state
of disrepair; and

"that the real estate has suffered and
continues to suffer further diminution
in value, ongoing exacerbation of
depreciation in condition/value and
waste."

Following the filing of the amended complaint, Carter renewed his

motion to change the venue to Mobile County. The plaintiffs then filed a

response to Carter's motion, arguing that their action against him

"involve[s] the use, condition, or damage to real property," which, they

said, meant that "the case must be brought where the real estate is

11
SC-2025-0452

located," i.e., in Dallas County. (Emphasis in original.) According to the

plaintiffs, this is true "even if real estate is not the exclusive subject

matter of the case." Carter argued in reply that "the subject matter of

this dispute is insurance[,] not real estate," and that, although "the

coverage decision at issue impacts potential insurance proceeds that

might be used to fix the [building], … that does not make real estate the

subject of the action."

The circuit court held a hearing on Carter's motion to change the

venue, but, if a transcript of that hearing exists, it has not been provided

to this Court. Following the hearing, the circuit court issued an order

denying Carter's motion. That order states, in relevant part:

"Carter contends that transfer of the claims against him
is required by [Rule] 82(b)(1)(A), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the venue
provision relating to personal claims against resident
defendants. In summary, Carter argues that he is a resident
of Mobile County and that none of his alleged overt acts were
committed in Dallas County as he never traveled there to
investigate the [insurance] claim, did not conduct any
business related to the claim in Dallas County, and never had
communications with anyone while he was in Dallas County.

"The plaintiffs contend that venue as to Carter is
controlled by [Rule] 82(b)(1)(B), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] the venue
provision relating to claims against resident individuals
where real estate or trespass is, at least in part, the subject
matter of th[e] action. The plaintiffs rely upon the plain
language of [Rule] 82(b)(1)(B) and Ex parte Mullen[, 394 So.
12
SC-2025-0452

3d 1072 (Ala. 2024),] and Ex parte E3 Pest Control[, LLC, 414
So. 3d 107 (Ala. 2024)].

"The court has carefully reviewed the case authority
relied upon by the parties for their respective positions. After
doing so, the court finds that [Rule] 82(b)(1)(B) and the
opinions in Ex parte Mullen and Ex Parte E3 Pest Control are
controlling. The subject matter of this case, even if not
exclusively, is the plaintiffs' real estate located in Dallas
County. In Carter's denial letter, he wrote that the
[insurance] claim was denied because the plaintiffs' building
was vacant at the time of the loss. His letter stated that at
the time of the loss: the building was a storage facility; the
building was empty; the building had no signs of customary
business; the building did not contain an active business; the
building did not contain enough personal property to conduct
customary operations; the building did not have an active
business; and the building did not have a tenant. The letter
also quoted policy provisions as to whether less than 31% of
the square footage was in use when the loss occurred.
Considering the parties' submissions, the predominant
factual issues in the case relate directly to the manner in
which the property was being used at the time of the loss; who
and for what purpose the property was being used at the time
of the loss; and, how much of the property was being used at
the time of the loss. In the plaintiffs' complaint, allegations
are made that directly address these factual issues and
evidence. The plaintiffs allege that Carter committed fraud
for the specific purpose of affecting a third party's willingness
or ability to supply evidence regarding the property that
would have supported the [insurance] claim. They allege
Carter altered provisions of the policy related to use of the
building to manipulate the denial. And, the plaintiffs
specifically allege that Carter intentionally ignored and
wrongfully categorized evidence regarding the property in a
way that would justify a denial. The condition, occupancy,
capacity and the manner of use of the real property are at the
core of the plaintiffs' factual assertions and their legal claims.
13
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Also, in his answer to the complaint, Carter admits that the
[insurance] claim involved real property in Dallas County,
and that the basis for the denial was the alleged vacancy of
the building at the time of the loss.

"The court also finds that the subject matter of the case,
at least in part, involves a trespass to the plaintiffs' property.
The denial letter states that the plaintiffs' loss was a result of
theft and vandalism. A trespass occurred, and it is the very
event that gave rise to this case. The plain language of [Rule]
82(b)(1)(B) does not require that a claim of trespass be made
directly against the individual defendant for this provision to
apply. Ex parte Mullen requires that the language of the rule
be applied as written. No such requirement exists.

"….

"It is therefore adjudged and decreed that venue in
Dallas County is proper and Carter's motion to transfer venue
is denied."

Carter timely sought mandamus relief in this Court.

Standard of Review

" 'Mandamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ, to be
issued only where there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3)
the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked
jurisdiction of the court.' "

Ex parte Jones, 414 So. 3d 86, 88-89 (Ala. 2024) (citation omitted).

" 'A trial court's denial of a motion to transfer based on
improper venue is reviewable by a petition for writ of
mandamus, and "such a petition is due to be granted if the
petitioner makes a clear showing of error on the part of the
14
SC-2025-0452

trial court." Ex parte Alabama Power Co., 640 So. 2d 921, 922
(Ala. 1994).' Ex parte Burr & Forman, LLP, 5 So. 3d 557, 565
(Ala. 2008)."

Ex parte Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc., 74 So. 3d 940, 942 (Ala. 2011).

Discussion

The sole issue in this case is whether the circuit court erred by

concluding that Dallas County is the proper venue for the plaintiffs'

action against Carter. Specifically, at issue here is Rule 82(b)(1), Ala. R.

Civ. P., which states:

"Actions against an individual or individuals having a
permanent residence in this state:

"(A) Must be brought in the county where the
defendant or any material defendant resides at the
commencement of the action, except that if the
action is a personal action other than an action on
a contract, it may be brought either in the county
where the act or omission complained of occurred,
or in the county of the permanent residence of the
defendant or one of them;

"(B) Must, if the subject matter of the action
is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or if it is
for recovery or the possession thereof or trespass
thereto, be brought in the county where the real
estate or a material portion thereof is situated."

(Emphasis added.) Thus, if the "subject matter" of the plaintiffs' action

is the building, "whether or not exclusively," then, pursuant to Rule

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82(b)(1)(B), venue is proper only in Dallas County, where the building is

located. If, on the other hand, the "subject matter" of the plaintiffs' action

is not the building, then, pursuant to Rule 82(b)(1)(A), venue is proper in

Mobile County, where Carter resides and where "the act or omission

complained of occurred."

In denying Carter's motion to change the venue, the circuit court

relied on this Court's decisions in Ex parte E3 Pest Control, LLC, 414 So.

3d 107 (Ala. 2024), and Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d 1072 (Ala. 2024). In

Ex parte E3 Pest Control, Timothy and Angela Garfield entered into a

contract with Michael Adams and E3 Pest Control, LLC (referred to

collectively as "E3"), whereby E3 agreed to identify and treat any termite

infestations in the Garfields' residence in Baldwin County. After the

Garfields discovered termite damage and a termite infestation in their

residence, they sued E3, asserting, among other claims, claims of

negligence; wantonness; and negligent and/or wanton hiring, training,

supervision, and retention of employees. The Garfields filed their

complaint in the Mobile Circuit Court because E3's principal place of

business was located in Mobile County, and, thereafter, E3 moved to

change the venue to Baldwin County, where the Garfields' residence was

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located. The Mobile Circuit Court denied E3's motion, and E3 then

sought mandamus relief in this Court. In reviewing E3's petition, this

Court discussed its prior decision in Ex parte Mullen:

" '[T]he … question is whether "the subject matter of the action
is real estate, whether or not exclusively." See [Rule
82(b)(1)(B)].' [Ex parte Mullen,] 394 So. 3d [1072,] 1076 [(Ala.
2024)].

"In ascertaining the meaning of the phrase 'subject
matter,' we … reasoned as follows in Ex parte Mullen:

" '[T]he pertinent language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is
derived from the predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2[,
Ala. Code 1975]. The phrase "subject matter" first
appeared in one such statute in § 3760 of the
Alabama Code of 1876. This Court has explained
that " '[w]ords used in a statute must be given their
natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly
understood meaning, and where plain language is
used a court is bound to interpret that language to
mean exactly what it says.' " Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293,
296 (Ala. 1998) (quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems
Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992)).

" 'The first edition of Black's Law Dictionary
was published in 1891. At that time, Black's Law
Dictionary defined "subject matter" as: "The thing
in controversy, or the matter spoken or written
about." Black's Law Dictionary 1130 (1st ed.
1891). At the time Rule 82(b)(1)(B) was adopted in
1973, Black's Law Dictionary defined "subject
matter" as: "The subject, or matter presented for
consideration; the thing in dispute; the right which
17
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one party claims as against another .... Nature of
cause of action, and of relief sought." Black's Law
Dictionary 1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The current
edition of Black's Law Dictionary defines "subject
matter" as: "The issue presented for consideration;
the thing in which a right or duty has been
asserted; the thing in dispute." Black's Law
Dictionary 1723 (11th ed. 2019).'

"394 So. 3d at 1076-77.

"In relevant part, [in Ex parte Mullen] we applied the
plain meaning of the phrase 'subject matter' as follows:

" '[T]he gravamen of the Leos' complaint is that the
Mullens improperly designed and constructed the
residence located on the property and sold it to the
Leos in an uninhabitable condition by making
false advertisements and representations
concerning the condition of the residence. ...

" 'In particular, we note that the Leos averred
that the Mullens "had a duty to exercise
reasonable care by properly designing and
constructing the [Leos]' home in a good and
workmanlike manner free from defects. [The
Mullens] breached their duty to exercise
reasonable care by [im]properly designing and
constructing the [Leos]' home." The Leos also
averred that, "[i]n entering into the contract for
the purchase of the [p]roperty, [the Mullens] made
certain materially false representations to the
[Leos], including but not limited to advertisements
and representations that the home was new as
well as representations that the home was free
from known and latent defects."

18
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" 'Thus, "[t]he thing[s] in controversy" in this
case are the condition of the residence located on
the property and the Mullens' representations
regarding that condition. See Black's Law
Dictionary 1130 (1st ed. 1891). Moreover, the
condition of the residence and the Mullens' related
conduct are the "matter[s] presented for
consideration [and] the thing[s] in dispute." See
Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968).
The rights asserted by the Leos against the
Mullens are reasonable care in the design and
construction of the residence and true
representations concerning the condition of the
residence. See id. Correspondingly, the residence
is "the thing in which a ... duty has been asserted,"
considering that the Leos averred that the Mullens
had "a duty to exercise reasonable care by properly
designing and constructing the [Leos]' home in a
good and workmanlike manner free from defects."
See Black's Law Dictionary 1723 (11th ed. 2019).
Therefore, we conclude that, in also considering
the historical plain meaning of the phrase "subject
matter," as used in the context of Rule 82(b)(1)(B),
the property is the subject matter of the Leos'
action against the Mullens.'

"394 So. 3d at 1079.

"In this case, the Garfields argue that their residence is
not the 'subject matter' of their action within the meaning of
Rule 82(b)(1)(B) …. In examining their chosen theories of
liability, however, we cannot agree that their residence is not
the subject matter of at least some of those theories.

"… Regarding their negligence claim, the Garfields
alleged that

19
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" 'the [d]efendants had an independent duty at
common law as a regulated licensee of the
[Alabama Department of Agriculture and
Industries] to fully provide all necessary termite
prevention and control services for the [Garfields]'
[h]ome in order to protect it against termite
infestation and damage and to do so in a
reasonable and workmanlike manner.'

"(Emphasis added.) The Garfields further alleged that Adams
'owed independent duties to … [the Garfields] to ensure that
the work performed at their [h]ome by employees operating
under his license met the minimum standards set forth by the
[Alabama Department of Agriculture and Industries'] rules
and regulations.' (Emphasis added.) The Garfields'
wantonness and 'negligent and/or wanton hiring, training,
supervision & retention of employees' claims also rely on these
same or similar allegations. Of course, the Garfields'
complaint further alleges that the defendants breached these
duties and proximately caused resulting damage to their
residence, contending: '[T]he [h]ome will require substantial
repairs, including the potential that the home may need to be
rebuilt.'

"Thus, at least insofar as these three claims are
concerned,

" ' "[t]he thing[ ] in controversy" ... [is] the condition
of the residence located on the property .... See
Black's Law Dictionary 1130 (1st ed. 1891).
Moreover, the condition of the residence and the
[the defendants]' related conduct are the
"matter[s] presented for consideration [and] the
thing[s] in dispute." See Black's Law Dictionary
1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The rights asserted by
the [Garfields] against the [defendants] are
reasonable care in the [inspection and treatment]
of the residence .... See id. Correspondingly, the
20
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residence is "the thing in which a ... duty has been
asserted," considering that the [Garfields alleged]
that the [defendants] had "a duty to [protect it
against termite infestation and damage and to do
so in a reasonable and workmanlike manner]."
See Black's Law Dictionary 1723 (11th ed. 2019).'

"Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1079.

"Therefore, we conclude that, in considering the
historical plain meaning of the phrase 'subject matter,' as
used in the context of Rule 82(b)(1)(B), the Garfields' real
property is the subject matter of at least three of the Garfields'
claims. Furthermore, in light of the mandatory language of
Rule 82(b)(1)(B), venue for this action is proper only in
Baldwin County, where the Garfields' residence is located,
even assuming, without deciding, that Mobile County would
be a proper venue for some of their other claims, had those
claims been asserted alone. See Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d
at 1079-80 (' "Actions concerning real estate must be brought
in the county where the real estate, or a material portion
thereof, is located, 'whether it is the exclusive subject matter
of the action or not.' " ' (quoting Ex parte Travis, 573 So. 2d
[281,] 282 [(Ala. 1990)], quoting in turn § 6-3-2(b)(1)))."

414 So. 3d at 113-15.

Carter contends that this case is distinguishable from Ex parte E3

Pest Control and Ex parte Mullen because, unlike the defendants in those

cases, he "is not alleged to have directly damaged the [building], nor is he

alleged to have breached any duty directly relating to the [building]."

Petition, p. 22. Instead, Carter argues, the plaintiffs' claims against him

involve "allegations of mishandling an insurance claim and defamatory
21
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statements in relation thereto, not real estate." Id., p. 17. Carter

concedes that "[t]here is no question that the insurance coverage decision

at issue in this action impacts potential insurance proceeds that might

be used to repair the … [building]," but he argues that this fact "does not

make real estate the subject of the action." Id., p. 24. According to

Carter, "[i]ndividual tort claims against an insurance claims

representative cannot be converted into a real estate action simply

because the insurance claim involves real property." Id., p. 8. Thus,

Carter argues that the circuit court "committed clear error by

determining that the subject of the tort claims against [him] is real

estate." Id., p. 16.

The plaintiffs argue in response that their claims against Carter

are based on the contention that he should have approved their insurance

claim, and they note that Carter denied the insurance claim based on his

conclusion that the building was "vacant," as that term is defined by the

policy, at the time it was damaged. The plaintiffs have alleged in their

complaint, however, that the building was not "vacant" at that time. As

the plaintiffs note in their answer to Carter's petition, "[i]nherent within

[the] contentions [in the complaint] [is] that the [building] was not vacant

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and that it was being actively used in the course of [their] customary

business at the time of the loss." Answer, p. 10. Thus, according to the

plaintiffs, "the fundamental issue … at the very heart of [their] claims

against [Carter]" is "the condition of the [building] at the time of the loss"

-- namely, whether the building was indeed "vacant" at that time. Id., p.

1. In fact, the plaintiffs argue that "[i]t is no understatement to say that

this case cannot be adjudicated without deciding the question of

vacancy." Id., p. 13 (emphasis in original).

We agree with Carter's contention that this case is distinguishable

from Ex parte E3 Pest Control and Ex parte Mullen. In each of those

cases, this Court held that the residence in question was the subject

matter of the plaintiffs' action because the plaintiffs had alleged that the

defendants had a duty with respect to the residence -- the duty to identify

and treat termite infestations in Ex parte E3 Pest Control and the duty

to properly design and construct in Ex parte Mullen -- and that the

defendants had breached that duty, thereby resulting in damage to the

residence. Here, on the other hand, the plaintiffs have not alleged that

Carter had any duty with respect to the building or that he caused any

damage to the building. Instead, the plaintiffs have alleged only that

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Carter tortiously denied their insurance claim and that he tortiously

made misrepresentations to third parties regarding the plaintiffs'

motivation for filing that claim. Thus, in this case, " 'the "matter[]

presented for consideration [and] the thing[] in dispute," ' " Ex parte E3

Pest Control, 414 So. 3d at 115 (citations omitted), is not Carter's conduct

with respect to the building itself -- as was the case in Ex parte E3 Pest

Control and Ex parte Mullen -- but, rather, is Carter's conduct during the

course of denying the plaintiffs' insurance claim.

That said, we realize that the plaintiffs' insurance claim seeks to

recover insurance proceeds that ostensibly will be used to repair the

building, and it does appear, as the plaintiffs contend, that whether the

building was "vacant" at the time it was damaged will be a factual issue

that must be resolved in this case. However, these facts are not enough

to make the building the subject matter of the plaintiffs' action. As this

Court has previously explained, " 'the term "subject matter," as it is used

in our venue statute and rules, "refers to the nature of the cause of action

and the nature of the relief sought." ' " Ex parte Ambrose, 813 So. 2d 806,

809 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis added; citations omitted). Thus, " '[i]f a

complaint does not allege [that the defendant caused] damage or harm to

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real estate or seek to affect the title to real estate, then real estate is not

the subject matter of the action,' " id. (citation omitted), and the plaintiffs'

complaint does neither of these things. See also Ex parte AU Hotel, Ltd.,

677 So. 2d 1160, 1163 (Ala. 1996) (holding that real estate was not the

subject matter of the plaintiffs' action because "[t]he complaint [could

not] be construed as alleging any injury to the real estate"); Ex parte E3

Pest Control, supra (holding that plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the

defendants' conduct had resulted in damage to the plaintiffs' residence);

and Ex parte Mullen, supra (same). Instead, the plaintiffs have alleged

only that Carter committed various torts during the course of denying

their insurance claim, and the mere fact that the insurance claim

involved real estate, as opposed to personal property, is not enough to

make the real estate the subject matter of the plaintiffs' action. Cf. Ex

parte Ambrose, 813 So. 2d at 809 (noting that " '[t]his Court has held that

real property is not the subject matter of a personal-injury action seeking

damages … in regard to claims arising from a real-estate transaction' "

(quoting Ex parte Nichols, 757 So. 2d 374, 377 (Ala. 1999))); Ex parte Jim

Walter Homes, Inc., 712 So. 2d 733, 736 (Ala. 1998) (holding that real

estate was not the subject matter of the plaintiffs' action, despite the fact

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that "all of the events leading up to the filing of the … action c[ould] be

traced to the conveyance of [the real estate]").

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that, for purposes of Rule

82(b)(1)(B), the building is not the "subject matter" of the plaintiffs' action

against Carter. That holding does not end our analysis, however, because

the circuit court alternatively concluded that the "trespass provision" of

Rule 82(b)(1)(B) applies in this case -- a conclusion that the plaintiffs

contend was correct. As noted, Rule 82(b)(1) states, in pertinent part:

"Actions against an individual or individuals having a
permanent residence in this state:

"….

"(B) Must, if the subject matter of the action
is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or if it is
for recovery or the possession thereof or trespass
thereto, be brought in the county where the real
estate or a material portion thereof is situated."

(Emphasis added.)

According to the circuit court, in this case "[a] trespass [to the

building] occurred," which is "the very event that gave rise to this case,"

and the court reasoned that Rule 82(b)(1)(B) "does not require that a

claim of trespass be made directly against the individual defendant for

[the trespass] provision to apply." The plaintiffs agree with the circuit
26
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court, arguing that "the trespass language in [Rule 82(b)(1)(B)] is

premised upon 'the subject matter of the action,' not the action itself."

Answer, p. 21. In other words, the plaintiffs argue that the "trespass

provision" of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) applies if a case involves a trespass to real

estate, no matter how tangential that trespass might be to the claims

asserted against the defendant. In support of that argument, the

plaintiffs contend that "the word 'it' in [Rule 82(b)(1)(B)] clearly refers to

the subject matter, not the action." Id. Carter disagrees, arguing that

"[t]he trespass component of [Rule 82(b)(1)(B)], under its plain language,

is applicable only if 'the action' against the … defendant is for '… trespass

… thereto.' " Petition, pp. 26-27.

Once again, we agree with Carter. First, even if the plaintiffs'

reading of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) were correct, we have already explained that

the subject matter of their action is not the building, and, thus, it

certainly is not the trespass to the building that was committed by a third

party. More importantly, though, the plaintiffs' reading of Rule

82(b)(1)(B) is not correct. When not otherwise clear, "[a] pronoun …

generally refers to the nearest reasonable antecedent." Antonin Scalia &

Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts § 18,

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p. 144 (Thomson/West 2012). The nearest reasonable antecedent to "it"

in Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is "action," not "subject matter." Thus, by replacing

"it" with its proper antecedent, Rule 82(b)(1), in pertinent part, reads as

follows:

"Actions against an individual or individuals having a
permanent residence in this state:

"….

"(B) Must, if the subject matter of the action
is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or if [the
action] is for recovery or the possession thereof or
trespass thereto, be brought in the county where
the real estate or a material portion thereof is
situated."

(Emphasis added.) In other words, the "trespass provision" of Rule

82(b)(1)(B) is applicable only when a plaintiff's complaint asserts a claim

alleging that the defendant has trespassed upon the plaintiff's real

estate. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that it is

consistent with § 6-3-2(a), Ala. Code 1975, which does not use the term

"subject matter" at all but, instead, straightforwardly provides, in

pertinent part:

"In proceedings of a legal nature against individuals:

"(1) All actions for the recovery of land, of the
possession thereof, or for a trespass thereto must
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be commenced in the county where the land or a
material part thereof lies."

(Emphasis added.) See Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1076 (noting that

"Rule 82(b)(1)(B) was intended to incorporate the pertinent provisions of

the predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2(a) and § 6-3-2(b)"). Thus, because the

plaintiffs have not asserted a trespass claim against Carter, the "trespass

provision" of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is not applicable in this case.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, Carter has demonstrated a clear

legal right to have the plaintiffs' action against him transferred to Mobile

County. Thus, we grant Carter's petition and instruct the Dallas Circuit

Court to transfer the plaintiffs' action to the Mobile Circuit Court.

PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.

Stewart, C.J., and Shaw, Wise, Cook, and Parker, JJ., concur.

Bryan, J., dissents, with opinion, which Sellers and Mendheim, JJ.,

join.

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BRYAN, Justice (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent from the Court's decision to issue the writ of

mandamus in this case to require a transfer of the underlying action from

the Dallas Circuit Court to the Mobile Circuit Court.

In Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d 1072 (Ala. 2024), this Court recently

clarified certain aspects of this Court's precedent dealing with the

provisions of a particular venue statute -- § 6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975 -- and

a related rule adopted by this Court -- Rule 82(b)(1)(B), Ala. R. Civ. P.

We noted: "Frequently, in determining whether the location of real

property dictates the venue of a particular action, this Court has

discussed § 6-3-2(b)(1) and considered both whether the proceeding at

issue was of an equitable nature and whether the subject matter of the

action was the real estate involved." Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1075.

After considering certain pertinent history, we stated:

"[W]e take this opportunity to clarify the proper
standard for evaluating whether the location of particular
real property dictates the venue of an action involving that
property asserted against resident individuals. Pursuant to
§§ 6-1-1(b) and 6-1-2, [Ala. Code 1975,] we conclude that Rule
82(b)(1)(B) governs that issue. As the Committee Comments
on the 1973 Adoption of Rule 82 make clear, Rule 82(b)(1)(B)
was intended to incorporate the pertinent provisions of the
predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2(a) and § 6-3-2(b) to provide a

30
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uniform rule to govern venue for 'specific actions involving
land.' "

Id. at 1076. We further stated:

"Under the clear language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B),
application of that rule does not depend on whether the action
at issue involves legal or equitable claims. Instead, venue is
dictated by Rule 82(b)(1)(B) 'if the subject matter of the action
is real estate, whether or not exclusively, or if it is for recovery
or the possession thereof or trespass thereto.' "

Id.

Thus, the first holding of Ex parte Mullen dealt with addressing the

unimportance of the distinction between legal and equitable claims under

the plain meaning of the language reflected in Rule 82(b)(1)(B). I

emphasize that the main opinion in this case does not discuss this holding

of Ex parte Mullen at all, and it does not appear to be relevant to the

main opinion's analysis.

Therefore, regardless of any impact the main opinion may have on

the prospective application of the other rationale set forth in Ex parte

Mullen, I do not believe the main opinion can be read as disturbing that

decision's first holding in any way, and I would continue to discourage

trial courts and attorneys from relying on this Court's older precedents

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suggesting that a distinction between law and equity is relevant to the

particular venue inquiry presented here.

Having made that initial observation, I next note my agreement

with the main opinion that this action is not one based upon a trespass

within the meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B). "Thus, the remaining question

is whether 'the subject matter of the action is real estate, whether or not

exclusively.' " Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1076 (quoting Rule

82(b)(1)(B)).

Regarding that question, the main opinion quotes from this Court's

decision in Ex parte E3 Pest Control, LLC, 414 So. 3d 107 (Ala. 2024),

which in turn quoted from Ex parte Mullen, in discussing the historical

plain meaning of the phrase "subject matter." In Ex parte Mullen, we

noted that the phrase "subject matter" appearing in Rule 82(b)(1)(B) had

been derived from predecessor statutes to § 6-3-2 dating back to 1876.

Thus, we examined the plain meaning of the phrase "subject matter" in

an effort to follow the mandate that

" ' "[w]ords used in a statute must be given their natural, plain,
ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that
language to mean exactly what it says." ' Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Alabama, Inc. v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d 293, 296 (Ala.

32
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1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp.,
602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala. 1992))."

Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1076. In other words, we returned to the

text of the statute and, in turn, our rule that was derived from the

statute.

We further reasoned:

"The first edition of Black's Law Dictionary was
published in 1891. At that time, Black's Law Dictionary
defined 'subject matter' as: 'The thing in controversy, or the
matter spoken or written about.' Black's Law Dictionary 1130
(1st ed. 1891). At the time Rule 82(b)(1)(B) was adopted in
1973, Black's Law Dictionary defined 'subject matter' as: 'The
subject, or matter presented for consideration; the thing in
dispute; the right which one party claims as against another
.... Nature of cause of action, and of relief sought.' Black's Law
Dictionary 1594 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). The current edition of
Black's Law Dictionary defines 'subject matter' as: 'The issue
presented for consideration; the thing in which a right or duty
has been asserted; the thing in dispute.' Black's Law
Dictionary 1723 (11th ed. 2019)."

Ex parte Mullen, 394 So. 3d at 1076-77.

In both Ex parte Mullen and Ex parte E3 Pest Control, at least some

of the claims at issue in those actions demonstrated that the "subject

matter" of those actions was real estate under the definitions quoted

above. Moreover, the previous cases of this Court cited by the parties in

both Ex parte Mullen and Ex parte E3 Pest Control that had discussed

33
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differing conceptions of the phrase "subject matter" were materially

distinguishable on the facts presented; therefore, those decisions

provided no reason to depart from the plain meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B).

It is at this point that I diverge from the main opinion's analysis.

Rather than adhere to the plain meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B), the main

opinion returns to conceptions of the phrase "subject matter" that appear

to be more narrow than the historical plain meaning discussed above. In

particular, the main opinion states:

" ' " [I]f a complaint does not allege [that the defendant caused]
damage or harm to real estate or seek to affect the title to real
estate, then real estate is not the subject matter of the
action," ' Ex parte Ambrose, 813 So. 2d 806, 809 (Ala.
2001), and the plaintiffs' complaint does
neither of these things."

____ So. 3d at ____. In Ex parte Mullen, we acknowledged this Court's

precedent articulating the proposition quoted above, but we did not

expressly abrogate it because, as already mentioned, the cases cited to

this Court applying that proposition were materially distinguishable

anyway.

However, when presented with another opportunity to consider the

question a few months later in Ex parte E3 Pest Control, this Court again

elected to return to the plain meaning of the text reflected in Rule
34
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82(b)(1)(B). In Ex parte E3 Pest Control, we did not again consider the

proposition from Ex parte Ambrose quoted above, but we did again

determine that certain of this Court's precedents were materially

distinguishable on the facts.

Based on my reading of the main opinion, it is unclear to me

whether the Court regards Ex parte Ambrose or other of this Court's

decisions applying the definition of "subject matter" provided by that

decision as factually indistinguishable from the circumstances presented

by this case. However, to the extent that this case has now presented

this Court with a true conflict between this Court's precedent attempting

to define "subject matter" and the historical plain meaning of the text

outlined in Ex parte Mullen, I would continue to adhere to the text of

Rule 82(b)(1)(B).

As demonstrated above, the plain meaning of the text of Rule

82(b)(1)(B) does not suggest that the subject matter of an action is real

estate only if the action alleges damage to the property or if the action

seeks to affect title to the property. The current edition of Black's Law

Dictionary continues to embrace much of the historical meaning we

outlined in Ex parte Mullen: "The issue presented for consideration; the

35
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thing in which a right or duty has been asserted; the thing in dispute."

Black's Law Dictionary 1730 (12th ed. 2024).

Thus, I now turn to the facts of this case. In its order denying

Woodrow Alan Carter's motion to transfer this action to the Mobile

Circuit Court, it is clear that the Dallas Circuit Court endeavored to

follow this Court's decisions in Ex parte Mullen and Ex parte E3 Pest

Control and to adhere to the plain meaning of Rule 82(b)(1)(B).

In so doing, the circuit court noted:

"[T]he Court finds that [Rule] 82(b)(1)(B) and the opinions in
Ex parte Mullen and Ex parte E3 Pest Control are controlling.
The subject matter of this case, even if not exclusively, is the
plaintiffs' real estate located in Dallas County."

Among other things, the circuit court determined:

"The condition, occupancy, capacity and the manner of use of
the real property are at the core of the plaintiffs' factual
assertions and their legal claims. Also, in his answer to the
complaint, Carter admits that the [insurance] claim involved
real property in Dallas County, and that the basis for the
denial was the alleged vacancy of the building at the time of
the loss."

In my view, this stated rationale by the circuit-court judge is

sufficient to demonstrate that the denial of the transfer motion in this

case does not reflect a situation in which the judge has refused to perform

an imperative duty, such that Carter has a clear legal right to the
36
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issuance of a writ of mandamus by this Court. See Ex parte Jones, 414

So. 3d 86, 88-89 (Ala. 2024).

I acknowledge that the facts of this case are different from the facts

of Ex parte Mullen and Ex parte E3 Pest Control -- both of which involved

allegations that the defendants in those cases owed the plaintiffs duties

arising directly from real property itself. Nevertheless, it is apparent

that the circuit court has determined that the real property at issue in

this case, and in particular whether it was vacant or occupied during the

relevant period, is an "issue presented for consideration" and a "thing in

dispute" in this action. See Black's Law Dictionary at 1730. Although

many other issues and disputed questions are no doubt also presented in

this action, the plain language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) provides that "if the

subject matter of the action is real estate, whether or not exclusively,"

the action must "be brought in the county where the real estate or a

material portion thereof is situated." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, as

we noted in Ex parte Mullen, the language of Rule 82(b)(1)(B) is

mandatory. 394 So. 3d at 1079.

37
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In reaching this conclusion, I would not hold that every action

involving the denial of an insurance claim pertaining to an insurance

contract covering real estate must necessarily fall within the purview of

Rule 82(b)(1)(B). However, based on the plaintiffs' allegations in this

action and the circuit court's evaluation of the disputed questions and the

issues presented for the court's consideration, I do not believe that the

circumstances of this case warrant the issuance of the " 'drastic and

extraordinary' " writ of mandamus by this Court. Ex parte Jones, 414 So.

3d at 88 (citation omitted). In short, it is apparent that the circuit court's

decision to deny Carter's motion to transfer this action was based on this

Court's precedent emphasizing and applying the plain meaning of Rule

82(b)(1)(B). I see no error by the circuit court in doing so, much less a

refusal by the circuit-court judge to perform an imperative duty to

transfer this action.

In concluding otherwise, the main opinion appears to restore a

narrow definition of "subject matter" to this Court's jurisprudence in this

area, limiting that concept to situations in which damage to real property

has been alleged or in which the action seeks to affect title to real

property. Because I conclude that the plain meaning of the phrase

38
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"subject matter" is not so limited and because I believe that, in so holding,

the main opinion undermines this Court's decisions in Ex parte Mullen

and Ex parte E3 Pest Control, I dissent from the main opinion's decision

to issue the writ of mandamus in this case. To avoid the inevitable

confusion to the bench and bar that will undoubtedly be presented by the

main opinion's holding, I would deny the present petition for the writ of

mandamus.

Sellers and Mendheim, JJ., concur.

39