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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Tara Grall v. William Grall and G-Team, P.C.

Supreme Court of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: SC-2025-0346

• Judges: Stewart, C.J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 13, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

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Tara Grall

v.

William Grall and G-Team, P.C.

Appeals from Lauderdale Circuit Court
(CV-24-900070)

STEWART, Chief Justice.

These consolidated appeals arise from a dispute between Tara Grall

and her former husband, William Grall, regarding a business in which

they are the sole, coequal shareholders, G-Team, P.C. ("G-Team"). In

appeal no. SC-2025-0346 ("the first appeal"), Tara filed a notice of appeal
SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

seeking review of several interlocutory orders of the Lauderdale Circuit

Court ("the trial court"). While the first appeal was pending, the trial

court purported to enter a final judgment directing the winding up of G-

Team, from which Tara also filed a notice of appeal -- appeal no. SC-2025-

0357 ("the second appeal"). For the following reasons, we dismiss both

appeals.

Facts and Procedural History

G-Team is an Alabama professional corporation that had previously

done business in Lauderdale County. In March 2024, during the

pendency of the Grall's divorce proceedings and after G-Team had

permanently ceased doing business, William commenced a derivative

action against Tara under § 10A-2A-7.40 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking

to enforce the purported right of G-Team to sell its real property ("the

property") to cover its mortgage debt. Following a hearing in which Tara

asserted that the property could not be sold because it was subject to a

lien from the Small Business Administration, the trial court ordered the

sale of the property. It then set a hearing to determine the proper

distribution of the sale proceeds and to complete G-Team's winding-up

process.

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

Tara, proceeding pro se, subsequently filed -- among many other

motions -- a motion titled "Emergency Motion to Stay May 1, 2025

Hearing Due to Vehicle Safety, Financial Hardship, and Pending Federal

Litigation," and a motion titled "Motion to Recuse Judge Ben Graves for

Judicial Bias, Ethical Conflict, and Material Witness Involvement." The

trial court entered orders denying both motions.

On April 22, 2025, Tara, citing Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., filed a

notice of appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. She described her appeal

as "interlocutory" and requested from the Court of Civil Appeals a stay of

proceedings in the trial court pending appellate review. That court denied

Tara's request.

Despite the pendency of Tara's appeal, the trial court conducted a

final hearing to complete G-Team's winding-up process. On May 1, 2025,

the trial court purported to enter a final judgment. Tara appealed that

judgment to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Civil Appeals

transferred Tara's appeals to this Court based on a lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.

Discussion

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

Although neither party has raised the issue, we must determine

whether this Court has jurisdiction over Tara's appeals before we can

consider the merits of her arguments. See Nunn v. Baker, 518 So. 2d 711,

712 (Ala. 1987) ("[J]urisdictional matters are of such magnitude that we

take notice of them at any time and do so even ex mero motu."). For this

Court to have jurisdiction to consider an appeal, the appeal must be

authorized by statute or the Alabama Rules of Appellate Procedure. See

John Crane-Houdaille, Inc. v. Lucas, 534 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (Ala. 1988)

(discussing this Court's jurisdiction over appeals from certain orders).

Section 12-22-2, Ala. Code 1975, authorizes appeals from final judgments

to the "appropriate appellate court."1 Rule 4(a)(1), among other things,

authorizes appeals arising from certain types of interlocutory orders.

Tara relies on Rule 4(a)(1) as authorization for each of her appeals.

The First Appeal, Appeal No. SC-2025-0346

Tara filed her first notice of appeal on April 22, 2025, before a final

judgment was entered by the trial court. In her notice of appeal, Tara

stated that she was appealing "(1) the trial court's failure to recuse

1A final judgment is one that resolves all claims against all parties.

Jakeman v. Lawrence Grp. Mgmt. Co., 82 So. 3d 655, 659 (Ala. 2011).
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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

despite being a material witness in the underlying matter, (2) the court's

refusal to allow remote appearance notwithstanding substantial evidence

of financial and physical hardship including irreparable harm to the

Defendant … and (3) judicial inaction in upholding clearly established

federal lien priority under 31 U.S.C. § 3713 and UCC § 9-315." None of

these orders addressing those issues qualifies as a final judgment that

would support an appeal. Nor is any of them a type of interlocutory order

from which Rule 4(a)(1) authorizes a direct appeal -- i.e., an interlocutory

order "(A) … granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an

injunction, or refusing to dissolve or to modify an injunction; (B) …

appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver; or … determining the

right to public office." Because Tara's first appeal is not from a final

judgment, and because it is not from a qualifying interlocutory order

under Rule 4(a)(1), we lack jurisdiction to consider that appeal, and it is

due to be dismissed. See Richey v. Morris, 389 So. 3d 347, 348 (Ala. 2023);

see also Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Hum. Res., 999 So. 2d 891, 895 (Ala.

2008) ("[W]e are obligated to dismiss an appeal if, for any reason,

jurisdiction does not exist.").

The Second Appeal, SC-2025-0357

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

Tara filed her second notice of appeal on May 1, 2025, seeking

review of the trial court's purported May 1, 2025, final judgment. That

judgment, however, was entered during the pendency of the first appeal.

The filing of an appeal has jurisdictional implications. Williams v.

Mari Props., LLC, 329 So. 3d 1237, 1240 (Ala. 2020). Specifically, it

divests the trial court of jurisdiction. Id. That is because "[j]urisdiction of

a case can be in only one court at a time," Reynolds v. Colonial Bank, 874

So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003), and, while an appeal is pending, the binding

presumption is that the court with jurisdiction is the appellate court.

Williams, 329 So. 3d at 1240 n.3. The appellate court retains jurisdiction

until it disposes of the appeal, even if it ultimately determines that it

never had jurisdiction to consider the appeal in the first place. See Foster

v. Greer & Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. 1984), overruled on other

grounds by Ex parte Andrews, 520 So. 2d 507 (Ala. 1987). Because only

the appellate court has jurisdiction while the appeal is pending, any

purported final judgment the trial court enters during that time is void.

See, e.g., Etheredge v. Genie Indus., Inc., 632 So. 2d 1324, 1325 (Ala.

1994) (holding that trial court's order entered while appeal was pending

"was a nullity and would not support a notice of appeal"). This Court

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

lacks jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a void judgment. See Honea

v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 240 So. 3d 550, 558 (Ala. 2017).

In this case, when Tara filed her first notice of appeal on April 22,

2025, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction to proceed to a final

adjudication of the matter. Nevertheless, the trial court continued

issuing orders, culminating in its purported final judgment entered May

1, 2025. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter that

judgment, the judgment is void. Accordingly, the second appeal, which

arises from that judgment, is also due to be dismissed. See MPQ, Inc. v.

Birmingham Realty Co., 78 So. 3d 391, 394 (Ala. 2011) (" 'A judgment

entered by a court lacking subject-matter jurisdiction is absolutely void

and will not support an appeal; an appellate court must dismiss an

attempted appeal from such a void judgment.' " (quoting Vann v. Cook,

989 So. 2d 556, 559 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008))).

Conclusion

The first appeal is taken from certain interlocutory orders from

which a direct appeal does not lie. The first appeal is, therefore,

dismissed. Because the judgment at issue in the second appeal was

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SC-2025-0346 and SC-2025-0357

entered while the trial court was divested of jurisdiction, that judgment

is void, and the appeal from that void judgment must also be dismissed.

SC-2025-0346 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

SC-2025-0357 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

Shaw, Bryan, Mendheim, and McCool, JJ., concur.

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