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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

STANLEY WEBB & Another v. GEORGE LEONTIRE.

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-P-1141

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (43)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-1141

STANLEY WEBB & another1

vs.

GEORGE LEONTIRE.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiffs, Stanley and Jacqueline Webb, appeal from a

judgment after a bench trial in the Superior Court.2 We conclude

that the judge properly allowed defense counsel to question the

plaintiffs on criminal matters directly connected to the

defendant's representation of the plaintiffs. We further

conclude that the abundant evidence of the defendant's work

performed permitted the judge to find that the defendant had

fully earned the paid fee. Finally, concluding that the judge

1 Jacqueline Webb.

2"Because these parties share a surname, we will refer to
each by first name." Franchi Mgt. Co. v. Flaherty, 93 Mass.
App. Ct. 418, 419 n.7 (2018).
properly found that the defendant did not act unfairly or

deceptively, we affirm.

1. Cross-examination on criminal matters. "A trial

judge's evidentiary ruling is owed 'great deference' and will

amount to an abuse of discretion only where we conclude that the

judge 'made a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors

relevant to the decision, such that the decision falls outside

the range of reasonable alternatives.'" Commonwealth v. Hinds,

494 Mass. 681, 689 (2024), quoting L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470

Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014). "Ultimately, it is 'a determination

for the judge to make and one which we do not disturb unless, in

our judgment, it is palpably wrong.'" Commonwealth v. Ramos, 63

Mass. App. Ct. 379, 381 (2005), quoting Commonwealth v. Fordham,

417 Mass. 10, 22 (1994).

Jacqueline Webb testified on direct examination that, when

she started at Nutel Communications, Inc. (Nutel), she was a

technician, and "then over time, [she] became a salesperson

attempting to gain new locations to dispense the phone cards.

And then after that, [she] worked mostly in office, where [she]

paid bills and accounting, that sort of thing." To impeach

Jacqueline's testimony that her role at the relevant time was

clerical, defense counsel asked her whether she made $9,000

deposits "to avoid the reporting requirements from the bank."

After the plaintiffs objected, the judge noted that he had

2
"never seen a case like this where a civil litigant who's facing

trial in a criminal matter has testified about the substance of

that criminal case." Consequently, he ruled, Jacqueline had

"open[ed] the door for cross-examination. Counsel is entitled

to inquire about the scope of her involvement with those

enterprises." See Commonwealth v. Quinn, 469 Mass. 641, 648

(2014) ("evidence that otherwise may be inadmissible may become

admissible where the [witness] opens the door to its

admission"). Having previously stated that "the underlying

criminal case is part and parcel to this overall dispute," the

judge ruled that "counsel is entitled to inquire to this witness

about her knowledge of what she was doing in and around the

time, not for purposes of securing a prosecution but to

determine her knowledge of whether she was knee-deep in this

process." See Mass. G. Evid. § 611(b)(1) (2025) ("A witness is

subject to cross-examination on any matter relevant to any issue

in the case, including credibility and matters not elicited

during direct examination"); Nuger v. Robinson, 32 Mass. App.

Ct. 959, 959-960 (1992).

Specifically, the judge stated that he would "allow some

testimony as to the scope of this witness's involvement with

Nutel only as it relates to impeachment of her testimony" and

where it "bears on the issue of what the scope of representation

was, whether a flat fee of the magnitude that was insisted on

3
. . . is appropriate or not, and then the issue of quantum

meruit." See Zabin v. Picciotto, 73 Mass. App. Ct. 141, 151

(2008), quoting Salem Realty Co. v. Matera, 10 Mass. App. Ct.

571, 576 (1980), S.C., 384 Mas. 803 (1981) (factors for quantum

merits include "the complexity of the case, the size of the case

in terms of dollars, . . . the fees usually charged for work of

the kind involved").

After Jacqueline denied making deposits "to evade the

reporting of cash transactions over $10,000," counsel asked her

whether she told her mother to "burn[] all the paperwork as it

pertains to the machines," whether she had personal knowledge

that the State police served her sister with papers, and whether

she had personal knowledge of the execution of the search

warrant at the Webb home. At the instruction of counsel,

Jacqueline refused to answer these questions. Counsel then

stated that Jacqueline "would invoke her privilege as to any

further questioning."3 Ultimately, the judge struck Jacqueline's

testimony.

To be sure, defense counsel's questions were aggressive and

concerning. The judge, however, tread carefully, ruling

"question by question" and reiterating that "as an overarching

3 The plaintiffs did not call Stanley as a witness, but the
defendant did. When Stanley was asked whether he knew about the
valuables in his house, counsel represented that he would refuse
to answer any questions.

4
theme, [he does not] want this trial to get derailed" or to

"stray into that . . . open criminal case." The most troubling

question -- whether Jacqueline structured deposits to evade

reporting requirements -- was answered. The other questions,

about whether Jacqueline instructed her mother to burn paperwork

and whether she had personal knowledge about police action,

attempted to elicit evidence that would rebut her testimony

about her clerical role at Nutel and would explain the scope of

representation. We discern no abuse of discretion or palpable

error in the judge's decision to allow these questions. See

Laramie v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 488 Mass. 399, 413 (2021),

quoting Gath v. M/A-Com, Inc., 440 Mass. 482, 488 (2003) ("A

judge has broad discretion to make evidentiary rulings"); Carrel

v. National Cord & Braid Corp., 447 Mass. 431, 446 (2006) ("We

will not reverse such [evidentiary] decisions unless there is

palpable error").

In any event, the judge's decision to strike Jacqueline's

testimony was correct. "A witness . . . is not entitled to make

a blanket assertion of the privilege. The privilege must be

asserted with respect to particular questions, and the possible

incriminatory potential of each proposed question, or area which

the [opposing party] might wish to explore, must be considered."

Hasouris v. Sorour, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 607, 613 (2018), quoting

Commonwealth v. Martin, 423 Mass. 496, 502 (1996). Once

5
Jacqueline improperly made a blanket assertion of the privilege

against self-incrimination to avoid cross-examination, the trial

judge had no choice but to strike her testimony. See

Commonwealth v. Silva, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 609, 615 (2018).

Accord Commonwealth v. Pixley, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 624, 628-629

(2010).

1. Quantum meruit. Quantum meruit is "an obligation that

arises under quasi contract theory in which an obligation is

'created by law "for reasons of justice, without any expression

of assent and sometimes even against a clear expression of

dissent."'" Liss v. Studeny, 450 Mass. 473, 479 (2008), quoting

Salamon v. Terra, 394 Mass. 857, 859 (1985). "In determining

the fair value of an attorney's quantum meruit recovery, '[t]he

question of what is fair and reasonable compensation for legal

services rendered is one of fact for a trial judge to decide.'"

Hug v. Gargano & Assocs., P.C., 76 Mass. App. Ct. 520, 525

(2010), quoting Malonis v. Harrington, 442 Mass. 692, 699

(2004). "[A]n appellate court will accept the facts as found by

the judge in a jury-waived case, unless shown to be clearly

erroneous, and will accord deference to the judge's

conclusions." Zaskey v. Whately, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 609, 614

(2004), citing Mass. R. Civ. P. 52 (a), as amended, 423 Mass.

1402 (1996). "A trial judge's finding is clearly erroneous only

when, 'although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing

6
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.'" H1 Lincoln,

Inc. v. South Washington St., LLC, 489 Mass. 1, 13 (2022), S.C.,

495 Mass. 484 (2025), quoting Demoulas v. Demoulas Super Mkts.,

Inc., 424 Mass. 501, 509 (1997), S.C., 428 Mass. 543 (1998), and

S.C., 432 Mass. 43 (2000).

In examining a quantum meruit claim, a trial judge "may

look to the terms of the underlying contract to help determine

appropriate recovery." Liss, 450 Mass. at 480. "Other factors

to be considered are the customary ones applicable in measuring

a legal fee: the special skills which may have been brought to

bear, the complexity of the case, the size of the case in terms

of dollars, the caliber of the services, the fees usually

charged for work of the kind involved, the time spent, and the

success achieved." Zabin, 73 Mass. App. Ct. at 151, quoting

Salem Realty Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 576.

The attorney "always bears the burden of proof in any

proceeding to resolve a billing dispute, whether the lawyer

appears as a plaintiff seeking to recover a fee or as a

defendant in a suit for a refund." Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.

Goldstone & Sudalter, P.C., 128 F.3d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1997).

"To satisfy this burden, the attorney must provide 'more than

purely speculative evidence that a client owes a particular

7
charge.'" Bistany v. PNC Bank, NA, 585 F. Supp. 2d 179, 184 (D.

Mass. 2008), quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co., supra.

Here, Attorney Leontire testified extensively to his

reconstruction of the work he performed. From June to August

2017, Attorney Leontire spent over 300 hours preparing for the

impending criminal litigation. He met with the plaintiffs,

called and texted the plaintiffs and the other attorneys, e-

mailed with the plaintiffs and related parties, reviewed dozens

of search warrants, years of tax returns, and other documents

pertaining to Nutel, and researched, "pull[ing] all the gaming

statutes in Massachusetts" and "look[ing] at prior

decisions. . . . that involved the gaming statutes." Attorney

Leontire met with the plaintiffs "pretty much every day," and

testified that "there wasn't a day that went by that [he] didn't

work between 10 and 15 hours every day," and "this was the only

case [he] worked on during this entire period." The

reconstructed accounting, supported by call, e-mail, and text

message logs, outlined all of these hours. Malonis, 442 Mass.

at 699-700 (attorney provided reconstructed invoice not from

contemporaneous time records). Cf. Bistany, 585 F. Supp. 2d at

184 (attorney provided only two affidavits in support of claim).

Attorney Leontire also brought forward an expert, Attorney

James Bolan, who opined that, "[g]iven the nature of the case,

given the issues involved, the risks involved, [the accounting]

8
also seemed quite appropriate," and confirmed that "$600 an hour

is consistent with fees charged for similar work." He went on:

"Mr. Leontire, particularly, performed a substantial amount of

work and that it was within the bounds of what had been agreed

and was appropriate."

The detailed evidence and testimony introduced by Attorney

Leontire provided more than adequate evidence to support the

judge's conclusion that, "under a theory of quantum meruit,

. . . the value of services rendered for the Webbs meets, and

potentially exceeds, the $139,705.26 fee paid by Stanley." See

Hug, 76 Mass. App. Ct. at 526 (judge properly awarded attorney

compensation based on skill and experience, usual fees, time

spent on claim, and other "intangible contributions"). We

discern no clear error.

1. Violation of G. L. c. 93A. a. Standard of review.

"To state a claim under the consumer protection statute, G. L.

c. 93A, § 9, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

establish four elements: first, that the defendant has

committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; second, that

the unfair or deceptive act or practice occurred 'in the conduct

of any trade or commerce;' third, that the plaintiff suffered an

injury; and fourth, that the defendant's unfair or deceptive

conduct was a cause of the injury." Rafferty v. Merck & Co.,

479 Mass. 141, 161 (2018), citing G. L. c. 93A, § 2 (a). "[T]he

9
practice of law constitutes 'trade or commerce' for purposes of

liability under c. 93A." Baker v. Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale

& Dorr LLP, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 850 (2017), quoting Brown v.

Gerstein, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 558, 570 (1984).

"[W]hether a particular set of acts, in their factual

setting, is unfair or deceptive is a question of fact." H1

Lincoln, Inc, 489 Mass. at 13-14, quoting Casavant v. Norwegian

Cruise Line Ltd., 460 Mass. 500, 503 (2011). "Courts must

consider whether the nature, purpose, and effect of the

challenged conduct is coercive or extortionate." Beverly v.

Bass River Golf Mgt., Inc., 92 Mass. App. Ct. 595, 606 (2018),

quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Backleaf, LLC, 60 Mass.

App. Ct. 502, 507 (2004). "To rise to the level of an 'unfair'

act or practice, the defendant's conduct must generally be of an

egregious, non-negligent nature." Walsh v. TelTech Sys., Inc.,

821 F.3d 155, 160 (1st Cir. 2016). "Likewise, a practice or act

is 'deceptive' for purposes of G. L. c. 93A 'if it possesses a

tendency to deceive.'" Governo Law Firm LLC v. Bergeron, 487

Mass. 188, 194 n.13 (2021), quoting Aspinall v. Philip Morris

Cos., 442 Mass. 381, 394 (2004). We review the trial judge's

factual findings in this regard for clear error. Bruno v.

Alliance Rental Group, LLC, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 170, 183 (2023)

("Factual findings underpinning a c. 93A claim are reviewed for

clear error").

10
b. Billing from August 10 to August 20. Late on August

10, 2017, Stanley texted Attorney Leontire, demanding he not

"work on [the] case any further and provide [a] summary of hours

worked." Between August 10 and August 20, Attorney Leontire

requested payment for just over two hours of work that consisted

solely of communications regarding the close of the

representation. Nothing in Attorney Leontire's calculation of

"a de minimus amount of time attributable to communicating with

Stanley and coordinating the production and transfer of

documents to Stanley's new lawyer" reveals any conduct that is

unfair or deceptive. Indeed, upon termination of the

representation, a lawyer has an ethical duty to assist the

client and "take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to

protect a client's interests," Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.16(d), as

amended, 471 Mass. 1397 (2015). See Malonis, 442 Mass. at 700.

c. Posttermination accounting. On August 10, 2017,

Attorney Leontire and Stanley's attorney-client relationship

ended. Any agreement between the two likewise ended, and

Attorney Leontire had no right to recover under the agreement.

Halstrom v. Dube, 481 Mass. 480, 484-485 (2019). See Finard &

Co., LLC v. Sitt Asset Mgt., 79 Mass. App. Ct. 226, 230 (2011),

quoting Boswell v. Zephyr Lines, Inc., 414 Mass. 241, 250 (1993)

("[r]ecovery in quantum meruit presupposes that no valid

contract covers the subject matter of a dispute. Where such a

11
contract exists, the law need not create a quantum meruit right

to receive compensation for services rendered"). Attorney

Leontire was entitled instead to "recover the reasonable value

of his services on a theory of quantum meruit." Malonis, 442

Mass. at 701. Although the plaintiffs' subsequent counsel

threatened suit unless Attorney Leontire sent a "detailed

accounting of the criminal retainer of $139,900.00 and the

remainder of the monies," no accounting was required. Indeed,

Attorney Leontire testified that he never sent the accounting to

Stanley because subsequent counsel "immediately said he was

going to sue me."4 The trial judge reasonably found that

Attorney Leontire's decision to share a reconstructed accounting

through the Office of Bar Counsel complaint process was not

coercive, egregious, or an example of "delaying tactics that

were fraught with deceit, conflicts of interest, breach of

ethical rules of confidentiality of privileged information, and

the wrongful holding back of monies." Grand Pac. Fin. Corp. v.

Brauer, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 407, 419 (2003).

4 Although a prompt and contemporaneous accounting is
expected in an ordinary hourly-rate representation, Attorney
Leontire's expert established that an attorney working on a flat
fee is not required "to keep contemporaneous records." In any
event, "disciplinary rules provide standards of professional
conduct of attorneys and do not in and of themselves create
independent causes of action." Bratcher v. Moriarty, Donoghue &
Leja, P.C., 54 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 115 n.8 (2002), quoting Doe
v. Nutter, McClennen & Fish, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 137, 141 (1996).

12
d. "Nonrefundable" fee. The plaintiffs contend that

Attorney Leontire "acted as if the monies he secured from the

plaintiffs was not refundable," and, therefore, he violated

G. L. c. 93A. Although unlawful billing for a lawyer's services

may constitute a chapter 93A violation, see Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 128 F.3d at 19; Doucette v. Kwiat, 392 Mass. 915, 916-917

(1984); Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802, 809 (1982), the

plaintiffs' contention misses the mark. See also Malonis, 442

Mass. at 701, quoting Salem Realty Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 575

("the right of a client to [change lawyers] has not much value

if the client is put at risk to pay the full contract price for

services not rendered and to pay a second lawyer as well");

Smith v. Binder, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 21, 23 (1985) ("if he

discharges his lawyer, the client is not bound to pay for

services not rendered").

Attorney Leontire testified that he "absolutely" did not

recall Attorney Jose Baez's describing the fee as nonrefundable.

Even though Attorney Jose Baez later sent a letter to the

plaintiff's subsequent counsel stating that "Stanley Webb signed

a nonrefundable fee agreement with the Baez Law Firm for

$250,000," the evidence did not require a finding that Attorney

Leontire "affirmatively adopted" the letter from Attorney Baez

13
through "willful inaction."5 Nowhere does the agreement state

that the fee was nonrefundable.6 To the contrary, the expert

explained that the plaintiffs were not charged a nonrefundable

retainer but a "flat fee, also known as a fixed fee," which is

"what [the attorney is] going to be paid for the case, assuming

[the attorney] make[s] it beginning to end." A flat fee can be

placed "immediately in [the attorney's] operating account"

because "[i]t's earned on payment." The expert further

explained that Florida, where Attorney Baez primarily practices,

"permits a nonrefundable true retainer and a nonrefundable flat

fee, which a lot of lawyers in Florida call a retainer."

In any event, upon Attorney Leontire's discharge, the issue

was one of quantum meruit. Attorney Leontire would indeed have

had to "return the unused portion of the fee that was already

[his]," but here Attorney Leontire had a reasonable belief that

he had earned the entire fee, as evidenced by the fact that the

5 Attorney Jose Baez, along with Attorney Ronald Sullivan
and Attorney Leontire, constituted the Baez Law Firm.

6 The parties disputed whether the agreed-upon flat fee was
$250,000 or $500,000 and whether the operative fee agreement
stated "nonrefundable," but a signed fee agreement without the
word "nonrefundable" was entered into evidence. The trial judge
credited the defendant's and Attorney Sullivan's testimonies,
and found that the fee agreement introduced in evidence was
accurate. A judge's choice between "two permissible views of
the evidence . . . cannot be clearly erroneous." Pehoviak v.
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 56, 65 (2014),
quoting Edinburg v. Edinburg, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 199, 203 (1986).

14
judge ultimately found that he had done so. The judge likewise

interpreted the fee not as "nonrefundable" but as "fully earned

once the client pa[id] it," agreeing that, "if the legal

services were not fully performed and the client terminated the

services, then the [plaintiffs] would be 'entitled to an

evaluation of the quantum merit.'" We discern no error.

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade,
Ditkoff & Toone, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: March 13, 2026.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

15