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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo v. Thiam

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23CA0962

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (7.2K)

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Combined Opinion

23CA0962 Peo v Thiam 03-12-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 23CA0962
City and County of Denver District Court No. 21CR6328
Honorable Ericka F.H. Englert, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Abou Thiam,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE BROWN
Schutz and Berger*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced March 12, 2026

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Solicitor
General and Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-
Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Daniel J. Sequeira, Deputy
State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025.
¶1 Defendant, Abou Thiam, appeals the judgment of conviction

entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of attempt to influence a

public servant and forgery. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In April 2023, Thiam was on probation for unrelated offenses.

As a condition of his probation, Thiam was required to either

maintain or pursue employment. To prove his employment status,

Thiam emailed his probation officer copies of fraudulent paystubs

and gave the probation officer a fraudulent check purporting to

reflect wages Thiam had been paid. For this conduct, the

prosecution charged Thiam with one count of attempt to influence a

public servant and two counts of forgery. A jury convicted Thiam as

charged, and the district court sentenced him to three years in

community corrections.

II. Analysis

¶3 Thiam contends that the district court violated his

constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury by denying certain

for-cause challenges to biased prospective jurors and by allowing

biased jurors to serve on his jury. We discern no error.

1
A. Generally Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶4 Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to trial by an

impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II,

§ 16. “A defendant’s right to an impartial jury is violated if the trial

court fails to remove a juror biased against the defendant.”

Morrison v. People, 19 P.3d 668, 672 (Colo. 2000).

¶5 “Procedures for preventing biased jurors from serving are

critical to the protection of the defendant’s right to an impartial

jury.” Clark v. People, 2024 CO 55, ¶ 2. To that end, section

16-10-103, C.R.S. 2025, identifies several grounds for which parties

may challenge for cause biased potential jurors. Mulberger v.

People, 2016 CO 10, ¶ 9; see Crim. P. 24(b). Of course, a party may

challenge a potential juror for cause based on their actual bias.

§ 16-10-103(1)(j) (“The court [must] sustain a challenge for cause”

based on “[t]he existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing

enmity or bias toward the defendant or the state.”); see also People

v. Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 300 (Colo. 2000) (Actual bias “is a state of

mind that prevents a juror from deciding the case impartially” and

arises from the juror’s beliefs. (citation omitted)), overruled on other

grounds by, People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 27. But “[i]f the trial

2
court determines that a potential juror falls within one of the

statutory grounds for causal challenges,” their bias is “implied by

law,” and the court must also sustain a challenge for cause on that

basis. Mulberger, ¶ 9; see also Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 300 (“Implied bias

arises out of external factors,” such as a relationship between the

juror and a participant in the trial.).1 The party raising the

challenge bears the burden of demonstrating a potential juror’s

disqualification under the statute. Mulberger, ¶ 9.

¶6 In addition to raising challenges for cause, parties may also

exercise a certain number of peremptory challenges, “which allow

‘both the prosecution and the defense to secure a more fair and

impartial jury by enabling them to remove jurors whom they

perceive as biased.’” People v. Abu-Nantambu-El, 2019 CO 106,

¶ 18 (quoting Vigil v. People, 2019 CO 105, ¶ 19); see

§ 16-10-104(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025; Crim. P. 24(d). “Within

1 In this context, “implied bias” is distinct from the concept of

“implicit bias.” Implied bias is bias “attributable in law to a
prospective juror regardless of actual partiality.” People v. Rhodus,
870 P.2d 470, 473 (Colo. 1994) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299
U.S. 123, 134 (1936)). Implicit bias, on the other hand, is “a bias or
prejudice that is present but not consciously held or recognized.”
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/A7Z6-HPLJ.

3
constitutional limits, a party may use a peremptory challenge to

remove a prospective juror without specifying a reason or for no

reason at all.” Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 19 (footnote omitted).

¶7 We review a trial court’s ruling on a challenge for cause to a

prospective juror for an abuse of discretion. People v. Oliver, 2020

COA 97, ¶ 7. This standard recognizes “the trial court’s unique role

and perspective in evaluating the demeanor and body language of

prospective jurors” and gives “deference to the trial court’s

assessment of the credibility of [their] responses.” People v.

Clemens, 2017 CO 89, ¶ 13. A court abuses its discretion when its

ruling is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or it

misapplies the law. Oliver, ¶ 7. To the extent that our review of a

for-cause challenge requires us to interpret the relevant statute, we

do so de novo. People v. Fransua, 2016 COA 79, ¶ 18, aff’d, 2019

CO 96. When reviewing a challenge for cause, we consider the

entire voir dire of the prospective juror. Oliver, ¶ 7.

¶8 Because an impartial jury is essential to protecting a

defendant’s right to a fair trial, any error by the court that results in

the seating of a biased juror is structural and requires automatic

reversal. Clark, ¶ 35. But if “a defendant is compelled to use a

4
peremptory challenge to correct a trial court’s erroneous failure to

dismiss a juror for cause, so long as the defendant receives . . . an

impartial jury . . . , the defendant’s constitutional rights remain

unaffected,” and the error does not require reversal.

Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 20; see Vigil, ¶ 15 (“[T]he defendant’s right to

an impartial jury can be adversely affected by an erroneous denial

of his challenge for cause only if that juror is not otherwise

removed, as by a different challenge for cause or a challenge

exercised peremptorily.”); Clark, ¶ 43 (a trial court’s erroneous

denial of a challenge for cause was harmless when the defendant

used the allotted number of peremptory challenges, the challenged

juror did not serve on the jury, and no other biased juror served).

B. Bias Implied by Law

¶9 Thiam contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenge to Juror B.L. He argues that B.L.’s

bias was implied by law because he was a compensated employee of

the Denver Sheriff Department. We disagree.

1. Compensated Employee of a Public Law Enforcement Agency

¶ 10 A prospective juror is presumed to be biased under the law if

they maintain a relationship with certain individuals that have the

5
potential to influence their decision-making at trial.

Abu-Nantambu-El, ¶ 17. As relevant here, bias is presumed when

“[t]he juror is a compensated employee of a public law enforcement

agency or a public defender’s office.” § 16-10-103(1)(k).

¶ 11 To be a “compensated employee” of a public law enforcement

agency for the purposes of section 16-10-103(1)(k), the prospective

juror must (1) work for a relevant public law enforcement agency;

(2) receive payment from the agency in consideration for that work;

and (3) work under the agency’s direction and control. Mulberger,

¶ 15. “The statute’s plain language makes no indication that it

intends to cover any contractual or other relationships beyond [a]

traditional and direct employment relationship.” Id. at ¶ 16.

1. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying Thiam’s For-Cause Challenge to B.L.

¶ 12 During voir dire, the district court asked prospective jurors to

raise their hands if they worked for a public law enforcement

agency or public defender’s office. B.L. raised his hand and stated

that he was “currently an internal medicine [physician’s assistant

(PA)] at the Denver jail across the street.” In response to the court’s

inquiry, B.L. clarified that he was “a third-party hire through the

6
[Denver Sheriff Department]” but worked “directly” for Denver

Health, was not Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)

certified, did not have the power to make arrests, and did not

investigate crimes. Defense counsel moved to strike B.L. on the

basis that he was “a paid member of law enforcement.” The court

denied the challenge, reasoning that B.L. is “an internal medicine

PA at the Denver jail, he stated he’s not POST certified, does not

have arrest power[,] and his employer is Denver Health[,] so I’m

going to find he’s not a paid employee of law enforcement.”

¶ 13 Defense counsel later asked B.L. if he worked at any other

Denver Health clinics outside of the jail, and B.L. responded that he

was “technically . . . contracted through the [s]heriff’s department”

and that the jail was the only location at which he provided care.

Counsel then asked who supervised B.L.’s work, and B.L. identified

his supervisor as the medical director at Denver Health. He

explained, “[The medical director] has a supervising position for the

overarching sheriff’s organization. That’s technically a physician for

Denver Health. He’s a contractor.”

¶ 14 When asked who directed his day-to-day activities, B.L.

explained, “We are pretty autonomous. I pretty much practice and

7
see my own patients.” Counsel then asked whether the deputies

“ever t[old] [B.L.], you know, go in this room and see this inmate for

that bed and stuff like that?” B.L. answered, “Yeah, normally we

have kites which are inmate requests to be medically seen, but

sometimes at night when emergencies happen, I have to check them

out and make sure they’re stable. If not, send them to the

hospital.” Counsel asked whether such actions would be at the

direction of the deputies, and B.L. responded, “Yes. Or we see

things that maybe the patient is critically ill or needs more

observation.” Counsel asked B.L. if it would be “awkward” if he

served on the jury and voted to acquit and had “to go to work with

the sheriffs the next day,” and B.L. said, “No, no, no, because the

sheriffs are not the ones that are making the charges.”

¶ 15 Defense counsel again moved to strike B.L., explaining, “[I]t

sounds like the sheriffs have some supervisory power over him.”

The court denied the challenge. It acknowledged that B.L. “d[id] get

some direction from the sheriffs and indications on who might need

medical attention” but explained that B.L.’s job was “working for

patients, not working for or against law enforcement.” B.L. sat on

Thiam’s jury.

8
¶ 16 Considering B.L.’s statements during voir dire, we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining

that he was not a “compensated employee of a public law

enforcement agency” for the purposes of section 16-10-103(1)(k).

The record does not contain any evidence that B.L. was directly

employed or compensated by the Denver Sheriff Department. On

the contrary, B.L. stated that he was directly employed by Denver

Health and practiced at the jail only on a contractual basis. See

Mulberger, ¶ 16 (“While . . . private contractors . . . may provide

services to public law enforcement agencies, their lack of direct

compensation or direction from the public law enforcement agency

places them outside of the statute’s scope . . . .”). And although

B.L. conceded that the deputies often informed him when specific

patients required care, he clarified that his work was “pretty

autonomous” and that he was supervised by the medical director of

Denver Health. At most, the record is unclear as to whether B.L.

worked under the Denver Sheriff Department’s “direction and

control.” Id. at ¶ 15. Even so, the other statutory requirements to

presume this category of bias are not satisfied.

9
¶ 17 Thus, Thiam did not meet his burden to prove that B.L. was

biased, and we perceive no error in the district court’s conclusion

that section 16-10-103(1)(k) did not preclude B.L. from serving on

Thiam’s jury. See Mulberger, ¶¶ 9, 15.

C. Actual Bias

¶ 18 Thiam contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenges to prospective jurors that evinced

actual bias against him. Specifically, Thiam argues that Jurors

D.H. and M.M. expressed bias against him due to his prior offenses

and that prospective Juror K.S. expressed bias against him based

on his race and gender. We perceive no error.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 19 A trial court must sustain a challenge for cause to a

prospective juror who has “a state of mind . . . evincing enmity or

bias toward the defendant,” unless the court is “satisfied, from the

examination of the juror or from other evidence, that [the juror] will

render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence

submitted to the jury at the trial.” § 16-10-103(1)(j); see Vigil, ¶ 24;

see also Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 301 (“A potential juror who exhibits

10
actual bias is not, unlike a juror whose bias is implied as a matter

of law, automatically disqualified from serving.”).

¶ 20 Notably, “[a] prospective juror’s indication that [they have] a

preconceived belief as to some aspect of the case does not . . .

mandate exclusion of that juror for cause.” People v. Gulyas, 2022

COA 34, ¶ 19. Instead, if after further examination, the “court is

satisfied that a challenged juror will render a fair and impartial

verdict according to the law and the evidence presented at trial,

then the court should not dismiss that juror for cause.” Clemens,

¶ 15; see People v. Merrow, 181 P.3d 319, 321 (Colo. App. 2007)

(When a “potential juror’s statements compel the inference that

[they] cannot decide crucial issues fairly, a challenge for cause must

be granted in the absence of rehabilitative questioning or other

counter-balancing information.”).

1. Juror D.H.

¶ 21 Thiam contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenge to Juror D.H. because D.H.’s

statements during voir dire evinced bias against Thiam because

Thiam was on probation when he committed the charged conduct.

We disagree.

11
a. Additional Background

¶ 22 During voir dire, defense counsel explained that Thiam was on

probation at the time of the charged offense and asked the venire,

“Is there anybody who would hold it against somebody that they

were accused of a crime while already on probation?” One

prospective juror expressed a sentiment common among several

others, indicating they would “try [their] best” to put the prior

offenses out of their mind and “listen to the evidence and follow the

law” but expressing concerns about how their knowledge of the

defendant’s probation status “would still put a bias” in their minds.

¶ 23 Defense counsel then asked D.H. how he felt about the other

juror’s response, and he stated, “I agree. I can go back to agree that

there’s the presumption of innocence, but there also would be bias.”

Defense counsel clarified, “So for you — you understand [the]

presumption of innocence, but it would be hard to put the bias out

of your head?” D.H. responded, “Hard, not impossible. . . . I mean,

if you give me an order and say don’t consider that, sure.” Defense

counsel concluded, “But you would always have it in the back of

your mind that somebody might have been convicted of a previous

crime?” and D.H. answered, “Yeah.”

12
¶ 24 Following defense counsel’s questions, the district court asked

the venire members to raise their hands if they felt “that [they]

might not be able to be fair and impartial towards the prosecution,

the defendant, the attorneys[,] and any of the witnesses.” The court

observed that none of the venire members raised their hand. The

court also asked if anyone felt they “might not be able to follow the

law for any reason.” The court addressed two jurors who raised

their hands, but D.H. was not one of them. The court then

individually addressed the prospective jurors who had expressed

concerns regarding the presumption of innocence. The court

specifically asked D.H. if he would “be able to follow the law,” and

D.H. responded, “Yes, ma’am.”

¶ 25 Defense counsel moved to strike D.H. because he expressed

difficulty putting aside his knowledge of Thiam’s probation status

and “had trouble with the presumption of innocence.” The court

denied the challenge for cause. The court recalled that D.H. “did

say it would be hard but not impossible” to disregard Thiam’s prior

conviction when evaluating the evidence, but it reasoned that, when

asked directly, D.H. stated that he could follow the law. The court

also noted that D.H. did not raise his hand when the court asked if

13
anyone thought they might be unable to be fair and impartial or

follow the law. D.H. sat on Thiam’s jury.

b. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Concluding
that D.H. Would Be a Fair and Impartial Juror

¶ 26 Thiam argues that D.H. “clearly expressed bias and sincerely

doubted his ability to be fair” and that the district court’s effort to

rehabilitate him was insufficient. Further, Thiam argues that

D.H.’s silence when the court asked all prospective jurors if they

were unable to be fair and impartial merely indicated his reluctance

to admit his continuing bias rather than his ability to set aside his

bias and follow the law.

¶ 27 True, D.H. expressed hesitation about affording Thiam the

presumption of innocence, knowing Thiam was on probation. But

his statements were equivocal. He said it would be “[h]ard, not

impossible,” to set aside the identified bias, adding that if the court

ordered him to not consider the prior convictions, he could do so.

See People v. Fleischacker, 2013 COA 2, ¶ 27 (“It is not necessary

that a prospective juror state with absolute certainty that he or she

will set aside all potential bias.”).

14
¶ 28 After further examination by the court, D.H. explicitly stated

that he would be able to follow the law notwithstanding his initial

indication that he would have a hard time setting aside Thiam’s

prior convictions. See id. (“A juror’s commitment to try to put [their]

biases aside and expression of a belief that [they] can be fair [is]

sufficient to deny a defendant’s challenge for cause.”); People v.

Conyac, 2014 COA 8M, ¶ 15 (“[A] trial court is entitled to afford

considerable weight to a juror’s commitment to set aside biases and

to be fair.”); Oliver, ¶ 11 (“In determining whether a potential juror

can set aside any preconceived notions and render an impartial

verdict, the trial court may consider a juror’s assurances that he or

she can serve fairly and impartially.”).

¶ 29 And when viewed in context, D.H.’s silence in response to the

court’s general questions concerning partiality and the inability to

follow the law corroborated his affirmative statements expressing

his ability to be fair and impartial. See Clemens, ¶ 19 (“[A]

prospective juror’s silence in response to rehabilitative questioning

constitutes evidence that the juror has been rehabilitated when the

context of that silence indicates that the juror will render an

impartial verdict . . . .”); cf. People v. Marciano, 2014 COA 92M -2,

15
¶ 16 (a prospective juror’s silence in response to questioning did not

constitute an affirmative indication of their ability to follow the law

because the record from voir dire did not contain any

counterbalancing information evincing the juror’s ability to be fair

and impartial).

¶ 30 The totality of D.H.’s voir dire does not “compel the inference

that he [could not] decide crucial issues fairly.” Merrow, 181

P.3d at 321. Rather, the record supports the district court’s

conclusion that D.H. could render a fair and impartial verdict. See

Clemens, ¶ 16 (“The court makes th[e] determination of whether a

juror should be removed at the conclusion of voir dire, considering

evidence such as the prospective juror’s response to the counsels’

questioning, the court’s own questioning, and the demeanor and

body language of the juror in the context of the entire voir dire.”).

As a result, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion

by denying Thiam’s challenge for cause to D.H. See id. at ¶ 25;

People v. Young, 16 P.3d 821, 825-26 (Colo. 2001) (the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s challenge for

cause because the juror had been rehabilitated).

16
3. Juror M.M.

¶ 31 Thiam contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenge to Juror M.M. because M.M.’s

statements during voir dire also evinced bias against Thiam for

having prior convictions. We are not persuaded.

a. Additional Background

¶ 32 As part of the discussion about having difficulty setting aside a

defendant’s prior conviction when evaluating the evidence in the

case, M.M. volunteered, “We are analytical thinkers so we recognize

patterns. As much as I would try to do what the judge says and

have an open mind, I know the way my brain thinks. I would

recognize patterns.” Defense counsel sought clarification, asking

M.M. if he meant “[t]hat [it] would be difficult for [him] to put aside

[a prior conviction] in jury deliberation?” M.M. began to respond, “I

mean, if it was a similar probation, yeah, hypothetically. I don’t

know details — .” But the prosecutor interrupted M.M.’s answer

and requested a bench conference. Following the bench conference,

defense counsel asked the venire, “[H]ow would anybody here feel if

they never get to find out the reasons someone was on probation?

Would that be something that you would hold against them?” The

17
record does not reflect that M.M. raised his hand or expressed

further concern.

¶ 33 As noted, after defense counsel finished her questioning, the

court asked the venire members to raise their hands if they felt as

though they could not be fair and impartial or could not follow the

law. M.M. apparently did not raise his hand. And the court did not

address M.M. individually.

¶ 34 Later, defense counsel moved to strike M.M. for cause because

he was “a very analytical person,” “an engineer [who] would see

patterns so it would be difficult for him to put aside the fact that

somebody had previously been convicted of a crime.” The

prosecutor argued that M.M. never indicated that he would not

follow the law. The court denied Thiam’s challenge for cause,

explaining that M.M. “was discussing the hypotheticals if he learned

that Mr. Thiam was on probation at the time. He said that he

recognizes patterns[,] and he said if it were similar, he might have a

difficult time, however, I understood [M.M.]’s comment to be more

general.” The court noted that M.M. did not raise his hand when it

asked the venire whether anyone believed that they could not be

fair and impartial or follow the law. M.M. sat on Thiam’s jury.

18
b. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Concluding
that M.M. Would Be a Fair and Impartial Juror

¶ 35 Thiam argues that M.M.’s statements reflected that he “would

hold the fact of a prior conviction against” Thiam. He also argues

that M.M.’s silence in response to the district court’s general

questions was insufficient to rehabilitate him.

¶ 36 We acknowledge that M.M. expressed hesitation in his ability

to afford Thiam the presumption of innocence upon learning of

Thiam’s prior convictions. But like D.H., M.M. did not

unequivocally indicate an inability to set aside that bias. See

Fleischacker, ¶ 27. Instead, M.M. explained that human beings are

“analytical thinkers” and that, while he “would try to do what the

judge says and have an open mind,” he likely would “recognize

patterns.” See People v. Richardson, 58 P.3d 1039, 1043 (Colo. App.

2002) (finding that a juror’s statements that she was “human” and

that “there [we]re no guarantees,” but she would “give it [her] best

shot” supported the trial court’s denial of a challenge for cause).

¶ 37 True, when pressed, M.M. stated that, if the defendant was on

probation for a similar crime, it would be difficult for him to put

that fact aside when deliberating. But he also stated that he “[did

19
not] know details” of the case and was only speaking

“hypothetically.” By qualifying his comments in this manner, M.M.

revealed his willingness to remain impartial until he heard the

relevant evidence. See People v. Garcia, 2018 COA 180, ¶ 23 (A

juror’s statement that he had “never been in this situation before

[so he didn’t] exactly know” established that he “took the duty to be

objective quite seriously.”). And when defense counsel asked

whether anyone would hold it against Thiam if they never found out

why he was on probation, M.M. did not raise his hand.

¶ 38 M.M. also remained silent when the court asked if any venire

members felt they could not be fair and impartial or follow the law.

Although Thiam argues that this silence reflects M.M.’s reluctance

to speak up, the context suggests otherwise. M.M. participated

actively in voir dire, offering his views about the prior convictions,

as discussed, and voluntarily answering another question

concerning relationships to law enforcement. Consequently, the

court could have “fairly attributed [his] silence to [his] willingness to

follow the law as instructed by the court as opposed to a fear of

speaking up.” Clemens, ¶ 22.

20
¶ 39 Viewed in the context of the entire voir dire, we conclude that

M.M.’s statements did not evince bias against Thiam. Thus, we

perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s determination that

M.M. was capable of being a fair and impartial juror and its denial

of Thiam’s challenge for cause. See id. at ¶ 15; see also Garcia,

¶ 21 (“The . . . court was in the best position to evaluate whether

[the prospective jurors]’s ambivalence about his objectivity was

sufficient to indicate bias.”).

1. Prospective Juror K.S.

¶ 40 Thiam contends that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenge to prospective Juror K.S. on the

basis that her voir dire comments reflected bias against Thiam

based on his race and gender. We are not persuaded.

a. Additional Background

¶ 41 During voir dire, the district court asked the venire, “Do any of

you feel you might be disqualified from being a juror on this case for

any other reason?” K.S. raised her hand and responded,

I don’t know if this matters at all. I have been
to [W]est Africa three or four times. My
nonprofit work is in that area extensively. I
definitely have developed biases, both pro and
con, on cultural issues there and differences

21
between cultural issues in Sierra Leone. I
don’t know exactly where he’s from. I know I
have been in western Africa. I don’t know if
that makes a difference or not.

¶ 42 The court asked K.S. if she had ever met Thiam or anyone who

knows Thiam while traveling in West Africa, and K.S. responded,

“No.” The court then asked if K.S. was “willing to set aside what

you know in [W]est Africa and your experiences there and take the

evidence you hear in this trial and apply the law to the facts you

decide as a juror?” K.S. responded, “I’ll do my best.” K.S.

apparently did not raise her hand when the court asked the

prospective jurors if they felt as though they could not be fair and

impartial or could not follow the law.

¶ 43 Defense counsel moved to strike K.S. because her responses

evidenced that “she had certain cultural biases[,] which [counsel]

basically heard as racisms . . . against people from Africa.” The

prosecutor argued that K.S. “said there were pros and cons with her

biases[,] and she said she would put them aside . . . [and] follow the

law.” The court noted that it heard K.S. “say on two occasions she

w[ould] follow the law and instructions from the court.” It denied

the challenge for cause.

22
¶ 44 Later, defense counsel asked the court to question K.S. further

about her “cultural biases.” Outside the presence of the venire, the

court asked K.S. to elaborate:

K.S.: Culturally there are things that happen
there — culturally my line of work that we do,
they have a different moral code in a lot of
ways. They will lie to your face if they think
that’s what you want to hear, but to them
that’s not an issue. They don’t see that as
lying. So when I put together the idea that
he’s still using a translator, I don’t know
whether he’s been here — how long he’s been
here, does he really understand? That’s what
starts to get things weird in my mind. I will do
my best to set it aside, but that’s kind of where
I was coming from.

COURT: What is the work you’ve done in
[W]est Africa?

K.S.: We do micro loans and business training
for at-risk women and vulnerable girls. We
work with women a lot whose husbands are
typically the bad guy, right? They abandon the
women. Women don’t have a whole lot of
rights. So we work with women to provide
micro loans and business training so they can
start businesses for themselves and support
for their families and their kids.

¶ 45 The prosecutor asked K.S. if she would be able to provide

Thiam with the presumption of innocence and hold the prosecution

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to its burden of proof, notwithstanding her preconceived beliefs.

K.S. said that she could, adding,

I get morally conflicted then in a particular
case as to how much did he really understand
about the law. I would like to be able to stand
here and say I’d never take that into account,
but it’s very emotional work that we do and it’s
hard, and like we run up against situations
where the women won’t pay their loans back
because they don’t see that they have to. They
have a different — they don’t understand a
business transaction or they don’t understand
that. We spent a lot of time teaching
accountability, responsibility and stuff. That’s
part of our curriculum. I believe, yeah, I could
do my best to do that.

¶ 46 Defense counsel asked whether K.S. meant “that potentially

people from western African countries are maybe less credible.”

K.S. responded,

Not that. I mean, their hearts are in the right
place. It’s just different culturally. That’s not
looked upon as a bad thing. When you’re lost
or something, you ask somebody for
directions, they will give you directions. It will
be to something totally different, but they don’t
want to be someone who says — they don’t
want to be the person who says I don’t know.
It’s trying to please you. It could be totally not
relevant in this case, but I do know that some
of the issues of lying are different. It’s looked
upon differently.

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Now, stealing, I mean, you know that’s
something that I think is universal. They’ll
borrow from a family member. If a family
member gets a loan, one of the micro loans,
they are obligated to share. It’s just a different
way of doing business.

¶ 47 Defense counsel next asked if Thiam “being a man specifically

from [W]est Africa . . . would be difficult” for K.S., and K.S. said she

did not think so. She reasoned, “I know a lot of really decent men

there too, you know. I don’t want to overgeneralize anything that

way. A lot of women that I work with are not in that situation, but I

do know a lot of men who aren’t that way.”

¶ 48 Elaborating on her concerns with Thiam using an interpreter

at trial, K.S. explained, “[I]t makes you wonder how much he

understands.” She continued, explaining that she was concerned

that Thiam did not “have a grasp of the English language.” She

went on, “I mean, we use translators all the time in our teaching

just because we don’t want anybody to miss anything.”

¶ 49 Then the court addressed K.S., asking whether she

understood that if she was selected as a juror, it would be her job to

“listen to the evidence . . . and follow the law in this case.” K.S.

said, “Yes.” The court asked K.S. if she understood it was not “part

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of [her] job here” to make assumptions about Thiam based on

where he came from. K.S. said, “Yes, I do.” The court asked K.S. if

she could follow the law and be a fair juror in the case, and K.S.

responded, “I think I could.”

¶ 50 Defense counsel renewed her challenge for cause to K.S.,

noting that the charges against Thiam involved allegations “related

to honesty.” The court denied the challenge, explaining that K.S.

said “she could follow the law and be a fair juror in this case” and

that “she understands what the role is here and that she’s not to

make assumptions about Mr. Thiam based on other people she

knew or may have known of.” The court concluded, “[T]he law tells

me that I’m to assume the jurors will follow my instructions. I’m

going to deny the motion for cause.” Defense counsel subsequently

used a peremptory challenge to strike K.S. from the jury.

b. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying
Thiam’s For-Cause Challenge to K.S.

¶ 51 Thiam argues that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his for-cause challenge to K.S. after she made statements

evincing racial and gender bias. Specifically, Thiam argues that

K.S.’s statements (1) that she “definitely” had developed biases for

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and against people from West Africa; (2) that people from West

Africa will “lie to your face”; and (3) that West African men

“abandon the women” show that K.S. was clearly biased against

Thiam.

¶ 52 First, we acknowledge that, out of context, several of K.S.’s

statements could reasonably be perceived as evincing racial or

gender bias — particularly, her statements that West African’s have

a “different moral code,” that they will “lie to your face,” and that

the men will “abandon” their wives. But when considered in

context, K.S.’s statements suggest that, because of the cultural

differences she had experienced, she was concerned that Thiam

may not have understood that his charged conduct was illegal.

¶ 53 K.S. stated that she was unsure “how much [Thiam] really

[understood] about the law.” And she flatly rejected defense

counsel’s characterization of her comments as reflecting a belief

that “people from western African countries are . . . less credible.”

Instead, she sought to communicate that people from West African

countries may view lying differently than people in western

cultures. K.S.’s comments also show her general concern about

Thiam’s ability to understand the trial proceedings given his “grasp

27
of the English language.” K.S. said that because Thiam was using

an interpreter, she was concerned about “how much he

understands.”

¶ 54 Second, even had K.S.’s statements evinced bias, the court’s

and counsel’s additional questioning provided sufficient

counterbalancing information for the court to conclude that K.S.

was willing to be a fair and impartial juror. See Merrow, 181 P.3d

at 321. The court carefully explained that K.S. did not have “to put

all [her] life experience in a box” but that, if she were to be selected

as a juror, it would be her job to “listen to the evidence in this case

and follow the law.” K.S. indicated she understood. K.S. also

affirmed she understood that it was not her job to “make

assumptions about Mr. Thiam and where he comes from.” Finally,

when the court asked whether K.S. could follow the law and be a

fair juror in this case, K.S. agreed she could. See Clemens, ¶ 17 (“If,

after such explanation, jurors no longer hold tight to their

preconceived expectations and instead are willing to apply the law

as instructed by the court, then the jurors are rehabilitated.”).

¶ 55 Considering K.S.’s entire voir dire, we conclude that her

statements generally reflected concern for Thiam’s right to a fair

28
trial rather than negative racial and gender biases against men from

West Africa. Further, the court’s efforts to rehabilitate K.S. were

sufficient for it to conclude that K.S. could set aside her beliefs and

be a fair and impartial juror. See Vigil, ¶ 24; Fleischacker, ¶ 27. On

this record, we perceive no abuse of discretion. See Clemens, ¶ 15.2

III. Disposition

¶ 56 We affirm the judgment of conviction.

JUDGE SCHUTZ and JUDGE BERGER concur.

2 Because we have concluded that the district court did not abuse

its discretion by denying Thiam’s for-cause challenge to K.S., we
need not consider Thiam’s arguments that the error is structural
even though a biased juror did not serve on his jury. See Clark v.
People, 2024 CO 55, ¶ 42 (“[W]hen a defendant uses a peremptory
challenge to correct a trial court’s erroneous denial of a challenge
for cause, ‘so long as the defendant receives both an impartial jury
and the number of peremptory challenges specified by state statute,
the defendant’s constitutional rights remain unaffected.’ Absent
bad faith, any such error that does not result in the biased juror
actually participating on the jury is necessarily harmless.” (citations
omitted)).

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