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March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

IN RE: ESTATE OF ULVANG (CIVIL)

Nevada Supreme Court

• Citations: 142 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 22

• Docket Number: 89422

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.1K)

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Combined Opinion

142 Nev.. Advanre Opinion
•

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF ESTATE OF No. 89422
WILLIAM F. ULVANG.

JAMIE LIPSON,
Appellant, FILED
vs.
ROBERT GETTO, PUBLIC MAR 1 2 2026
ADMINISTRATOR FOR LYON BRO
SU
COUNTY; JOHN R. ULVANG; JEAN H. RT
BY
STARKEY; RICHARD F. GREEN; DEPUTY LERK

HENRY F. STARKEY; SUSAN
KOIVISTO; AND JOHN DOUGLASS
MANN,
Respondents.

Appeal from a district court order determining that a decedent's
living first cousins are the sole legitimate heirs to his estate. Third Judicial
District Court, Lyon County; John Schlegelmilch, Judge.
Affirmed.

Solomon Dwiggins Freer & Steadman, Ltd., and Brian P. Eagan, Alexander
G. LeVeque, and Michael P. Desmond, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Prunty Law, PC, and Jessica C. Prunty, Carson City,
for Respondent John R. Ulvang.

Wallace & Millsap and F. McClure Wallace, Reno,
for Respondent Robert Getto.

Woodburn and Wedge and Sharon M. Jannuzzi, Reno,
for Respondents Richard F. Green, Susan Koivisto, and Henry F. Starkey.

Jean H. Starkey, Verona, Wisconsin,
Pro Se.
John Douglass Mann, Phoenix, Arizona,
Pro Se.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, EN BANC.

OPINION

By the Court, LEE, J.:
In this appeal, we consider whether NRS 134.070, which
prescribes distribution of the decedent's estate to "the next of kin in equal
degree," requires distribution to the decedent's closest living relatives per
capita, to the exclusion of more remote relatives, or per stirpes, which would
include more distant relations. After the death of William F. Ulvang, the
district court determined that Ulvang's living first cousins were the sole
heirs to Ulvang's estate under NRS 134.070, holding that the statute
required a per capita without representation distribution of the estate. This
resulted in the exclusion of appellant Jamie Lipson, Ulvang's first cousin
once removed, from the inheritance. Lipson now appeals.
We hold that NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without
representation distribution scheme. In doing so, we recognize the
continuing validity of In re McKay's Estate, 43 Nev. 114, 184 P. 305 (1919),
which informs our analysis. Moreover, our holding accords with the
principles of civil intestacy law and traditional principles of statutory
construction, which lead to the same result. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
William F. Ulvang, a Lyon County resident, died intestate in

2023, leaving an estate with an estimated value of $32 million. Ulvang was
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predeceased by his wife and had no children. The Lyon County Public
Administrator identified Ulvang's living first cousins as potential heirs of
the estate. The Administrator then requested an order from the district
court confirming Ulvang's living first cousins as the legal heirs of the estate
to ensure proper distribution of its assets. Lipson, the child of one of
Ulvang's predeceased first cousins—his first cousin once removed—
contested this determination. Lipson argued that NRS 134.070 should be
interpreted as providing a per stirpes distribution scheme, which would

allow all of Ulvang's first cousins once removed to also be recognized as
heirs of the estate by right of representation. The district court concluded
that NRS 134.070 plainly and unambiguously requires a per capita
distribution of the estate, not a per stirpes distribution, cutting off Lipson's
bid for heirship. Accordingly, the district court determined that only
respondents,1 Ulvang's living first cousins, were heirs of his estate. Lipson
appeals from this decision.

DISCUSSION
This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de
novo. N. Nev. Homes, LLC v. GL Constr., Inc., 134 Nev. 498, 500, 422 P.3d
1234, 1236 (2018). "When a statute is clear and unambiguous, [this court]
give[s] effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words, and the
primary consideration is the Legislature's intent." Las Vegas Metro. Police
Dep't v. Holland, 139 Nev. 96, 99, 527 P.3d 958, 962 (2023) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This court "avoids statutory interpretation that

1The Lyon County Public Administrator, Robert Getto, is also
identified as a respondent in this case. However, in his answering brief,
Getto takes no position on the appeal and commits to following the court's
decision. Thus, when referring to "respondents," this opinion refers to the
living first cousins.
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renders language meaningless or superfluous" and will "interpret a rule or
statute in harmony with other rules and statutes" where necessary. Clay
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. 445, 451, 305 P.3d 898, 902 (2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without representation distribution
NRS 134.070 provides that when a decedent has no surviving
spouse, children, or immediate family, the estate "goes to the next of kin in
equal degree." This appeal requires us to address whether NRS 134.070
requires a per capita without representation distribution or a per stirpes
distribution. "Per capita" means "by the head or individual" and refers to
taking equally with other children or heirs. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Descent &
Distribution § 58 (2024). If a statute requires a distribution system of per
capita without representation, it refers to a relative's taking, if at all, "in
his or her own right, and not as a representative of a deceased ancestor."
Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Wills and Donative Transfers § 2.4 cmt. j

(1999).
Conversely, to take "per stirpes," or "by root or stocks," means
to take by representation "the share that a deceased ancestor would have

taken had he or she survived the intestate." Am. Jur. 2d Descent &
Distribution, supra § 58. As relevant here, if NRS 134.070 requires a per
capita without representation distribution, then the respondents would
share equally, Lipson to take nothing. In contrast, if NRS 134.070 requires
a per stirpes distribution, then Lipson and other first cousins once removed
will be entitled to take whatever share their parents—the predeceased first
cousins—would have taken if they had survived thc decedent.
While NRS 134.070 does not mention the terms "per capita
without representation" or "per stirpes," we conclude that NRS 134.070
requires a per capita without representation distribution. Our holding is
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consistent with the holding in In re McKay's Estate, which interpreted the
statutory predecessor to NRS 134.070 as requiring a per capita without
representation intestate distribution and remains governing law. Our
holding is also supported by NRS 134.070's language directing distribution
to "the next of kin in equal degree," which the Restatement and other

jurisdictions have nearly uniformly interpreted to require a per capita
distribution, and which interpretation aligns with Nevada law addressing
computation of degrees of consanguinity. Finally, we reject Lipson's
arguments that canons of statutory interpretation indicate that NRS
134.070 should, along with similar intestacy statutes, be understood to
require a per stirpes distribution scheme.
The district court was correct in relying on In re McKay's Estate
In its order below, the district court relied on In re McKay's
Estate, 43 Nev. 114, 184 P. 305 (1919), in concluding that NRS 134.070
requires a per capita without representation intestate distribution. We hold
that the district court did not err in relying on McKay, whose outcome
compels a reading of NRS 134.070 under the per capita without
representation theory.
McKay involved a dispute over a decedent's intestate estate
between the decedent's nieces, nephews, and grandniece, who respectively
vied for heirship. Id. at 116, 184 P. at 305. The grandniece requested that
the court decree her to be an heir of the estate by representation through
her deceased mother. Id. at 117, 184 P. at 305. The court considered the
question under Section 259 of the Act to Regulate the Settlement of Estates
of Deceased Persons. Id. at 119, 184 P. at 306. That statute, the predecessor

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of NRS 134.070,2 stated that "[i]f the intestate shall leave no issue, nor

husband, nor wife, nor father, nor mother, and no brother or sister living at
his or her death, the estate shall go to the next of kin in equal degree." See
id. at 121, 184 P. at 306 (emphasis added) (quoting 1915 Nev. Stat., ch. 130,
§ 254(4), at 150).

The court, calculating the degree of kinship, determined that
the nieces and nephews were in a third degree of relationship to the
decedent, and the grandniece was related in the fourth degree. Id. at 122,
184 P. at 307. The court concluded that the term "next of kin in equal
degree" "excludes from the inheritance all kindred not in that degree of
kinship to the intestate" and noted that "[t]his is the established law in all
jurisdictions where the statute . . . is the same or substantially the same as
the statute under consideration." Id. at 124, 184 P. at 307-08. Noting that
this was "purely a question of statutory construction," the court determined
that the statute designated the nieces and nephews as the "next of kin in
equal degree," who "must inherit to the exclusion of the grandniece." Id. at
122, 184 P. at 307. The court elaborated that there was "little room for
construction" and that, because the grandniece was not in an equal degree
of kinship as the nieces and nephews, she "cannot inherit" by "the express
prohibition of the statute." Id. at 126, 184 P. at 308. Accordingly, we
understand In re McKay's Estate as clearly establishing that the prior
statute, which is substantively similar to NRS 134.070, requires a per
capita without representation distribution.
We reject Lipson's argument that In, re Estate of Melton, 128
Nev. 34, 272 P.M 668 (2012), renders In re McKay's Estate outdated. In

2 Compare NRS 134.070, with 1915 Nev. Stat., ch. 130, § 254(4), at
150. The relevant statutory language at issue here is substantively the
same as it was in 1919 when McKay was decided.
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Estate of Melton, the respondent cited McKay in support of its argument
that the definition section of the Nevada Probate Code should not be given

substantive effect and claimed that giving effect to disinheritance
provisions would make estate planning unpredictable. See id. at 46 & n.7,
272 P.3d at 675 -76 & n.7. The court observed that McKay was an
:`unremarkable case" that "merely indicated that a general definition could
not be 'carried into' a specific provision relating to rights of representation."
Id. at 46 n.7, 272 P.3d 675 n.7 (quoting McKay, 43 Nev. at 127, 184 P. at
308). At no point did the Melton court substantively engage with McKay.

Contrary to Lipson's suggestion, Melton does not disturb the
continuing validity of McKay's holding. Lipson provides no compelling
reasons why we should depart from the principle of stare decisis and

overturn our precedent here. Lipson fails to show that the policy
considerations and principles of statutory interpretation used by the McKay
court are no longer sound. See Miller v. Burk, 124 Nev. 579, 597, 188 P.3d
1112, 1124 (2008) ("[W]e will not overturn [precedent] absent compelling

reasons for so doing. Mere disagreement does not suffice." (footnote
omitted)). Thus, the district court did not err in relying on McKay, which
calls for NRS 134.070 to be interpreted as requiring a per capita without
representation scheme.
The meaning of N RS 134.070 is clear and unambiguous under civil
law of intestacy
Our holding that NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without
representation distribution scheme is also supported by the statute's plain
language requiring distribution "to the next of kin in equal degree" when
viewed in light of the civil intestacy laws, as explained by the Restatement
(Third) of Property. This court has often relied on the Restatements to guide
or supplement its analysis. See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Jud. Dist.

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Ct., 125 Nev. 449, 457, 215 P.3d 697, 703 (2009) (stating that the court's
conclusion was supported by the Restatement (Third) of Property).
NRS 134.070 requires distribution "to the next of kin in equal
degree." While the statute does not contain the terms "per capita without
representation" or "per stirpes," the Restatement (Third) of Property
explains that intestacy statutes indicating that a decedent's estate
distribute to his "next of kin" or "nearest kindred" frequently add phrases
like "in equal degree" or "without representation," or both. Restatement,
supra § 2.4 cmt. j. When this happens, distribution is generally to the
kindred lowest in degree and is nonrepresentational, or "per capita without
representation." Id. This is because "[e]ach heir takes an equal share,
because all the relatives who are entitled to participate in the estate will be
in the same degree." Id. Almost without exception, cases that have
considered statutory language similar to NRS 134.070 have held that the
statutes required a nonrepresentational distribution. See, e.g., In re Reil's
Est., 211 P.2d 407, 410 (Idaho 1949); Appeal of Hall, 102 A. 977, 977 (Me.
1918); Douglas v. Carneron, 66 N.W. 430, 432-34 (Neb. 1896): In re Breg's
Est., 73 N.W. 511, 512-13 (Minn. 1897).
Because a statute requiring a per capita without representation
distribution requires determining degrees of kinship, the next inquiry is
how degrees of kindred must be computed. Nevada law requires that
degrees of kindred be computed according to the rules of the civil law. NRS
134.150. The process for computing degrees of kinship in American law
dates back to English judges' interpretations of the Statute of Distribution
of 1670. Restatement, supra § 2.4 cmt. k. The civil law method for
calculating degrees of kinship under the Statute of Distribution involved
counting the number of generations (1) up from the decedent to the
decedent's ancestor who was also an ancestor of the collateral relative, and
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then (2) down from that ancestor to the collateral relative. Id. Under that
computation, a first cousin would be a fourth-degree collateral relative, and
a first cousin once removed would be a fifth-degree relative.3 See id. The
result here is clear: respondents, as kindred in a lower degree of
relatedness, take the decedent's estate on a per capita without
representation basis; Lipson takes nothing.

Traditional principles of statutory interpretation support the
conclusion that NRS 134.070 requires a per capita without
representation distribution
Finally, we dismiss the several theories Lipson advances
suggesting that traditional principles of statutory interpretation and public
policy support a per stirpes reading of NRS 134.070, as none are persuasive.
Where principles of statutory construction are employed, this court may
seek to interpret statutes in harmony with an overall statutory scheme,
Tough Turtle Turf, LLC v. Scott, 139 Nev. 459, 462, 537 P.3d 883, 886

(2023), avoid nugatory renderings or constructions resulting in surplusage,
Speer v. State, 116 Nev. 677, 679, 5 P.3d 1063, 1064 (2000), and infer that
the omission of terms included in one part of a statutory scheme but absent
from a similar statute was intentional, Smith v. Zilverberg, 137 Nev. 65, 72,
481 P.3d 1222, 1230 (2021).
While it is true that courts may seek to interpret a statute in
harmony with a relevant statutory scheme, harmony does not require
sameness. As Lipson points out, the legislature provided per stirpes
language in many adjacent sections of NRS Chapter 134 but did not do so
in NRS 134.070. See Sn2ith, 137 Nev. at 72, 481 P.3d at 1230. In fact,

3Counting up two generations from (1) parent of decedent to
(2) grandparent of decedent, and then down two generations to
(3) aunt/uncle of decedent to (4) cousin of decedent. For a first cousin once
removed, count down once more to (5) child of cousin.
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McKay has been a published opinion for over a century, and the legislature,
despite having many opportunities to clarify that the statute requires a per
stirpes distribution, has never done so. These facts suggest that the
omission was intentional. Cf. N. Nev. Ass'n of Injured Workers v. Nev. State

Indus. Ins. Sys., 107 Nev. 108, 112, 807 P.2d 728, 730 (1991) ("The statutory
language considered by this court in [an earlier opinion] has remained
unchanged and thus it is presumed that the legislature approves of our
interpretation of the provision."). Further, despite arguing that NRS
134.070 should be interpreted in harmony with other statutes to avoid
rendering parts of the statute nugatory or mere surplusage, Lipson
inadequately articulates which provisions of NRS 134.070 will be rendered
nugatory or mere surplusage under a per capita reading of the statute.
Lipson also contends that reading NRS 134.070 under the per
capita without representation paradigm would result in absurd or
unreasonable results and would entitle respondents to an unjust windfall.
A similar argument appears to have been raised and rejected in McKay.
There, the court explained
[m]uch has been said by counsel for appellant of the
injustice of a rule that will deprive appellant of her
inheritance. Even so, we cannot amend the statute.
The policy, wisdom, or expediency of a law is within
the exclusive theater of legislative action. It is a
forbidden sphere for the judiciary, which courts
cannot invade, even under pressure of constant
importunity.
43 Nev. at 127, 184 P. at 309. We find this reasoning persuasive and
conclude that Lipson's arguments as to the absurdity and unreasonableness

of this conclusion are also without merit on these points.
Finally, Lipson asserts that public policy may guide the court's
interpretation of NRS 134.070. Lipson references the Uniform Probate

SUPREME COURT Code (UPC) and California Probate Code as evidence that the modern trend
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is to provide for a per stirpes distribution. This argument is unpersuasive.
The meaning of NRS 134.070 is clear, and because the weight of authority
supports the per capita without representation reading of NRS 134.070, we
see no reason to consult the UPC or California Probate Code.

CONCLUSION
The district court was correct in relying on McKay, which
requires that NRS 134.070 be interpreted as providing for a per capita

without representation intestacy scheme. This conclusion is supported by
reading the statutory language of NRS 134.070 in conjunction with the civil
law of intestacy and by contemporary principles of statutory interpretation,
which compel the same resul.t. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's
decision.

J.
Lee gY-dt•J
We concur:

J.

Parraguirre Bell

A1/44,4
Stiglich Cadish

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