Jump To

Top Caption Syllabus Combined Opinion The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 12, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State ex rel. Fought v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 825
• Docket Number: 24AP-706

• Judges: Mentel

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.3K)

• PDF

Syllabus

The magistrate correctly held that relator has not demonstrated that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in making its findings regarding his "vocational potential" since some evidence supported those findings. We also agree with the magistrate that these facts provide adequate assurances that the staff hearing officer appropriately considered the psychological condition in conjunction with the physical conditions when reaching the decision that relator's permanent total disability application should be denied. Objections overruled. Writ of mandamus denied.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State ex rel. Fought v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 2026-Ohio-825.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Jason B. Fought, :

Relator, : No. 24AP-706

v. : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., :

Respondents. :

D E C I S I O N

Rendered on March 12, 2026

On brief: Larrimer and Larrimer, and Thomas L. Reitz, for
relator.

On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Justin Marshall,
for Industrial Commission of Ohio.

On brief: Barnes & Thornburg LLP, and Samatha Pugh, for
CFA Staffing.

IN MANDAMUS
ON RELATOR’S OBJECTIONS
MENTEL, J.
{¶ 1} Relator, Jason B. Fought, brings this original action seeking a writ of
mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio (“commission”), to vacate
its denial of his application for permanent total disability compensation and to issue an
order granting such compensation.
{¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
this matter was referred to a magistrate of this court. On November 25, 2025, the
magistrate issued the appended decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law,
recommending we deny Fought’s request for a writ of mandamus. The magistrate found
No. 24AP-706 2

that “Fought has not demonstrated the commission abused its discretion in making its
findings regarding Fought’s ‘vocational potential’ since some evidence supported those
findings.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at 24.)
{¶ 3} On December 2, 2025, Fought filed objections to the magistrate’s decision.
After a brief extension of time, the commission and respondent CFA Staffing filed
memorandums in opposition to Fought’s objections on December 29, 2025 and January 5,
2026, respectively.
{¶ 4} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d), we undertake an independent review of the
objected matters “to ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the factual
issues and appropriately applied the law.” We may adopt or reject a magistrate’s decision
in whole or in part, with or without modification.
{¶ 5} Fought first objects to the magistrate’s decision writing, “[t]he Magistrate
improperly held that the Commission was within it’s right as the evaluator of factual
evidence to conclude that there is no vocational preclusion to re-training or skills
enhancement to increases the injured workers vocational potential.” (Internal quotation
omitted.) (Relator’s Obj. at 2.)
{¶ 6} Upon review, we find Fought’s objection without merit. As set forth in the
magistrate’s decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “the commission, as the
exclusive evaluator of disability, is not required to accept vocational evidence, even if
uncontroverted.” State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm., 2015-Ohio-2313, ¶ 14. As such,
the commission, as the expert on vocational evidence, may accept or reject a vocational
report. Id. Thus, the commission does not abuse its discretion if its order is based on some
evidence in support of its findings.
{¶ 7} Here, the magistrate acknowledged that in October 2023, the commission
found vocational rehabilitation services were not feasible for Fought because there was not
a reasonable probability that such services would result in him returning to work.
(Appended Mag.’s Decision at 24.) The commission’s subsequent order denying Fought’s
application for permanent total disability compensation, however, found that Fought does
have the physical capacity to return to light level employment writing there is no vocational
preclusion to re-training or skills enhancement to increase his vocational potential. While
these findings are at odds with each other, the magistrate aptly points out that Fought “does
No. 24AP-706 3

not explain why the commission could not reach a different conclusion in July 2024 based
on the evidence presented with regard to Fought’s application for permanent total disability
compensation. And, indeed, some evidence and sufficient analysis supports the staff
hearing officer’s findings regarding Fought’s ‘vocational potential’ in the July 9, 2024
order.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at 23.) The magistrate highlighted some of the various
medical and non-medical factors, see Appended Mag.’s Decision at 23-25, provided by the
staff hearing officer, which formed the basis for the different conclusion. As such, we agree
with the magistrate that there is some evidence to support the commission’s findings
concerning Fought’s vocational potential.
{¶ 8} Fought also takes issue with the commission’s purported failure “to consider
the psychological limitations noted by Dr. Shuman, when determining that Fought was able
to return to sustained remunerative employment.” (Relator’s Obj. at 8.) The magistrate
correctly noted that Fought’s arguments parallel those made by the claimant, and
subsequently rejected by the Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Urban v. Wano Expiditing,
Inc., 2025-Ohio-3009. The record reveals that the staff hearing officer reviewed and
summarized the reports of Drs. Onamusi, Shuman, and Ravin. The magistrate found that,
like Urban, the staff hearing officer’s reliance on these reports necessarily shows—at the
very least, implicitly—that the staff hearing officer considered the physical and
psychological conditions. “The staff hearing officer identified Fought’s physical and
psychological conditions and relied on reports opining on both the physical and
psychological restrictions.” (Appended Mag.’s Decision at 21.) We agree with the
magistrate that these facts provide adequate assurances that the staff hearing officer
appropriately considered the psychological condition in conjunction with the physical
conditions when reaching the decision that Fought’s permanent total disability application
should be denied. (Appended Mag.’s Decision at 23.)
{¶ 9} Upon review of the magistrate’s decision, an independent review of the
record, and due consideration of Fought’s objections, we find the magistrate has properly
determined the pertinent facts and applied the law. Therefore, we overrule Fought’s
objections and adopt the magistrate’s decision, including the findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Accordingly, we deny Fought’s writ of mandamus.
No. 24AP-706 4

Objections overruled;
writ of mandamus denied.

DORRIAN and LELAND, JJ., concur.

---

No. 24AP-706 5

APPENDIX
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State ex rel. Jason B. Fought, :

Relator, :

v. : No. 24AP-706

Industrial Commission of Ohio et al., : (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Respondents. :

MAGISTRATE’S DECISION

Rendered on November 25, 2025

Larrimer and Larrimer, and Thomas L. Reitz, for relator.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Justin Marshall, for
respondent Industrial Commission of Ohio.

Barnes & Thornburg LLP, and Samantha Pugh, for
respondent CFA Staffing.

IN MANDAMUS

{¶ 10} In 2023, relator Jason B. Fought applied for permanent total disability
compensation in his workers’ compensation claim. Respondent Industrial Commission of
Ohio (“commission”) denied Fought’s application on the basis that he had the physical
capacity to return to employment at a light-work level and consideration of nonmedical
disability factors. Fought now requests a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to
vacate its denial of his application for permanent total disability compensation and to issue
an order granting such compensation. For the following reasons, the magistrate
recommends denying Fought’s request for a writ of mandamus.
No. 24AP-706 6

I. Findings of Fact

{¶ 11} 1. Fought was injured on August 2, 2011 through his employment with
respondent CFA Staffing when he was struck on his right side by a falling box. Fought’s
workers’ compensation claim was ultimately allowed for the following conditions: sprain
rectus abdominis, abdominal wall; abdominal hematoma; lower right abdomen tissue
infection; complex regional pain syndrome type I; somatic symptom disorder; complex
regional pain syndrome of the abdomen; left upper extremity complex regional pain
syndrome; reflex sympathetic dystrophy right upper extremity; reflex sympathetic
dystrophy right face; reflex sympathetic dystrophy right eye.
{¶ 12} 2. Fought underwent several surgical procedures related to his allowed
conditions including multiple procedures related to the placement or removal of spinal cord
stimulators.
{¶ 13} 3. Michael Salerno, PT, conducted a functional capacity evaluation of Fought
on March 16, 2023 and issued a report on the same day. Salerno found that Fought fell
“within the Sedentary Work Classifications for Material Handling Activities” as Fought
demonstrated “decreased dexterity completing fine motor tasks and difficulty with gross
motor activities causing increased pain.” (Stip. at 76.)
{¶ 14} 4. Rita P. Calhoun, MA, CRC, issued a vocational rehabilitation peer review
report dated June 27, 2023. Calhoun noted that in the March 16, 2023 functional capacity
evaluation, “[t]here was no testing that indicated [Fought’s] ability to perform frequent to
constant sitting and use of his upper extremities.” (Stip. at 246.) While acknowledging the
functional capacity evaluation “report indicates [Fought] is functioning in the sedentary
physical demand level,” Calhoun found that “details in the report negate the stated
functional level.” Id. According to Calhoun, a vocational rehabilitation case manager who
was assigned to Fought’s case on May 19, 2023 “opined that Mr. Fought is not a good
candidate for participation in a vocational rehabilitation plan with the goal of returning to
work.” Id. Despite Fought’s indication that he “would like to return to work for personal
and financial reasons,” the vocational rehabilitation case manager found the “totality of his
limitations and symptoms [were] work prohibitive,” and closed the vocational
rehabilitation file due to poor feasibility. Id. In response to being asked whether the
determination to close the case plan was appropriate, Calhoun responded: “Yes, based on
No. 24AP-706 7

the information obtained by the [vocational rehabilitation case manager] and the
documentation provided, [Fought] is not a feasible candidate for vocational rehabilitation
services. Closure of the vocational rehabilitation file was appropriate.” Id. at 247. Calhoun
recommended that the rehabilitation file remain closed.
{¶ 15} 5. A commission staff hearing officer conducted a hearing on October 12,
2023 on the issue of whether Fought’s vocational rehabilitation file should be closed. In an
order issued on October 14, 2023, the staff hearing officer found Calhoun’s June 27, 2023
report and opinion to be persuasive. The staff hearing officer noted Calhoun’s opinion that
the details of the functional capacity evaluation conducted by Salerno “negate the identified
functional level of sedentary.” (Stip. at 82.) The staff hearing officer found sufficient
persuasive evidence to establish that vocational rehabilitation services were not feasible for
Fought because there was not a reasonable probability that such services would result in
Fought returning to work. As a result, the staff hearing officer found closure of Fought’s
vocational rehabilitation file was appropriate.
{¶ 16} 6. Fought filed an application for permanent total disability compensation
(also known as an “IC-2”) on December 7, 2023. Fought’s application was supported by the
August 13, 2023 letter of Aaron LaTurner, Ph.D., and the November 14, 2023 report of
Donato Borrillo, M.D., J.D.
{¶ 17} 7. In the August 13, 2023 letter, Dr. LaTurner stated that Fought began
receiving treatment in February 2014 after the allowance of the psychological condition of
somatic symptom disorder. Though the commission found Fought had reached maximum
medical improvement with regard to that condition, Fought continued to receive behavioral
and supportive treatment with Dr. LaTurner.
{¶ 18} With regard to Fought’s condition, Dr. LaTurner stated that Fought had “a
low frustration tolerance” and was “easily overwhelmed.” (Stip. at 92.) Fought was not
sleeping well and continued to “experience significant variability in his moods.” Id.
Furthermore, Dr. LaTurner stated that “Fought’s pain remains poorly controlled, the focus
of his attention and presentation exacerbating and maintaining his psychological
difficulties.” Id. Dr. LaTurner found that Fought’s “ability to understand, carry[ ]out and
remember instructions, maintain concentration and attention, manage work stressors, and
respond appropriately to supervision, coworkers, or interact with the public would be
No. 24AP-706 8

limited.” Id. As a result, Dr. LaTurner opined that Fought would be unable to engage in
sustained remunerative employment and was permanently and totally disabled as a result
of his allowed condition of somatic symptom disorder.
{¶ 19} 8. Dr. Borrillo conducted a physical examination of Fought on October 30,
2023. In the November 14, 2023 report, Dr. Borrillo summarized the history of Fought’s
injury and treatment and the results of the physical examination. Dr. Borrillo opined that
Fought was permanently and totally disabled based solely on the allowed conditions in the
claim and discussed the impact of Fought’s allowed conditions. Dr. Borrillo stated that the
allowed conditions of reflex sympathetic dystrophy right face and eye and complex regional
pain syndrome type I prevented Fought from performing remunerative employment and
returning to his former position of employment. Due to these conditions, Dr. Borrillo found
Fought was “unable to focus, remain on task, or work one ore more hours without respite.”
(Stip. at 96.) Additionally, Fought was “unable to work at heights, climb, or drive
commercially.” Id. Dr. Borrillo found that the conditions of sympathetic dystrophy right
upper extremity and left upper extremity complex regional pain syndrome limited Fought
to “lifting less than 10 or more pounds.” Id. at 97. Dr. Borrillo stated that Fought was
“unable to perform bimanual labor” and “unable to perform sedentary work.” Id.
{¶ 20} 9. After his application was submitted, Fought was examined at the request
of the commission by three specialists: Babatunde T. Onamusi, M.D., Joshua Shuman,
Psy.D., and James G. Ravin, M.D.
{¶ 21} 10. On January 31, 2024, Dr. Onamusi conducted a physical examination of
Fought with regard to the allowed physical conditions, with the exception of the physical
condition of reflex sympathetic dystrophy right eye. In a commission specialist report
completed on the same date, Dr. Onamusi summarized the history of the present condition,
current reported symptoms, Fought’s subjective report of the impact of the allowed
conditions on activities, and the results of the physical examination. Next, Dr. Onamusi
provided opinions in response to three questions posed by the commission.
{¶ 22} First, Dr. Onamusi found that Fought had reached maximum medical
improvement for each of the allowed physical conditions. Second, Dr. Onamusi provided
an estimated percentage of whole person impairment arising from each allowed condition.
Dr. Onamusi found a zero percent impairment for the conditions of sprain rectus
No. 24AP-706 9

abdominis, abdominal wall; abdominal hematoma; and lower right abdomen tissue
infection. Dr. Onamusi noted that “[t]hese are self-limiting soft tissue conditions that based
on physical examination there are no residual impairments.” (Stip. at 178.) Dr. Onamusi
found a 3 percent impairment for the conditions of complex regional pain syndrome type
I; complex regional pain syndrome of the abdomen; and reflex sympathetic dystrophy right
face. For the condition of left upper extremity complex regional pain syndrome, Dr.
Onamusi found a 3 percent impairment. Finally, for the condition of reflex sympathetic
dystrophy right upper extremity, Dr. Onamusi found a 5 percent impairment. As a result,
Dr. Onamusi found a combined whole person impairment of 11 percent.
{¶ 23} Third, Dr. Onamusi summarized Fought’s residual functional capacity
resulting from the impairment associated with the evaluated physical conditions as follows:
“Sit frequently, stand, or walk occasionally, bend or squat occasionally, and use the upper
extremities for gross and fine motor tasks frequently. [Fought] is capable of exerting up to
20 lbs. force occasionally and is capable of pulling and pushing 5-10 lbs. occasionally.”
(Stip. at 180.) “Based on treatment received, and response to treatment and effects of the
injury on his activities of daily living,” Dr. Onamusi concluded that Fought was “capable of
sustaining remunerative activity in the light work capacity.” Id. In a physical strength rating
form attached to the report, Dr. Onamusi indicated Fought was capable of work in the
physical demand category of light work and referred to the report for restrictions.
{¶ 24} 11. On February 22, 2024, Dr. Shuman conducted a psychological evaluation
of Fought with regard to the allowed psychological condition of somatic symptom disorder.
In a report dated March 5, 2024, Dr. Shuman provided a summary on a number of topics
including Fought’s history of the present condition, review of past treatment, and current
reported symptoms arising from the allowed psychological condition. Dr. Shuman reported
the results of a mental status evaluation, including observed or tested cognition, insight,
and judgment. Dr. Shuman also reviewed and summarized the four functional areas. Next,
Dr. Shuman responded to three questions posted by the commission.
{¶ 25} First, Dr. Shuman found Fought was at maximum medical improvement with
regard to the allowed psychological condition. Second, Dr. Shuman provided the class and
percentage of whole person impairment due to the allowed psychological condition in each
of the four functional areas as follows: for activities of daily living or typical day, a class 2,
No. 24AP-706 10

mild impairment of 20 percent; for social functioning, a class 2, mild impairment of 20
percent; for concentration, persistence, and pace, a class 2, mild impairment of 20 percent;
and for adaptation, a class 3, moderate impairment of 30 percent. From the four functional
areas, Dr. Shuman found Fought had a combined whole person impairment of 23 percent
due to the allowed psychological condition alone.
{¶ 26} Third, with regard to Fought’s residual functional capacity related to the
allowed psychological condition, Dr. Shuman concluded that Fought was “functioning well
enough to work at this time” based on Dr. Shuman’s review of records and Fought’s self-
report. (Stip. at 172.) Dr. Shuman noted that “[w]hile [Fought] struggles with fatigue and
lowered self-esteem, by his self-report, those symptoms only occasionally cause occasional
and [m]ild impairment.” Id. Additionally, Dr. Shuman noted that “[w]hile [Fought]
reported suffering from depressed moods daily, he is able to complete all important
functions of [a]ctivities of [d]aily [l]iving without difficulty.” Id. As a result, Dr. Shuman
found Fought was not prohibited from work due solely to his psychological impairment
previously allowed in this claim with limitations noted on the occupational activity
assessment. In the occupational activity assessment attached to the report, Dr. Shuman
indicated Fought was capable of work with the following limitations: “(1) working no more
than 6 hours per day, 5 days per week due to fatigue, (2) not working directly with
customers due to irritability, and (3) a position that allows him extra breaks when suffering
from pain from his allowed physical conditions.” Id. at 173.
{¶ 27} 12. On March 22, 2024, Dr. Ravin, conducted an ophthalmological
examination of Fought with regard to the allowed condition of reflex sympathetic dystrophy
right eye. In a commission vision specialist report, Dr. Ravin provided a brief summary of
the history of Fought’s present condition, current reported symptoms, and subjective
report of the impact of the allowed condition on activities. Dr. Ravin also summarized the
results of the examination. Next, Dr. Ravin responded to three questions posed by the
commission. First, Dr. Ravin stated that Fought had reached maximum medical
improvement for the evaluated allowed condition. Second, Dr. Ravin found Fought had a
zero percent whole person impairment arising from the allowed condition. Third, Dr. Ravin
found that there was no limitation in functional capacity of the eye and no need for
No. 24AP-706 11

restrictions since there was no finding of impairment. In a residual function assessment
form attached to the report, Dr. Ravin indicated that Fought had no work limitations.
{¶ 28} 13. Having been informed that Fought “was participating in physical activity
outside of what was reported on his application for Permanent Total Disability benefits,”
the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (“bureau”) Special Investigations Department
conducted an investigation and issued a report dated May 29, 2024. (Stip. at 253.) In the
report, the special investigations department provided findings from its review of Fought’s
social media and surveillance of Fought. The special investigations department contrasted
the results of its investigation with Fought’s application for permanent total disability and
medical reports. Based on its findings, the special investigations department concluded that
Fought “actively participated in regular physical activity which was not reported on his
application for permanent total disability nor was this activity reported to examination
physicians.” Id. at 256. According to the report, the “information provided on [Fought’s]
application for permanent total disability and attached examination reports specifically
noted no involvement with clubs or associations, a limited ability to interact with the public,
and painful and limited range of motion in the wrist, elbow, and shoulder.” Id. Though
“[s]ubsequent examinations ordered by the [commission] reported [Fought] had detailed
an inability to leave his house four days a week, no exercise, and no hobbies,” the special
investigations department found that “evidence . . . showed [Fought’s] active participation
in regular physical activity, with the only break in this activity due to health conditions
unrelated to his claim allowances. Id.
{¶ 29} 14. A hearing on Fought’s application for permanent total disability
compensation was held by a commission staff hearing officer on June 12, 2024. In an order
issued July 9, 2024, the staff hearing officer denied Fought’s application for permanent
total disability. The staff hearing officer reviewed the history of Fought’s injury, treatment,
and workers’ compensation claim. Next, the staff hearing officer summarized the reports of
the commissions’ specialists—Drs. Onamusi, Shuman, and Ravin.
{¶ 30} With regard to Dr. Onamusi’s report, the staff hearing officer noted
Dr. Onamusi’s opinion that Fought “was able to return to sustained remunerative
employment at a light level capacity.” (Stip. at 110.) With regard to Dr. Shuman’s report,
the staff hearing officer stated:
No. 24AP-706 12

Dr. Shuman opined [Fought] had reached maximum medical
improvement for the allowed psychological condition and
assessed a 23 percent whole person impairment, based solely
on the allowed psychological condition. Dr. Shuman indicated
[Fought] was capable of working six hours per day, five days
per week, no direct contact with customers due to irritability,
and in a position that allowed extra breaks when suffering
from pain related to the allowed conditions.
Id. The staff hearing officer also noted Dr. Ravin’s opinion that Fought “had no work
limitations due to the condition, right eye reflex sympathetic dystrophy.” Id.
Having reviewed the findings in the commission specialists’ reports, the staff hearing
officer found the specialists to be persuasive that Fought was “at maximum medical
improvement for all the allowed conditions.” The staff hearing officer also found Drs.
Onamusi and Shuman to be persuasive that Fought was “unable to return to his former
position of employment due to residuals from the industrial accident,” but “could
potentially return to work within his restrictions.” Id.
{¶ 31} Because Fought was unable to return to work at his prior position of
employment, but could potentially perform sustained remunerative employment with
restrictions, the staff hearing officer considered not only Fought’s medical impairments,
but his age, education, work record and other relevant nonmedical factors. The staff hearing
officer noted Fought was 46 years of age at that time. With regard to education, the staff
hearing officer found that although Fought had not graduated from high school or obtained
a GED, Fought had obtained a commercial driver’s license, was a certified welder, and was
able to read, write, and do basic math. Though Fought reported not having basic computer
skills, the staff hearing officer found Fought had reported being able to type frequently and
was “able to communicate on FaceBook using his cellular device, including typing and
taking photographs.” (Stip. at 111.) The staff hearing officer reviewed Fought’s work history
from 2003 onward, noting that Fought had performed welding and used basic hand tools
to perform medium-work job activities. Additionally, the staff hearing officer found Fought
had been employed in a supervisory capacity during all his employment and had trained
other workers.
{¶ 32} Next, the staff hearing officer made findings regarding the May 29, 2024
report of the bureau special investigations department. The staff hearing officer noted the
No. 24AP-706 13

argument of the bureau’s counsel that the investigation began because “an allegation was
received [Fought] was participating in physical activity that was inconsistent with what he
reported on his IC-2, and [Fought] did not document that he participated in corn hole
events on his IC-2, nor report his activity during examinations completed by his own
providers or the Commission’s specialists.” Id. The staff hearing officer summarized
Fought’s testimony regarding the findings in the report as follows:
[Fought] testified he began participating in corn hole events
during Covid because it was a way for him to engage with
others and get out of the house. [Fought] testified the events
were in St. Marys and it was a small group of people he knows,
totaling about 15 to 20 people. [Fought] testified the bean bag
weighs about one pound and it is tossed to a tilted board
approximately 27 feet away. [Fought] testified he did not
always participate in the games and that was why he was not
pictured in all the photographs. [Fought] testified some of the
corn hole events he attended, he took the photos that were
posted on FaceBook. [Fought] further testified he did not
participate in Singles events because it was too much walking.
He explained he played on a team with one other person
because he did not have to walk back and forth between the
corn hole boards. [Fought] further testified each game lasted
about eight to 10 minutes, he was able to sit for a minute if he
needed to rest, and there were three games in a tournament.
Id.
{¶ 33} Having noted the report and reviewed Fought’s testimony, the staff hearing
officer found Fought “did not provide a sufficient reason for not disclosing his corn hole
hobby.” (Stip. at 111.) The staff hearing officer found Fought “was not forthcoming about
extent of his corn hole activity to the Commission or to the Commission Specialists.” Id.
Stating that “the evidence contained in the Report inconsistent with what [Fought] reported
to the Commission Specialists and his testimony at today’s hearing,” the staff hearing
officer continued:
The Staff Hearing Officer finds [Fought] reported to
Dr. Onamusi he was only able to drive or ride about 20 miles.
The Staff Hearing Officer finds on pages seven through nine
in the Report, [special investigations] documents pages 351
through 400, a list of events in which [Fought] participated.
The Staff Hearing Officer finds the events were held in the
following Ohio cities: Bellefontaine, New Bremen,
Wapakoneta, Lima, Huber Heights, Rockford, Tiffin, Mt.
No. 24AP-706 14

Cory, and Celina. Additionally, [Fought] participated in a corn
hole tournament in Brighton, Michigan. Furthermore, the
Staff Hearing Officer finds [Fought] was evaluated by Dr.
Ravin in Toledo on [March 22, 2024] and attended the
Brighton, Michigan event the next day, on [March 23, 2024],
but reported to Dr. Ravin, he did not have any hobbies.
The Staff Hearing Officer finds [Fought] testified he did not
participate in Singles events because it was too much walking.
However, the Staff Hearing Officer finds page 48 of 50, SIU
documents pages 201 through 250 and page 32 of 50, SIU
documents 301 through 350, demonstrated [Fought]
participated in Singles events.
The Staff Hearing Officer finds [Fought] reported to
Dr. Onamusi on [January 31, 2024] he did not have any
hobbies, but the Report documented [Fought] participated in
a corn hole event the evening of [January 31, 2024] and before
the examination by Dr. Onamusi, on [January 29, 2024]. The
Staff Hearing Officer finds [Fought] told Dr. Shuman on
[February 22, 2024], he visited with friends frequently. Dr.
Shuman quoted [Fought], “ ‘I go to the bowling alley and
watch them bowl, but I hardly ever leave the house.’ ” The Staff
Hearing Officer finds [Fought] was at a corn hole event on
[February 20, 2024], [February 22, 2024] and [February 24,
2024].
(Stip. at 111-12.)
{¶ 34} Next, the staff hearing officer summarized Fought’s testimony with regard to
his complex regional pain syndrome. Fought testified that he had “good days and bad days,”
with his ability level depending on whether his complex regional pain syndrome was flaring
up. (Stip. at 112.) On good days, Fought was “able to engage in activities around the house,
such as house cleaning and doing dishes.” Id. On bad days, Fought stated he “usually ends
up in the emergency room due to loss of blood.” Id. Fought explained he “usually stays on
the couch when he is having a bad day” and estimated he had “about 15 bad days each
month.” Id.
rehabilitation services several times but never participated in services. A 2013 vocational
rehabilitation closure report reflected case closure due to “lack of support from the
physician of record.” Id. Another closure in 2014 was due to “medical instability.” Id.
Finally, the staff hearing officer noted the 2023 commission order finding vocational
rehabilitation services were not feasible for Fought.
No. 24AP-706 15

{¶ 35} Next, the staff hearing officer analyzed and weighed the nonmedical factors.
First, the staff hearing officer found Fought’s age was a positive factor, as he had “many
productive years during which he could be involved in sustained remunerative
employment, even on a part-time basis.” (Stip. at 112.) Second, education was found to be
a neutral factor based on a finding that Fought had “sufficient basic skills for entry level
employment and the capacity to acquire new job skills either through retraining or on-the-
job training.” Id. The staff hearing officer noted Fought’s computer skills based on his
ability to “type and upload photos to the Internet.” Id. Further, the staff hearing officer
noted Fought’s communication skills based on his prior employment in a supervisory
capacity, as well as a finding that “many of the screen shots contained in the Report of
Investigation demonstrated [Fought’s] responsiveness to others and his ability to relay
information.” Id.
{¶ 36} Third, Fought’s employment history was found to be a neutral factor since
Fought’s employment was “not varied” but did include employment in a supervisory
capacity throughout his employment history. (Stip. at 112.) The staff hearing officer found
Fought “would have developed skills to coordinate tasks, delegate responsibilities, monitor
progress and assess the quality of the job performance by others.” Id. Fought also “would
have developed leadership skills and had the ability to motivate and empower others,
facilitate and manage group interactions and communicate effectively with others to
achieve goals and activities.” Id. Noting Fought’s history training other employees, the staff
hearing officer found Fought “would have developed skills to help others gain knowledge
and learn new things.” Id. at 113.
{¶ 37} In conclusion, the staff hearing officer found “sufficient persuasive evidence
to support [Fought] has the physical capacity to return to light level employment, and his
education and work history are assets rather than barriers to performing work at a light
level.” Id. The staff hearing officer also concluded there was “no vocational preclusion to
re-training or skills enhancement to increase [Fought’s] vocational potential.” Id. As a
result of these findings, the staff hearing officer denied Fought’s application for permanent
total disability compensation.
{¶ 38} 15. Fought filed a request for reconsideration of the July 9, 2024 staff hearing
officer’s order.
No. 24AP-706 16

{¶ 39} 16. On August 9, 2024, the commission issued an order denying Fought’s
request for reconsideration.
{¶ 40} 17. Fought commenced this action in mandamus with the filing of his
complaint on November 26, 2024.

II. Discussion and Conclusions of Law

{¶ 41} Fought asserts entitlement to a writ of mandamus ordering the commission
to vacate its denial of his application for permanent total disability compensation and to
issue an order awarding him such compensation. In the alternative, Fought requests a writ
of mandamus remanding this matter for further proceedings before the commission in
accordance with law.

A. Requirements for Mandamus

{¶ 42} In order for this court to issue a writ of mandamus as a remedy from a
determination of the commission, Fought must establish a clear legal right to the requested
relief, that the commission has a clear legal duty to provide such relief, and the lack of an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm.,
11 Ohio St.2d 141 (1967). “A writ of mandamus may lie when there is a legal basis to compel
the commission to perform its duties under the law or when the commission has abused its
discretion in carrying out its duties.” State ex rel. Cassens Corp. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio,
2024-Ohio-526, ¶ 10.
{¶ 43} With regard to legal questions, a writ of mandamus “ ‘may issue against the
Industrial Commission if the commission has incorrectly interpreted Ohio law.’ ” Id.,
quoting State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio St.2d 64, 65 (1975). With regard
to factual determinations, where there is no evidence upon which the commission could
have based its factual determination, the commission has abused its discretion and the
issuance of a writ of mandamus is appropriate. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm., 68 Ohio
St.2d 165, 167 (1981). See State ex rel. Johnson v. Indus. Comm., 11 Ohio App.3d 22, 23
(10th Dist.1983) (“For more than fifty years, the ‘some-evidence’ rule, although not always
referred to by that name, has been recognized as the rule to be applied in determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion with respect to factual matters.”).
Furthermore, in all matters affecting the rights and obligations of the claimant or employer,
No. 24AP-706 17

the commission must specifically state what evidence has been relied upon and briefly
explain the reasoning for its decision. See State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm., 57 Ohio St.3d
203 (1991), at syllabus; State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys. v. Indus. Comm., 71 Ohio St.3d
139, 142 (1994).

B. Permanent Total Disability

{¶ 44} “[T]he purpose of permanent and total disability benefits is to compensate
injured persons for impairment of earning capacity.” State ex rel. Stephenson v. Indus.
Comm., 31 Ohio St.3d 167, 170 (1987), citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus.
Comm., 42 Ohio St.2d 278 (1975). Permanent total disability is the inability to do any
sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed conditions in the claim. See State
ex rel. Schultz v. Indus. Comm., 2002-Ohio-3316, ¶ 61, citing Stephenson at 170; Adm.Code
4121-3-34(B)(1). Compensation for permanent total disability is governed by R.C. 4123.58,
which allows compensation only when one of the following conditions is met:
(1) The claimant has lost, or lost the use of both hands or both
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two
thereof; however, the loss or loss of use of one limb does not
constitute the loss or loss of use of two body parts;
(2) The impairment resulting from the employee’s injury or
occupational disease prevents the employee from engaging in
sustained remunerative employment utilizing the
employment skills that the employee has or may reasonably
be expected to develop.
R.C. 4123.58(C). Work is considered “sustained” under R.C. 4123.58(C) when it “consists
of an ongoing pattern of activity.” State ex rel. Bonnlander v. Hamon, 2017-Ohio-4003,
¶ 15. To be considered sustained, the work need not be regular or daily; rather, it may be
intermittent, occasional, or even part-time. Id.
{¶ 45} Circumstances prohibiting compensation for permanent total disability are
contained in R.C. 4123.58(D), which provides as follows:
Permanent total disability shall not be compensated when the
reason the employee is unable to engage in sustained
remunerative employment is due to any of the following
reasons, whether individually or in combination:
(1) Impairments of the employee that are not the result of an
allowed injury or occupational disease;
No. 24AP-706 18

(2) Solely the employee’s age or aging;
(3) The employee retired or otherwise is not working for
reasons unrelated to the allowed injury or occupational
disease.
(4) The employee has not engaged in educational or
rehabilitative efforts to enhance the employee’s employability,
unless such efforts are determined to be in vain.
R.C. 4123.58(D).
{¶ 46} Adm.Code 4121-3-34 contains definitions, requirements, and procedures for
the adjudication of applications for permanent total disability compensation. Definitions
pertaining to the classification of physical demands of positions of employment are found
in Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(2).
{¶ 47} If the commission finds the claimant is medically incapable of returning to
the former position of employment, but may be able to engage in sustained remunerative
employment, commission must also consider nonmedical disability factors. Adm.Code
4121-3-34(D)(2)(b). Nonmedical factors include: “the injured worker’s age, education,
work record, and all other factors, such as physical, psychological, and sociological, that are
contained within the record that might be important to the determination as to whether the
injured worker may return to the job market by using past employment skills or those skills
which may be reasonably developed.” Id. See Stephenson, 31 Ohio St.3d at 173 (setting forth
the nonmedical disability factors, which are commonly referred to as “Stephenson factors”).
Thus, even where the injured worker is medically capable of employment, permanent total
disability compensation may still be awarded based on the nonmedical disability factors.
See State ex rel. Kidd v. Indus. Comm., 2023-Ohio-2975, ¶ 20.
{¶ 48} Where a claim contains an allowed psychiatric or psychological condition and
the injured worker retains the physical ability to engage in some sustained remunerative
employment, the commission “shall consider whether the allowed psychiatric condition(s)
in combination with the allowed physical condition(s) prevents the injured worker from
engaging in sustained remunerative employment.” Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(i). See State
ex rel. Urban v. Wano Expiditing, Inc., 2025-Ohio-3009, ¶ 26; State ex rel. Guy v. Indus.
Comm., 2009-Ohio-2553, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.).

C. Analysis
No. 24AP-706 19

{¶ 49} Fought asserts the commission’s denial of his request for permanent total
disability compensation was an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, Fought contends
the commission abused its discretion by denying Fought’s application without specifying
his residual functional capacity when considering both his physical and psychological
limitations. In making this argument, Fought relies on a decision of this court that has,
since briefing concluded in this matter, been reversed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. See
Urban, 2025-Ohio-3009.
{¶ 50} In Urban, a worker’s compensation claimant sought a writ of mandamus,
arguing that because his claim included allowed psychological conditions and a commission
staff hearing officer had found him physically able to work, Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(i)
required the staff hearing officer to separately consider his ability to work based on the
combination of limitations relating to his physical and psychological conditions. By merely
concluding that the claimant was able to return to work “with limitations contained in the
doctors’ reports,” the claimant argued the staff hearing officer supplied insufficient
reasoning, especially considering the failure to fully identify the extent of the psychological
limitations imposed in a doctor’s report. Urban at ¶ 24. This court agreed and granted a
writ of mandamus compelling the commission to vacate its order denying the claimant’s
application for permanent total disability compensation and enter a new order adjudicating
the application in a manner consistent with the opinion of this court.
{¶ 51} On appeal, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, finding that although the
staff hearing officer “did not cite Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(i) or quote the operative
language from that administrative rule,” the staff hearing officer’s order “sufficiently
establishes that she considered [the claimant’s] psychological conditions in combination
with his physical conditions before concluding that he could engage in sustained
remunerative employment.” Id. at ¶ 26. The staff hearing officer “expressly identified” the
claimant’s psychological conditions and relied on reports from two doctors, one doctor who
opined on the claimant’s physical restrictions and another who opined on his psychological
restrictions. Id. at ¶ 30. The Court found that the staff hearing officer’s “reliance on those
two reports necessarily shows—at the very least, implicitly—that she considered [the
claimant’s] physical and psychological conditions.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 28. The
Court found that under the facts of the case, there was “sufficient assurance” that the staff
No. 24AP-706 20

hearing officer “considered [the claimant’s] psychological conditions in combination with
his physical conditions in reaching her ultimate decision.” Id. at ¶ 30.
{¶ 52} The Court found that none of the reasons cited by this court supported
vacating the staff hearing officer’s order and issuing a new one. Despite the fact that the
staff hearing officer’s order identified some, but not all, of the work restrictions identified
in the psychological specialist’s report, the Court relied on the boilerplate1 statement in the
staff hearing officer’s order that “ ‘[a]ll of the evidence was reviewed and considered in
rendering th[e] decision.’ ” (Brackets in original.) Id. at ¶ 35. Given “presumptions of
regularity and of consideration of all the evidence,” the Court accepted the staff hearing
officer’s statement and explicitly refrained from “speculat[ing] as to why [the staff hearing
officer] did not recite each restriction identified in [the psychological specialist’s] report.”
Id. As a result, the Court reversed this court’s judgment and denied the writ.
{¶ 53} In this case, Fought acknowledges that the commission relied upon the
reports of its specialists—Drs. Onamusi, Shuman, and Ravin. Yet, Fought argues that the
staff hearing officer “did not elaborate on how Fought’s psychological conditions would
affect his physical work limitations.” (Fought’s Brief at 15.) Fought further contends that
the staff hearing officer failed to “indicate how Dr. Shuman’s limitations (fatigue, 30-hour
work week, not [sic] interaction with public and rest breaks) are considered” in denying the
application. Id. Fought asserts the staff hearing officer’s conclusion runs afoul of Adm.Code
4121-3-34(D)(3)(i) by failing to acknowledge the psychological limitations set forth by Dr.
Shuman. These arguments parallel those made by the claimant and rejected by the
Supreme Court of Ohio in Urban.
{¶ 54} The staff hearing officer’s order in this matter identified Fought’s allowed
physical and psychological conditions, reviewed the history of Fought’s claim and
treatment, and then summarized the reports of the commission’s specialists. With regard
to the allowed physical conditions, the staff hearing officer summarized the reports of
Drs. Onamusi and Ravin. The staff hearing officer noted Dr. Ravin’s opinion that Fought

1 See State ex rel. Donohoe v. Indus. Comm., 2011-Ohio-5798, ¶ 17 (affirming this court’s decision to return a

matter to the commission for clarification and consideration of all evidence because, despite a boilerplate
statement that “ ‘all evidence was reviewed and considered,’ . . . other language in the order cast doubt on the
true extent of evidentiary review,” and stating that “[a]n order that can engender two viable, yet irreconcilable,
interpretations is too ambiguous to withstand scrutiny”).
No. 24AP-706 21

had reached maximum medical improvement and had no work limitations related to the
reviewed allowed physical condition of right eye reflex sympathetic dystrophy. As to
Dr. Onamusi’s report, which addressed the remaining allowed physical conditions, the staff
hearing officer noted Dr. Onamusi’s opinion that Fought had reached maximum medical
improvement and was able to return to work, with the restriction that such work be within
the physical demand category of light work.
{¶ 55} The staff hearing officer also addressed Dr. Shuman’s report on Fought’s
allowed psychological condition. The staff hearing officer summarized some of
Dr. Shuman’s findings, including with regard to the four functional areas. For example, the
staff hearing officer noted Dr. Shuman’s finding that Fought’s “activities of daily living,
social functioning, and persistence, pace and concentration were mildly impaired.” (Stip.
at 110.) Additionally, the staff hearing officer’s order reflects Dr. Shuman’s finding that
Fought had “reached maximum medical improvement for the allowed psychological
condition” and had “a 23 percent whole person impairment, based solely on the allowed
psychological condition.” Id. Furthermore, the staff hearing officer recited each of the
limitations imposed by Dr. Shuman as follows: “Dr. Shuman indicated [Fought] was
capable of working six hours per day, five days per week, no direct contact with customers
due to irritability, and in a position that allowed extra breaks when suffering from pain
related to the allowed conditions.” Id.
Immediately following the summaries of the specialists’ reports, the staff hearing officer
stated that “Doctors Onamusi, Shuman and Ravin are found persuasive [Fought] is at
maximum medical improvement for all the allowed conditions.” (Stip. at 110.) Next, the
staff hearing officer stated: “Drs. Onamusi and Shuman are found persuasive [Fought] is
unable to return to his former position of employment due to residuals from the industrial
accident. Further, they are found persuasive [Fought] could potentially return to work
within his restrictions.” Id.
{¶ 56} As in Urban, the staff hearing officer’s “reliance on [these] reports necessarily
shows—at the very least, implicitly—that [the staff hearing officer] considered [the]
physical and psychological conditions.” (Emphasis in original.) Urban, 2025-Ohio-3009, ¶
28. The staff hearing officer identified Fought’s physical and psychological conditions and
relied on reports opining on both the physical and psychological restrictions. “These facts
No. 24AP-706 22

provide sufficient assurance that the [staff hearing officer] considered [the] psychological
condition[] in combination with [the] physical conditions in reaching [the] ultimate
decision” that Fought’s permanent total disability application should be denied. Id. at ¶ 30.
Moreover, unlike in Urban, in which the staff hearing officer’s order failed to identify all of
the psychological restrictions imposed by the psychological specialist, the staff hearing
officer’s order in this case identified all of the psychological limitations imposed by
Dr. Shuman. This is consistent with the principle that the “commission is required only to
specify the evidence it relied on and to briefly explain the reasoning for its decision.” Id. at
¶ 34.
{¶ 57} Therefore, consistent with Urban, the staff hearing officer in this matter
complied with Adm.Code 4121-3-34(D)(3)(i) by considering whether the allowed
psychological condition in combination with the allowed physical conditions prevented
Fought from engaging in sustained remunerative employment. Fought has not
demonstrated the commission abused its discretion in its determination of his residual
functional capacity in light of both his physical and psychological limitations.
{¶ 58} Second, Fought contends the commission failed to cite some evidence for its
holding there is no vocational preclusion to retraining or skills enhancement to increase
Fought’s vocational potential. Fought argues that the March 16, 2023 functional capacity
report contradicts the staff hearing officer’s finding that Fought is a candidate for vocational
rehabilitation.
{¶ 59} In the October 14, 2023 staff hearing officer order finding closure of the
vocational rehabilitation services file to be appropriate, the staff hearing officer found the
June 27, 2023 peer review report issued by Calhoun to be persuasive. The staff hearing
officer found there was sufficient persuasive evidence to establish that vocational
rehabilitation services were not feasible for Fought. The staff hearing officer further found
there was not a reasonable probability that such services would result in Fought returning
to work.
{¶ 60} In the July 9, 2024 order denying Fought’s application for permanent total
disability compensation, the staff hearing officer summarized Fought’s history with
vocational rehabilitation services. The staff hearing officer noted the October 14, 2023
order finding vocational rehabilitation services were “not feasible based upon the opinion
No. 24AP-706 23

by Rita Calhoun, MA, CRC, set forth in her report dated [June 27, 2023] and the Functional
Capacity Evaluation report, dated [March 16, 2023].” (Stip. at 112.) After reviewing the
medical and nonmedical factors, the staff hearing officer ultimately found there was
sufficient persuasive evidence to support that Fought possessed “the physical capacity to
return to light level employment,” finding Fought’s “education and work history [were]
assets rather than barriers to performing work at a light level.” Id. at 113. Immediately after
this finding, the staff hearing officer found there was “no vocational preclusion to re-
training or skills enhancement to increase [Fought’s] vocational potential.” Id.
{¶ 61} Thus, Fought is correct in noting that in October 2023, the commission had
found vocational rehabilitation services were not feasible for Fought because there was not
a reasonable probability that such services would result in Fought returning to work.
However, Fought does not explain why the commission could not reach a different
conclusion in July 2024 based on the evidence presented with regard to Fought’s
application for permanent total disability compensation. And, indeed, some evidence and
sufficient analysis supports the staff hearing officer’s findings regarding Fought’s
“vocational potential” in the July 9, 2024 order.
{¶ 62} Following a review of the medical evidence relied upon in the commission’s
specialists’ reports, the staff hearing officer engaged in a lengthy discussion of the
nonmedical factors relevant to Fought’s claim. The staff hearing officer made factual
findings regarding Fought’s age, educational history, employment history, and the results
of the bureau’s special investigations department report.
{¶ 63} Weighing the nonmedical factors, the staff hearing officer found Fought’s age
was a positive factor based on a determination that Fought had “many productive years
during which he could be involved in sustained remunerative employment, even on a part-
time basis.” (Stip. at 112.) More importantly, with regard to education, which was found to
be a neutral factor, the staff hearing officer found Fought had “sufficient basic skills for
entry level employment and the capacity to acquire new job skills either through retraining
or on-the job training.” Id. The staff hearing officer also noted Fought’s communication
skills based on his previous employment in a supervisory capacity and evidence obtained
from the bureau’s special investigations department report that, in the staff hearing officer’s
opinion, “demonstrated [Fought’s] responsiveness to others and his ability to relay
No. 24AP-706 24

information.” Id. With regard to Fought’s employment history, which was determined to
be a neutral factor, the staff hearing officer found based on Fought’s prior employment in
supervisory positions that he “would have developed skills to help others gain knowledge
and learn new things.” Id. at 113.
{¶ 64} Furthermore, the staff hearing officer considered the report of the bureau’s
special investigations department, which was completed after the October 14, 2023 staff
hearing officer order finding vocational rehabilitation services were not feasible for Fought.
The staff hearing officer found that found the evidence regarding Fought’s activities
presented in the bureau’s special investigations department report was inconsistent with
Fought’s statements to the commission’s specialists and Fought’s testimony at the
permanent total disability hearing.
{¶ 65} The commission is the expert on vocational evidence and possesses the
discretion to accept or reject a vocational report. See State ex rel. Lacroix v. Indus. Comm.,
2015-Ohio-2313, ¶ 14 (stating that “the commission, as the exclusive evaluator of disability,
is not required to accept vocational evidence, even if uncontroverted”); State ex rel. Jackson
v. Indus. Comm., 1997-Ohio-152, ¶ 14 (“The commission may credit offered vocational
evidence, but expert opinion is not critical or even necessary, because the commission is
the expert on this issue.” (Emphasis in original.)). The commission is also the “exclusive
evaluator of the weight and credibility of the evidence.” State ex rel. Neitzelt v. Indus.
Comm., 2020-Ohio-1453, ¶ 10. Though Fought takes issue with the evidence cited by the
staff hearing officer, particularly the findings regarding the bureau’s special investigations
department report in light of Fought’s complex regional pain syndrome symptoms, these
disputes merely challenge the weight of the evidence. Whether this court would reach a
different conclusion in weighing the evidence is a question outside of the scope of review in
mandamus. See State ex rel. Certified Oil Corp. v. Mabe, 2007-Ohio-3877, ¶ 4 (10th Dist.),
citing State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18 (1987). In sum, Fought has
not demonstrated the commission abused its discretion in making its findings regarding
Fought’s “vocational potential” since some evidence supported those findings.
No. 24AP-706 25

D. Conclusion

{¶ 66} For the foregoing reasons, Fought has not demonstrated a clear legal right to
the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of the commission to provide it.
Accordingly, it is the decision and recommendation of the magistrate that Fought’s request
for a writ of mandamus should be denied.

/S/ MAGISTRATE
JOSEPH E. WENGER IV

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
error on appeal the court’s adoption of any factual finding or
legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(b). A party may file written objections to the
magistrate’s decision within fourteen days of the filing of the
decision.